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GROVER SELLERS honorable Olin Culberson, Chairman Railroad Commission of Texas Austin, Texas Dear Sirr Opinion No. O-6603 Ret lkuld an injunotion prohib- iting the drilling or pro- ducing from a certain well prevent the Railroad ConwAs- sion from granting an exoep- tion to Rule 37, allowing such drilling because of a change in conditions? Your letter of September 5, 1945, requests the opinion of this De- partment as to whether or not, under the facts stated, the Commission would be in contempt of court in asswning jurisdiction and hearing an ap- plication for an exceptionti Rule 37 based upon ohangad oonditions when the permit to drill at the identioal location had been cancelled and annulled by the Courts and the applicant permanently enjoined from pro- duoing suah well. From your letter and information oontained in our file No. A. G. 3740, we determine the following faotsr On June 16, 1943, judgment was entered in the 126th District Court oancelling and annulling the order entered bythe Commission in Rule 37, &se No. 24,062, dated August 28, 1940, granting &us B. Spear permit to drill well No. 2 on his Hubbard Botor 0.95 acre tract in Gregg County and permanently enjoining Spear from drilling or producing euch well. Prior to 1935, Spear drilled Well No. 1 on the same tract at'a location approximately 75 feet north of the proposed Well No. 2. Spear now desires to plug and aban- don Well Elo.1 (due to faulty equipment, aooording to in- formation furnished this office by Spear) and oontemporane- ously with the application to plug Tlo.1 desires:a permit to reopen and produce No. 2. The Connnissionhad allowed the drilling of Well No. lmany years prior to the application for and the drilling of Well No. 2. For the purpose of this‘opinion RU presume that permit for Well k. 1 was a valid Hon. Olin Culberson, Page 2 (O-6603) permit as no appeal is evidenced by the facts stated or in the file in this case. We further presume that Spear was entitled to one well as a matter of law to protect vested riahts. the location of such to be determined by the C-&mission to prev&t &te and confiscation, as there is no indication that the traot of land was illegally subdivided. The concluding paragraph of the judgment above referred to reads as follows, "This judgment is without prejudioe to any right of the Defendant, Angus B. Spear, to apply for a new permit to operate said Well No. 2 and without preju- dice to aqy right of the Railroad Commission tog-ant a new permit to operate said well Xo. 2 when and if ever oonditions have so materially ohanged as to au- thorize the granting of an exoeption to Rule 37 in this location." _ We do not dean it neoessary here to discuss fullythe authority and jurisdioti.onof the Railroad Commission relating to the production of oil, but think it till suffioe to oite the aase, of Railroad Caamis- aion VS. l@ncksr, 168 S.,W. (2d) 625 in which Mr. Justioe Sharp saidi “The statutes authoriee the Railroad Commission to handle the details relating to the production of oil and gas in the State. Article 6004, et seq., Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. The Railroad Conmission has exolusive original jurisdiction to determine the mat- ter of changed oonditions in granting permits to drill wells, subject to the right of appeal to the courts. agnolia Petroleum Co. V. Ren Prooess Production Co.,
129 Tex. 617,
104 S.W.2d 1106; Gulf Land Co. V. Atlintio Refining Co., 134 Tax. 59,
131 S.W.2d 73; Brown v..Rumble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Sex. 296, 63 5. II. 2d 935, 99 b. L. R. 1107r The Railroad Conssission is given the power to determine prilaarilyall faat is- suss, that is, all issues that are not established as a matter of law: and to permit the aourts to pass upon a question not passed on by the Commission would violate such power. Gulf Land Co. V. Atlantic Refining Co., dupra; Brown V. Humble Oil & Refining Co., suprah" And further in the Henoker case, the Supreme Court said: "Until the Railroad Commission has exercised ths:powers conferred on it by law over oprtain matters, its jurisdiation over such matters should notbe denied.* Hon. Olin Culberson, Page 3 (O-6603) Cited in the opinion in the Wenoker
case, supra, are authori- ties which leave no doubt as to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Commission to determine the matter of ohanged conditions and the courts~will not usurp such function. Inthe instant situation the Commission is called upon to find that the plugging of the No. l'wll will oreate such a change of aon- dition on the lease as to warrant the granting of a new permit at the No. 2 location. The above quoted section of judpent aoknqwledges the "right of the Conmnissionto grant a new permit to operate said 'IkallNo. 2 when and if .ever conditions have so materially ohenged as to authorize the granting of an exowption to Rule 37 in this location." Under the stated faots the plugging of No. 1 Rotor will result in the lease having no produoing well thereon. This, in our opinion, brings about a condition of ahange as contemplated by the interpreta- tion placed on the statutes by the appellate courts. Whether the No. 2 Well will be identified in that manner or will be referred to as No. 1, or any other number, is immaterial as the fact remains it mill lit- erally be the only producing well on the lease. In the Uenoker
case, supra, Justice Sharp discusses fully the effeot of numbering wells on the same lease. It follows that the Consaissionhas jurisdiction to hear such application and if it finds that the location of the now existing No. 2 Well is one that will prevent confiscation andwaste and a permit be granted, such a&ion will not, in our opinion, be in oontempt of the Judgement of June 16, 1943. Yours very truly, #.TTORNEYGENEXAL OF TEXAS &’ a/ Harris Toler Harris Toler Assistant APPRCVED SEP 12 1945 S/Grover Sellers ATlORNEYGERBRLL OPTBXAS Approved Opinion Committee By WVG Chairman
Document Info
Docket Number: O-6803
Judges: Grover Sellers
Filed Date: 7/2/1945
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2017