Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1986 )


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  •                                 The Attorney’ General of Texas
    Jmuary   15.        1986
    JIM MATTOX
    Attorney General
    T4,.s   (g ph~-o~
    s~pwne CourtBuilding            RoMrAble Tim Rod$;c.rs                           Opinion No. m-422
    P. 0. BOX m4a                   Wise County Audito!
    *ustIn. TX. 78711- 254a         P. 0. Box 899                                    Rc: nether  the offices  of constable
    SW4752K)l
    Decatur, TexAs    ;‘6234                         And city marshal, And the OffiCaS of
    TeIaX 91olB7Ll367
    Talecopier 31214750266
    justice  of the peACA And QnmiCipal
    judge. ere incompatible;  And related
    matters
    714 h3cson. Suite 700
    Da~m. T7.. 75202.4506
    DeAr Hr. Rodgers:
    214f742-8944
    You Ask:
    41J24Albwta Ave.. Suite 1W
    El P,so, TX. 799052793                        1. Wether A person Appointed chief of police
    91Y5334a
    in A city wIthIn the county con cllso serve simul-
    taneous!.y AS the elected  ConstAbble of A precinct
    ,001 Texas, Suite 700                     in which the city is located;
    “ovrton. TX. 77002-3111
    7?3’222-5886                                   2.  Vhether A person elected      justice of the
    pAACe   iI1 thr pTACitlCt CAn SAX-VA SiSNltAneOUSly AS
    606 Broadway. Suite 312
    parttiw     appointed magistrate for the city;  And
    L”~c+ck. TX. 79401.3479
    lxw747.5238                                    3. Whether  either    situation  would present A
    risk of increased    liability    on the past of the
    county.
    4x39 N. Tentn. Suite B
    MCN.“.   TX. 78501~lS85
    SWSS2.4547                            You advise t1a.t A eun llActed constable in 1982 WAS hired in 1984
    by A gcnersl     law city located     within the precinct   as its chief of
    police.     The comti.ssioners    court thereupon declared    the office  of
    200 bin   Plaza. Suite 400
    constable    VACAOt.  Thereafter,    the man YAS Again elected constable of
    San A”,O”lO. TX. 762052797
    the precinct,    but the commissioners     court has refused to certify  Xs
    51212254191
    most recent elcct!.on or to approve his bond.
    An Equal Opportunltyl                 A single ind:lviduAl may not simulr~neously        hold two incompatibLe
    Affirmative Action Employer    offices.     “Incompat.ibility”    is to be distinguishcd    from A “conflict of
    intCreSt.”      As saLd. in Attorney   General Opinion JM-172 (198&l:
    Ordirra.rily , A mere ’conflict            of        interest’
    !&,      21 conflict    created by chr private           pecuniary
    interest: of a public officer          or employee)       will not
    make a pcrson        legally     ineligible    for       a public
    office   276 S.W. 305 
    (Tex. Civ. App. - EastlAnd
    1925, a0 writ).         On the other bend, ‘incompati-
    bility’      prevents. one person            from holding       tuo
    governmental posts          if the positions          are incom-
    patible.       The conflict         in an ‘incompatibility’
    situation      is not between an officer’s                private
    interests     and his public duty, but rather between
    two inconsistent         public     duties.      See Themes v.
    Abernathy County Line Independent School District,
    
    290 S.W. 152
    (7%.            Cosxa’n App. 1927);         Attorney
    General Opiniom3 JM-97 (1983);                   MW-170 (1980);
    Attorney General ‘Letter Advisory Nos. 114 (1975);
    86 (1974).
    In our opinion,       the offices      of constable      of A precinct      and of
    chief of police of A general law city located within the precinct                       are
    incompatible.        A constable        is    required     to    exercise     independent
    judgment respecting        the pr’oper discharge of his duties,            including his
    responsibility      to preselvc! the peace.          See Tex. Coast. art. V, 518;
    V.T.C.S.     art.   6878, -- et saqy; Code Crib            Proc.    arts.    2.12.   2.13;
    Attorney GenArAl Opinions JM-140 (1984); J’M-57 (1983).                   See also Webcr
    v. City of SAchSe. 
