Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1981 )


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  •                                  The Attorney           General of Texas
    December 4, 1981
    MARK WHITE
    Attorney General
    Mr. Andy Shuval                         Opinion No.   NW-404
    Supreme Court Building
    Executive Director
    P. 0. Box 12546
    Austin, TX. 76711              Texas Prosecutors Coordinating          Re: Appointment    of prosecutor
    5121475-2501                      Council                              pro tempore
    Telex 9101674.1367             1414 Colorado
    Telecopier   51214750266       Austin, Texas 78711
    1607 Main St., Suite 1400      Dear Mr. Shuval:
    Dallas, TX. 75201
    21417428944                         You have informed us that House Bill No. 649, passed in the last
    legislative session, contains language that raises questions regarding
    the manner and means by which a temporary prosecutor is appointed in
    4624 Alberta Ave., Suite 160
    El Paso, TX. 79905
    certain situations where the elected prosecutor is unable to serve.
    9151533.3464                   Section 3 of House Bill No. 649 amends article 332d. V.T.C.S.. by
    adding section 10A which provides in part:
    1220 Dallas Ave.. Suite 202
    (a) A prosecuting attorney pro tempore shall
    Houston, TX. 77002
    713/6500666
    be appointed by the body or person who has the
    authority to appoint the prosecuting attorney in
    the event of a vacancy.
    806 Broadway, Suite 312
    Lubbock, TX. 79401
    Acts 1981, 67th Leg., ch. 709, 53, at 2651.
    6061747-5236
    You ask what legal effect, if any, this statutory   language has on
    4309 N. Tenth, Suite B         the prior appointments of a criminal district attorney   pro ternwho was
    McAHen, TX. 76501              appointed on a continuing basis by the judges of         that county in
    5121662.4547
    accordance with article 2.07, Texas Code of Criminal     Procedure.  The
    elected criminal district attorney is under suspension   while appealing
    200 Main Plaza, Suite 400      his disbarment.
    San Antonio, TX. 76205
    512/225-4191                        The appointment of a prosecutor pro tern was initially made in
    1980. The same person was reappointed on August 24, 1981, by order
    An Equal Opportunity/
    signed by the judges of all the county courts of law and district
    Affirmative Action Employer    courts for the county. Article 2.07 provides, in pertinent part:
    (a) Whenever an attorney for the state is
    disqualified to act in any case or proceeding, is
    absent   from  the  county  or  district,  or  is
    otherwise unable to perform the duties of his
    office, or in any instance where there is no
    attorney for the state, the judge of the court in
    p. 1371
    Mr. Andy Shuval - Page 2   (Mw-404)
    which he represents the state may appoint any
    competent attorney to perform the duties of the
    office during the absence or disqualification of
    the attorney for the state.
    Specifically, you inquire:
    (1)  Whether  the governor may or should
    appoint a prosecutor pro tempore on the effective
    date of House Bill No. 649;
    (2) Whether the judicial appointments of the
    prosecutor pro tern are cancelled when House Bill
    No. 649 becomes effective;
    (3) Whether the judicial appointments of the
    prosecutor pro tern are cancelled when the governor
    appoints another prosecutor pro tempore;
    (4) Whether the judicial appointments of the
    prosecutor pro tern are cancelled when the removal
    action   against  the   current  elected   district
    attorney is completed?
    Article IV, section 12 of the Texas Constitution and article 328,
    V.T.C.S., grant the governor power to appoint a district attorney when
    a vacancy occurs.   Thus, you wish to know whether House Bill No. 649
    authorized the governor to appoint another prosecutor pro tempore to
    replace the individual serving on September 1, 1981, the effective
    date of the act.
    Section 10 of article 332d, V.T.C.S., provides for the suspension
    of a prosecuting attorney upon disbarment by a trial court and in
    subsection (III) states that "[ulpon disqualification or suspension of a
    prosecuting attorney, the duties of his office shall be performed by a
    prosecuting attorney pro tempore as provided by this Act." Acts 1981,
    67th Leg., ch. 709, §2, at 2651.         The suspension of the elected
    prosecutor does not create a vacancy in his office; it prevents him
    from performing its duties pending final resolution of the disbarment
    action.
    Prior to September 1, 1981, section 10(m) of article 332d,
    V.T.C.S.,  stated that "[ulpon disqualification     of a prosecuting
    attorney, the duties of his office shall be performed by a prosecuting
    attorney pro ternas otherwise provided by law." Acts 1977, 65th Leg.,
    ch. 345 at 917.    (Emphasis added).   In our opinion, this provision
    referred to article 2.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  Thus, the
    judge's appointment of a prosecutor pro tern was made pursuant to
    section 10(m) of article 332d, as well as article 2.07.
    The amendment to article 332d, V.T.C.S., which became effective
    on   September 1, 1981 protides that the governor shall appoint a
    p. 1372
    .   .
