Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2012 )


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  •                               ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    GREG       ABBOTT
    September 24,2012
    Raymund A. Paredes, Ph.D.                               Opinion No. GA-0969
    Commissioner of Higher Education
    Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board              Re: Authority of the Texas Higher Education
    Post Office Box 12788                                  Coordinating Board to promulgate a rule that
    Austin, Texas 78711-2788                               would permit a veteran who is entitled to two kinds
    of federal education benefits to be eligible to apply
    for benefits under section 54.341, Education Code,
    based upon the federal program to which the
    veteran opts to apply rather than on the federal
    program which he or she is entitled to use
    (RQ-I053-GA)
    Dear Commissioner Paredes:
    You inquire about the authority of the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to
    promulgate a rule that would permit a veteran who is entitled to two kinds of federal education
    benefits! to be eligible to apply for benefits under section 54.341, Education Code, based upon the
    federal program to which the veteran opts to apply rather than on the federal program which he or
    she is entitled to use. 2 Under the federal Montgomery GI Bill program known as Chapter 30,
    qualifying veterans are eligible to receive monthly allowance payments "to help meet, in part, the
    expenses of ... subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books, equipment, and other educational costs"
    associated with full-time enrollment at any institution of higher education. 38 V.S.c.A. § 3014(a)
    (West 2002). In the Post-9fll GI Bill benefits program known as Chapter 33, educational benefits
    are remitted directly to the university by the federal government, unlike the allowance payments
    under Chapter 30, which are paid directly to recipients. See 
    id. § 3313(h)
    (West Supp. 2012).
    Federal law precludes veterans from receiving both Chapter 30 and Chapter 33 benefits at the same
    ISee Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2553 (1984) (codified as amended at 38
    V .S.c.A. §§ 3001-36 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012) and 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 708, 2006, 2138, 16136 (West 2010 & Supp.
    2012» ("Chapter 30"); Post-9111 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-252, 122 Stat. 2357
    (2008) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-24 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012) and 10 U.S.C.A. § 16132a (West
    Supp. 2012» ("Chapter 33").
    2See Letter from Raymund A. Paredes, Ph.D., Comm'r, Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., to Honorable Greg
    Abbott, Tex. Att'y Gen. at 1 (Apr. 13,2012), http://texasattorneygeneral.gov/opin ("Request Letter").
    Raymund A. Paredes, Ph. D. - Page 2              (GA-0969)
    time. See 
    id. §§ 3033(a)(l),
    3322 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 21.9690 (2011) (Nonduplication of
    Educational Assistance).
    Because a veteran may not receive Chapter 30 and Chapter 33 benefits at the same time, the
    Texas Veterans Commission ("Commission") has asked the Texas Higher Education Coordinating
    Board (the "Board") to adopt a rule based on which benefits the veteran elects to pursue. See 38
    U.S.C.A. §§ 3033(a)(l), 3322 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 21.9690 (2011) (Non duplication of
    Educational Assistance). You ask "whether the Hazlewood Act Exemption permits [the Texas
    Higher Education Coordinating Board] to promulgate rules which would allow a veteran applying
    for the Exemption who is otherwise entitled to [federal] Chapter 33 benefits to not first exhaust his
    or her Chapter 33 benefits." Request Letter at 4. You indicate that the Board is concerned that such
    a rule would conflict with the Board's authority under the Education Code. See 
    id. at 1,
    4.
    Under the state Hazlewood Act Tuition Exemption ("Exemption"), veterans of the United
    States military who meet statutory residency requirements are exempt from "tuition, dues, fees, and
    other required charges, including fees for correspondence courses but excluding general deposit fees,
    student services fees, and any fees or charges for lodging, board, or clothing" at state universities and
    institutions of higher education. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.341(a) (West Supp. 2012). The
    Legislature, however, limited the Exemption by providing that it "does not apply to a person who
    at the time of registration is entitled to receive educational benefits under federal legislation that may
    be used only for the payment of tuition and fees if the value of those benefits received ... is equal
    to or exceeds the value of the exemption .... " 
    Id. § 54.341(e).
    The legal issue you present is whether the Board, an administrative agency, has the authority
    to adopt a rule. An administrative agency has only those powers expressly granted to it by statute
    and those necessarily implied from its statutory authority or duties. See Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation
    Comm'n v. Lakeshore Util. Co., 
    164 S.W.3d 368
    , 377-78 (Tex. 2005). Accordingly, an "agency
    may adopt only such rules as are authorized by and consistent with its statutory authority." Pruett
    v. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 249 S.W.3d 447,452 (Tex. 2008) (citation omitted). A court will
    generally defer to an agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged with enforcing, "'so long as
    the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute. ", R.R.
    Comm'n v. Tex. Citizens for a Saje Future & Clean Water, 
    336 S.W.3d 619
    , 625 (Tex. 2011)
    (quoting First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs, 
    258 S.W.3d 627
    , 632 (Tex. 2008)). Here, the Legislature
    expressly authorized the Board to promulgate rules "to provide for the efficient and uniform
    application of [section 54.341]." TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.341(i) (West Supp. 2012). Thus, we
    examine the relevant language of section 54.341 .
    Subsection 54.341(e) provides that
    [t]he exemption from tuition, fees, and other charges provided for by
    this section does not apply to a person who at the time of registration
    is entitled to receive educational benefits under federal legislation that
    may be used only for the payment of tuition and fees if the value of
    those benefits received in a semester or other term is equal to or
    Raymund A. Paredes, Ph. D. - Page 3              (GA-0969)
    exceeds the value of the exemption for the same semester or other
    term. If the value of federal benefits that may be used only for the
    payment of tuition and fees and are received in a semester or other
    term does not equal or exceed the value of the exemption for the same
    semester or other term, the person is entitled to receive both those
    federal benefits and the exemption in the same semester or other
    term. The combined amount of the federal benefit that may be used
    only for the payment of tuition and fees plus the amount of the
    exemption received in a semester or other term may not exceed the
    cost of tuition and fees for that semester or other term.
    
    Id. § 54.341(e).
    By its plain language, subsection 54.341(e) consistently refers to "benefits
    received." See 
    id. The first
    sentence's restriction applies "if the value of those benefits received
    in a seme~ter or other term is equal to or exceeds the value .... " 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    The second
    sentence applies only "[i]f the value of federal benefits that may be used only for the payment
    of tuition and fees and are received in a semester or other term does not equal or exceed the value
    .... " !d. (~mphasis added). And the final sentence also speaks in terms of the "exemption
    received," not the amount for which the veteran is eligible. See 
    id. Given this
    clear language, a rule
    conditioning the application of the Exemption on the basis of benefits received rather than on the
    benefits to which the veteran is entitled is not contrary to the plain language of subsection 54.341 (e).
    N or can we say that such a proposed rule is unreasonable under the language of subsection 54.341 (e).
    Accordingly, a court would likely conclude that such a proposed rule is within the scope of the
    Board's authority.
    Because you ask a specific question about one aspect of a particular proposed rule, we do not
    generally address the discretion of the Board to implement alternatives to this proposed rule. Nor
    do we address the validity of different interpretations or constructions of subsection 54.341(e).
    Further, because the Texas Legislature has charged the Board with applying the Hazlewood Act, we
    recognize that it is the Board's responsibility in the first instance, subject to judicial review, to fully
    construe subsection 54.341(e) and to determine whether to adopt a rule such as that proposed by the
    Commission. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0899 (2011) at 2-3 ("Rather, we leave it to the [State
    Cemetery] Committee to determine, in the first instance and subject to judicial review, the exact
    scope of its operational authority, and whether that authority necessarily includes the power to
    regulate bicycles. "). We conclude only that the plain text of subsection 54.341 (e) does not preclude
    a rule that allows a veteran applying for the Hazlewood Act Tuition Exemption who is eligible for
    federal Chapter 33 benefits to not first exhaust his or her Chapter 33 benefits.
    Raymund A. Paredes, Ph. D. - Page 4         (GA-0969)
    SUMMARY
    Under section 54.341 of the Education Code, a court would
    likely conclude that the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board
    has authority to adopt a rule which would allow a veteran applying for
    the state Hazlewood Act Tuition Exemption who is otherwise entitled
    to federal Chapter 33 benefits to not first exhaust his or her Chapter
    33 benefits.
    DANIEL T. HODGE
    First Assistant Attorney General
    JAMES D. BLACKLOCK
    Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
    JASON BOATRIGHT
    Chairman, Opinion Committee
    Charlotte M. Harper
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: GA-0969

Judges: Greg Abbott

Filed Date: 7/2/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017