Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1949 )


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  •           ~KEATII-ORN~Y   GENERAL
    OF v?JcuAs
    AUWTIN   11. TExAe
    February 1.6, 1949
    Hon. William N. Hensley
    Criminal District  Attorney
    San Antonio, Texas
    Dear Mr. Bensleyr                      Opinion No. V-776
    Rer   Several   quest Ions
    relating to ren-
    dition and assess-
    ment of property
    for ad valorem
    taxation.
    You request the opinion of this       office   upon
    the questions  set out below as follows:
    “(1)    What Is the percentage of the
    fair cash market value of property upon
    which a taxpayer may make a sworn rendl-
    tion* In other words, can the taxpayer
    legally     render his property at, say,
    Flg*percent        of the fair cash mai%et
    “(2)  Should the Tax Assesso? ad-
    vise persons making renditions   th.:ct the
    rendition  must be on the true and full
    value that Is to say, the fair cash
    markei value of the property?    Is It the
    duty of the Tax Assessor to tier to the
    Board of Equalization  such r endltions   as
    are not made at the fair cash market
    value?
    “(3) At what percentage of fair cash
    market value may the Tax Assessor assess
    unrendered properties when he makes his
    assessment on such unrendered properties?
    “(4)   At what values can the Board of
    Equalization   set the assessed values of
    property before them for consideration?
    May the Board of Equalization   set a value
    of less than the fair cash market value?
    Hon. William    N. Hensley,   Page 2, v-776
    What Is the effect  of the ‘uniformity!    pro-
    vision of the statutes?    In other words,
    may the Board set a value on a particular
    piece of property at the fair cash market
    value while the standard for property as-
    sessments generally   Is at forty percent of
    the fair cash market value?”
    We shall not attempt to answer your questions
    categorically,    for as we perceive your primary concern
    is:   What significance    is to be attached to the several
    constitutional    and statutory  provisions  pertaining to
    the value at which property is to be assessed for ad
    valorem taxes?
    Preliminary to our discussion      of this ques-
    tion,  it may be observed that the duties of the tax-
    the Tax Assessor-Collector       and the Board of
    gt%&ation      have been definitely’deflned      by statute.
    An excellent    summary from which may be gathered the
    narrw function of an “assessment ‘I Is contained in the
    case of Cracker v. Santo Consolidated        Independent
    School District,    116 S.. W. (2d) 750 (C.C.A. . . . 1938)
    expressed in the following      language:
    “Some confusion Is manifest.    . . regard&
    ing the nature and functions     of renditions    of
    property and assessments of property,       particu-
    larly manner of listing    or otherwise evidenc-
    ing rendition   and assessments.
    “It should be borne in mind that a tax-
    payer never assesses his property for taxas.
    Not even a commissionerst    court has author-
    ity t0 a0 that.    The assessment of property
    Is peculiarly   the duty and responsibility    of
    a tax assessor.    The jurisdiction   of the com-
    missioners’ court with r eference to assess-
    ments Is confined to raising or lowering
    assessments as incident to Its duties as a
    board of equalization.     It has no power to
    add property to the tax rolls not previously
    assessed,   nor to take property from them . . .
    ‘#The taxpayer lists  or Inventories  pro-
    perty by describing    it and placing a value
    upon same. He may make the list himself,      or
    merely furnish the information to the assessor.
    If the assessor agrees to the rendered valua-
    tions    he the assessor,  makes the rendered
    valua 4 ion the assessed valuation,   or, If he
    Hon. William   N. Hensley,    Page 3, v-776
    does not agree, he Is required to note the
    assessed value on the same list,      subject
    in either case. to final action bv the
    board of equalization     as to &sing     or low-
    ering it.    B. S. 1925, Art. 7211. Thus
    the r enditlon lists   become also assessment
    lists.    When after legal levy such assess-
    ment lists   are corrected and approved by
    the board of equalization     the liability     of
    a taxpayer is thereby fixed.”
    In addition to the provisions .of Article       7211,
    v. c. s., other statutory        provisions   direct the Assess-
    or-Collector     to transmit to the Commissioners’ Court,
    sitting    as a Board of Equalization,       assessments of ren-
    dered and unrendered property which have been made to
    him. After the .Board of: Equalization          has equalized the
    values, the Assessor-Collector          then proceeds to assess
    ;llcuniSendered    property as required by Article        7218,
    .     * to prepare rolls     or books of all rendered or
    &rende&.       real and personal property as required by
    Article    7218 and 7219, V. C. S.; on or before August 1
    to transmit to the Board of Equalization           his rolls   or
