Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1951 )

' EATTOKNEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS
December 19, 1951
Han* Homer Garrison, Jr+, Director
Texas Department of Public Safety
Austin, Texas Opinion No. V-l 380
Re: Applicability of Texas
Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act,
House Bill 219, Acts
52nd Leg., R.S. 1951,
(Article 67Olh. V&S,)
to operators of public-
Dear Colonel Garrison: ly owned motor vehicles.
Your request for an opinion in connection with the above-
captioned matter states: ..
“Reference is made to Section 33, Article VI, H-B.
No. 219, 52nd Texas Legislature, the ‘Texas Motor
Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act.’
“The first portion of Section 33 of the Act referred
to provides :
” ‘This Act shall not apply with respect to any
motor $ehicle owned by the United States, the
State ofTexas or any pc@ical subdivision of
this state or municipality therein; * * *‘,
“H.B1 219, in effect, provides that under certain con-
ditions (an accident involving property damage of a
certain sum, under certain conditions, and upon con-
viction of certain offenses) the operator or owner of
the motor vehicle involved shall be required to furn-
ish proof of financial responsibility. If proof of
financial responsibility is not, furnished within the re-
quired time the Department is required to suspend ’
the license of the operator and the registration of
the owner of the motor vehicle involved ‘in the acci-,
dent,
Hon, Homer Garrison, Jr., page 2 (V-1380)
“Let us assume that a motor vehicle owned by the
State of Texas, or a political subdivision of the State,
or a municipality within the State is involved in an
‘accident in which somuona is killed, or s,erlously
injured’,or in which thaw is gr,eat property damage*
Under the excepUons referred to we cannot suspend
the registration on the vbhicle involved. Would the
operator of the vahiele referred to above be required
to furnish proof of financial responsibility within the
period provided by law? If your answer is yes, and
such proof is net furnished, are we required to re-
voke his drtvere license and suspend the registration
on all motor vehicles pcrsonally owned by him?
“Also let us assum,a that the operator of a ctty gar-
bage truck is convicted of d,riving a city truck on a
public street while intoxicated, or failure to stop end
render aid, or some other offense for which hia.li-
tense to operate ,a motor veh~ek must be suspended
or revoked, and said truck driver does-not then give
end thereafter&aintain proof of financiai rasponci-
b,Uity with respect to all vehicles registered by him
as an individual, should the registration on motor ve-
hicles privately owned by him be suspended? Could
he register s new vehicle without furnishing proof of
fhencisl responsibility? (See See, 17 of the Act.)
Wfftcere of polfttcal subdfvisioar of the state are ask-
ing us about the status of their drivers under the Act.
We have told th+m that there ham been nQ court opinions
on the newly enbckrd,iaw and thatwe are asking you for
ea opinion on thu matter,”
You prcrent for our determination two questions, as follows:
1. 1s the operator of a motor vehicle owned by
the United States, the State of Texas. a political sub-
division of the State or a municipality of the State, re-
quired to furnish proof of financial responsibility un-
der the provisions of House BUl 219, Actr 52nd Leg.,
R,S, 1951. ch, 498, p. 1210 (Article 6701h, V,C&)?
2. ;tt the above question is answered in the af-
ffrrnetive. then ir the Department of Public Safety,
in the event of an accident by the operator of a publicly
.
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 3 (V-1380)
owned vehicle under the conditions set out in the
act, required to revoke the operator’s driver’s li-
cense and suspend the registration of his privately
owned vehicles 7
Article 6701h, V.C.S., the “Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-’
Responsibility Act” (H.B. 219. Acts 52nd Leg., H.S. 1951, ch. 498,
p, 1210) is designed to compel owners and drivers of motor vehicles
to maintain ability to satisfy claims for injury and damage oris-
ing out of accidents involving motor vehicles. Financial respon-
sibility is nowhere required absolutely by the act, but is merely
a condition to the continued privilege to drive or use a vehicle
under certain circumstances. Ability to satisfy claims may be
established under various circumstances by several methods,
including maintenance of insurance against such claims, pay-
ment, or discharge from or satisfaction of such claims in desig-
nated ways and within the time specified,
Section 33 of the act provides in pa@ as follows:
“This Act shall not apply with respect to any
motor vehicle owned by the United States, the State
of Texas or any political subdivision of this State :,,
or any municipality therein; . . .”
You have correctly stated that the question presented
with reference to the above quoted provision has not been answered
by the courts of this State. On the other hand, this question has
been decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in City of St.Paul
v. Hoffman, 25 N.W.2d 661 (Mina Sup. 1946). under a provision of
the laws of that State, which, in so far as pertinent here, is in al-
most the identical language as Section 33 of our act. There it was
contended that the provisioru of the Minnesota act providing that
it Udoes not apply with rempect to any motor vehicle owned and
operated by the United States, this State or any political subdivi-
sion of this State or any municipality therein” did not have the ef-
fect of exempting from the provisions of the drivers’ responsibil-
ity law an operator of a city-owned vehicle,. The court in refusing
such a construction said:
“The controversy here arises over the proper
construction of Minn. St. 1945 and M.S.A. 5 170.51,
which is L. 1945, c. 285 g 31, and reads as follows:
‘Sec. 31. This act does not apply with respect to any
motor vehicle owned and operated by the United
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr,, page 4 (V-1380)
States, this state or any political subdivision of this
state or any munirtpality therein.’