    Mr. Andy Shuval - Page 3       (Mw-404)
    prosecutor   v-0   tempore   when    the  regular  prosecutor    has   been
    disqualified or suspended.     Sets. 10(m), lOA(     see also Tex. Const.
    art. IV, §12; V.T.C.S. art. 328. The governor's power of appointment
    under article 332d comes into effect only upon the occurrence of a
    specific event -- the disqualification or suspension of the regular
    prosecutor.   In the present case, the significant event occurred prior
    to the time the governor had the power to appoint a prosecutor pro
    tempore. Thus, his appointment power could not have been brought into
    existence at that time. We do not believe that the governor acquired
    the power to replace the judicially appointed prosecutor pro tern on
    September 1, 1981. A statute is held to operate prospectively only,
    unless   it   clearly    states    a   legislative  intent    to    operate
    retrospectively.    See Freeman v. Terrell, 
    284 S.W. 946
    (Tex. 1926).
    Thus, the enactment of House Bill No. 649 does not terminate judicial
    appointments of a prosecutor pro ternmade before the effective date of
    the statute.
    You specifically inquire when the judicial appointments of the
    prosecutor pro tern terminate.   In our opinion, they will terminate
    when the suspension of the criminal district attorney is lifted, or
    when the disbarment becomes final and the governor exercises his right
    to fill the vacancy.
    A prosecuting attorney is suspended when he is disbarred, whether
    following trial or upon agreement, and a prosecutor pro tempore may
    then be appointed.      V.T.C.S. art. 332d, 810(d),(m).      See Green V.
    County Attorney of Anderson County, 592 S.W.Zd 69 (Tax.-".           App.   -
    Tyler 1979, no writ).     The prosecuting attorney is removed from office
    upon final adjudication or conviction for any cause of action which
    was the basis of his suspension.         V.T.C.S. art. 332d, 510(e).        A
    "final conviction" is a judgment of conviction from which defendant
    has exhausted his right to appeal.        Adams V. State, 
    125 S.W.2d 583
            (Tex. Crim. App. 1939); Allen V. Texas Department of Public Safety,
    
    411 S.W.2d 644
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1966, no writ).           In our
    opinion, "final adjudication" of a disbarment action also occurs when
    the defendant     has   exhausted   his   right   to appeal.    Any   other
    construction would render meaningless the provision for suspension of
    a prosecutor following disbarment rather than outright removal.           But
    cf.  Oliphint    V.   Christy,   
    299 S.W.2d 933
     (Tex.  1957)   ("final
    adjudication" in article 7.14, section 23 of the Election Code means
    determination by judge on competent evidence).      Although the court in
    Phagan v. State, 510 S.W.Zd 655 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1974,
    writ ref'd n.r.e.), held that a district attorney vacated his office
    upon the trial court's judgment of disbarment, that determination
    predated the enactment of article 332d.         Acts 1977, 65th Leg., ch.
    345, at 917. Procedures governing removal proceedings are established
    by statute.   -See Sullivan V. Berliner, 
    568 S.W.2d 844
    (Tex. 1978).
    Thus, under article 332d, V.T.C.S., the prosecutor's office is vacated
    by disbarment only upon final adjudication of disbarment.
    If the highest  court       to which   the disbarment   is appealed
    overturns it, the district       attorney's  suspension  from office is
    P. 1373
    .   .
    Mr. Andy Shuval - Page 4      (MW-404)
    lifted.   V.T.C.S. art. 332d, 510(m), Acts 1981, 67th Leg., ch. 709,
    42, at 2651. If the court upholds the disbarment, he is removed from
    office.   The governor is then entitled to appoint a replacement for
    the elected district attorney, to fill the vacancy created by his
    removal. Tex. Const. art. IV, 512; V.T.C.S. art. 328. The governor's
    appointment will continue only until the first general election
    thereafter.    T.3. Const. art. IV, 912.     If the governor does not
    exercise his power to appoint a successor immediately upon the
    district attorney's removal, the judges of the district court retain
    authority under article 2.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
    appoint a prosecutor pro tern "in any instance where there is no
    attorney for the state."     Under the facts presented, the prosecutor
    pro tern appointed by the judges may serve until the governor exercises
    his right to fill a vacancy created upon a final adjudication of
    disbarment.
    SUMMARY
    The appointment   of a prosecutor     pro tern
    pursuant to article 2.07 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure did not terminate as of September 1,
    1981, the effective date of amendments to article
    332d, V.T.C.S., by House Bill No. 649 of the
    Sixty-seventh Legislature.   This appointment will
    terminate when the suspension against the district
    attorney   is lifted, or in case the district
    attorney is permanently removed from office, when
    the governor exercises his right to fill the
    vacancy thereby created.
    Very truly yours,
    MARK      WHITE
    Attorney General of Texas
    JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    RICHARD E. GRAY III
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    Prepared by Joe Foy Jr. &
    Susan L. Garrison
    Assistant Attorneys General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Susan L. Garrison, Chairman
    Joe Foy Jr.
    Rick Gilpin
    Jim Moellinger
    p. 1374