Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1998 )


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  •                                 @ffice       of tip Elttornep @eneral
    Sdate of EexaG
    DAN MORALES
    ATTORNEY
    GWERAL                                    December 21,199s
    The Honorable Jerry Patterson                       Opinion No. DM-495
    Chair, Committee on Veteran Affairs &
    Military Installations                             Re: Whether the legislature may authorize a state
    Texas State Senate                                  agency to construe Texas Constitution article XVI,
    P.O. Box 12068                                      section 50, the home equity amendment  (RQ-1167)
    Austin, Texas 7871 l-2068
    Dear Senator Patterson:
    You ask whether the legislature, either by statute or by constitutional amendment approved
    by the voters, may authorize a state agency to construe the provisions of article XVI, section 50 of
    the Texas Constitution.   The most recent amendment to article XVI, section 50 was approved by
    Texas voters in a general election held on November 4, 1997. The amendment added types of debt
    that may be enforced by foreclosure against a homestead, including an extension of credit secured
    by the borrower’s equity in the homestead, popularly known as a “home equity loan.” As your letter
    points out, the amendment has given rise to numerous questions regarding its construction. Section
    50 does not authorize the legislature to enact general implementing legislation or empower a state
    agency to adopt interpretive rules. Consequently, the state is faced with an environment of
    uncertainty as to how lenders, builders, insurers, borrowers, and others may properly negotiate
    enforceable home equity loans. You tell us that the legislature seeks to appoint a state agency to
    resolve these complicated questions as they arise.
    We cannot tell you in advance whether any particular legislative action you might take will
    be valid, but we can advise you of the basic legal principles governing your question.
    We begin with your proposal to grant interpretive authority to a state agency by statute.
    Article III, section 1 of the Texas Constitution vests legislative power in the Texas Legislature.’
    This means, as a general rule, that the legislature has the power to enact any law that is not in
    violation of state or federal constitutional provisions.2 And, where the legislature has established
    a sufficient standard of guidance on a particular policy of law, it may delegate power to executive
    ‘Tex. Const. art. III, 5 1 (“The Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of
    Representatives,  which together shall be styled ‘The Legislature of the State of Texas.“‘).
    lDe Sham v. Webb, 113 S.W.Zd 519, 523 (Tex. 1938); Brown v. City     ofGalveston,   75 S.W. 488,493   (Tex.
    1903).
    The Honorable Jerry Patterson           - Page 2              (DM-495)
    agencies to prescribe and administer the details of the law.’ Any limitations on the legislature’s
    power must be shown by express words in the constitution or by necessary implication.4 When
    reviewing the legislature’s power to enact a particular statute, courts apply a strong presumption that
    the statute is valid, and a court will not declare a statute invalid unless it is clearly unconstitutional.s
    In general, then, the legislature may enact any law that is not in conflict with the constitution.
    Your particular question is whether the legislature may legally authorize and empower a state agency
    to construe and interpret the provisions of section 50 of the Texas Constitution as it now stands. The
    answer to your question, strictly read, is no. “[Tlhe Legislature has no authority to interpret or
    declare a matter of constitutional         construction,“6 nor may it delegate such authority to an
    administrative agency.’ To do so, absent express constitutional authorization, would be to usurp the
    powers ofthe judiciary in violation ofthe separation ofpowers principles set out in article II, section
    1 of the Texas Constitution.’ Below we will discuss the interpretive powers that might be authorized
    by the constitution.     But as section 50 now stands, neither the legislature nor any state agency has
    the power to declare definitively what it means. The ultimate power to construe constitutional
    provisions lies solely with the courk9
    This does not mean, however, that the legislature or a state agency may not in fact construe
    the constitution.  Some provisions of the Texas Constitution give the legislature, a state agency, or
    a court the power to regulate in the subject area of the constitutional provision. For example, article
    V, section 24 provides that certain county officers may be removed from office “for incompetency,
    official misconduct, habitual drunkenness, or other causes defined by law,” impliedly authorizing
    the legislature to construct causes for removal. (Emphasis added.) Other grants of regulatory
    authority are more explicit. Article III, section 47(b), provides: “The Legislature by law may
    ‘Railroad Commh    v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.Zd 619,689.90       (Tex. 1992),
    ‘Brown Y. City of Galveston, 75 S.W. 488,493 (Tex. 1903).
