Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1947 )

R-408
OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
PRICEDANIEL
/aTTcmNEYGENER.M. May 29, 1947
Honorable S. J. Isaacks, Chairman~
Judiciary Comittee
House of Representatives
Austin, Texas
Opinion No. V- 228
Re: Constitutionality
of House Bill No.
739.
Dear Sir:
Your statement and request for an opinion is in
part as r0110ws:
"The Judiciary Connnittee of the House or
Representatives has instructed me, as Chainnan
of the Committee, to request from you a ruling
as to the constitutionality of House Bill No.
739, and particularly in its relation to Arti-
cle I, Section 21 of the Texas Constitution."
This bill prevents the acquisition of any ,prop-
erty by one who wilfully and u,nlawfully takes or procures
to be taken thle life of another, as the result of such
death. It changes the laws of descent and distribution
and the vesting of estates to acoomplish this purpose.
1follows :
Article 3314 of Vernon's Civil Statutes reads as
"When a person dies, leaving a lawful
will, all of his estate devised or bequeath-
ed by such will shall vest itnnediately in the
devisees or legatees; and all the estate of
such person, not devised or bequeathed, shall
vest innnediately in his heirs at law; subject
Honorable S. J. Isaaoks - Page 2
however, to the payment of the debts of the
testator or intestate, except such as may be
ex,empted by law; and, whenever a person dies
intestate, all of his estate shall vest im-
mediately in his heirs at law, but with the
exceptions aforesaid shall still be liable
and subject in their hands to the payment of
the debts of the intestate; but upon the is-
suance of letters testamentary or of adminis-
tration upon any such estate, the executor or
administrator shall have the right to the pos-
session of the estate as it existed at the
death of the testator or intestate, with the
exceptions aforesaid; and he shall recover
possession of and hold such estate in trust
to be disposed of in accordance with law.”
House Bill No. 739 will change the above quoted
statute, insofar as the vesting of an estate where a slay-
er, having an interest in the estate of the deceased, is
concerned.
Article I, Section 21 of the Texas Constitution,
reads as follows:
“No conviction shall work corruption
of blood, or forfeiture of estate, and the
estates of those who destroy their own lives
shall descend or vest as in case of natural
death. v
To better understand our problem, let us first
look to the definition of corruption of blood and forfeit-
ure or estate. Volume 9 of Words and Phrases, at page
778, provides the rollowing definition:
v’Corruption of blood’ was an incident
on an attainder for treason or felony. The
doctrine of corruption of blood was of ieu-
da1 origin, introduced after the Norman Con-
quest. The blood of the attainted person was
deemed to be corrupt, so that neither could
he transmit his estate to his heirs, nor
could they take by desoent from the ances-
tor. The crime of the attainted felon was
deemed a breach of the implied condition in
the donation or the,feud *dum bene seges-
serit,’ and, the descent to his heirs being
interrupted by the corruption of blood, his
Honorable S. J. Isaacks - Page 3
lands escheated to the lord. But this es-
cheat was subordinate to the prior and supe-
rior law of forfeiture. Avery v. Everett,
18 N.E. 148, 150, 110 N.Y. 317, 1 L. R. A.
26I+, 6 Am. St. Rep. 368."
We already have a statute in this State wherein
the beneficiary of a life insurance policy forreits hie
rights to the proceeds by wilfully bringing about the death
of the insured. (Art. 5017, V. C. S.). The constitution-
ality of this statute has not been raised in our Courts,
however.
Other States have passed statutes wherein any
person convicted of killing another shall not inherit any
property from the deceased by their wrongrul act, and the
constitutionality of these statutes have been attaoksd on
substantially the same grounds as provided in Article I,
Section 21 of our Constitution. Those states have oonsti- '
tutionsl provisions similar to our own regarding corrup-
tion of blood and forfeiture of estates. The Supreme
Court of Kansas in the case of Hamblin vs. Edna Marohant,
175 P. 678, passing on such a statute said:
"The constitutionality of the statute is
questioned. It is argued that it violates L) g
10 and 12 of the Bill of Rights, and 9 6 of
Article 6, of the State Constitution, and that
it also violates the 14th Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United states. It is argued
that the statute is penal and works a iorfeit-
ure. So far as the present action is conaern-
ed, the statute changed the law of the devolu-
tion of property, on the death of the owner.
The legislature has entire control of that mat-
ter. The Law of Descents and Distribution pres-
cribes the way in which property shall go on the
death of the owner, and the statute in question
is merely an exception to the 8eneral rules pres-
cribed by the Statute of Desoents and Distribu-
tions. The statute in question is a part of the
Law of Descents and Distibutions, and it.pro-
vides that the property of a deceased owner
shall not go to the person who took the owner's
life. Whether the person to whom the property
would ordinarily go took the owner's life is a
question that must be judicially determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction. The legisla-
ture has seen fit to say that that fast must be
. .
