Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1948 )

THEA NEY GENERAL
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr. OpiriionNo. V-700
Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Public Safety Re: Repeal of Article 1150,
Austin, Texas Vernon's Penal Code,
relative to stopping,
rendering aid, and giv-
ing Information follow-
ing an accident, by
reason of conflicts be-
tween this statute and
the Uniform Traffic
Code of 1947.
Diar Sir:
Your recent request for an oplliionby this De-
partment contained the following question:
'Was Art. 1150, Texas Penal Code, re-
pealed by The Uniform Act Regulating Traf-
fic on the Highways (Acts, 1947, 50th Leg.
~it96;;o~;;H421) Vernon's Ann. CIV. St.,
.
Article 1150 of the Texas Penal Code Is a8 fol-
lows:
"Whenever an automobile, motorcycle
or other motor vehicle whatsoever, regard-
less of the power by which the same may be
propelleb, or &awn, strikes any person or
collidee with any vehicle containing a per-
son, the driver of, and all persons In con-
trol of such automobile, motor vehicle or
other vehicle shall stop and ehall render
to the person struck or to the occupants of
the vehicle collided with all necessary as-
sistance Including the carrying of such per-
son or occupants to a physician, or surgeon
for medical or surgical treatment, If such
treatment be required, or if such carrying
Is requested by the person struck or any OC-
cupant of the vehicle collided with; ad 8ucb
Bon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 2 (V-700)
driver and person having OP assuming auth-
ority of such driver shall further give to
the occupant of such vehicle or person
struck, if requested at the time of such
striking OP collision OP immediately there-
after, the number of such automobile, motor-
cycle or motor vehicle, also the name of the
owner thereof and his address, the names of
the passenger or passengers not exceeding
five in each automobile or other vehicle,
together with the address of each one there-
of. Any person violating any provision of
this.articl.eis punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary not to exceed five years
or in jail not exceeding one year or by fine
not exceeding five thousand dol,lfjrs,
or by
both such fine and imprisonment.
Pertinent provisions of Article 670ld, Vernon's
Civil Statutes, are:
"Sec. 38 (a) The driver of any vehicle ln-
volved in an accident resulting in injury
to or death of any person shall immediate-
ly stop such vehicle at the scene of such
accident or as close thereto as possible but
shall then forthwith return to and in every
event shall remain at the scene of the ac-
cident until he has fulfilled the require-
ments of Section 40, Every such step shall
be made without obstructing traffic more
than Is necessary.
"(b) Any person falling to stop or
to comply with said requirements under
such circumstances shall upon conviction
be punished by imprisonment in the penlten-
Mary not to exceed five (5) years or in
jail not exceeding one (1) year or by fine
not exceeding Five Thousand ($5,000.00)
Dollars, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment.
Y3ec. 39. The driver of any vehicle ln-
volved in an accident resulting only in
damage to a vehicle which is driven or
attended by any person shall immediately
stop such vehicle at the scene of such
accident until he has fulfilled the re-
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 3 (v-700)
quirements of Section 40. Every such
stop shaI.1be made without obstructing
traffic more than is necessary. Any
person failing to stop or to comply
with said requirements under such clr-
cumstances shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor.
"Sec. 40. The driver of any vehicle in-
volved in an accident resulting in injury
to or death of any person or damage to
any vehicle which is driven or attended
by any person shall give his name,address,
and the registration number of the vehicle
he is driving and shall upon request and
if available exhibit his operator's, com-
mercial operatorss, or chauffeur's license
to the person struck or the driver or oc-
cupant of or person attending any vehicle
collided with and shall render to any per-
non injured in such accident reasonable
assistance, including the carrying, or the
making of arrangements for the carrying,
of such person to a physician, surgeon or
hospital for medical or surgical treatment
if it is apparent that such treatment is
necessary or if such carrying is request-
ed by the injured person.
