Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1971 )


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  • CRAWFORD     C.   MAR-rxiw
    AUSTIN.   TEXAS    18111
    AITORN&Y   CiENERAL
    May 18, 1971
    2 --jLfl-          47
    Honorable G. F. Mutscher                 Opinion No. M-861
    Speaker, House of Representatives
    Capitol Building                         Re:     Constitutionality of
    Austin, Texas 78711                              Senate Bill 56 authorizing
    tuition equalization grants
    to students of approved
    private colleges and uni-
    Dear Mr. Mutscher:                               versities in Texas.
    We have received your request for an opinion of this
    office as follows:
    "Your attention is called to Senate Bill #56,
    copy enclosed, which is presently being considered
    by the House of Representatives.  Your opinion is
    respectfully requested as to whether the bill if
    enacted would in any respect violate the Texas Con-
    stitution, and most specifically, whether it would
    violate Article III, Section 51, or Article I,
    Section 7. of the Texas Constitution."
    The question for resolution       is presented in Section 1
    of the proposed bill which reads:
    "Section 1. In order to provide the maximum
    possible utilization of existing educational re-
    sources and facilities within this State, both
    public and private, the Coordinating Board, Texas
    College and University System, is authorized to
    provide tuition equalization grants to Texas resi-
    dents enrolled in any approved private Texas
    college or university, based on student financial
    need."
    -4179-
    ..
    lion. G. F. Mutscher, page 2                   (M-861)
    It is the opinion of this office that Senate Bill #56
    does not violate either Article I, Section 7, or Article III,
    Section 51, or other parts of the Texas Constitution.
    Article I, Section 7, Texas Constitution, reads as follows:
    "NO money shall be appropriated, or drawn
    from the Treasury for the benefit of any sect,
    or religious society, theological or religious
    seminary: nor shall property belonging to the
    State be appropriated for any such purposes."
    Article III, Section 51, reads, in its pertinent part,
    as follows:
    "The Legislature shall have no power to
    make any grant or authorize the making of any
    grant of public moneys to any individual, asso-
    ciation of individuals, municipal or other corpo-
    ration whatsoever; . . .I'
    The questions presented by Senate Bill #56, and your
    letter were passed on by this office in Opinion NO. M-391 while
    considering Senate Bills 631 and 485 in 1969. Such opinion de-
    termined that the Senate Bills considered did not violate Article
    I, Section 7, Article III, Section 51, or Article XVI, Section 6,
    of the Texas Constitution.
    The problem of separation of Church and State has been
    frequently discussed, and is presently before the United States
    Supreme Court in the cases Tilton v. Richardson, Lemon v. Kurtzman,
    and DiCenso v. Robinson.  This opinion, of course, is subject to
    the final outcome of these cases.
    In the case Board of Education v. Allen, 
    392 U.S. 236
    ,
    the United States Supreme Court reviewed a New York law requiring
    local public school authorities to loan textbooks, free of charge,
    to all students, grades seven through twelve, including those in
    private schools. The Court upheld the New York law stating:
    "Everson' and later cases have shown that the
    line between state neutrality to religion and state
    support of religion is not easy to locate. The
    constitutional standard.i.6 the separation of Church
    lEverson v. Board of Education, 
    374 U.S. 1
    (1947)           -4180-
    .      .
    Hon. G. F. Mutscher, page 3                          (M-861)
    and State. The problem, like many constitutional
    problems in constitutional law, is one of degree."
    The Court then set out a test to measure the degree
    declaring:
    "The test may be stated as follows: what are
    the purpose and then primary effect of the enactment?
    If either is the advancement or inhibition of re-
    ligion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
    legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
    That is to say that to withstand the strictures of
    the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
    leqislative purpose and a orimarv effect that neither
    advances nor inhibits religion."   (Emphasis added.)
    The primary purpose of Senate Bill 56, as set out in
    Section 1, is to serve a State or public purpose by 0 . . . uti-
    lization of existinq educational resources and facilities within
    this State, . . ." (Emphasis added.) with all the financial bene-
    fits to be derived therefrom.  The tuition aid is provided to in-
    dividuals, so the benefit to a particular religion is "indirect"
    and "remote" as opposed to "primary".
    There can be no doubt that it is in the public interest.
    to provide for the education of the student citizens of this State.
    The subject has been foremost in the minds of our citizens since
    prior to the Texas Declaration of Independence from Mexico, and
    exists today in our Texas Constitution.  Article VIII, Sections 1
    and 10.
    It is submitted that Senate Bill #56 meets the Supreme
    Court's test of having fl . . . a secular legislative purpose and
    a primarv effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
    (Emphasis added.)
    Courts in other states have followed the reasoning of the
    Supreme Court of Kentucky in Kentucky Buildinq Commission v. Effron,
    310 Ky. ‘355, 
    220 S.W.2d 836
    (1949) wherein the Court announced:
    -4181-
    Hon. G. F. Mutscher, page 4                      (M-861)
    "It is well settled that a~ private agency may
    be utilized as the pipe-line through which a public
    expenditure is made, the test beinq not who receives
    the money, but the character of the use for which
    it is expended."  (Emphasis added.)
    See also: In re Opinion of the Justices, 
    113 A.2d 114
    (Supreme
    Court, New Hampshire, 1955); Craiq v. Mercy Hospital-Street
    Memorial, 
    209 Miss. 427
    , 
    45 So. 2d
    . SO9 (1950); Leqat v. Adorno,,
    