    assessment books with his affidavit          attached thereto
    in the form directed by Article          7222, V. C. S.; and
    the Board of Equalization        after it has examined and
    approved the rolls       or assessment books trsnsmlt copies
    to the Comptroller,        County Clerk and the Assessor-
    Collector     as prescribed    in Article   7224. The Assessor-
    Collector’s     tax rolls,    as finally   equalized and ap-
    proved by the Board of Equalization          and delivered,
    constitute     the assessment upon which the Tax Collector
    proceeds to collect        the taxes assessed by the Assessor
    and as equalized by the Board of Equalization.,
    We now pass to the question in which we think
    you are primarily    interested.    That Is, the standard of
    fixing the value upon which taxes are ultimately        as-
    sessed and collected.      There are three constitutional
    provisions  which should be noted.       Article VIII, Sec-
    tion 1, of the. Constitution     provides:
    “Taxation shall be equal and unlf orm.
    All pr~operty. . . shall be taxed in propor-
    tion to Its value, which shall be,,ascer-
    tained m~mav be Drovided bv law.
    Section    11 of the same Article    provided:
    “And all    lands and other   property,   . .
    Hon. William    N. Bensley,        Page 4, v-776
    shall    be assessed     at    Its   fair   value.”
    Section   20 of the same Article              provides:
    “No property of any kind in this State
    shall ever be assessed for ad valorem taxes
    at a rester  value than wair        cash
    &JJ~ nor shall any board of equalization         of
    any county or political   subdivision    or tax-
    ing district  within this state fix the value
    of any property at more than its
    market-”
    The following   statutory              provisions     also   deal
    with the quest ion of value.
    Article   7149 provides         in partz
    “The term ,ltrue and full value f wher--.
    ever used shall be held to mean the fair
    market value, in cash, at the place where
    the roperty to which the-m      is applied
    shal P be at the time of assessment    being
    the price which could be obtained {herefor
    at private sale, and not at forced or auc-
    t ion sale .‘I
    Article   7174 provides:
    “Personal property of every descrip-
    tion shall be valued at its true and full
    value In money.”
    We think that the apparent confusion as to
    value which would seem to arise by these numerous
    statutory  provisions     for the guidance of tax admin-
    istrative  officials     is dispelled   by the case of West
    Texas Hotel Company v. City of El Paso, 83 S- W. (2d)
    772 (C. C. A.)      holding that there is no substantial
    difference  In 4he terms (1) market value, (2) fair
    market value, (3) cash market value, (4) fair cash
    market value, (5) reasonable cash market value, and
    (6) true and fu3.1 value in money, which terms appear
    In various constitutional       and statutory  provisions
    pertaining  to value for the assessment of taxes.
    Since our courts have held that the various terms
    used in the Constitution       and Statutes as a basis of
    value for assessing      taxes are synonymous we shall
    use for the purpose or this opinion the 4 erm “fair
    ,
    Hon. William   N. Hensley,   Page 5, v-776
    cash market value" used in Section 20 of Article     VIII
    of the 
    Constitution, supra
    , and the term used in
    Article   7149, V. C. S., "fair market value in cash",
    which clearly   are equivalent terms.   Ko provision
    similar to Section 20 of ?rticle    VIII was in the
    Constitution   prior to its adoption ,$ugust 23, 1937,
    and it did not become effective    under its express
    terms until January 1, 1939.
    Clearly,   from the Constitutional    and statu-
    tory provisions      above mentioned, it is lawful for the
    Tax Assessor-Collector to assess and the Commissioners1
    Court to equalize property assessments at the full
    cash market value.        If there were not court interpre-
    tations to the contrary,        one would conclude from the
    above provisions      that ,this was the only legal stand-
    ard which could be used.         However there have been
    numerous court decisions        which hoid that the ,taxing
    authorities    may use'8 lesser value if the standard is
    uniformly applied to all taxable property.           Therefore,
    in the light of the court decisions,         the taxing auth-
    orities    are free to elect whether they will assess and
    equalize at the full cash market value or a lesser
    percentage thereof,       so long as the percentage is uni-
    formly applied to all taxable property.          It is worthy
    to note that Section 20 of Article         VIII of the Con-
    stitution,    which became effective      January 1, 1939,
    does not specifically       forbid an assessment at less
    than the fair cash market value, but expressly forbids
    an assessment upon a valuation greater than such value.
    Uniformity of assessment is the end to be achieved