    591 S.W.2d 563
    (Tu.                  Civ. App. - DALLAS 1979, no
    writ).      Cf. State LX rel.         Eightover v. Smith, 
    671 S.W.2d 32
    (Tex.
    1984) ; JoncS v. state.          lj;, S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. - TSArkAnA
    1937, no writ);     Attorney General Opinion J’M-57 (1983).               Re is elected
    by the citizens       of the precinct       to discharge     his duties independently
    of the wishes -- even if wpressed                by ordinance -- of the governing
    body of a city located vj.thin the precinct.                  On the other hand, the
    chief    of police     of s city      is subject      to the control        of the city
    council,    and is duty bound to enforce its ordinances.                   V.T.C.S.   art.
    998.    The tuo officers      arc subject to inconsistent           duties, making the
    offices    incompatible.       Sw Attorney General Opinion Jh-203 (1984).
    ---
    See also V.T.C.S. arts. 9!Kl, 999a; Alexander v. City of Lampasas, 
    275 S.W. 614
    (Tsx. Civ. App. - Austin 1925, no writ);                      Attorney+General
    Opinion hU-394 (1981).           Cf.
    ---   Attorney    General    Opinions    E-727 (1975);
    O-1263 (1939).
    When the constable e:;ectcd in 1982 became chief               of police of the
    city   in 1984, ipso factc, he automatically    vacated               the incompatible
    office   of constable.    Tfoms
    --       v. Abernathy  County               Line Zndependent
    p. 1924
    School District.      
    290 S.W. 1
    .52 (Tex. Cosss’a App. 1927 judSmt adopted).
    See Attorney     General Opioloo JM-97 (1983).           Cf. Prultt v. Glco Rose
    tndependeot     School District    No. 1. 
    84 S.W.2d 1004
    ?Tex. 1935).          But he
    did not thereby become ioslinible            to future    election    as coostable,
    lv8a though he -continued       1x1 s&vc   as chief of police.       See Centeno v.
    lnselmann,     519 S.U.Zd     889 ( T a x .Civ.    App. - San Antxo         1975, no
    xrit).is        occupancy of th e police      post cannot justify      a refusal    on
    the part of the county cosmtissionern           to certify    his election      or to
    approve    his bood,     bccauslc once he qualifies          for   the   office    of
    constable,    ipso facto    thl! position    of chief    of police    is instantly
    vacated (for the reason d::ocussed above) and ha holds only the office
    of coostable.      Ceoteoo v. -Ioselmaoo.      B.       See Stat=       rel. Peden
    v. Valeotine,     
    198 S.W. 1006
    (Tex. Civ. App. Tort             Worth 1917, writ
    ref’d).
    We are alao of the oploiou     that the doctrine  of Incompatibility
    prevents  a person clectei   justice    of the peace from serving    simul-
    taneously  as a parttime appointed magistrate    for the city.
    Tvo opinions of this office        -- one dated harch 16, 1913, and the
    other dated October 3, 1913 --          found   in the 1912-1914 Report of the
    Attorney    General at pages 722-724, advised that the offices        of justice
    of the peace and of jud,str (recorder)            of a corporatlou   court vere
    Incompatible.        The later opinion explained that although article        XVI.
    section    40 of the Texas Constitution         exempted justices  of the peace
    frox its proscription         against holding more tbao one civil      office   of
    emolument, it did oot exmpt them from the further 1limitation                 that
    additional      offices    held bsy thw      must not be incompatible       or in
    cooflict     vith     the office!   of  !uatice   of  the peace.    The oniaion
    conclud.ed the offices       were ioncompatible because,
    to the extent of offenses        arising  under the State
    law.     the   justice    of  the peace     and the city
    recorder      could    take jurisdiction     of the same
    offense,     and, consequently,    you vould have one man
    presiding      over two courts      of concurrent  juris-
    dlctioo.