    ‘Shepherd v. San Jacinto Jr. College Dist., 363 S.W.2d 742,743,750-51 (Tex. 1962).
    6PoweN v. State, 17 Tex. Ct. App. 345,350 (1884); seeBarnettv. State, 
    62 S.W. 765
    .769-77 (Tex. Grim. App.
    1900) (Davidson, J., dissenting); Attorney General Opinion M-1201 (1990) at 8.
    “‘The legislature has no strictly judicial functions; and has no power to delegate to a hoard a function which
    it does not itselfpossess.”  Sun Gil Co. v. Potter, 182 S.W.2d 923,928 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1944), rev’d on other
    grounds, 
    189 S.W.2d 482
    (Tex. 1945).
    ‘Article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution provides: “The powers of the Government ofthe State of Texas
    shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit:
    Those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and
    no person, OI collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to
    either of fhe others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.”
    ?Yee Hays County AppraisalDist.   v. Mayo Kirby Springs, Inc., 903 S.W.2d 394,397 (Tex. App.--Austin      1995,
    no wit).
    p.   2821
    The Honorable        Jerry Patterson   - Page 3               (DM-495)
    authorize and regulate bingo games          .” When given the power to implement constitutional
    provisions, the legislature may define terms that are not defined in the constitution itself, provided
    the definitions constitute reasonable interpretations of the constitutional language and do not do
    violence to the plain meaning and intent of the framers.‘0
    Thus in Schwenke v. State the court held that an administrative agency designated by the
    legislature could define the causes for which a county officer could be removed from office under
    article V, section24.” AndinAerospace       Optimist Club v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission,‘z
    the court upheld the legislature’s interpretation of the term “proceeds” as used in the constitutional
    provision regarding bingo proceeds, saying:           “The legislature’s practical interpretation of a
    constitutional term can be a valuable aid in determining the meaning and intention of that term in
    cases of doubt.“13 In ways such as these, the legislature construes the constitution.         While not
    binding on the courts, these constructions are given weight. Whether a legislative construction is
    a reasonable interpretation ofthe constitutionultimately    remains amatter for the judiciary to decide.
    Even where no implementing authority is given, a construction of a constitutional provision
    given by the legislature or an executive agency will be given weight by a court in determining the
    meaning of the provision. I4 A contemporaneous          construction that has been acquiesced in and
    adhered to for a long period of time is entitled to great weight.15 For example, the court in Panas
    v. Texas Breeders & Racing Associution’6 considered a law regulating horse racing. The law was
    challenged on the grounds that it violated article III, section 47 ofthe constitution, which at that time
    prohibited “the establishment of lotteries          or other evasions involving the lottery principle,
    established or existing in other States.“” The court ofappeals held that the legislature’s legalization
    of horse racing constituted an interpretation that horse racing did not violate the constitutional
    ‘%vearingen Y. CiiyofTaarkana,596S.W.2d        157,160n.l (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1979,mitref           dn.r.e.)
    (citing San Antonio Conservation Sot ‘y, Inc. v. City ofSun Antonio, 
    455 S.W.2d 743
    (Tex. 1970)).
    “Schwenke v. State, 960 S.W.2d 227,233 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied) (“Incompetence     is
    merely one of the four grounds for removal from oftice set out in article V, section 24. Each of these grounds:
    incompetence, official misconduct, habitual drunkenness, or other causes defmed by law, requires interpretation. That
    interpretation is left to the legislature and the courts.“).
    “886 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. App.--Austin       1994, no wit).
    “Id. at 560.
    “Walker v. Baker, 196 S.W.Zd 324,327       (Tex. 1946)
    “Director    ofthe Dep’t ofAgric.   & Env’t v. Printing Indus. Ass’n, 600 S.W.2d 264,269   (Tex. 1980).
    I680 S.W.2d 1020 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston       1935, wit dism’d w.o.j.),
    “Id. at 1024.
    p.   2822
    The Honorable      Jerry Patterson     - Page 4              (DM-495)
    prohibition against lotteries. Unless clearly wrong, the court said, a legislative construction                    of a
    constitutional provision will not be set aside.”