.I
. . .
“It is the contention of the city that its drivers
are by virtue of the quoted section exempt from the
provisions of the safety responsibility act, The state
very earnestly contends that ths act applies to such
drivers and that the commissioner may ,auapelPdthair
drivers’ licenses as in the case of other drivers.
“Just how 6 31 came into L. 1945, c. 285, is not
disclosed by legislative history. The Minnesota State
Bar Association, as amicus curiae, states in its brief
that the law as enacted is in the exact form proposed
by its committee, and it earnestly contends that drivers
of city vehicles are not excluded from the act. We must
interpret the language as it was enacted ‘by the legislature,
and we cannot accept the authors’ construction of its im-
port unless that construction Is consistent with the legis-
lative intent as evidenced by the language ussd. Taking
the act as a whole, we can discover no purpose in f 31
except to exempt the city’s drivers from suspension of
their licenses under the operatton of the act, Since the
act operates exclusively by suspension of licenses to
operate motor vehicles and not against the vehicles them-
selves, the exclusion of the city’s vehicles from the ap-
plication of the act must have been intended to exempt the
city’s drivers. The purpose of the act~was to effect fi-
nancial responsibility to injured persons. The city is
liable for injuries inflicted by negligent acts performed
in the disch8rge of its corporate or proprietary functiona.
Boye Y. Ctty of Albert Lea, 74 Miun. 230. 76 N.W. 1131;
Freeman v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Mtnn. 202, 17 N.W.
2d 364. In cases involving the proprietary functions of
citiee, it would, ba futile to require additional s’eturity
to the public. City employes are personally liable for
their negligence when engaged in the performance of the
city’s governmental functions. Florio v. Jersey City,
101 N.J.L. 535, 129 A. 470, 40 A.L.R. 1353. and annotdoa;
Miller v. Joe&es,224 N.C. 783, 32 S.E.Zd 594. The city is
authorized by statute, but not required, to cover its em-
ployes against liability in such cases. Minn. St. 1945 and
M.S.A. fg 471.42. 471.43. B seems qutte obvious to AS
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr,,, page 5 (V-1380)
that fi 31 was inaerted in the act to relieve munici-
palities, and others that are exempted, from embar-
rassment in the performance of their functions by
finding the discharge of such functtona hampered by
the:lack of licensed drivers.
“Xf the lew is to complete&y ‘achieve ite avowed
pnrpoaea, the legialetute couN:either waive gevernmen-
tal immunity from suit in negligence cases as the United
Stetea has dons in the Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub-
lic Law, 6Ol,.Title N, 79th CMylreaa, 28 U.&CA. 8
921, which the Lcgialature tou&d do not only in behalf
of ths atebe but of cities and other governmental aub-
divisions, or it could require such municipalities or
subdivisions to cover their drivers with insurance.
We tbarefore hold that the trial court -was right in
holding the drivers of vehiclaa owned and operated by
the city exempt from the proviabna of the act.” (Em-
phasis added.)
The above decision ia the only one we have been ebla to
find conatruing such a provision in a drivers’ reaponaibility act,
end in view of the fact that the Texas act, as well as that of ‘Min-
nesota, was modeled after the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Re-
sponsibility Act, we feel compelled to follow the above conatruc-
tton. The Attorney General of California has reached a similer
conclusion, See Att’y Gea. Op. 48/205 (Cal. 1949).
You are, therefore, advised that the operetor of e motor
vehicle owned by the United States, the State of Texas, a political
subdivision of the State or a municipality of the State is exempt
from the provisions of Article 67Olh. V.C.S., while lawfully engaged
1~ the operation of such publicly owned vehicle,
Our answer to your first question makes unnecessary an
answer to.your second question,
SUMMARY
Section 33 of Article 6701h, V.C.S.. the Texas
Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, providing
that the “act shall not apply with respect to any motor
:
,“j.
. .
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 6 (V-1380)
vehicle owned by the United States, the State of
Texas or any political subdivision of this State or
any municipality therein” has the effect of exempt-
ing from the provisions of the act the operator of a
publicly owned vehicle while lawfully engaged in the
operation of such vehicle.
Yours very truly,
APPROVED:
PRICE DAMLEL
C. K, Richards Attorney General
Trial & Appellate Division
E. Jacobson By &g&.,&J 25. rr)d=w
Reviewing Assistant Charles I). Mathews
Fwt Asatstant
Price Daniel
Attorney General