    138 Conn. 134
    , 
    83 A. 2d
    . 185 (1951); Roe v. Kervich, 
    42 N.J. 191
    ,
    
    199 A.2d 834
    (1964); and Attorney General Opinions C-644 and C-
    719 which approved contracts and tuition payments with religious
    institutions under the theory above stated.
    Further, "It is plain that an expenditure is not neces-
    sarily barred because individuals as such may profit . . .", 51
    Am.Jur. 281 Taxation, Sec. 330, et seq. and authorities cited
    therein. See also Attorney General Opinions C-474, C-719 and
    M-391.  In Attorney General Opinion V-1067 (1950) we stated, in
    part, as follows:
    "In determining whether an expenditure of
    public moneys constitutes a gift or a grant of
    public moneys, 'the primary question is whether
    the funds are used for a "public" or "private"
    purpose. The benefits of the State from an ex-
    penditure   for a "public purpose" is in the nature
    of consideration and the funds expended and there-
    fore not a gift even though private persons are
    benefited therefrom."'
    It is a legislative function to determine what consti-
    tutes a "public purpose" and will not be reversed by the courts
    unless manifestly arbitrary and incorrect. State ex rel. McClure
    v. Haqerman, 
    155 Ohio St. 320
    , 
    98 N.E.2d 835
    (1951). Where a low
    rent housing project was objected to as being a prohibited gift
    to individuals, our Supreme Court in Housinq Authoritv of City of
    Dallas v. Hiqqinbothom, 
    135 Tex. 158
    , 
    143 S.W.2d 79
    (1950) held
    that the Legislative Declaration of the purpose of the legislation
    must be given weight by the Courts.
    -4182-
    Hon. G. F. Mutscher, page 5                      (M-861)
    It is therefore our opinion that Senate Bill #56 declares
    a secular legislative or public purpose and is not violative of the
    Constitution of the State of Texas.
    Our only reservation concerning Senate Bill No. 56 is
    that, if passed, the Coordinating Board, under Section 6, should
    make sufficient regulations to prevent forced religious courses
    or activity on the recipients of the funds by the schools attended..
    mace   Mann League of U.S. v. Bd. Public Wks,, 220 A2d 51 (Md.1966).
    SUMMARY
    Senate Bill No. 56, providing for tuition
    equalization grants, states a primary purpose to
    provide the maximum possible use of existing re-
    sources and facilities in this State and therefore
    does not violate the separation of church and state
    doctrine of Article I, Section 7 or the prohibition
    of grants of public funds to individuals of Article
    III, Section 51 of the Texas Constitution.
    Attor   General of Texas
    Prepared by Melvin E. Corley
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Kerns Taylor, Chairman
    W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman
    -4183-
    (   9
    Hon. G. F. Mutscher, page 6                    (M-861)
    Rex White, Jr.
    J. C. Davis
    Jack Goodman
    Bob Flowers
    HEADE F. GRIFFIN
    Staff Legal Assistant
    ALFREDWALKER
    Executive Assistant
    NOLA WRITE
    First Assistant
    -4184-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M-861

Judges: Crawford Martin

Filed Date: 7/2/1971

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017