Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1988 )


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  •                        February8, 1988
    Honorable Chet Brooks          Opinion No.   .I%853
    Chairman
    Health and Human Services      Re: Whether House Bill No. 83,
    Committee                   Acts 1987, 70th Legislature,
    Texas State Senate             p;;riEts   a judge ,from re-
    P. 0. Box 12068                         a   probationer   to
    Austin, Texas   78711          make any payment to a crime
    stoppers organization
    Dear Senator Brooks:
    You ask three questions prompted by a recent amend-
    ment to the Adult Probation Law, article 42.12 of the Code
    of Criminal Procedure.  The enactment, House Bill No. 83,
    related primarily to the continuation of the Adult Proba-
    P
    tion Commission,  but also amended article 42.12.     Acts
    1987, 70th Leg., ch. 939, at 6289. The bill added section
    6(e), which reads as follows:
    (e) A court may not order a probationer
    to make any payments as a term and condition
    of probation, except for fines, court costs,
    restitution of the victim, and other terms
    and conditions    expressly  authorized   by
    statute.
    Attorney General Opinion JM-307 (1985) concluded that
    article 42.12 authorizes a judge to require a probationer
    to make a payment to a private crime stoppers program as a
    condition of his probation when the condition bears a
    reasonable relationship to the treatment and rehabilita-
    tion of the accused and the protection of the public.  YOU
    express concern about the effect of section     6(e) on a
    judge's authority to impose this condition   of probation.
    Thus, you ask the following questions:
    1. Is the 'may notI language used in the
    bill [H.B. No. 831 specific enough to pro-
    hibit ordering payments   to local    crime
    stoppers programs?
    p. 4127
    Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 2   (JM-853)
    2. Since crime stoppers was created by
    the legislature    and is    authorized   by
    statute, is it a    \condition[  ] expressly              -\
    authorized by statute' as mentioned in House
    Bill No. 83?
    3. May a court offer a probationer    the
    choice of making a donation to a local crime
    stoppers organization in lieu of part or all
    of a community  service condition of proba-
    tion?
    your first question may be answered in the affirma-
    tive. Although section 6(e) does not specifically address
    donations to crime stoppers organizations,        it plainly
    prohibits the ordering of payments as a condition           of
    probation except for those payments specified      in section
    6(e) or expressly   authorized by statute. The provision
    operates as a blanket prohibition, subject to the stated
    exceptions.    It   was  therefore    unnecessary   for    the
    legislature to specify the prohibited payments.       Article
    42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, moreover,       does
    not authorize   payments to crime stoppers programs as a
    condition of probation.    Neither does section    351.901 of
    the Local Government     Code   (formerly   article   2372bb,
    V.T.C.S.),  which authorizes  county commissioners  courts  to
    donate money to   crime stoppers  organizations,   or article
    4413(50), V.T.C.S., which establishes the Crime Stoppers
    Advisory Council.    Also, statutory provisions     that are
    negatively expressed, such as section 6(e), must neces-
    sarily be construed as mandatory.    E.Q., Citv of Uvalde v.
    Burnev, 
    145 S.W. 311
    , 312 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio
    1912, no writ): Attorney General Opinion JM-501       (1986).
    Thus, viewed simply as a problem of statutory       construc-
    tion, the language of section 6(e) is broad enough to
    prohibit   the ordering   of payments     to crime stoppers
    organizations as a condition of probation.
    your second question  is whether  donations to crime
    stoppers programs may be required     as a condition   of
    probation pursuant  to section 6(e) since such programs
    are, in your words, "created by the legislature and . . .
    authorized by statute." Our answer to your first question
    makes it clear that section 6(e) does not envision    the
    kinds of payments you inquire about.     A crime stoppers        _,
    program is not created by statute: rather, it is
    a nrivate.  nonorofit oraanizatioq that  is
    operated on a local or a statewide   level,
    p. 4128
    Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 3         Of-8531
    that accepts and expends donations       for
    rewards to persons     who report to     the
    ,-
    organization  information   about   criminal
    activity, and that forwards the information
    to the appropriate  law enforcement  agency.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Local Gov't Code 5351.901(a).       See also V.T.C.S.    art.
    4413(50), 51 (defining "local crime stoppers program" as a
    nprivate, nonprofit   organization . . . operated on less
    than a statewide level," etc.). Section 351.901(a) of the
    Local Government   Code and article     4413(50),   V.T.C.S.,
    acknowledge   the existence    of private     crime  stoppers
    programs   and authorize   certain   forms of governmental
    assistance   to local programs.      Though these statutes
    bestow official imprimatur upon crime stoppers      organiza-
    tions, they do not establish       conditions    of probation
    requiring   or allowing payments     to a     crime stoppers
    organization.     Accordingly,         probation    condition
    requiring a donation to such aa program       cannot, in the
    absence of a more   specific statutory mandate, be said to
    be a "term and condition expressly authorized by statute."
    ,-        Before answering    your final question,     we should
    address an issue implicated by your first two questions --
    specifically, the legislature's authority    to restrict   a
    judge's discretion in setting the terms and conditions of
    probation.   Article IV, section 11A of the Texas Constitu-
    tion is cited as the source of the judiciary's      power to
    determine and set probation conditions.   Additionally, the
    expressed purpose of article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure is "to place wholly within the state courts of
    appropriate jurisdiction   the responsibility   for deter-
    mining . . . the conditions of probationl' in accordance
    with the powers granted to the judicial department by the
    constitution.   Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12,     §l. It is
    firmly established that a trial court in setting condi-
    tions of probation    is not limited to the conditions
    specified in section 6 of article 42.12.    Tames v. State,
    