    the absence of which is forbidden by the Constitution.
    Our Supreme Court so held in the case of Lively v.
    ?.fissouri ,Kansas Texas Railway Company of Texas, 120 S.
    W. 852, speakin:. through Justice r.::a;rn, in the follow-
    ing language:
    "But, as stated before in this opin-
    ion the wrong which was inflicted      upon the
    appellee was not in requiring      it to pay
    taxes upon the full value of its property,
    but In denying to it the equality       of taxa-
    ;hec Constitution,   %
    i n n cessa ilv deD n 9
    yoon yniformitv   of assessment."
    n this case the Railroad Company objected
    to the 10 4 o valuation upon its intangible assets for
    the purpose of assessing taxes against it in Dallas
    :.
    .   1
    Ron. William   N. Hensley,   Page 6, V-776
    County, which county adopted a 66 2/3$ value applic-
    able to property generally  in the County, and in
    settling this difficulty,  the Supreme Court said:
    nIn administering   the remedy the
    court must take the course which 1s most
    practical    to secure uniformity     of valua-
    tion of the property to be taxed.          This
    may be done either by Increasing the as-
    sessment of each property owner in the
    county to its full value and to collect
    from each the taxes upon this full value,
    or to reduce the assessment of the intan-
    ible assets of the railroad      company to
    t 6 2/j per cent on the $100 of its assess-
    ed value.     The court will adopt that plan
    which is most feasible     and calculated      to
    secure justice    to the parties.     . . The
    Court is placed in a dilemma, from which
    it can only escape by taking that path
    which while it involves a nominal depar-
    ture irom the letter     of the law, does
    injury to no ane, and secures that uni-
    formity of tax burden which was the sole
    end of the Constitv~tion.     To hold other-
    wise is to make the restrictions         of the
    Constitution    instruments for defeating
    the very purpose they were intended to
    subserve.     It is to stick in the bark,
    and to be blind to the substance of
    things.    It Is to sacrifice     justice   to
    it 9 incident :
    “It would be utterly impracticable   to
    increase the assessment of all other pro-
    perty owners in Dallas County to its full
    value, therefore  a court of equity will
    adopt the other method--reducing   the as-
    sessment made by the state board tomthe
    same proportion  of value as was placed up-
    on the masS of property in the county. . .”
    The principle laid down by Judge Brown in
    this case bas not been departed from but uniformly
    adhered to as will appear from quota 1,ions from the
    following cases:
    In city of El Paso et al. v. Howze, 248
    5. W. 99 (writ of error denied), which dealt with a
    City Charter provision  requiring rendition and as-
    sessment at a “fair market value”, the Court said:
    Hon. William   N. Hensley,    Page, 7, v-776
    “Then assessor a@ ,collector       oft the
    city of El Paso is ~the office*        tiji6ri whom
    is impo.sed the duty of making’the ini-
    ;p;t;:;uatlon       of property r~endered for
    The .law, has established      the ,~
    basis o?‘the’ valuation td be “its true
    and full value in money” .(article ‘753’0,
    R. S.:) or as it is termed in article
    7569. 6. S.,: “its reasonable cash mar-
    ket value. n
    “in the valuation  of property the
    function of the city council is limited
    to that of a board of equalization..
    When exerci,siag  such function,  it has
    the authority not only to equalize val-
    ues but to see that all property has
    been assegsed at its falr market :value.
    But before such board can increase the
    value of property theretofore~ assessed
    it must give notice to the owner and
    afford him a hearing.
    .“In this case Howse. rendered his
    property to the asses’sor asd that offi-
    cer approved and accepted the valua-
    tions placed thereon.    This valuation
    by the assessor was a quasi judicial
    act and wasp not subject to increase
    except by the board of equaliaation
    after notice and hearing.     No notice
    was given, 90 shearing was afforded,    and
    without the consent of the taxpayer the
    valuation was changed and increased by
    the assessor,   acting under the order of
    the city council made in i.ts legida-
    tlve capacity,   on August 14th.    We are
    of the opinion that such incregs,e was
    invalid.    . .
    ~“The~.
    edidence- shows that for a
    I’& t.ime ,it. has been .the custom of the
    ..oltp.:t~o a&ss    property. upon the basis
    oC.64 per cent, Of it.% ~ptual, or market ~.
    va$ue and the value which the assessor ‘,
    placed upon the plalnt$ffls      property in
    the qriginal     assessment was 6stimat.ed
    upon that basis.,, ‘But an assessment
    made by the assessor upon ,that basis
    .   .   .
    Hon.   William   N. Hensley,   Page 8, V-776
    when uniformly          to all okE+h;nt;x.+L
    ;b$e FoRpert.: is not Invalid.
    244 u. s. 499, 37 sup:ct:
    673' 6i L: Ed:'1280 Ann. Gas. 1917s aa-
    Taylor v. L. % N. R: R. Co., 88 Fed.'305:
    
