Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1947 )


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    R-657
    THti   ,!i                        NERAL
    OFTEXAS
    Hona Howard Traweok       ODinion No. P-322
    County Attorney
    Motley county              Re:   Liability of a defendant,
    Matador, Texas                   upon   final   conv!ction   in
    a Justice Ceart, for pay-
    ment of commitment or re-
    lease fee, or both suoh
    fehs.
    Dear Sir:
    We refer to your letter of July 11, 1947, in
    trrhioh
    yam ask:
    “Ia the sheriff entitled to the statutory
    fee for commitment or/and release In a
    justice oourt case where the defendant Is
    not actually committed to jrll? In such
    case the defendant is arrested by the sher-
    iff and by him taken before #a, XV&+&%% of
    t‘nePeace who assesses a fine upon a plea
    of guilty and then allowed the defendant
    time in which to pay the fine, said arrange-‘
    ment being agreed to by the officer. Would
    the fact that the defendant should Day the
    Sine to the sheriff at the time of assess-
    ment and receive a receipt therefor make
    any differenae in regard to Nhe oiriaor*s
    feesP
    Your first question presents a case in which
    the sheriff arrested the defendant and took him to just-
    ice court where a pecuniary judeent  of convic,tionwas
    rendered against him; the justice of the peace, by agree-
    ment with the sheriff, allowed the defendant tfme in
    which to pay the judgment. Your second question presents
    a case In whfch the fine is paid to the sheriff at the
    time a peauniary judgment is entered,
    We are of the opinion that the Sheriff is,not
    entitled to a fee for ~commltment” of a defendant unless
    such defendant is confined in jail; and he is not entit-
    led to a fee for giving the defendant time in which to
    ,
    Han, Howard Traweek, Page 2, V-322
    pay the judgment, But he is entitled to racefve one dol-
    lar for final "release" of such a defendant from his cus-
    tody in either case submitted by you upon payment of the
    judgment in full if the sheriff had custody of the defen-
    dant,
    Article 917, V.C.C,P,, reads:
    "The judgment, in case of convfctisn in a
    criminal action before a justice of the
    peace, shall be that the State of Texas
    recover of the defendant the fine and
    costs, and that the defendant remain in
    custody of the sheriff until the fine and
    costs are paid; and that execution issue
    to collect the same,"
    Article 787, V.C.C,P., reads:
    "When a judgment has been rendered
    against a defendant for a pecunfary fine,
    if he is present, he shall be imprisoned
    in jail until discharged as provided by
    law, A certified copy of such judgment
    shall be sufficient to authorize such im-
    prisonment."
    Article 783, V.C.C.P., reads in part:
    "When the defendant is only fined
    the judqnent shall be that the State of
    Texas recover of the defendant the amount
    of such fine and all costs of the prose-
    cution, and that the defendant, if present,
    be committed to jail until such ffna and
    costs are paid; a D oR
    Article 1065, V.C.C.P,, fixes the fees of the
    sheriff or other peace rfficers fm misdemeanor cases;
    paragraph 5 reads: "For each commitment or releaee,ene
    dollar."
    That means one dollar for each *commitment"
    and one dollar for each "release". When the sheriff a-
    greed to give the defendant time in which to pay the
    pecuniary judgment for the fine and costs, he and his
    bondsmen became responsible for the judgment. Spradley~
    vs. State, 56 S. 1. 114, writ refused.  The sole respon-
    sibility was his. The action of the justice of the peace
    Hon. Howard Traweek, Page 3, V-322
    is immaterial because such officer is not authorized to
    take the defendant from the custody of the sheriff, or,
    grant time in which to pay a pecuniary judgment for a
    fine and costs. The defendant was not "committed" to
    jail; was he "released", when the fine and costs were
    paid?
    In Ex Parte Griffis, 145 S.W, (2d) 192, the
    Court of Criminal Appeals construed the word "released"
    as used in Article 1065, V.C.C,P* and said:
    "As we understand the statute the
    'release' for which the sheriff or con-
    stable may have the item of one dollar
