Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1965 )

NEY GENERAL
EXAS
June 7, 1965
Honorable John C. White Opinion No. C-450
Commissioner of Agriculture
John H. Reagan Building Re: Whether the sale of cer-
Austin, Texas tain packages of sliced
bread weighing less than
one pound violates the
provisions of Rule 5 of
Article 719 of Vernon's
Dear Mr. White: Penal Code.
You have requested the opinion of this office in con-
nection with the following questions:
"1. Does a 'loaf' of bread lose its identity
and need for conformity to the law when the product
is baked in the usual fashion but packaged in slices
without end pieces and labeled as 'bread slices' with
a total weight of less than a pound?
"2. Under the circumstances as above, would
the elimination of the word 'bread' on the label
and the substitution of a descriptive phrase such
as 'party slices' or 'rye slices' or similar term(s)
exempt the product from provisions of the law?
"3. If the slices are packaged in a fashion
as to dlstinguish.them somewhat from the usual pound
or heavier loaf, can the wrap cause the bread to
lose its identity as a 'loaf',and exempt it from the
law?
"4. Is it your opinion that the makers of the
law intended the term 'loaf' as a general application
to a unit of merchandisable bread or is the law limited
to a bread product whose sha e or configuration has, by
common usage, establishedYE%3a 'loaf'?"
Rule 5 of Article 719, Vernon's Penal Code, provides
that:
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Hon. John C. White, page 2 (C-450)
"Bread to be sold by the loaf made by bakers
engaged in the business of wholesaling and retailing
bread, shall be sold based upon any of the following
standards of weight and no other, namely: a loaf
weighing one pound or 16 ounces, a loaf weighing 24
ounces or a pound and a half, and loaves weighing
two pounds or 32 ounces, and loaves weighing three
pounds, or some other multiple of one pound or 16
ounces. These shall be the standard of weight for
bread to be sold by the loaf. Variations, or toler-
ance, shall not exceed one ounce per pound over or
under the said standard within a period of 24 hours
after baking."
In regard to the foregoing statute and questions you
have set forth in your opinion request that:
"The statute was passed in 1921. In 1921,
practically all the bread offered for sale was
sold in a solid, uncut or undivided loaf and sold
by the pound and other multiples of a pound and
sold as an unwrapped product. The wrapping of
bread with labels on the wrapper descriptive of
the contents was unknown at that time and no such
product as sliced bread or sliced rolls was being
made then. . . .'
In Attorney General's Opinion No. WW-290 (1957), the
question was presented as to whether a one pound package of Rye
Slices composed of two rows of slices in a cardboard box with a
cellophane overwrap could be legally sold in Texas in view of the
provisions of Rule 5 of Article 719. In holding that such a sale
was not in violation of Rule 5 of Article 719, it was stated in
Attorney General's Opinion No. WW-290 (1957) that:
"The purpose for prescribing standard weights
for loaves of bread is to prevent the vendor from
selling loaves of similar size as those of a larger
size. 90 A.L.R. 1291. In the case of the product
at hand, we fall to find any factor present which
would tend to mislead the public. As a result of
the packaging of the product, the buyer must pur-
chase both rows of slices, which have an aggregate
weight of one pound. Thus, it is logical, we
believe, to hold that the purchaser is in fact
getti;g Ia loaf' of bread which weighs one pound.
. . .
In the case of Petersen Raking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S.
570 (1934), the United States Supreme Court had before it the
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Hon. John C. White, page 3 (c-450)
question of the validity of a statute of the State of Nebraska
similar to Rule 5 of Article 719. The Court in its opinion up-
holding the validity of the statute stated that:
f!
. . .The fixing of a maximum weight for
each size or class of loaves is not unreasonable.
In Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, we were
called on to consider the constitutionality of a
similar measure. .We were there adverted to
the undoubted power,of the State to protect pur-
chasers of bread from imposition by the sale of
short-weight loaves (Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226
U.S. 578, 588) and showed that the purpose of
prescribing minimum weights Is to prevent sellers
from palming off loaves ?f smaller size as those
of a larger size. . . .
In view of the foregoing, it seems obvious that the
intent of the Legislature in enacting Rule 5 of Article 719 was
to protect purchasers of bread from being misled by "short-weight"
loaves or units of bread. The Legislature, by prescribing the
various weights that bread could be offered to the public for sale,
was protecting the unwary from the unscrupulous. Such being the
case, we are of the opinion that the use of the word "loaf" or
'loaves" in Rule 5 of Article 719 should not be given a narrow or
restrictive construction which might easily result in defeating
the legislative intent. This viewpoint is well recognized as a
cardinal rule of statutory construction. See 39 Tex.Jur., Sec-
tion 110, Statutes.
We are therefore of the opinion that your first three
questions should be answered in the negative. The mere descrip-
tive designation, manner of packaging or method of slicing a loaf
or unit of bread will not operate to exempt the vendor of such
bread from the requirements of Rule 5 of Article 719.
As to the remaining question posed, we are of the
opinion that it is the obvious legislative intent, in view of
the foregoing authorities, that the use of the word "loaf" or
'loaves' in Rule 5 of Article 719 refers to a "unit" of bread
being offered for sale rather than the bread's shape or config-
uration.
SUMMARY
The mere descriptive designation, manner of
packaging or method of slicing a loaf or unit of
bread being offered for sale will not operate to
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Hon. John C. White, page 4 (C- 450)
exempt the vendor of such bread from the require-
ments of Rule 5 of Article 719, Vernon's Penal
Code.
,P.he
use of the word 'loaf" or 'loaves" in
Rule $ of irticle 719, Vernon's Penal Code, refers
to a unit of bread being offered for sale rather
than the bread's shape and configuration.
Very truly yours,
WAGGONER CARR
Attorney General
By:%k \s
Pat Bailey
Assistant
PB:mkh
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
George Gray, III, Acting Chairman
Bill Allen
John Banks
V. F. Taylor
Bob Norris
APPROVED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: T. B. Wright
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