    31 Cow. C
    . A. 537; Cam Phosphate Co. v.
    Allen, 
    77 Fla. 341
    , gl South. 503.
    "On the contrary   it Is valid and
    must stand as made u&l1 corrected    by the
    proper reviewing authority and in the man-
    ner prescribed  by law."
    See also the statement by the Waco Court of
    Civil Appeals in Duvall v. Clark, 158 S. W. (26) 565,
    from which we quote as follows:
    "And It Is well settled    that an as-
    sessment at less than actual    or market
    value when uniformly applied    is valid."
    To the same effect, the Supreme Court of the
    UniteilSEatg   in the case of Greene v. Louisville  R.R.
    co.,             u. S. 242, 1280, stated In the follow-,
    ing la&go**
    "It Is equally plain that it makes
    no difference   what basis of valuation-
    that Is what percentage of full value-i
    ma be adopted,, provided it be applied
    to L 11 alike.   The adoption of full value
    has no different   effect  in dlstrlbuti
    the burden than would be gained by ad 7 p$-
    lng 75 per cent< or 50 per cent, or even
    10 per cent as he basis--so      long as
    either was applied uniformly."
    It is  therefore   apparent that the custom
    of fixing valua120 S.W. 852
    .
    Duvall v. Clark, 158 S. 4. (2d) 565; ci$y of
    El Paso w.        v. Howze, 
    248 S.W. v
    . Louisville    R
    w;      Texas Conik
    tions 1, 11 and 20;...-
    Articles   7149, 7174, 7211, 7218, '7219, 7222
    and 7224.Y.c.5
    Yours very truly,
    ATTORNEY
    GENERALOF TEXAS
    LPL: 3mc
    

Document Info

Docket Number: V-776

Judges: Price Daniel

Filed Date: 7/2/1949

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017