Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1955 )


Menu:
  • Honorable Wa1ter.L. Bell     OpinionsHo. S.-l70
    Executive Director   "     .~ : ,-.
    State Board of Control      Re: Construction of Section.
    Austin, Texas                     21 of Article XVI. of the ``
    Constitution of Texas a,s
    to the purchase offuel
    Dear Mr.-Bell:                    for State departments. i
    ~Your opinion request reads as follows:
    "Section 21 ~ofArticle .XVI of the Constitui
    tion of Texas provides in substance, with,,other
    provisions not material to this request, that
    all :fuel used inthe legislative~,andother de-,.    .``
    partments of the government shall be furnished    ..
    under contract to be given to the lowest respon-
    sible bidder and under such regulations as'-shall '.
    be prescribed by law and all such contracts shall ,.1,:
    be subject to the approval of the Governor,
    Secretary of State and Comptroller.,
    "Under Article .634,of~the Revised Civil Stat-  ~:
    utes, the Board of Control is made the purchasing
    agent for all supplies, except perishable goods,
    which are used by the departments and inst.itutions :
    of the State. The Board also handles utility con-
    tracts for the state ~buildingswhichare in its
    custody. In carrying out .these duties it is neces-
    sary for us to determine whatcontracts made by
    the Board~come withinthis constitutional provi-
    sion. We request.your opinion on the following
    questions:
    "(1) Does the term 'fuel' as used in Section
    21 of Article XVI of the Constitution include gas-
    oline and other motor fuels which,are purchased
    and used exclusively for operating automobiles,
    trucks, airplanes, boats or other types of vehi-
    cles?
    "(2) Do contracts for the purchase of gasoline,
    diesel fuel, propane, butane, and similar typesof
    fuel for stationary power or heating purposes come
    within this provision?
    r   -.
    Hon. Walter L. Bell, page 2 (S-170)
    “(3)  DO contracts for the purchase of gas
    which is furnished by connection with a public
    utility system come within this provision?"
    Webster's International Dictionary defines fuel as
    "any matter used to produce heat or power by burning, as
    wood, coal, peat, petroleum, gas." Another definition is
    "any matter used to produce heat or power by combustion."
    This definition includes all the substances listed in your
    inquiry, but we can not conclude that Section 21 applies to
    all ~purchases of fuel, regardless of the use to which it is
    put. We must examine the full wording of the section and
    determine the intended scope of the language "fuel used in
    the departments of the government."
    The primary rule of interpreting and construing a
    constitutional provision is to ascertain the intention of the
    people in adopting it; and to give effect to that intention.
    Cox v. Robison, 
    105 Tex. 426
    , 
    150 S.W. 1149
    (1 12); Williams
    v. Castleman, 
    112 Tex. 193
    , 
    247 S.W. 263
    (19223 .* The language
    of constitutional provisions should be construed as the
    voters at the time of its adoption would reasonably have
    understood it to be. Orndorff v. State, 108~S.W.2d 206 (Tex.
    'Civ.App. 1937, error ref.). In arriving at the intended
    -meaning of the language, the history of the time and the con:
    ditions prevailing at the time of its adoption may be con-
    sidered. Grass.0v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, 
    125 Tex. 154
    , 
    81 S.W.2d 482
    (1935). The fact that new conditions not
    known to the framers of the Constitution have arisen since
    its adoption does not prevent the application of the terms
    used as then intended to new and changed conditions if such
    new and changed conditions come within the purpose, meaning
    and intent of the framers. Western Co. v. Sheppard, 
    181 S.W.2d 850
    (Tex.Civ.App.~l944 errorref.). But where con-
    ditions have changed since thi time of adoption, "it is a
    proper inquiry, in ascertaining whether a certain lnterpre-
    tation should be given to the language of the Constitution,
    to consider whether its framers and the voters by~whom it
    was adopted intended the consequences which must follow such
    interpretation." Kay v. Schneider, 
    110 Tex. 369
    , 378, 
    218 S.W. 479
    , 
    221 S.W. 880
    (1920).
    To answer your first two questions, we must deter-
    mine the scope of the words "fuel used in the departments of
    the government"~in the light of the conditions which existed
    at the time this provision was adopted in 1876.   At that
    time the use of fuel by the departments of the state govern-
    ment was confined to heating and lighting the buildings in
    which the departments were housed. This is the general
    nature ~of the use which the language of Section 21 suggests
    .Hon. Walter L. Bell, page 3 (S-170),::
    and which was within the contemplation of ,its adopters. It
