Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1985 )


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  •                                 The Attorney       General of Texas
    JIM MAlTOX                                   December 19. 1985
    Attorney General
    Supreme Court Suildlng         HonorableLloyd Crtss                 OpinionNo. JM-397
    P. 0. BOX 12548
    Austin, TX. 78711.2548
    chairmen
    512l4752501                    Committeeon Labor and                Re: When a county treasureris
    Telex 9101874-1367                EmploymentRela:ions               requiredto deposit funds under
    Telecopier 51214750286         Texas House of Rep,cesentatives      article 1709a. V.T.C.S.. and
    P. 0. Box 2910                       related questions
    714 Jackson, Suite 700         Austin, Texas 78'169
    Dallas. TX. 7520245Oa
    214742.8944                    Dear RepresentativeCriss:
    You ask several questions about the 1985 amendment to article
    4824 Alberta Ave.. Suite 180
    El Paso, TX. 7990~2793         1709a, section 2, 'T..T.C.S.
    That provisionnow reads as follows:
    915/53xua4
    The County Treasurer in each county of this
    state shall receive all moneys belonging to the
    v-4  Texas, suite 700
    county fr'omwhatever source they may be derived.
    Ho”, TX. 77W2.3111
    71312235886
    SC6 Broadway, Suite 312
    Lubbock, TX. 79401.3479
    8061747.5238
    4309 N. Tenth, Suite B
    McAllen, TX. 78501-1885
    51218824547
    200 Main Plaza. Suite 400
    San Antonio, TX. 782052797
    512/225-4191                   Acts 1985. 69th Le,g..ch. 145, at 766 (underlinedlanguage added by
    S.B. No. 449).
    An Equal Opportunity/
    Afflrmatlve Action Employer        You request clarificationof the following issues raised by the
    languageadded to article 1709a, section 2:
    1. 1s the phrase 'seven business days' in-
    tended t) be the usual prescribed practice or a
    grace period without penalty? It would seem that
    every efEort should be made by each fee officer
    affected to deposit funds by the next business
    day. Tke extension of 'seven business days,'
    p. 1817
    HonorableLloyd Criss - 2   (JM-397)
    therefore,would be a grace period to allow for
    extenuatingcircumstances.
    2. Is a 'pcpulation under 50,000,' to be
    determinedon the basis of the last federal census
    or by use of som other numbers? Often, statutes
    utilizingpopulationreferencesincludethe phrase
    'accordingto th'zpreceding federal census.' As
    this phrase is not contained in article 1709a as
    amended, quest1or.s
    have arisen as to what popula-
    tion figures are to be used to comply with this
    legislation.
    3. Does the phrase 'thirtydays' mean calendar
    or business days;? As the statute reads 'seven
    business days' and 'thirty days' written in the
    same paragraph,d,twould seam that 'sevenbusiness
    days' means spe&ificallyworking days and that
    'thirty days' cold therefore refer to thirty
    sequentialcaleni,a,r
    days.
    The statute says that a county officer shall deposit funds "not
    later than the next regu1e.rbusiness day after the day on which the
    funds are received,but in no event shall depositsbe made later than
    seven business days after receipt of said funds." You ask what the
    effect of that languagewould be, but you do not put your question in
    the context of any particularcircumstances.
    Statutes prescribing the time for performance of a duty by a
    public officer are genemlly held to be directory rather than
    mandatory,even though the statuteuses the word "shall." Chisholmv.
    Bewley Mills, 
    287 S.W.2d 943
    (Tex. 1956). A duty set out in a
    directory statute may be effectivelyand validly performed after the
    time prescribed for performance has passed. See Kessler v. Texas
    Employers'InsuranceAssoc:~*,      421 S.W.2d 133,137 (Tex. Civ. App.
    - Eastland 1967, writ ref'c.n.r.e.).
    We assume, however, that you are concerned about the point at
    which a county officer mig!HIbe subject to criminalpenaltiesor to a
    writ of mandamus for failure to deposit funds with the county
    treasurer, rather than whether a county officer can validly deposit
    the funds after a certain date. See Turner v. Pruitt, 