    Certain provisions in the home equity amendment authorize legislative action, creating
    avenues for legislative       or executive interpretations    of those provisions.        For example,
    section 50(a)(6) provides that an enforceable home equity loan is one that “permits a lender to
    contract for and receive any fixed or variable rate of interest authorized under statute.” (Emphasis
    added.) And section 50(b) prohibits the sale or abandonment of a homestead without the consent
    of each owner and spouse of each owner “given in such a manner as may beprescribed by law.”
    (Emphasis added.) The legislature has already incorporated into statutory law someofthe provisions
    of section 50, even though not expressly instructed by the constitution to do so. Section 41.001 of
    the Property Code exempts homesteads from seizure for the claims of creditors, except for those
    claims listed in the statute, which claims mirror the debts listed in section SO(a)(l) through 50(a)(5)
    of article XVI.‘9 And section 53.254, regarding the requirements of a lien on a homestead for a
    residential construction     loan, incorporates some of section 50’s requirements           for a home
    improvement      loan. To the extent that they construe the constitution, laws such as these are
    legislative interpretations and will be given weight by a court, unless clearly wrong?O
    The home equity amendment gives no general implementing authority to the legislature.
    Nevertheless, given the legislature’s plenary powers, we see no constitutional prohibition on the
    legislature authorizing a state agency to adopt rules implementing the requirements of section 50.
    Any such delegation of power would have to be consistent with the provisions of section 50,
    including those directing the state supreme court and the state Finance Commission to take certain
    actions with respect to home equity lending. *’ Again, while not binding on the courts, executive
    constructions will be given weight by a court in construing the constitution. Whether an agency’s
    interpretation of section 50 conforms to the requirements of the constitutional provision ultimately
    will be a question for the courts.
    This brings us to your proposal to amend the constitution. The constitution may be amended
    to create any law that the voters see fit to approvez2 and that is not inconsistent with the United States
    ‘8Id.
    ‘The debts enforceable against a homestead listed in section 41.001 are debts for: (1) purchase money; (2)
    taxes; (3) home improvements;   (4) owelty of partition; and (5) refinance of a lien. Curiously, section 41.001 does not
    include as permissible encumbrances home equity loans or reverse mortgages as provided for in section 50(a)(6) and
    50(a)(7) of the constitution.
    “See In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502,Sl     I 11.18 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
    507 U.S. 971
    (1993); In reMoody,
    
    862 F.2d 1194
    , 1201 (5tb Cir. 1989).
    “See infrn note 26.
    “The    power to amend,   revive or re-enact a   law rests with the people of the State. They can amend the
    (continued...)
    p.   2823
    The Honorable        Jerry Patterson        - Page 5                  (DM-495)
    Constitution.”   While the purpose of a constitution normally is to establish the basic and general
    foundation of a governmental system, in Texas, as one court has noted, “[o]ur Constitution is
    distinguished for the particularity of its provisions and the details into which it enters in reference
    to matters of government.“*4 This statement is no more clearly evidenced than by the home equity
    amendment, which, in nineteen paragraphs with over forty subsections, prescribes in detail the
    requirements for debts enforceable by foreclosure on a homestead. Although the wisdom of writing
    such details into the constitution has been questioned,25 it is nevertheless not prohibited.
    As we discussed above, the legislature, a state agency, or a court may be given the power to
    implement constitutional provisions. While section 50 contains no general grant of implementing
    authority, it directs the state Finance Commission and the state supreme court to take certain specific
    actions with respect to home equity lending. x We see no prohibition on section 50 being similarly
    amended to include a grant of authority to the legislature or to a state agency to regulate with respect
    to some or all of its provisions, and in this way construe the constitution. Still, in such a case, the
    courts must decide whether any statute or regulation is consistent with the constitution.
    In theory, the state constitution                   could be amended to give a state agency definitive
    interpretive powers over constitutional                     provisions, subject to the requirements of the federal
    Constitution   in any particular    they desire.”    Stephens v. Sfate, 
    133 S.W.2d 130
    , 131 (Tex. Grim. App. 1939).