    charged against an accused is the 're-
    lease' from the judgment directing that
    he remain in the officer's custody un-
    til the fine and costs are paid."
    Attorney General's Opinion No. O-693 (which
    is conference opinion No. 3058, rendered in 1939) reads
    as follows:
    "On February 13, 1928, this de-
    partment held in a conference opinion
    written by Hon. H. Grady Chandler and Han,
    Galloway Calhoun, Assistant Attorneys Gen-
    eral, that a release for which a peace of-
    ficer is allowed a fee of one dollar is
    for releasing or discharging a defendant
    ,.from the force and effect of a judgment;
    and the fee is allowed in all cases wlmre
    a defendant is convicted and discharged
    his fine and costs, whether under a plea
    of guilty or not guilty,  We quote from
    this opinion as follows:
    "'The term "release" must be con-
    strued according to its ordinary meaning.
    Webster's Dictionary defined release as
    follows:
    "'To let loose again; to set free
    from restraint; to give liberty to or set
    at liberty; to let go.'
    "'The dictionary also gives the word
    "discharge" as a synonym for "releaseuO
    Hon. Howard Trezeek, Page 4, V-322
    11 t :!   ,‘.-,
    0”  the Coc?e3’;’
    i
    ,Criminal
    p, ‘1. c,   .L
    I7
    Procedure, as heretofore stated, provides
    that the judgment of the Justice court shall
    recite that the defendant is to remain in
    custody of the sheriff until the fine end
    costs a re paid. Articles 785, 787 and 792
    provide for enforcing a judgment in all mis-
    demeanor cases and make provisions for dis-
    charging the defendantu The term “release”,
    therefore, as used in the fee bill and as
    defined in the dictionary, we believe is the
    same as “discharge” and the officer who dis-
    charges or releases a defendant from the
    force and effect of a judgment restraining
    him is entitled to collect the fee of $1000
    for a release. As the judgment is the same
    in all cases of conviction, whether under a
    plea of guilty or a plea of not guilty, it
    follows) therefore, in every case an officer
    is entitled to a fee of #lQOO for a release.
    But a fee is not allowed for a commitment in
    every case unless the court is required to
    commit the defendant to jail in default of
    payment of the fine and costs or in the coup-
    ty court, the defendant might be committea
    to serve a jail sentence even though the
    fine and costs are paid.’
    *It appears that this conference opia-
    ion has been followed by this department for
    more than eleven years; we are unable to
    find any authority to the contrary; the op-
    inion appears to be based upon sound reason-
    ing; we therefore, approve and follow this
    opinion,
    “You are therefore respectfully advised
    that it is the opinion of this department that
    a charge of one dollar for release is a proper
    charge to be taxed as costs against the de-
    fendant when a plea of guilty is entered and
    the fine paid immediately after the defendant
    isnotified of the amount and no commitment
    iS,made, and that the officer who discharges
    o.rreleases a defendant from the force and
    effect of a judgment restraining him is en-
    titled to collect the fee of one dollar for
    a release.”
    .
    Hon. Howard Traweek, Page 5,``V-322
    'We adhere to the opinion O-093 and enclose a
    copy thereof ror your information.
    Where   a pocluiary     judpmt    for a   rm
    and ooets, is rendered mgainst a derendant
    who is present in court, the sheriff is en-
    titled to receivs one dollar under the p-0
    vieions of Article 1045,, B.C.C.I., ror final
    release of the derendant from his custody
    when suoh judgment is paid in full, whether
    6uoh judC;ment be paid at the time 9f it8 6R-
    try or at a later date. The Sheriff ia not
    entitled to receive a fee f&r wconrmitmentw
    in such case unless the defendant is confined
    la jail. Art. 1065 V.C.O.P.; EX Part0 Orlfffa,
    145 S.W.  (2d) 192; Attorney General's Opiaien
    Iio.O-693.
    Yours very truly
    ATTORNEY   OENERAL OFTEXAS
    Assistant
    AOTIIG ATTORNEY GENERAL
    W!lW:wb:jrb
    

Document Info

Docket Number: V-322

Judges: Price Daniel

Filed Date: 7/2/1947

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017