Honorable 6. J. Isaacks - Page 4
ascertained in a criminal prosecution in which
the person who would take the property is charg-
ed with killing the owned, When that fact is
ascertained, the property is not then taken from
the person who would inherit, but it is then de-
termined that the person never did inherit, and
never did acquire any interest in the property.
The statute is not penal; it does not add any-
thing to the punishment of the person convicted;
neither does it provide for a forfeiture; and
nothing is taken from the person convicted.
Edna Marchant never aoquired nor received any-
thing that could be taken frctn her. It follows
that neither of the constitutional provisions
mentioned has been violated by the statute. The
conclusion reached is supported by Perry vs.
Strawbridge, 209 MO. 621, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.)
244, 123 Am. St. Rep. 510, 108 s. w. 641, 14
AM. Cas. 92."
In the case of Perry vs. Strawbridge, 108 5. W.
641, 209 MO. 621,it was held that the construction of a
statute giving a widower one half the property of his child-
less wife, as not applying to one who murders his wife, is
not prevented by such a constitutional provision. The Court
said:
"This construction of the existing stat-
ute, or even an express statute, as they have
in Iowa, prohibiting a murderer from inherit-
ing from his victim, does not violate our con-
stitutional provision. There is no farfeiture
of an estate which he has, but it is simply
preventing him from acquiring property in an
unauthorized and unlawful way, i.e., by mur-
der. It takes nothing from him, but simply
says: 'You cannot acquire property in this
way.' Nor does such a statute prevent his
heirs from inheriting through him property
rightfully his, at the time of his demise.
The state cannot by law take a criminal's
property, but it can say to every individual
citizen: 'You cannot aoquire property by des-
ignated unlawful means.' Such statutes vio-
late no constitutional provisions either state
or Federal."
The annotations in 6 A. L. R. 1408 on the constitu-
tionality of such statutes reads in part as follows:
, .
Honorable S. J. Isaocks - Page 5
“This situation has led to the adoption
in various states 0r statutes of the type in-
volved in the reported case (Hamblin v. Mar-
chant, ante 1403)) providing that anyone con-
victed of killing a person from whom he would
have inherited shall forfeit such inheritable
interest. To these statutes two objections
have been made on constitutional grounds:
First, that they constitute an impairment of
a vested right, and, second, that they contra-
vene constitutional provisions that no con-
viction shall work a forfeiture of estate.
Since there cannot be a forfeiture of estate
unless some vested right is interfered with
(see cases set forth, infra), both objections
involve substantially the same inquiry into
the nature of the right which the statute
operates to limit.
“Notwithstanding the suggestion thrown
out arguendo in several cases in support of
the view that no exception can be made in the
case of murderers, to the ordinary operation
of the Statutes of Descent and Distribution,
that a contrary conclusion would be at var-
iance with the constitutional provision that
no conviction shall work a forfeiture of es-
tate, the courts which have had occasion di-
rectly= sis z;“”
consider the have held-
otherwiz.” (Empha
The only Texas cases we have found touching on
this subject are Davis vs. Laning, 19 S.W. 846, Murchison
vs. Murchison, 203 S.W. 423, and American National Insur-
ance Company vs. Coates, 246 S.W. 356. The Davis vs. Lan-
ing case by the Supreme Court of Texas held that a convict
may either inherit himself or transmit inheritsnce. The
Murchison case held that although a wife who feloniously
killed her husband could not collect the proceeds Of an in-
surance policy under the terms of such policy, she was en-
titled to the money as surviving wife of the deceased when
the Insurance Company paid the money to the husband’s es-
tate. The American National Insurance Company vs. Coates
case held the heirs of the slayer were entitled to the pro-
ceeds of an insurance policy on the life of the deceased.
All of the Texas cases cited were decided on the
theory of the laws of descent and distribution and we have
found no case in point as to a construction of Article I,
. 1
Honorable S. J. Isnacks - Page 6
Section 21 of the Constitution from the view of a slayer
inheriting property from his wrongful act of killing the
deceased. We must, therefore, accept the construction
placed on such statutes by Courts of other jurisdictions.
From the authorities cited, we conclude that
the Legislature can pass a constitutional act to prevent
one who will'ully and unlawfully takes or procures to be
taken the life of another, from acquiring property by
reason of such death.
Your question is therefore answered that House
Bill No. 739 does not violate Article I, Section 21 of the
Constitution.
We call your attention to the caption of the bill
and suggest you delete the words "killed another" and add
after the word Wunlawfullgn the following: "taken or pro-
cured to be taken the life of another." This would be in
conformity with the body of the Act.
SUMMARY
House Bill No. 739, which prevents the ac-
quisition of any property by one who wilfully
and unlawfully takes or procures to be taken the
life of another, as the result of such death, is
not violative of Article I, Section 21 of the
Texas Constitution, as prior to such death there
is no vested interest but only an inheritable in-
terest and there is actually no forfeiture of an
estate. (6 A. L. R. 1408).
Yours very truly
ATTORRRY
GRNRRAL
OF TBXAS
RAH/JMc By 4tirt$P.
Assistant
APPROWD:
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