Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1965 )


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  • Honorable R. A. Stalllngs       Opinion No. C-515
    County Attorney
    Port Rend County                Re: Whether the operator's
    Richmond, Texas                     license of a defendant granted
    probation under the provisions
    of the Misdemeanor Probation
    Law of 1965 for the first
    offense of driving a motor
    vehicle while,intoxicatedis
    Dear Mr. Stallings:                 automaticallysuspended.
    In your opinion request you ask if a driver's license is
    automaticallysuspended when a person has been convicted of the
    misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated,first offense,
    and has been granted probation under the terms of the Misde-
    meanor Probation Law of 1965, Acts 1965, 59th Leg:, Ch. 164,
    p. 346. This question presupposes that said Misdemeanor Pro-
    bation Law of 1965 applies to driving while intoxicated,first
    offense, and that a person convicted of said offense is eligible
    for probation under the terms thereof.
    Section 3(a) of said A&provides   in part as follows:
    "A defendant who has been found
    guilty of a misdemeanorwherein the
    maximum permissible punishment is by
    confinement in jail or by a fine in
    excess 0-0     may be granted proba-
    tion If:
    II
    . . ." (Emphasis added)
    Adherence to the strict letter of this provision would mean that
    misdemeanor probation,may be granted only where the maximum
    permissible punishment is (I) by confinement in jail or (2) by
    a fine in excess of $200, and that when both confinement in jail
    and a fine are permitted or required, the Act would not apply.
    The purpose of the Misdemeanor Probation Law of 1965 was
    to extend the benefits of probation to those persons convicted of
    certain misdemeanor offenses. Heretofore, the benefits of pro-
    bation have been available only to those persons convicted of
    felony offenses. Section 3(a) of said Act was put in as a
    -2423-
    c
    Hon. R. A. Stallings,page 2 (C-515)
    bottom limit for the granting of probation so that probation
    could only be granted to those persons convicted of misdemeanor.
    o?fenses of a more serious nature and to prevent our courts from
    being cluttered with probation requests in mere trivial matters.
    If a strict interpretationof this Act is made, however,
    then we will arrive at an absurd and unjust result. First,
    Section 3(a) would allow a hiatus from probation for lesser
    misdemeanor offenses to probation for felony offenses while no
    probation could be given for more serious misdemeanor offenses.
    The absurdity of such a strict construction is more apparent
    in Sections 3(a)(2) and 3(c), for the strict interpretationof
    these Sections would mean that a person who has previously been
    convicted of a misdemeanor offense, wherein punishment by con-
    finement In jail only is allowed, would not be eligible for
    ,futureprobation while a person who has previously been convicted
    of a misdemeanor offense, wherein confinement in jail and a fine
    of less than $200 is permissible,would be eligible fofpro-
    bated sentence. Such a result would be one neither intended nor
    anticipated by the Legislature and should not be attributed to
    them.
    In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 
    83 S.W. 929
    , our
    Supreme court held:
    II
    'Where,however, the language
    .   .   .
    of the statute is of doubtful meaning,
    or where ah adherence to the strict
    letter would lead to injustice, to ab-
    or to contradictoryprovisions,
    SF%%
    e u y devolves upon the court of as-
    certaining the true meaning. If the
    intentions of the Legislature cannot be
    discovered, it is the duty of the court
    to give the statute a reasonableconstruc-
    tion, consistent with the general rin-
    ciples of law.' 59 C.J., P. 957, f356%
    Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State of 
    Texas, supra
    ." (Emphasis added)
    We, ,therefore,hold that the Misdemeanor Probation Law of
    1965 applies to all misdemeanorswherein a permissible  punish-
    ment upon conviction is:   1) by confinement in jail; (2) by a
    fine in excess of $200; (3f by confinement in jail plus a fine
    of any amount.
    We are further supported In our conclusion by the recent
    decirion of the Supreme Court of Texas in Sweeny Hospital
    Dirtrict v. Carr, 
    378 S.W.2d 40
    (TexiSup.IgW) :
    -2424-
    - Ron. R. A. Stallings,page 3 (C-515)
    “The courta of this state have
    on occasion added worclsor phrases to
    statutes when necessary to gtve effect
    to legislativeintent,.. . .
    Section k(a) of the Misdemeanor Probetion Laudof 1965 is
    clear and unambiguous. It states:
    “When a defendant is granted pro-
    bation under the terms of this Act,
    the finding of guilty does not become
    final, nor may the COI11% render judg-
    B-thereon,    except as provided-in-
    Section 6 of this Act.” (Emphasis
    added)      .
    Article 6687b, Section 24(a)2, V.C.S., provides for the
    automatic suspension of the license of any person upon final
    conviction of driving a motor vehicle while undtr the mnce
    of intoxicatingliquor or narcotic drugs.
    Since the probated Judgment is not a final con?rSction,
    the
    driver’s license is not automaticallysuspended.
    Section 6(b) provides:
    “On the date the probation Is
    revoked, the finding of guilty becomes
    final and the court shall render judg-
    ment thereon against the dtfendant....”
    In the event that probation is revoked and the judgment
    becomes final in accordance with this prOVlBiOn, tht dri%fSr’S
    license is automaticallysuspended at such ,time.
    We art not unmindful of tht provision of Article 668?b,
    Soetlon 25(c), V.C.S., which reads as follows:
    “For the purpose of this Act, the
    term ‘conviction’shall meana finaT
    conviction. Also, for the purpose of
    Fhis Act, a forfeltur% of bail or collateral
    deposited to secure a defendant’s appearance
    in court, which forfeiture has not been
    vacated, shall be equivalent to a conviction.
    “Provided,however, that in case of
    conviction for any of the offenses enumerated
    in paragraph (a) of Section 24 of this Act,
    -24253
    Hon. R. A. Stallings,page 4 (c-515)
    and the sentence of the court having
    been suspended as provided in the
    Statutes, such suspended sentence shall
    not mitigate against the suspension of
    the operatorts,commercial operator's,
    or chauffeur's license of the person
    convicted." (Emphasisadded)
    It is well settled that there is no sentence in a misde-
    meanor case. Since this proviso applies only where the
    sentence of the court is suspended, it has no application to a
    misdemeanor case.
    SUMMARY
    A driver's license is not automaticallysus-
    pended when a person is convicted of driving
    while intoxicated,first offense, and placed
    on probation under the terms of the Misdemeanor
    Probation Law of 1965.
    Yours very truly,
    WAGGONER CARB
    Attornev General of Texas
    Assistant Attorney General
    REO:sss
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    W. V. Geppert, Chairman
    W. 0. Schultz
    John Banks
    Robert W. Norris
    John Reeves
    APPROVED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: T. B. Wright
    -2426-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C-515

Judges: Waggoner Carr

Filed Date: 7/2/1965

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017