    534 S.W.2d 686
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Thus, it is argued
    that the legislature may not constitutionally         impose
    restrictions on a judge's discretion to set the terms and
    conditions of probation because   it usurps the powers and
    functions of the judicial department.
    Article   IV,   section     11A     contains   the   following
    language:
    p. 4129
    Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 4   (JM-853)
    The Courts of the State of Texas having
    original jurisdiction  of criminal   actions
    shall have the power, after conviction,   to              -.
    suspend the imposition    or execution    of
    sentence and to place the defendant     upon
    probation and to reimpose     such sentence,
    under such conditions as the Leaislature may
    prescribe.  (Emphasis added.)
    The interpretive commentary   following section 11A    states
    that the provision
    gives to the courts the clear power to sus-
    pend not only the imposition of sentence,
    but also the execution of sentence, to place
    the defendant on probation, and to reimpose
    such sentence,   all under conditions    D -
    scribed bv     the leaislature.     (BmphaEzs
    added.)
    The court's power to suspend sentences      and place
    defendants on probation    is not inherent.    Lee v. State,
    
    516 S.W.2d 151
    (Tex. trim. APP. 1974).        Article   IV,
    section 11A is a limited grant of clemency to the courts
    by the people. McNew v. State, 
    608 S.W.2d 166
    (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1978); Bx oarte Giles, 
    502 S.W.2d 774
    (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1973).     Thus, the legislature may,    in its wisdom,
    circumscribe a judge's power to grant probation in certain
    cases without usurping    the court's powers   and functions.
    m,      Rivas v. State, 627 S.W.Zd 494 (Tex. App. - San
    Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd)     (upholding former Code Crim.
    Proc. art. 42.12,    §3f(a), which  prohibited the grant of
    probation    to defendants    adjudged guilty of       certain
    offenses).     The constitutional    power vested     in   the
    legislature to enact laws includes the right to define
    crimes   and the punishment therefor. pendv v. Wilson, 179
    S.W.Zd 269 (Tex. 1944); EX narte Granviel,     
    561 S.W.2d 503
     (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).      Accordingly,   we believe    the
    legislature may limit the terms and conditions      which may
    be placed on a court's grant of probation without thereby
    usurping the powers and functions of the court.
    Your third question  is whether a judge may offer a
    probationer the choice of donating money to a crime
    stoppers organization  in lieu of    all or part of the
    community service required as a condition of probation.
    Section 6(e) prohibits   a judge from offering    such a
    choice. Accordingly, your third question is answered in
    the negative.                                                    1
    p. 4130
    Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 5         0%853)
    SUMMARY
    Article 42.12, section 6(e) of the Code
    of Criminal  Procedure (as enacted by Acts
    1987, 70th Leg., ch. 939, at 6289) prohibits
    the ordering of payments to a local crime
    stoppers organization   as a condition    of
    probation.  A judge may not offer a proba-
    tioner the choice of making a donation to a
    local crime stoppers organization   in lieu
    of all or part of a condition of probation
    requiring the probationer to perform    com-
    munity service.
    J w  Very truly yo
    kr\,
    J I-M   MATTOX
    Attorney General of Texas
    MARY KELLER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    LOU MCCREARY
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Rick Gilpin
    Assistant Attorney General
    p. 4131