    
    Id. at 726.
      See People e:t rel. Goode11 v. Garrett, 
    237 P. 829
    (Cal.
    57.    1925), %?h’g   deni&      See also   State   ax rel.   Crawford v.
    Andersoo. 136 g.W. 128 (10;s 1912).     Cf. Thomas v. Sams, 
    734 F.2d 165
     (5th Cir. 19841, reh’g denled,
    --   741 F.5783    (5th Cir. i984).
    IO 1940, Attorney    General Opinioo     O-2055 overruled   the 1913
    opinions on grouods (1) thae the case of Luera v. State, 
    63 S.W.2d 699
     (Tex. Grim. App. 1933), “cecessarlly”     dcclded that the holding of the
    tvo offices    by one person :is not inhibited     by the rule of incompatl-
    bility,    and alternative27     (2) that    tvo    judicial  posts  are not
    p. 1925
    Honorable   Tim Rodgers - Ps8r 4              (Jn-422)
    incompatible         ocrely  baause     thq           are   vested     vith         concurrent
    jurirdictioo.        We agree with neither          of those assertions.
    The Luera case iovolv~rd a claim by a                criminal  defendaut   that the
    search vaz         involved should have beeo               quashed because the justice
    of the peace vho swore thus affimts      vas               “oat s qualified     and acting
    legal    justice  of the peace” in that he                 had qualified     and was slso
    acting     as the recorder   of a corporation                  court at the time.       The
    Commission of Appeals vrotc!:
    Article      16. $40, of the Coostitutloo.                 provides
    that    ‘no person shall hold or exercise,                   at the
    Same     time.     mol’cl than      one     civil      office      of
    emolument, except that of justice                 of the peace,
    county        comis~r:ioner,         ootary        public        and
    postmaster.’      etc.      It will therefore       be seen that
    under       the     Cop3titution         there      Is      nothing’
    prohibiting      the Lustice      of the peace from holding
    or lxercisiog          ‘sore than      one civil        office     of
    emolumcot.       (Eu$&sis      
    added). 63 S.W.2d at 701
    .
    From the foregoing       pmsage it is apparent tbat the Commissioo of
    Appeals    in its    original     opinion did oot consider       the rule against
    holdiog    incompatible     offices,     but considered    ouly the article    XVI,
    section     40 constitutiona:.       prohibition   against    the holding   of tvo
    offices    of amolment.       from vhich justices     of the peace are excepted.
    The Court of Criminal           Al~peals approved the opinion:        a motion for
    rehearing vas overruled bmause the court remained convinced of “the
    correctness     of the disposPtion        made” aod it   sav oo need for further
    vriting     upon propositions         that    vere “correctly    decided”   in  the
    origioal    opioioo.
    The disposition    of the case vas correct,   of course, if the motion
    to quash the search varrant: was properly denied - no matter what vas
    the proper ground for its, denial.        Cf. State v. Cook, 160 S.E.2d Il9
    (N.C. 1968).     The argument that arti=       XVI, section 40 of the Texas
    Constitution   required quashal was properly refuted by the court, but
    if the issue of locompatibility       hsd been raised and the offices    had
    been pronounced       incompa ::lble, the    outcome would oot    have been
    different.
    Judges of corporatj 00 courts     may also  execute   valid  search
    varranfs.    O’Quinn v. State, 462 S.V.2d 583 (Tu.      Grim. App. 1971).