    342 S.W.2d 422
    (Tex. 1961) (mandamuslies to corn3 performanceof ministerial   duty
    by government officer); Penal Cobe 5-39.01(defines the offense 0;
    "officialmisconduct"as the willful violation of any law by a public
    official); see also V.T.C,S. art. 339 (county attorney or district
    attorney shall institute proceedings against any officer entrusted
    with collectionor safekeepingof public funds who fails to discharge
    his duties in connectionwith such funds).
    p. 1818
    HonorableLloyd Criss - 3   t:JM-397)
    The phrase you ask about appears to contradictitself. First, it
    directs county officersto d.epositfunds on the first regularbusiness
    day after receipt. Then it directs them to do so within seven
    business days after receipt. The original bill introduced in the
    Sixty-ninthLegislaturesimply said that an officerwho receivesfunds
    shall deposit them on the next regular business day after receipt.
    S.B. No. 449, 69th Leg. (1%5) (as originallyintroduced). The clause
    that refers to the seven-day time period was added later in the
    legislativeprocess. H.J. of Tex., 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2269 (May
    15, 1985) (Housecommitteesubstitutefor S.B. No. 449).
    The legislativehistory of S.B. No. 449 leads us to concludethat
    the legislaturewas unwilling to enact a statute that would have
    allowed county officers ori1.yone day in which to deposit funds with
    the county treasurer.   Thus we  construe the amendment to mean that
    county officialsshould deposit funds on the first day after receipt,
    if possible, but that f;%:ilure   to deposit funds with the county
    treasurer would not be a violation of a clear statutory duty until
    seven business days after the county officialin questionhad received
    the funds.
    Your second question is whether the determinationof a county's
    populationfor purposes of article 1709a is to be made on the basis of
    the last federal census or on some other basis. Article 1709a does
    not state how a commiss:toners   court is to determine a county's
    population. Nor is there nn applicablegeneral statute. Cf. V.T.C.S.
    art. 5429b-2, §1.04(3) (fcr purposes of code provisionsTpulation"
    is that sham by last federal census).
    It is implicit in the grant of power to commissionerscourts,
    however, that a commissiox~ers  court may determine the population of
    the county it governsby any reasonableand suitableprocedure. city
    of Tyler v. Tyler Building i4Loan Association,81 S.W. 2 (Tex. 1904);
    -see Attorney General OpiELon w-1491 (1962). In the absence of
    unusual circumstauces,the last federal census would be a reasonable
    method of determiningthe I,opulation of a county.
    Your third question concernsthe provisionin article 1709a that
    permits commissionerscourts in counties with a population of less
    than 50,000 to extend ihe time period during which funds receivedmay
    be deposited "up to 30 dag!sfrom the time said funds are received."
    You ask whether this mea'x130 business days or 30 calendar days.
    Previouslyin the same provision the legislaturetwice used the term
    "businessdays." Consequently,we think that the legislature'schoice
    of the phrase "30 days" mulctbe read as 30 calendardays.
    SUMMARY
    A county offi,cial'sfailure to deposit county
    funds with the county treasurerwithin seven days
    p. 1819
    .
    RonorableLloyd Criss - 4 UM-397)
    ?
    of the county official's receipt of such funds
    would be a violation of his statutory duty.
    V.T.C.S. art. 1709.~.
    In determiningthe population of a county for
    purposes of article 1709a. a commissionerscourt
    may use any reasonableand suitablemethod.
    The phrase "30 days" in article 1709a means
    calendardays, not business days.
    JIM    MATTOX
    AttorneyGeneral of Texas
    JACKHIGHTOWRR
    First AssistantAttorneyGeneral
    MARY KELLER
    ExecutiveAssistantAttorney General
    ROBERT GUY
    SpecialAssistantAttorneyGeneral
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman,Opinion Committee
    Preparedby Sarah Woelk
    AssistantAttorney General
    p. 1820
    

Document Info

Docket Number: JM-397

Judges: Jim Mattox

Filed Date: 7/2/1985

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017