Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1981 )


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  •                             The Attorney                 General of Texas
    May    22,   1981
    MARKWHITE
    Attorney General
    Honorable John J. Kavanagh, M.D.                  Opinion No. Mu-339
    Commissioner
    Texas Department of Mental Health                 Re: Consent for comprehensive
    and Mental Retardation                          diagnosis and evaluation and for
    P. 0. Box 12668, Capitol Station                  admission to non-residential mental
    Austin, Texas 78711                               retardation services
    Dear Dr. Kavanagh:
    You ask several questions involving an interpretation of the Mentally
    Retarded Persons Act of 1977, article 5547-300, V.T.C.S. You first ask
    whether this statute or any other statutory, constitutional or common law
    provision requires legally adequate consent for the performance        of a
    comprehensive diagnosis and evaluation.
    Section   3(20) of article    554’7-300, V.T.C.S., provides    the following
    definition:
    em eroadww. suite 312
    (20) ‘Legally adequate consent’ means consent
    ‘&bock, TX. 73401                     given by a person when each of the following
    am/74%3w3                             conditions has been met:
    (A) legal capacity: The person giving the Ansent
    is of the minimum legal age and has not been
    adjudicated   incompetent   to manage his personal
    affairs by an appropriate court of law;
    (B) comprehension of information:       The person
    giving the consent has been informed of and com-
    prehends the nature, purpose, consequences, risks,
    and benefits of and alternatives to the procedure, and
    the fact that withholding or withdrawal of consent
    shall not prejudice the future provision of care and
    services to the client       Furthermore,  in cases of
    unusual or hazardous treatment procedures, experi-
    mental research, organ transplantation,*      and non-
    therapeutic surgery, the person giving the consent has
    been informed of and comprehends the method to be
    used in the proposed procedure; and
    (Cl voltmtariness        The consent has been given
    voluntarily  and free        from coercion and undue
    influence.
    p. 1112
    Honorable John J. Kavanagh - Page Two         (MW-339)
    This standard of consent represents an attempt to state comprehensively the
    judicially developed standard of informed consent and to tailor it to persons who may
    be mentally retarded. As stated in Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W. 2d 299,301 (Tex. 1967):
    Physicians and surgeons have a duty to make a reasonable
    discloeure to a patient of risks that are incident to medical
    diagnosis and treatment.   This duty is based upon the patient’s
    right to information adequate for him to exercise an informed
    consent to or refusal of the procedure.     [Citations omitted].
    The nature and extent of the disclosure depends upon the
    medical problem as well as the patient.         In some medical
    procedures the dangers are great; in others they are minimaL
    Although the Mentally Retarded Persons Act expressly requires legally adequate
    consent in only three instances, see sections 35, 46(a) and 56(c) of article 5547-300, we
    believe legally adequate consenis       required where the common law would require
    informed consent    It is to be noted that the standard is flexible, in that the nature and
    extent of the information given will vary with the risks inherent to the procedure.
    In answer to your first question, we believe that article 5547-300, V.T.C.S..,
    requires legally adequate consent for the performance of a comprehensive diagnosm
    and evaluation, which is defined as follows:
    ‘Comprehensive diagnosis and evaluation’ means a study
    including a sequence of observations and examinations of a
    person leading to conclusions and recommendations formulated
    jointly, with dissenting opinions, if any, by a diagnosis and
    evaluation team. The study shall include but not be restricted
    to a social and medical history, and medical, neurological,
    audiological, visual, educational, appropriate psychological, and
    sociological examinations, and sn examination of the person’s
    adaptive behavior 1eveL
    V.T.C.S. art. 5547-300, S3(24).
    You next ask whether a comprehensive         diagnosis and evaluation must be
    performed before a person may be admitted to residential or non-residential mental
    retardation services. Section 28 of article 5547-300, V.T.C.S., clearly provides that no
    one is eligible to receive mental retardation      services unless he first receives a
    comprehensive diagnosis and evaluation.     “Mental retardation services” is defined to
    include residential   care and other programs of treatment       and rehabilitation   for
    mentally retarded persons. & S3(8).
    You next ask whether legally adequate consent is required for admission to
    residential or non-residential  mental retardation services.   In sections 35 and 46 of
    article 5547-300, V.T.C.S., the statute specifically requires legally adequate consent
    for admission to residential services. In addition, we believe the common law requires
    the acquisition of informed consent before a retarded person receives diagnosis or
    p.   1113
    Honorable John J. Kavanagh - Page Three      (MI+3391
    treatment.  The informed consent standard, as adapted to mentally retarded persons by
    article 5547-300, V.T.C.S., is the standard of legally adequate consent.
    You next ask whether mental retardation      services must be denied an adult
    proposed client if he has not been declared incompetent, has no guardian, and does not
    possess the mental capacity to give legally adequate consent for admission to mental
    retardation services. We believe the statute clearly requires us to answer this question
    in the affirmative.
    If the services must be denied, you next ask whether the proposed client has a
    property right protected by the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution similar
    to the one recognized in Java v. California Department            of Human Resources