    Cf. Carnell V. State, 70 ?rW.2d 152 (Tex. Crlm. hpp. 1934).        Because
    the first    of the Incompatible   offices  would lwze been vacated by
    acceptance of the second me, the person taking the affidavits       was an
    officer   authorized to do :w, whichever of the offices   was the one last
    p.   1926
    Booorablo   Tim Rodgers - Palie 5        (JM-422)
    lcctpttd.     Stt Ctnrtoo v.       fnetlmann.       e;     State   v.   Cook,   m.
    Conrtqutotly vt,   do oot     bd?iltve     eht Lutra tes    t
    “ntcertorllp~     dtcidtd
    that  cht holding of tht      ol’ficcs    of jui        of tht QttCt and rtcordtr
    of tht corporaclot   court    b:r oot    person ir aoc iohibirtd     by tht rult     of
    incompatibility.     Nor     do vt       thiok    rht alternative      rttaoning     of
    Attornty GtntrtlOpinion       0,~:!055   requirts   rher cooclusion.
    Attornty   Gtocral   Op~loion O-2055   argued that tht      eoocurrtnr
    jurisdiction    txtrcittd   by the juetict court and rht municipal       court
    could ooC, in itself,     rtndgcr the offices incompatible btcaust:
    Ntithcr    office    is   accounCable    to, under the
    dominion of, or subordinate        20 the other; ntithtr
    ha8 any righr or power to ioCcrftre        vith the other
    in the performawe       of any duty.      An apptal from
    either court has no rtlation        to rht othtr, but is
    indeptodtotly     to other courts.
    We belitve    rhc fortgoing     1:atslogue of conflicts   ntithtr    accurately
    states tht complett test ,:I incompatibility.        nor accurately     rtfltcts
    tht  full relationship    betieeo    courts of concurrent jurisdiction.         See
    Codt Grim. Proc. art. 4.14; Peoplt tx rel. Goodtll v. Garrttt.           6
    Courts of coocurrtnt      jurisdiction     may waive their jurisdiction         in
    favor of each other vitk. respect              to particular      eests.     Flares    v.
    Statt. 487 S.W.Zd 122 (Tu.          Grim. AQQ. 1972).        If one person acted as
    bothjustice     of the peace and city judge at tht same time. it would be
    within his power to manipc,latc the Income of the courts over vhich ht
    presidtd to the advaotagt or disadvantagt              of either rhe county or tht
    city -- to both of whict. ht would owe a duey of colltctloo.                          The
    reeeoo is. justices      of tht ‘ptact     are requlrtd to account to the county
    trtasurtr     for  the fiots        colltcttd     by his      court,   whereas     fines
    colltcttd    by city    judges ,go into ciry coffers.             Ste    V.T.C.S.    art.
    1619; Codt Grim. Proc. art. 45.06.           By waiving the jurisdiction         of the
    court in favor of the other court,              the “justice      of ehe peace/city
    judgt” could enrich ont &wtrnmental               cotiCy at the expense of the
    other, depending, ptrhaps, on which of them used such fees to comptn-
    sate the offictr    colltctirlg     rhem. -Cf. Attorney General Opinion C-718
    (1966).
    It is not correct,  t’xrefort.     to say that ntither court has any
    right or power to interf s:ce vith        the other.     But there is another
    reason why Attorney Central Opinion O-2055 reached an improper result.
    The test it formulated Is too narrow.           Courts -- Texas courts among
    them -- look to the publx: policy which the rule against              incompati-
    bility    seeks to Implement,   and   not  mtrely   to recitals of conflicrinR
    relationships     cond&ned  :.ri the past.       see 63 Am. Jur.       2d Fubli;
    Officers    and Employees 578, at 726; Stexo            State lx rel.    Knox v.
    Hadley, 7 Wise. 700 (1860:;      People ex rel. Goode11 v. Garrett,        supra.
    p. 1927
    Roaoreblt     TIB godgtrr    - PeI,e 6    (RI-4221
    Cf. ehlingtr   v. Clerk, 8 Z;.W.2d 666 (Tu.  1928); gaskiot v. Stete lx
    x.    Earringtoo.  
