Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1984 )


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  •                                   The Attorney          General of Texas
    JIM   MATTOX                                        June 7, 1984
    Attorney    General
    Supreme Court Building         Honorable Luther Jones                      Opinion No. ``-161
    P. 0. Box 12548
    Austin, TX. 78711. 2549        El Paso County Attorney
    512/475-2501                   Room 201. City-County Building              Re: Whether district judges
    Telex 9101874.1367             El Paso, Texas   79901                      may institute a program to
    Telecooier 5121475-0266                                                    represent indigents in civil
    cases
    714 Jackson, Suite 700
    Dallas, TX. 75202.4506         Dear Mr.   Jones:
    2141742.8944
    You state that the ten district judges of El Paso County have
    4824 Alberta Ave., Suite 160
    signed a joint order implementing a pro bono publico plan in El Paso
    El Paso. TX. 79905.2793        County. The ,order provides that each attorney practicing or employed
    915/533-3484                   in El Paso County shall be appointed to handle no more than two
    domestic matters for indigents each year. The bar association for the
    county will screen applicants to determine indigency and will notify
    ,F’=‘Ol Texas, Suite 700        attorneys of their appointments. You suggest that an attorney
    uston, TX. 77002-3111
    7131223-5886
    appointed under this program would sustain violations of his
    constitutional rights to be free from involuntary servitude and from
    the taking of property without due process of law. U.S. Coast. Amend.
    806 Broadway, Suite 312        I, v, XIV.
    Lubbock. TX. 79401.3479
    8061747-5238
    The order reads as follows:
    4309 N. Tenth. Suite B                                   IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
    McAllen, TX. 78501-1685
    5121682.4547
    OF EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS
    200 Main Plaza, Suite 400
    San Antonio, TX. 78205.2797                IN RE:
    51212254191
    EL PASO BAR ASSOCIATION
    An Equal Opportunity/
    Affirmative Action Employer               PRO BONO PUBLIC0 PROGRAM
    ORDER
    ON THIS DAY the Courts did consider the motion
    of the EL PASO BAR ASSOCIATION to implement a pro
    bono public0 plan in El Paso County, Texas. The
    motion of the EL PASO BAR ASSOCIATION is granted.
    p. 707
    Honorable Luther Jones - Page 2    (JM-161)
    The undersigned District Courts of      El Paso
    County, Texas, ORDER the following:
    1.   Pursuant to Art. 1917 of the Texas Revised
    Civil Statutes, the undersigned courts do
    authorize the appointment of all lawyers
    holding an active Texas law license and who
    practice or are employed in El Paso County,
    Texas.
    2.   Such lawyers shall be appointed under this
    program to no more than two domestic
    matters  each fiscal year (October 1 to
    September 30).
    3.   The EL PASO BAR ASSOCIATION or its delegate
    shall screen applicants to the program to
    determine indigency.
    4.   Indigency for purposes of' this program
    shall be that defined by Legal Services
    Corporation guidelines and regulations.
    5.   The EL PASO BAR ASSOCIATION or its delegate
    shall   notify    an   attorney    of   the
    appointment.
    6.   A pauper's affidavit shall be executed by
    the client prior to the making of an
    appointment.
    7.   Uncooperative clients shall be dismissed
    from the pro bono public0 program.
    8.   An attorney may be excused from the program
    for good cause shown to the appropriate
    committee of the EL PASO BAR ASSOCIATION.
    9.   Participating attorneys will be provided
    with professional liability coverage.
    [No item 10 appears on copy of order submitted
    to US.1
    11. The Courts are encouraged to accept
    simplified pleadings in pro bono cases.
    SIGNED AND    ORDERED this      24      day   of
    September, 1982. (Emphasis added).
    p. 708
    Honorable Luther Jones - Page 3   (``-161)
    While we agree with the laudable goal of providing a system of
    representatives for indigents, we cannot agree that the method
    selected is authorized by the statutes of the state of Texas.
    We need not address your constitutional concerns because article
    1917, V.T.C.S., the authority cited in the order, does not empower the
    ten judges to act together in implementing the described program. Cf.
    V.T.C.S. art. 1958 (county judge may appoint counsel for indigentr
    Article 1917, V.T.C.S., provides as follows:
    Judges of district court8 may appoint counsel
    to attend to the cause of any party who makes
    affidavit that he is too poor to employ counsel to
    attend to the same.
    The statute authorizes a district court judge to appoint counsel in a
    particular cause when tha party makes the required showing. The
    predecessor of article 1917 is found in the 1846 statute organizing
    the district courts and defining their powers and jurisdiction:
    Be it further enacted, [t]hat the judges, in any
    case, civil or criminal, in which a party may
    swear that he is too poor to employ counsel, shall
    .-              appoint counsel for such party, who shall attend
    to the cause in behalf of such party without any
    fee or reward.
