Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1950 )


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  •                              Awwt     25, 1950
    Hon. Roy L. Hill                       opiniorr   ao.    V-1098.
    County Attorney
    Runnels County                         Re: Authority  of the Coun-
    Ralllnger , Texas                          tg to prevent a land
    owner frcm closing  a
    Dear SFr:                                  road across his land.
    Your request    for   an opinion    reads in part as
    follows   :
    ‘In the year 1939, a number of citi-
    zens together with the owner of land, over
    which the road was established,       agreed on
    the community using the road across his
    ranch; t&s was a permissive and agreeable
    ‘,use on the part of the owner. They sought
    help from the County in maintaining the
    road, and the Commissioner used his ma-
    chl.nery in gram,        filling in, building
    cattle    guards, etc. on the road, and such
    work is still     being done, as I understand.
    The road is nov, and has been used by the
    general publio,     and a school bus route has
    been maintained       and Is nov being so used
    on this road.      he son of the original     ovn-
    er now wants to close the road . . ."
    You ask vhether           the landovner       csn close    the
    road in question.
    It was held In Evaus v. Scott,                83 S.N.    874,
    877 (Tex.Clv.App.1904):
    ”
    There were two theories     upon
    vhlch ihi ippellees      sought to restrain    ap-
    pellant    from Interference    with the publlcts
    use of the road and the closing         of the same;
    First,   an Implied dedication      to such use by
    appellant     and those under whcunhe claimed;
    second, the acquisition      of the right on the
    part of the public to use the road by pre-
    scription.      These respeatlve    olalms of right
    to the we of a highway rest upon and are
    678
    Hon. Roy L. Hill,      page 2     (V-1098)
    governed by essentially         different    princi-
    ples of law.       It iS eaid that an Implied
    dedication     is one arising      by operation of
    law from the acts of the owner, and is
    founded on the doctrine         of equitable es-
    top 41. Elliott        ,011Roads and Streets (26
    It is essential      in such case
    %k   1 !d”,&er      Intended to set the land
    apart to the use and benefit           of the pub-
    lic.     This need not be evidenced by deed.
    ‘It Is enough that there has been scme
    clear,     UmqtiVocal act or d8claFatlon          of
    the proprietor       evidencing    an intention     to
    set it apart for a public use, * and that
    there has been an acoeptauce on the part
    of the public.        The length of time the
    .. road has been used by the public is of no
    consequence,      unless it becomes Important,
    in connection with other circumstances,
    to show an intention        on the part of the
    owner of the land to dedicate it to the
    public e Oswald v. Grenet, 
    22 Tex. 94
    ;
    Preston v. City of Navasota, 
    34 Tex. 684
    ;
    City of Corslcana v. Anderson (TexXlv.
    App.) 78 S.X. 261; Elliott           on Roads dc
    ‘.                Streets,     Sg 160, 161.      Unlike an implied
    dedication,      which as ve have seen, oper-
    ates by way of es~oppel ln pals rather
    than by grant, a right by prescription
    rests upon the presumption that the own-
    er of the land has granted the easement,
    and that the grant has been lost.             City
    of Austin v. Hall. 
    93 Tex. 591
    , 57 S.Y.
    563; Saunders v. Simpson (Tenn.Sup.) 
    37 S.W. 195
    .      To sustain this claim it is
    not neaessary to show intent on the part
    of the owner of the land to set apart the
    road to the use of the public, and the
    e:ement of acceptance Is not Involved;
    vhereas the length of t-8            the’road baa
    been used by the public is the foundation
    upon which the cla$m rests, and the use
    upon which the right is predicated must
    have contlnued uninterrupted           under au ad-
    verse ‘claim of right’ for the full pre-
    scriptive    period. . . . The public’s
    right of prescrlptlon         to a highway is not
    dependent upon the recognition           of that
    right by the mnlclpal         authorities    of the
    i
    Ron. Roy L. Bill,
    679
    page 3    (V-10@)
    county, but is acquired by adverse use
    for the time arid In the manuerprescrlb-
    ed by the rule8 of lav to which we have
    adverted.     Acts done by the munlclpal au-
    thorities    of the county In reoognltion       of
    the road in question as a public hi huay
    vould doubtless be facts or circmm f ances
    evidenci      the aCCOpbtnC8 of it under ap-
    p41144~s 2 heory of dedication,      but the
    absence of such acts vould not prevent the
    acquisition     of the right on the part of the
    public to use the road by preecriptlon.          Pub-
