Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1945 )


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  • Honorable H. A. Jamison,              Commissioner
    Department   of Banking
    Austin 14, Texas
    Dear      Mr.   Jamison:                       Opinion No. o-6808
    Re:     Construction    of the term “general
    obligations”,   as used in Subsec-
    tion 6, Article   7, Chapter V, of
    the Texas Banking Code of 1943.
    Your   request     for an opinion upon the above-captioned
    subject    matter   is as follows:
    “Your attention is invited to Sub-section  6 of
    Article  7 Chapter V of The Texas Banking Code, which
    in effect makes reference   to the type of investment
    a State ,bank may make in an amount exceeding its loan
    limit.
    “Your particular attention is invited to the
    word ‘general” as used in Sub-section      6 which word
    and the meaning of it is the occasion for our inquiry.
    We have taken the position that some character       of con-
    struction must be given to the word that will lend to
    it a special significance   since obviously it intends
    to embrace a type of obligation which would offer the
    holder appropriate    assurance   as.to the issuing body’s
    capacity to pay.
    “From a Departmental       point of view we have taken
    the position that the word when construed in the light
    of the over-all     subject involved in Subrsection    6 Arti-
    cle 7 alIows a State bank to make investments         repre-
    senting general obligations      of the issuing bodies
    named which are voted by the State, the County or
    municipality     involved and which involves the full
    faith and credit of the issuing body.       Stating our
    position another way we feel that revenue bonds and
    warrants or script, the latter issued by authority
    of the Commissioners’        Court, could not be appropriate-
    ly classified    as a general obligation.    Our question,
    therefore,    is as follows:
    .-.
    Honorable     H, A.   Jamison-page     2 (O-68438)
    “‘Does the language of Subsection 6 Article     7
    Chapter V of the Texas Banking Code exclude as lawful
    investments    by a State bank in an amount in excess of
    the loan limit revenue bonds issued by a municipality
    and/or other obligations    issued under the authority
    vested in Commissioners”       Courts, or does it follow
    that the use of the word ‘general” in Subsection 6
    Article  7 requires the broader c,onstruction to the
    effect that it embraces    only obKgations which in-
    volve the full faith and credit of the issuing body
    an obligation authorized    or voted upon by the people ?”
    Subsection 6, referred to by you, is a part of the
    enumerated     exceptions   to our bank-loan limit statute. It is
    as follows:
    ‘“6. Bonds and other legally created general ob-
    ligation of the State of Texas or of any county,
    city, municipality    or political subdivision thereof
    and indebtedness     of the United States of America,
    the Reconstruction     Finance Corporation      or other in-
    strumentality    or agency of the United States Govern-
    ment. ” (Article    342-507,    Rev. Civ, Stat., Vernon’s
    codification).
    A word or term when used in a statute is to be
    given its generally accepted and understood meaning, unless
    it appears from the context that it was used in a different
    sense.   The generally accepted meaning of the word ““general”
    is all embracing,    without qualification, exception or limita-
    tion, and is, of course, to be understood as pertaining to
    the noun which it describes,     Thus, a ““general obligation”‘,
    in the business    or financial world, means an unlimited or un-
    qualified liability or obligation or undertaking.    This view
    is supported by such decisions      as--
    Lloyd t$;rporation     v. Bannock   County,   25 Pac.   (2)
    IllinoisPower & Light Corporation    v. City of
    Centralia, 11 Fed, Supp. 874;
    City of Eugene v. Willomet   Valley Co., 
    97 P. 817
    ;
    DeLoach v. Scheper, 
    198 S.E. 409
    ;
    Hartz v. Truckenmiller,   
    296 N.W. 568
    .
    Yourare correct in classifying revenue bonds as not
    being a general obligation, but are in error as to warrants or
    scrip; these are general obligations.
    of course, the ter’m in the connection here under con-
    sideration does not necessarily  mean only an obligation voted
    upon by the people, although it of course includes such,It
    Honorable   H. A.   Jamison-page   3 (06808)
    is enough that such general    obligation   must have been   “IegaJly   created.”
    This construction    is accentuated by the context of the
    statut~c. The class  of obligations   specially excepted in Subdivision 6
    is based upon the legislative    thought that they are a Class-A  favored
    investment.
    Very truly yours
    ATTORNEY   GENERAL      OF TEXAS
    BY                  S/ Ocie Speer
    Ocie Speer
    Assistant
    APPROVED      SEP 18, 1945
    S/ Grover Sellers
    ATTORNEY    GENERAL        OF TEXAS
    OS-MR-bjb
    Approved
    Opinion
    Committee
    By BWB
    cl-law
    

Document Info

Docket Number: O-6808

Judges: Grover Sellers

Filed Date: 7/2/1945

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017