Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1960 )


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  •                            June 22, 1960
    Mr. William J. Gillespie      Opinion No. WW-862
    County Attorney
    Lubbock County               Re:   Does Article 2892, Ver-
    Lubbock, Texas                     non's Civil Statutes,
    mean that children can
    be compelled to attend
    school only during the
    first one hundred twen-
    ty days of the school
    year, and related
    Dear Mr. Gillespie:                questions.
    We are In receipt of your letter requesting an opinion
    on the following questions:
    "a) Does Article 2892 pernon's Civil
    Statuteg mean that children can be compel-
    led to attend school only during the first
    one hundred twenty days of the school year?
    "b) Does Article 2892 pernon's Civil
    Statutegmean   that children can be compel-
    led to attend school at any time during the
    school year until a total of one hundred
    twenty days attendance Is reached.
    "c) Does the failure to file a com-
    plaint within the first one hundred twenty
    days of the school year preclude a criminal
    action against the parent under Article 299?"
    Article 2892, Vernon's Civil Statutes, reads as follows:
    "Every child In the State who Is seven
    years and not more than sixteen years of
    age shall be required to attend the public
    schools In the district of its residence, or
    In some other district to which It may be
    transferred as provided by law, for a period
    of not less than one hundred and twenty days.
    The period of compulsory school attendance at
    each school shall begin at the opening of the
    school term unless otherwise authorized by
    i.   -   -   I
    Mr. William   J. Gillespie, Page 2 (``-862)
    the district school trustees and notice given
    by the trustees prior to the beginning of such
    school term; provided that no child shall be
    required to attend school for a longer period
    than the maximum term of the public school In
    the district where such child resides."
    The Court In Trimmer v. Carlton, 
    116 Tex. 572
    , 
    296 S.W. 1070
    (1927), In interpreting a statute held that It Is
    the duty of the court to ascertain the Intention of the Leg-
    islature and that words will not be given their literal
    meaning where such an Interpretation will lead to an absur-
    dity or thwart the plain purpose of the Legislature. The
    Court also held that in Interpreting a statute It is the
    duty of the court to consider the whole Act, including the
    caption, the Act Itself and the emeraencv clause. in order
    to-arrive at the Intention of the Legislature. ~The Supreme
    rs v. City of San Antonio, 
    110 Tex. 618
    , 223
    0) held these to be the primary rules of con-
    struction.
    The caption of the original compulsory education Act,
    Acts 1915, page 92, begins as follows:
    "An Act to compel attendance upon public
    schoo+,sof Texas by children between the ages
    . . .
    Section 1 of this Act, from which Article 2892, Ver-
    non's Civil Statutes, and Article 297, Vernon's Penal Code,
    were derived, reads In part as follows:
    "Section 1. Attendance Requirements and
    Provisions. - Every child In this State who Is
    eight years and not more than fourteen years
    old shall be requlred to attend the public
    schools In the district of Its residence, or In
    some other district to which It may be trans-
    ferred, as provided by law, for a period of not
    less than sixty days for the scholastic year,
    beginning September 1, 1916, and for a period
    of not less than eighty days for the scholastic
    year beginning September 1, 1917, and for the
    scholastic year 1918-19. and each scholastic
    year thereafter a~minlmkn attendance of IO0
    days shall be required. . . .I'(Emphasis added)
    It Is our opinion that the language of this Act shows
    the primary Intent of the Legislature to compel a minimum
    Mr. William J. Gillespie, Page 3 (~11-862)
    attendance and that the number of days rather than a partl-
    cular calendar period ls,what was Intended by Section 1.
    This view Is In accord with that of the Texarkana
    Court of Appeals which hel'd'as follows In the case of Palmer
    v. District Trustees of District No. 21, 
    289 S.W.2d 344
    ,
    error ref. n.r.e. [lgbb).
    II
    . It Is our view that the para-
    mount purpose of the,compulsory school law
    Is to compel parents, or'persons~standlng
    In parental relation to children,subject to
    the compulsory school law, to see that such
    children attend school . . i"
    This interpretation is supported further by the Acts
    of 1939, 46th Legislature, page 227, which amended Article
    297 of Vernon's Penal Code. The Legislature In 193.5(Acts
    1935, 44th Legislature, page 409, chapter 160) had amended
    Article 2892, Vernon's Civil Statutes, and Article 297, Ver-
    non's Penal Code, to lower the minimum age and raise the
    maximum age. Article 2892, Vernon's Civil Statutes quoted
    above is identical to the,1935 Act. The Legislature In the
    1939 amendment inserted the word "annually" after the words
    "one hundred twenty days" In Article 297. Section 2 of the
    1939 amendment expresses the legislative Intent as follows:
    "Sec. 2. The fact that the word 'annu-
    ally' was omitted from Article 297 as amended
    whereas it was clearly the Intent of the Leg-
    islature as expressed in the Act to require
    school attendance of one hundred and twenty
    (120) days each scholastic year . . .'
    This language shows clearly that the Legislature was
    concerned with a minimum number of days In attendance In con-
    trast to a certain period on the calendar. It Is our opinion
    that by the doctrine of "par1 materia" (See Texas Jurls. Vol.
    '39, page 253) Article 2892, Vernon's Civil Statutes, would beg
    governed by the same Interpretation, as Article 297, Vernon's
    Texas Penal Code.
    In view of the reasons and rules of construction stat-
    ed above you are advised that your first question Is answered
    in the negative and that your second question Is answered In
    the affirmative.
    Applying the same reasons and rules of construction
    stated above we are of the opinion that the failure to file a
    complaint within the first one hundred and twenty days of the
    Mr. William J. Gillespie, Page 4 (``-862)
    school year will not preclude a criminal action against the
    parent or person standing ln.parental relation to the child
    under Article 299 of the Penal Code.
    Your third question Is, therefore, answered in the
    negative.
    SUMMARY
    The compulsory education law, specl-
    flcaIIy Articles 2892, Vernon's civil
    Statutes, and.297, Vernon's Penal Code,
    requires school attendance for a minl-
    mum of one hundred twenty (120) days a
    year. The failure to file a complaint
    within the first one hundred and twenty
    days of the school year will not pre-
    clude a criminal action against the
    parent or the person standing In parent-
    al relation to the child under Article
    299 of the Penal Code.
    Very truly yours,
    Robert A. Rowland
    Assistant Attorney General
    RAR:mm
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    W. V. Geppert, Chairman
    Donald R. Bernard
    Houghton Brownlee, Jr.
    Riley Eugene Fletcher
    James R. Irlon, III
    REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY:   Leonard Passmore
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WW-862

Judges: Will Wilson

Filed Date: 7/2/1960

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017