    516 P.2d 1
    .171 (Wyo. 1973); Attorney   Gtotrel Lttter
    Advisory No. 114 (1975).
    Thlt     offict   concludtd   In Attornty      Ctotrel   Opinion   WU-1359 that
    oot ptrson could not hold 8~ the teme dme both tht offict of justice
    of tht ptace, plect  oat, end justice of tht QUCC.  Qhce  two.   10                     8
    single precinct.    The opinion dlrcusttd    article   V, srcrlon   18 of the
    Turns Constltutioo,   but tht! rtel bttit for dtcition     setme to hevt been
    public policy refltcttd   by tht incompatibility     doctriot:
    [W]hIle P Justice    of the Peace may hold somt other
    offlct  oat 1ocom)atlblt   with the office of Justict
    of the Petct,     lw may not hold      tht offlcts    of
    Justice   of tht Peace, Prtclnct      1. Piece 1, and
    Justice   of the I'sace, Precinct   1, Place 2 et the
    semt time.
    Cf.   Attorney     Central   Opinions    V-1192 (1951);   V-828 (1949).    Wt btlieve
    Attorney      Gtntral Opinion SW-1359 ceo be viewed          no overruling   Attornty
    Gtntral      Opinion O-2055.    sub tilentio.
    --
    Rttsooiog    slmiler     tf) that ustd by Attorney General Opinion
    WV-1359 ves used IO the wet of Sate             ex rel. Knox v. Etdlte,       s\tprrr,
    nod Ptoplt tx rtl.      Goodel:,v.   
    Garrttt. supra
    . to hold that we person
    could not at the eeme time eerve et 8 justice             of eht ptect end e city
    judge with ovtrleppiog        concurrent    jurisdiction.       Set rlso Statt ex
    rel. Crawford v. Andtrtoo, suprl;        In rt Corum. 62 P.661 (Kens. 1900).
    Cf. Eeocock v. Sape        225 lio.2d 411 (Fla. 1969); Stete v. Cook, aupra.
    Wcbtlltve     the cour;t    of T8cxes would dtclart       rhtt the statutory     pro-
    visions   for a “judge” of l:lre munlcIpa1 court (V.T.C.S. art. 1196) end
    for “ont justice    of tht ptrtrct” In tech precinct.        (V.T.C.S.  err. 2373)
    coottmplete    that each offIct     will bt fllltd     by a different   ptrson. end
    thet the officts     ere incoprpatlhlt.      Cf. Iitrris County v. Stevert.       
    41 S.W. 650
    (Ttx. 1897); --   Ex Earta WIlbarF,       
    55 S.W. 968
    (Tex. CrIm. App.
    1900).
    Inasmuch es we contludt        that the doctrine    of incompatibility
    prevents a juscicc   of the peace from simultaneously holding the office
    of city magistrate,    and p'cevents a constable    from holding at the same
    time the office   of chief of police     for a city within the precinct,     we
    do not reach your final       qutstion.     Attorney General Opinion O-2055
    (1940) is overruled.
    SUMMARY
    The dcccrim     of    incompatibility   prevents   a
    constable from s,imultantously     holding the office
    of chief of police    for a city located vithin the
    p. 1928
    Emoreblr    Tim Rodgtrr        - PegI, 7     (34422)
    prtcinct.        nod prrreots   e juatict of tht ptact  from
    holding     at     tht sme    timt the office   of parrc+be
    maglsrrett         for the city.
    JIM     MATIOX
    Attoroey Generel of funs
    JACK HIGETOWER
    First Assistsnt Attorney            Gtwral
    XARYKELLER
    Executive Assistant           Atrornq     Gcntral
    ROBERTGRAY
    sQtciel.keiStaot        Attorney       Gc!ntral
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman. OpIoioo       Coumittee
    Prepared by Bruce Younghlootl
    Assistant Attorney Gtntral
    p. 1929