    would be unreasonable to assume thatthey envisioned the
    time when the departmen~tswould be using-fuel for operating
    vehicles or thatthey would have intended Section 21 to
    encompass such a use. The problems connected~with refuel-
    ing vehicles are so different from those involved in the re-
    fueling ~ofequipment,used for.providing light,.heat, and
    similar~services at f~ixed,locationsthat the adopters could
    not reasonably have Mtended the consequencea which would
    follow from an interpretation which would place.fuel ,for
    operation of vehicles within the,terms of Section 21. It
    should -be noted, further, that Section 2lwas not framed to
    include all supplies required by the departments of the
    government. - It ~selectedonly a limited number of items..::
    ,,w
    Our research into the extent of governmental activities at,
    _,,
    tha~tperiod does not reveal whetherany departments of the
    government maintained their own transportation.facil,itie,s~‘as
    < .,     anincident.to carrying out their duties. Whether..they,did
    .~.      or.not; it is ~evidentthat if the framers of the Constitu-
    .tion-had~intendedto regulate the purchase of the commodity
    .<’      necessary.for maintaining these facilities they would have
    .included feed in the list of items regulated as the horse
    ..:.furnishedthe motive power for the usual mea:8 of.transpor--
    tation known to that era.
    It is our opinion that Section 21 should be given
    no broader scope than was within the contemplation of its
    framers and the voters who adopted it--the purchase'of f.uel
    for providing services at the buildings and grounds where
    the departments were located. We therefore hold that it
    does not apply to the purchase of fuel for operating vehicles.
    Prefacing our answer to your second question, it is
    not the nature of the substances which are now used as fuel,
    but the nature of the conditions and purpose of use which
    take fuels used for operating vehicles out of the scope of
    Section 21. The development of gasoline, diesel fuel, liqu+
    fled gases SUC!~as propane and butane, and similar types of
    fuel has taken place largely since the adoption of Section 21
    in 1876, but they-nevertheless come within its provisions
    when they are used for furnishing stationary power, heat,
    light, and similar services at the premises which the depart-
    ments occu.py.
    In your third question you ask whether contracts
    for the purchase of gas from a public utilitp system come
    within the provisions of Section 21. This section provides
    that contracts to which it applies shall be given to the
    lowest responsible bidder and shall be subject to the approval
    Of the Governor, Secretary of State and Comptroller. In
    Ron. Walter L. Bell, page 4 (S-170)
    passin on a related question, Attorney General's Opinion
    V-941 1949) states:
    "A public utility is usually a monopoly oper-
    ating under a franchise with the tgpe'of service
    defined and rates controlled. These factors make
    purchase of public utility services on the basis
    of competitive bids impracticable. The courts
    have.recognized these conditions and have held
    that purchases of utility services do not come
    within the statutes which require 'supplies' to
    be purchased by competitive bidding."
    The same reasoning is applicable to the present question.
    Section 21 embraces only those contracts which are the
    proper subject of competitive bidding and on which the re-
    quirement for approval would serve as a check against ex-
    cessive contract prices. It is our opinion that the pur-
    chase of gas from a public utility by connection with a
    community system at a price which is within the established
    rates charged by the utility does not come within the pro-
    visions of this section.
    SUMMARY
    Section 21 of Article XVI of the Texas Con-
    stitution, which regulates the purchase of fuel
    used by the departments of the government, does
    not apply to the purchase of gasoline and other
    motor fuels used for operating vehicles. It
    applies to the purchase of fuel, including gas-
    oline, diesel fuel, propane, butane, and other
    fuels, which is used for furnishing stationary
    power, heat, light, and similar services at the
    premises which the departments occupy. It does
    not apply to the purchase of gas from a public
    utility system at a price which is within the
    established rate charged by the utility.
    APPROVED:                         Yours very truly,
    Davis Grant                       JOHN BEN SRRPPRRD
    Reviewer                          Attorney General
    J. A. Amis, Jr.
    Reviewer
    Will Davis
    Special Reviewer                      Assistant
    Robert S. Trotti
    First Assistant
    John Ben Shepperd
    Attorney General
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S-170

Judges: John Ben Shepperd

Filed Date: 7/2/1955

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017