    lic use i.wthe mamer stated and for the
    necessary period of prescription        establishes
    the public right as firmly as if It had been
    created by an express grant.        Furthermore,
    .   a suit to establish      a right to use a way
    claWed by prescription        is in the nature of
    or analogous to a suit to recover land,
    based upon a title      acquired by adverse pos-
    session under our statutes of llmitatlon,
    although the interest       which may be acqtir-
    ed by prescription      is only an easement, and
    not en estate In fee; and, where the pre-
    scriptive    period, as in this state, is not
    fixed by statute,      we conclude the longest
    period of limitation      In actions for land,
    which 1s 10 years, till,by       analogy, apply.
    Hence we hold that 10 years is the erlod
    of prescription    rln this state, and -the
    court correctly    so charged.'
    It was held in Philll~s    v. T. dc P. Ry. 296 S.Y.
    877, 880 (Tex. Comm.App.1927) that "the ublic may by ad-
    verse use for the prescriptive    period, &l.ch 1s ordlnarl-
    ly 10 years in this state, acquire the line of hlghvay in
    a road though the counties have not recognized it as such.*
    In Black v. Terry Countg,        183 S V.26 685, 687
    (Tex.Civ.App.l944),  it was held:
    "The law is vell established    in this
    State that whenever the ovners of land ob-
    tatamwledge      of the fact that the county,
    the right tomintaina       roadaud,
    acting "&hrough its road overseer, takes ac-
    tual end visible   possession  of the land over
    which It runs by vorklng it or Preparing it
    for public travel,   thereby asserting a Clair
    .
    Hon. Roy L. Rlll,      page 4   (V-1098)
    to it for the public in such manner that
    the ovners, if present, would have ascer-
    tained the fact that the road vas being
    established    In behalf af the county and
    the public general1        the period of llm-
    ltation   or prescrip enIon begins to run.
    The testimony shows that J. S. Black had
    possession    of the entire Section 25 until
    his death and since MS death, J. Ii. Black
    has nW.ntained possession       for himself and
    the other appellants      oonstantly and con-
    tinuous1y.     He admitted in his testimony
    that there probably was a road or passage-
    vay along the north line of Section 25
    ever since the Forrlster       schoolhouse was
    erected,    and stated that he put some of
    the section In cultivation       in 1928.   But
    whether any of the appellants had actual
    know14 4 of the road or not, according
    to the “&estlmony it was laid out by the
    citizens    of Terry County and worked or
    ‘scraped out’ in 1924 by the county au-
    thorities    and graded by them in 1927.
    Even If the appellant,      J. B. Black, who
    represented the other appellants,        did not
    have actual knowledge of the establish-
    ment of the road, he vas charged with such
    tiowledge because he undoubtedly would have
    ho!in about it if he had been present at
    the time and would have lmown of the pub-
    lic travel over it at any time afterwards.
    These acts of establisblng       the road and
    the general travel over it having occur-
    red more than nfneteen years before appel-
    lants filed this suit or made any effort
    to discontinue     the road, the County and
    the public    acquired  title   to it by pre-
    scrlptlon.”
    . ..
    In view of the foregoing,    it is ow oplnlon
    that vhen a county maintains a road by working it or pre-
    paring it for public travel,    thereby asserting  a claim to
    it for the public in such a manner that the road is es-
    tablished  for the benefit  of the county and the public
    generally,   the period of prescription   begins to run. The
    period of prescription   in this State is 10 years. Uheth-
    or the Poad In question has been acquired by Runnels
    County by rescription    is a fact question which this of-
    fice canno ii answer.
    I
    .._
    681
    Hon. Roy L. Hill,     page 5’ (V-1098)
    SUMMARY
    A county may acqoire a public road by
    prescription,   which Fn this State is 10
    years.    Uhena countymalntains    a roadby
    vorlslng it or preparing it for public trav-
    ' 41, thereby establishing    a claim to the
    road for the public in such a manor that
    the road is establlshed    for the benefit   of
    the   couuty and the public generally,   the
    period of prescription    begins to run.
    APPROVED%                                Yours very truly,
    J. C. Davis, Jr.                           PRICE MRIRL
    County Affairs  Mvlslon                  Attorney General
    Everett Hutchinson
    Executive Assistant
    Charles D. Mathews                       B%5-ezcAv~
    First Assistant                                       Assistant,
    JR:mf:mw
    

Document Info

Docket Number: V-1098

Judges: Price Daniel

Filed Date: 7/2/1950

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017