    Law of May 11, 1846, 111, 2 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1509 (1898). See
    also Code Grim. Proc. art. 26.04 (appointment of counsel in crimiz
    cases). Read in this context, article 1917 and its predecessor
    unmistakably refer to a single judge acting in a cause before his
    court.
    Article 1917 does not authorize district judges to act jointly to
    establish a program for matching indigents with counsel in civil
    eases. Cf. V.T.C.S. art. 200a. 04 (judges in Administrative Judicial
    District~pressly authorized to act jointly to facilitate disposition
    of cases). Thus, this statute does not authorize issuance of the
    order. A court may not hold an attorney in contempt for refusing to
    comply with an ambigious or invalid order. Bx parte Duncan, 
    62 S.W. 758
    (Tex. Grim. App. 1901).
    The order also attempts to delegate significant responsibility
    for carrying out the pro bono public0 plan to the El Paso Bar
    Association and other entities. It gives the El Paso Bar or its
    delegate authority to screen applicants for indigency. Indigency is
    to be determined according to the definition promulgated by the Legal
    Services Corporation. Thus, the order delegates the power to develop
    /-   standards for indigency to a federal entity. Although the order
    p. 709
    Honorable Luther Jones - Page 4    (JM-161)
    authorlees appointment of all licensed attorneys in the county without
    stating who will appoint attorneys in particular cases, paragraph 5
    seems to authorize the El Paso Bar Association or its delegate to
    appoint the attorney, while section 8 permits a committee of the bar
    association to excuse attorneys from the program.
    It is well established that a public officer cannot dalmgate
    judicial as opposed to ministerial powers without expreoo statutory
    authorization. Newsom v. Adams, 
    451 S.W.2d 948
    (Tex. Civ. App. -
    Beaumont 1970, no writ); Moody v. Taxas Water Conrmission.373 S.W.2d
    793 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1963, writ rcf'd n.r.s.). See Attorney
    General Opinions H-644 (1975); H-386 (1974); WJ-66 (19%;      V-350,
    V-265 (1947).
    Article 1917, V.T.C.S., is discretionary with the judge. Garcia
    v. I(lay, 
    556 S.W.2d 870
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Chrlsti 1977,
    dism d); Sandoval v. Rattikin, 
    395 S.W.2d 889
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus
    Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). cert. denied, 
    385 U.S. 901
    (1966).
    A district judge's power to appoint necessary subordinate officers and
    assistants is a judicial power. Eucaline Medicine Co. v. Standard
    Inv. co., 
    25 S.W.2d 259
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1930, writ ref'd).
    See also Boynton v. Brown, 
    164 S.W. 893
    (Tex. Civ. App. -,8m Antonio
    1914, writ ref'd) (distinguishing "judicial" and %lnisterial" acts in
    context of mandamus action).
    A presiding judge's decision to asatgn a judga to try cesee in a
    particular county and his choice of a particular judge are both
    discretionary acts. Morton's Estate v, Chapnun. 75 S.W.ld   876 (Tex.
    1934) (mandamus suit). See also White v. Reitar. 
    640 S.W.2d 586
    (Tex.
    Grim. App. 1982) (district judge ordered to dismiss court appointed
    attorney under exception to general mandamus rule).
    A judge's power under article 1917 to decide whether'an indigent
    should have a court appointed attorney and to appoint a particular
    attorney are discretionary powers which cannot be delegated to other
    persons.   A district judge may not delegate the powers which
    paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 8 attempt to delegata. Cf. White v. 
    Reiter. supra
    ; Rx parte Mays, 212 S.W.2d lb4 (Tax. Grim. K     194g) (district
    judge must consider attorney's claim that       conflict of interest
    prevents his appointment in particular criminel case).
    The quoted order is invalid in its entirety. Article 1917.
    V.T.C.S., authorizes a judge to appoint counsel for an indigent in a
    particular case but does not authoriae joint action   by a group of
    district judges to establish a progrem providing generally for
    representation of indigents. Moreover, specific prwiaionr of the
    order attempt to delegate nondelegable dircretlonary powers of the
    district judges, such as the power to appoint an attorney in a
    particular case, excuse attorneys from an appointment, determine
    p. 710
    Honorable Luther Jones - Page 5 (JM-161)
    standards for indigency, and apply those standards to particular
    applicants for legal services.
    SUMMARY
    Article 1917, V.T.C.S., does not authorize the
    district judges of El Paso County to establish a
    program for providing representation of indigents
    of the county in civil actions. The district
    judges may not delegate to another person or
    entity the discretionary powers to appoint an
    attorney in a particular case, excuse attorneys,
    determine standards for indigency or determine
    iudigency of a particular applicant for counsel.
    JIM     MATTOX
    Attorney General of Texas
    TOM GREEN
    First Assistant Attorney General
    DAVID R. RICBARDS
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    Prepared by Susan L. Garrison
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Rick Gilpin, Chairman
    David Brooks
    Colin Carl
    Susan Garrison
    Jim Moellinger
    Nancy Sutton
    P.,
    p. 711