Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1987 )


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  •                                 THE   ATTORNEY             GEXERAL
    OF    TEXAS
    May 26. 1987
    .Jn¶ xxrrGx
    A-Ey          0RSWRa.L
    Honorable Ray Parabee                 Opinion No. JM-709
    Co-Chairman
    Joint Special Committee on            Re: Constitutionality of proposed
    Cogeneration                       statute authorizing state agencies
    Texas State Senate                    to contract for the installation,
    P. 0. Box 12068                       operation and financing of co-
    Austin, Texas   78711                 generation units
    Honorable James E. (Pete) Laney
    Co-Chairman
    Joint Special Committee on
    Cogeneration
    Texas House of Representatives
    P. 0. Box 2910
    Austin, Texas   78769
    Gentlemen:
    As Co-Chairmen of the Joint Special Committee on Cogeneration,
    you ask whether article III, section 49, of the Texas Constitution
    prohibits contracts between state agencies and third-party vendors for
    the installation, operation, and financing of cogeneration units to be
    repaid over a period of years from energy savings. You indicate that
    the coemittee intends to recommend legislation authorizing state
    agencies to enter into such contracts. Your concern is that article
    III, section 49, a section that prohibits the state from creating debt
    or authorizing the creation of debt on behalf of the state, prevents
    such contracts.
    Section 49 of article III provides:
    No debt shall be created by or on behalf of the
    State, except to supply casual deficiencies of
    revenue, repel invasion, suppress insurrection.
    defend the State in war, or pay existing debt; and
    the debt created to supply deficiencies in the
    revenue, shall never exceed in the aggregate at
    any one time two hundred thousand dollars.
    Tex. Const. art. III, 549. A history of controversy surrounds this
    provision. See generally Attorney General Opinion JR-666 (1987). It
    is not necessary to repeat that history in detail here.
    The Texas Supreme Court has consistently upheld methods of
    avoiding this constitutional prohibition which involve the issuance of
    p. 3277
    Honorable Ray Farabee
    Honorable James E. (Pete) Laney
    Page 2    (a-l-709)
    bonds that are not secured by the full faith and credit of the state.
    For example, in Texas National Guard Armory Board v. McGraw, 
    126 S.W.2d 627
    (Tex. 1939). the court upheld the creation of an authority
    to issue bonds to acquire buildings to be leased to the state for a
    rental amount adequate to maintain the buildings, to pay the interest
    on the bonds, and to eventually retire the bonds. In the Armory Board
    case, the court relied on the fact that the whole process depended
    upon the execution of a new lease every two years. Without an
    "optional" two-year renewal, the state would be obligated beyond
    current revenues, see Tex. Const. art. VIII, 56, and would therefore
    be in violation ofarticle III, section 49. See Armory 
    Board, 126 S.W.2d at 634-35
    . In Texas Turnpike Authority vxhepperd,    279 S.W.Zd
    302 (Tex. 1955). the court upheld the creation of a turnpike authority
    to finance a highway system by issuing bonds payable solely from
    highway tolls and concessions.      Even if highway revenues were
    insufficient to retire the bonds, bondholders had no recourse against
    the credit of the 
    state. 279 S.W.2d at 305
    . The court relied on the
    Armory Board case and determined that this financing plan did not
    create a debt in violation of article III, section 49. of the Texas
    Constitution. See 279 S.W.Zd at 304.        In Texas Public Building
    Authority v. Mat=,   686 S.W.Zd 924, 928 (Tex. 1985). the court again
    relied on the Armory Board case.       The court upheld legislation
    creating an agency to issue and sell bonds to finance the acquisition,
    construction, and improvement of buildings used by state agencies.
    The principal and interest on the bonds were to be repaid by pledging
    all or part of the designated rents, issues, and profits from leasing
    a building to the state or by obtaining funds from any other lawful
    source. The court held that the act did not create a debt of the
    state. 686 S.W.Zd at 928.
    You have not submitted to this office specific proposed legisla-
    tion outlining the essential terms that the proposed cogeneration
    contracts would include. So long as such legislation and contracts
    executed pursuant to the legislation comply with the guidelines set
    forth in the Building Authority case, Texas courts would not find the
    legislation invalid under section 49 of article III. The situation
    presented by your request is somewhat different than that presented in
    the Armory Board case and its progeny. In these cases, legislation
    created an agency to issue bonds to finance certain projects. Your
    request involves a contract with a private party to build cogeneration
    units. Application of the principles announced by the Texas Supreme
    Court to your situation would require that the private party agree
    that its recourse is not against the credit of the state.
    You indicate that the contemplated legislation would authorize
    contracts for the private construction, operation, and maintenance of
    cogeneration units for which a state agency would pay an amount of
    money over a period of years, based on a percentage of the amount of
    money operation of the unit saved the agency. You indicate that
    payment would continue until an amount determined by the contract had
    been paid. Some contracts may require payment for less than five
    p. 3278
    Honorable Ray Farabee
    EIonorable($smgsgF.(Pete) Lauey
    Page 3      -
    years, others may require payment for more than seven years. In w
    of Tyler v. L.L. Jester 6 Co., 
    78 S.W. 1058
    , 1062 (Tax. 1904), the
    Texas Supreme Court held that a contract for the delivery of water for
    a number of years did not create an unconstitutional debt of the city
    because the liability of the city arose only upon the city’s    use of
    water during each year. In Charles Scribner's Sons v. Marrs, 
    262 S.W. 722
    (Tex. 1924), the supreme court upheld a contract between the State
    Textbook Commission and a private party to purchase books for five
    years because the state's obligation was not to buy a fixed number of
    books over five years but to buy only the number of books needed in
    any given year, to be purchased out of the current fund for that year.
    In City of Big Spring v. Board of Control, 404 S.W.Zd 810 (Tex. 1966),
    the supreme court considered an agreement by the city to furnish a
    state hospital with water "as long as the State of Texas shall in good
    faith retain and operate said hospital on said site." The court
    upheld the contract. See 404 S.W.Zd at 814-15. This office has
    considered previously theexpress language that contracts must contain
    in order to comply with article III, section 49, of the Texas
    Constitution. See, e.g., Attorney General Opinions M-656 (1970);
    M-253 (1968). Without specific legislation to review, however, it is
    impossible to determine conclusively whether the contemplated
    contracts violate article III, section 49, or other constitutional
    provisions.
    SUMMARY
    Legislation authorizing state agencies to
    enter into contracts with third-party vendors
    for the installation, operation, and financing
    of cogeneration units to be repaid from energy
    savings that follows the guidelines in Texas
    Public Building Authority v. Mattox, 686 S.W.Zd
    924 (Tex. 1985) and Charles Scribner's Sons V.
    Mars, 
    262 S.W. 722
    (Tex. 1924). would not create
    ZZdebr in violation of article III. section 49, of
    the Texas Constitution.
    Attorney General of Texas
    JACK HIGWTOWER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    MARY KELLER
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    p. 3279
    Honorable Ray Farabee
    Honorable James E. (Pete) Laney
    Page 4   (JM-709)
    JUDGE ZOLLIE STRAKLET
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Jennifer Riggs
    Assistant Attorney General
    p. 3280
    

Document Info

Docket Number: JM-709

Judges: Jim Mattox

Filed Date: 7/2/1987

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017