    Development, 
    317 F. Supp. 875
    (NJ). Cal. 19701, afPd, 
    402 U.S. 12lU
    971). Java involved
    unemployment compensation claimants who were ruled eligible for beats              at an
    eligibility    interview   but whose payments were stopped, pending their former
    employer’s appeaL The district court held that absence of a pretermination       hearing
    constituted a denial of procedural due process The Supreme Court did not reach the
    constitutional     issue because it found the state practice to conflict with the Social
    Security Act.
    We believe the situation you pose invoIving mentally retarded clients is
    distinguishable from that in Java. The state never obtains the right to provide the
    mental retardation services as        the client has granted adequate consent to them.
    Although a client who has not given consent is denied the services, we do not believe
    the denial of services Infringes any right protected by the fourteenth amendment.
    You next inquire about a situation where an adult client has been admitted to
    mental retardation services and it is then determined that he has never been judicially
    declared incompetent, has no guardian, and does not possess the mental capacity to
    give legally adequate consent for the provision of such services. You ask whether the
    client must be discharged from the services.      We answer in the affirmative because
    one essential statutory criteria for the provision of services to the person has not been
    met.
    If such a client must be discharged, you ask whether he has a property right
    protected by the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution similar to the one
    recognized in Java. We do not believe he has such a property right, in that he has
    never initiallyeed     eligibility for such services nor has the state’ever acquired the
    power to provide them. However, article 5547-300 may impose additional duties on
    the superintendent in particular cases. See
    -   SS35,49. See also subchapter I.
    If, however, a mentally retarded client was admitted to facilities of the
    department under laws in force prior to the enactment of article 5547-300, he may
    remain until appropriate alternative placement is found or until he can be admitted or
    committed to a facility under the new law. V.T.C.S. art. 554’7-300, S49(a). If the
    person cannot be discharged without safety to himself or the general public, the
    superintendent or director of the Institution may apply for his commitment. Id, S49(b).
    p. 1114
    Honorable John J. Kavanagh - Page Four          (Mw-339)
    You finally ask whether the facility has any duty to initiate a guardianship
    proceeding to determine whether the client should be legally adjudicated incompetent
    and whether a guardian should be appointed for the client.         The statute does not
    impose any duty on the facility to initiate a guardianship proceeding for the client and
    the facility is prevented in some cases from serving as a guardian. -See Probate Code
    SS130A-1300.
    Nonetheless, when a person who must be released is in need of further care, the
    department may assist him in securing it. It may inform a relative or other person
    interested in the client’s welfare of the possibility of a guardianship. The relative, if
    willing, can become guardian and consent to the comprehensive             diagnosis and
    evaluation necessary to admission to mental retardation services. In the alternative,
    where the client meets the criteria set forth in article 5547-300, section 37(a), a
    judicial commitment under that section may be sought. Thus, although the department
    has no duty to initiate a guardianship proceeding, it can take measures to assist a
    discharged client in need of Institutional care to be provided a guardian or committed
    to an appropriate facility.
    SUMMARY
    Legally adequate consent as defined by section 3(20) of
    article 5547-300, V.T.C.S., is required for the performance of
    a comprehensive diagnosis and evaluation.         A comprehensive
    diagnosis and evaluation must be performed before a person
    may be admitted to residential          or non-residential     mental
    retardation services. Legally adequate consent is required for
    admission to residential or non-residential mental retardation
    services.    If an adult proposed client has not been declared
    incompetent, has no guardian, and does not possess the mental
    capacity to give legally adequate consent for admission to
    mental retardation services, he must be denied the services. If
    he has been admitted to services and it is then determined that
    he has never been judicially declared incompetent,             has no
    guardian, and does not possess the mental capacity to give
    legally adequate consent, he must be discharged from such
    service-s.    In neither case does he have a property right
    protected by the fourteenth amendment to the United States
    Constitution.     However, a client admitted to a facility under
    prior law may remain there until appropriate              alternative
    placement can be found. If he cannot be discharged without
    safety to himself or the public, the superintendent may apply
    for his commitment.        The facility has no duty to initiate a
    guardianship     proceeding to determine      whether the client
    should be legally adjudicated incompetent, but the department
    may take measures to assist a discharged client in need of
    institutional care to be provided a guardian or committed to an
    appropriate facility.
    p. 1115
    Honorable John J. Kavanagh - Page Five   (w-339)
    MARK      WHITE
    Attorney General of Texas
    JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    RICHARD E. GRAY III
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    Prepared by Susan L. Garrison
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMlTTEE
    Susan L. Garrison, Chairman
    Martha AlIan
    Jon Bible
    Rick Gilpin
    Bruce Youngblood
    p. 1116
    

Document Info

Docket Number: MW-339

Judges: Mark White

Filed Date: 7/2/1981

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017