"Sec. l.56. All laws or parts of laws in-
consistent or conflictinn with the orovi-
slons of this Act are hereby repealed,
rovided, however, that nothing in this
!i
ct is,intended to repeal provisions of
s v Q (several I.awsspecified but Arti-
cle 1150 of the Penal Code is not includ-
. ed In the group,) (Emphasis supplied)
By comparing the subject matter of Article
1150 of the Penal Code with that of the above quoted
provisions of Article 67016, it becomes apparent that
the Legislature, in the enacting of such provisions of
Article 6701&, has established a comprehensive law
covering the field of traffic legislation provided for
in Article 1150. Basically, the question of repeal,
whether express or implied, of one statute by another
is one of legislative intent. The enactment of subae-
quent comprehensive legislation such as is found in
Sections 38, 39 and 40, Article 67016, manifests an in-
Bon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 4 (v-700)
tent on the part of the Legislature to repeal all for-
mer laws upon the subject. By every reasonable construc-
tion, It is clear that the later enactment is intended to
supersede the existing law and the latest legislative ex-
pression prevails.
We quote the following from Meek v. Wheeler
County, et al, 125 g.W.(2d) 331, 334:
‘In the case of Bryan v. gun&berg
5 Tex. 41.8,424, the Supreme Court of {his
State announced the rule which, we think,
is decisive of the issue before us. Such
rule is in the following language: ‘It un-
doubtedly is true that a construction which
repeals former statutes, by implication,
is not to be favored; and it is also true
that statutes In par1 materia, and relating
to the same subject, are to be taken and
construed together; because it is to be
inferred that they had one object in view,
and were Intended to be considered as con-
stituting one entire, and harmonious sys-
tem. But when the new statute, in itself,
comprehends the entire subject, and creates
a new, entire, and independent sy(Jtem,re-
specting that subject matter, it is uni-
versally held to repeal and supercede all
previous systems and laws respecting the
same subject matter. 1
“An even stronger rule than the above
is to be found in Black on Interpretation
of Laws, Second Edition, page 355, in the
f011owing language:
“‘Even where there is no direct re ug-
nancy or inconsistency between the earl!i
er
and the later law, there may in some case8
be an implied repeal. This result follows
where the later act revises, amends, and
sums up the whole law on the particular
subject to which it relates, covering all
the ground treated of In the earlier stat-
ute, and adding new or different provisions,
and thus plainly shows that it was intended
to supercede any and all prior enactments
on that subject-matter, and to furnish, for
the future, in itself alone, the whole and
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 5 (V-700)
only system of statute law applicable to
that subject.'"
In State v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, et al,
194 S.W. 422, 432, it is said:
"The rule is well settled that, when
a subsequent statute shows by its context
that it was intended to embrace all the
law upon the subject dealt with, such stat-
ute will, by implication, repeal all former
laws relating to the same subject. The cor-
rectness of that rule is not controverted,
and it is unneces$ary to c1t.eauthorities
in support of It.
The following quotation from 39 Tex. Jur.
pages 148, 149 is made in Luse v. City of Dallas, 131
S.W.(2&) 1079, 1084:
'Where it is apparent that a Statute
is Intended to embrace all the law upon the
subject with which It deals, it repeals all
former laws relating to the same subject.
Under this rule, a statute that covers the
subject matter of a former law and is evi-
dently intended as a substitute for it, al-
though containing no express words to that
effect, operates as a repeal of the former
law to the extent that its provisions are
revised and its field freshly covered. Ac-
cordingly, parts of the original act that
are omitted from the new legislation are to
be considered as anuulled. If the later
act is clearly intended to prescribe the
only rules which should govern, it repeals
the prior statute, although the twt are
not repugnant in their provisions.
set
Applying the rule of ‘*comprehhenslieness”
out in the above quotations to the situation under oon-
sideration, it is our opinion that Article 1150, Ver-
non's Penal Code, was repealed by The Uniform Act Rs-
ulating Traffic on the Highways, Article 670ld, Vernon’s
8 Iv11 Statutes.
SUMMARY
When a subsequent statute shows by
lion.Homer Garrison, Jr,, page 6 (V-700)
its context that it was intended to em-
brace all the law upon the subject dealt
with, such statute, by implication, re-
peals a former law covering the same sub-
ject.
Article 1150, Vernon’s Penal Cede,
dealing with ‘hit and runU drivem, was
repealed by The Uniform Act Regulating
Traffic on the Highways, Article 67016,
Vernon’s Civil Statutes, dealing with the
same subject.
Your8 very truly,
ATTORIIEYOBlWML OP TEXAS
CBXlwb:mw BY
APPROVED: