Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2007 )


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  •                                                 GREG         A B B O T T
    July 26,2007
    The Honorable Craig Watkins                                     Opinion No. GA-0557
    Dallas County Criminal District Attorney
    Frank Crowley Courts Building                                   Re: Whether, under particular circumstances, a
    133 North Industrial Boulevard, LB 19                           former district judge may be employed in the
    Dallas, Texas 75207-43 13                                       same county in which she sat as a judge
    (RQ-0565-GA)
    Dear Mr. Watkins:
    You ask about "an appearance of impropriety, a conflict of interest or a violation of any law"
    with respect to current employment of a former district judge.' You tell us that a former district
    judge, Ms. Green, served in a Dallas County District Court and heard family law matters, including
    cases that involve Child Protective Services ("CPS") removing a child from a home. See Request
    Letter, supra note 1, at 1. You inform us that while presiding over these CPS cases, Ms. Green
    "appointed and paid attorneys out of the general fund of Dallas County." 
    Id. at 2.
    Ms. Green served
    as district judge until December 3 1, 2006,2and is currently employed as an assistant district attorney
    for Dallas County. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. In that position, Ms. Green prosecutes
    CPS cases and also supervises attorneys who prosecute CPS cases. See 
    id. at 2.
    In some of the cases
    currently being prosecuted by the district attorney's office, opposing counsel was appointed and paid
    out of county funds by order of then-presiding Ms. Green. See 
    id. 'Letter from
    Honorable Craig Watkins, Dallas County Criminal District Attorney, to Honorable Greg Abbott,
    Attorney General of Texas, at 1 (Jan. 24, 2007) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available at
    http://www.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].
    2Questions regarding an appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest for judges are primarily governed by
    the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. See TEX.CODEJUD.CONDUCT,              reprinted in TEX.GOV'TCODEANN.,tit. 2, subtit.
    G app. B (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006). In the absence of any indication that Ms. Green is subject to assignment under
    chapter 74, Texas Government Code, we assume that she is no longer subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct. See 
    id. Canons 6A,
    F (providing canons applicable to former judges subject to assignment); see also TEX.GOV'TCODEANN.
    53 74.054(a)(3) (Vernon 2005) (providing for judicial assignment), 74.055(c)(prescribing eligibility requirements for
    judicial assignment, including certification of a "willingness not to appear and plead as an attorney in any court in this
    state for a period of two years"), 82.064(a) ("A judge . . . o f . . . a district court . . . may not appear and plead as an
    attorney at law in any court of record in this state."). In the event Ms. Green is subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct,
    the State Commission on Judicial Conduct is responsible, in the first instance, for applying the judicial canons to specific
    conduct by judges. See TEX.CONST.art. V, 5 1-a(2), (6)(A), (8); see also TEX.GOV'TCODEANN. $ 5 33.001L.051
    (Vernon 2004) (pertaining to State Commission on Judicial Conduct).
    The Honorable Craig Watkins - Page 2                (GA-0557)
    You further inform us that your office has taken certain steps to avoid "the appearance of
    impropriety, a conflict of interest or a violation of any law." 
    Id. You state
    that Ms. Green "will not
    handle any case filed" in the court in which she served, nor will Ms. Green "handle any case filed
    in another court that is related . . . to a case" filed in the court in which she formerly served. 
    Id. Additionally, you
    tell us that the prosecutors under Ms. Green's supervision will not consult with
    her about those same cases or discuss the cases in her presence. See 
    id. And you
    inform us you are
    "sending written notice to the parties on those cases" as required under the Texas Disciplinary Rules
    of Professional Conduct. 
    Id. (citing TEX.DISCIPLINARY
           R. PROF'LCONDUCT     1.1l(c)(2), reprinted
    in TEX.GOV'TCODEANN.,tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005) (TEx. STATEBARR.art. X, fj 9)).
    In addition to your primary question, you also inquire whether the steps you have taken to
    screen Ms. Green are sufficient and "[ulnder what circumstances [Ms. Green may] consult with [or]
    advise the other attorneys that she is currently supervising [about] cases filed in or related to" cases
    filed in Ms. Green's former court. Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2. You seek our opinion
    regarding various aspects of Ms. Green's ability to prosecute cases or supervise attorneys on future
    cases to be filed in her former court. See 
    id. We first
    note that Ms. Green's current employment does not implicate laws pertaining to dual
    office holding and conflicts of interest. The proscriptions against dual office holding that stem from
    the constitutional prohibition and the common-law doctrine of incompatibility are not applicable
    here. See TEX.CONST.art. XVI, fj 40 (prohibiting individual from simultaneously holding more than
    one "civil office of em~lument");~  see also Thomas v. Abernathy County Line Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    290 S.W. 152
    (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgm't adopted) (discussing common-law incompatibility).
    For any relevant prohibition against dual office holding to arise, an individual must simultaneously
    hold two offices. An assistant district attorney does not hold a public office. See State ex. rel. Hill
    v. Pirtle, 887 S.W.2d 921'93 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (recognizing that an assistant district attorney
    is an employee, not apublic officer); accordPowell v. State, 898 S.W.2d 821,825 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1994). And further, Ms. Green does not hold two offices because she no longer serves as judge. See
    supra, note 2. Accordingly, Ms. Green's current employment as an assistant district attorney does
    not violate laws governing dual office holding.
    Similarly, constitutional and statutory provisions governing conflicts of interests are not
    implicated by Ms. Green's current employment. Chapter 572, Government Code, contains standards
    of conduct for state officers and employees. See TEX.GOV'TCODEANN.ch. 572 (Vernon 2004 &
    Supp. 2006). An assistant district attorney, however, is not a state employee subject to chapter 572.
    See 
    id. $6 572.002(11)
    (Vernon Supp. 2006) (defining "state employee" to include individuals, not
    state officers, who are employed by a state agency), 572.002(10) (defining "state agency" to include
    departments, offices, or other agencies that have authority that is not limited to a geographical
    portion of the state); see also 
    id. chs. 43
    (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006) (defining judicial districts for
    district attorneys), 44 (defining county territory for criminal district attorneys). And because Ms.
    'See Tilley v. Rogers, 
    405 S.W.2d 220
    , 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont   1966, writ ref d n.r.e.) (recognizing
    there is no distinction between "civil office" and "public office").
    The Honorable Craig Watkins - Page 3                   (GA-0557)
    Green serves as an assistant district attorney rather than as a judge, the constitutional conflict of
    interest provision pertaining to judges is also not a bar. See TEX.CONST.art. V, 5 11.
    Questions involving a lawyer's appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest arising from
    the representation of a particular client are governed by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
    Conduct ("rules of professional conduct"). See generally TEX.DISCIPLINARY           R. PROF'LCONDUCT,
    reprinted in TEX.GOV'TCODEANN.,tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006) (TEx.
    STATEBARR. art. X, 5 9). Violations of, or sufficiency of actions taken under, the rules of
    professional conduct are to be decided in the first instance by the lawyer, or by the disciplinary arm
    of the Supreme Court of Texas and the State Bar of T e ~ a s See  . ~ 
    id. Preamble 7
    15 (Vernon 2005)
    (stating that rules are basis for lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the
    administration of a disciplinary authority); see also TEX.GOV'TCODEANN.5 8 1.071 (Vernon 2005)
    ("Each attorney admitted to practice in this state . . . is subject to the disciplinary. . .jurisdiction of
    the supreme court and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, a committee of the state bar."); TEX.
    R. DISCIPLINARY    P. Preamble, reprinted in TEX. GOV'TCODEANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A-1
    (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006) (disciplinary rules of procedure stating that the "Supreme Court of
    Texas has the constitutional and statutory responsibility within the State for the lawyer discipline
    . . . system"). The issuance of opinions on the propriety of attorney behavior under the rules of
    professional conduct is a statutory function of the Committee on Professional Ethics, which consists
    of nine members of the Texas State Bar who are appointed by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX.
    GOV'TCODEANN.5 5 8 1.091 (Vernon 2005) (creating Committee on Professional Ethics), 8 1.092(a)
    (providing that the committee shall "express its opinion on the propriety of professional conduct");
    see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0488 (2006) at 3 (stating the Committee on Professional Ethics
    is the "appropriate body to consider the attorney's responsibility under the Texas Disciplinary Rules
    of Professional Conduct").
    Your query5thus requires a determination that initially is to be made by Ms. Green and the
    State Bar of Texas. Moreover, questions about rules of professional conduct violations require an
    examination of all the facts in a particular circumstance and are not appropriate for an attorney
    general opinion. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0087 (2003) at 1 (recognizing that conflict of
    interest questions involve questions of fact). Therefore, we cannot resolve your questions about any
    appearance of impropriety or a conflict of interest under the rules of professional conduct. For the
    same reasons, we cannot evaluate the sufficiency of efforts taken by your office to ensure that Ms.
    Green's activities as assistant district attorney comport with the rules of professional conduct.
    4The Texas Supreme Court has exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law in the State of Texas. See
    State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243,245 (Tex. 1994); see also TEX.GOV'TCODEANN.5 8 1.071 (Vernon 2005)
    (disciplinary jurisdiction over each attorney admitted to practice in the state). The State Bar of Texas is an arm of the
    judiciary created to assist in the regulation of the practice of law. See TEX.GOV'TCODEA m . 5 81.011 (Vernon 2005).
    'You do not ask about any impropriety, conflict of interest, or violation of law regarding Ms. Green's tenure
    as district judge. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1-2. Thus, we do not consider any possible violation of provisions
    governing successive employment of state officers or adjudicatory officials. See TEX.GOV'T CODEANN. § 572.054
    (Vernon 2004); see also TEX.DISCIPLINARY       R. PROF'LCONDUCT1.1l(b), reprinted in TEX.GOV'TCODEA m . , tit. 2,
    subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005) (TEx. STATEBARR. art. X, 5 9).
    The Honorable Craig Watkins - Page 4         (GA-0557)
    S U M M A R Y
    The employment of a former district judge as an assistant
    district attorney, under the particular circumstances, does not violate
    constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to dual office
    holding or conflicts of interest.
    The professional conduct of attorneys is governed by the
    Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Such rules
    include prohibitions against appearances of impropriety and conflicts
    of interest, but violations thereof are to be determined, in the first
    instance, by the attorney and the disciplinary arm of the Supreme
    Court of Texas and the State Bar of Texas. Morever, questions about
    violations of the rules of professional conduct cannot be answered in
    an attorney general opinion because they involve considerations of
    fact.
    Very truly yours,
    Attorney ~ e M of1Texas
    KENT C. SULLIVAN
    First Assistant Attorney General
    NANCY S. FULLER
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Charlotte M. Harper
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: GA-0557

Judges: Greg Abbott

Filed Date: 7/2/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017