    21A state constitutional     provision     is invalid if it conflicts with the federal Constitution.    See Reynolds v. Sims,
    
    377 U.S. 533
    , 584 (1964).
    
    2’Brown, 75 S.W. at 493
    .
    2“‘Procedural details should not be written into constitutions, but state constitutions should provide for
    reasonable procedural regulations by legislative enactment.” Exparte Davis, 574 S.W.2d 166,169 1x4 (Tex. Grim. App.
    1978).
    The United States Supreme Court said inM’Cu~/och                 Y. Mmyland,    17 U.S. 316,407       (4 Wheat.) (1819):
    A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers
    will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake
    of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It
    would, probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only
    its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
    ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects
    theIIlSelVeS.
    ?See Tex. Const. art. XVI, 5 50(r) (directing supreme court to promulgate rules for expedited home equity loan
    foreclosure proceedings);   
    id. 5 50(s)
    (directing Finance Commission to research availability, quality, prices, and
    practices of home equity fmancial services and report annually to legislahue).
    p.   2824
    The Honorable Jerry Patterson           - Page 6              (DM-495)
    Constitution.27 As we discussed above, a statute authorizing a state agency to construe section 50
    of the constitution as it now stands would usurp the power of the judiciary branch. However, article
    II, section 1 provides for the separation of legislative, judicial, and executive functions “except in
    the instances       expressly permitted” in the constitution.      The interpretive commentary to the
    constitution explains:
    The Texas Constitution itself vests in each of the three departments certain
    powers which, in their essential nature, have not belonged to it. Article II
    recognizes this when it states that “no person, or collection of persons, being
    of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to
    either of the others, except in instances herein expressly permitted.”
    .
    Thus, it is not exactly correct to state the principle of separation of
    powers as absolutely prohibiting performance by one department of acts
    which by their essential nature belong to another.          Rather, the correct
    statement is that a department may constitutionally        exercise any power
    whatever its essential nature, which has, by the constitution, been delegated
    to it; but that it may not exercise powers not so constitutionally      granted
    which from their essential nature do not fall within its division of
    governmental functions.28
    In other words, each branch of government may exercise those powers that are essentially within its
    area of function-legislative,   executive, or judicial-and may exercise powers outside of its area if
    expressly authorized by the constitution to do so. The interpretive commentary cites such grants of
    power already in the constitution:
    [T]he Constitution expressly permits the Supreme Court to exercise the
    essentially legislative power of making certain rules of procedure, and the
    executive power to appoint a clerk. The executive has been granted the
    legislative veto, and the judicial right of pardoning. The legislature has been
    given the judicial powers of impeachment and the right to judge of the
    qualifications   and elections of its own members; and the Senate, the
    essentially executive power ofparticipating in the appointment of ofticials.29
    27See supra note 23.
    28Tex. Const. art. II, 5 1 (intap.   commentary)   (Vernon   1997).
    “Id.
    p.    2825
    The Honorable Jerry Patterson    - Page 7            (DM-495)
    Thus the constitution could be amended to give to an executive agency judicial-type         interpretive
    powers with respect to the home equity amendment.
    We do not advise you on the wisdom of this or any other particular action. We believe,
    however, that both statutory and constitutional avenues exist for the legislature to authorize a state
    agency to regulate with respect to the home equity amendment.
    SUMMARY
    The legislature has the power to enact any law that is not in violation of
    state or federal constitutional provisions. It may not, however, infringe upon
    the power of the judiciary to construe and interpret the constitution.      Thus
    while the legislature may not, absent express constitutional           authority,
    empower a state agency to definitively construe article XVI, section 50 ofthe
    Texas Constitution-the         home equity amendment-the       legislature may
    authorize a state agency to adopt rules implementing the requirements of the
    home equity amendment. Whether any legislative or administrative action
    is consistent with the requirements ofthe constitution is ultimately a question
    for the courts to decide.
    The constitution may be amended to create any law that the voters see fit
    to approve. The legislature may propose, and the voters may approve, a
    constitutional   amendment authorizing a state agency to implement or
    construe provisions of the constitution.
    Yours very truly,              /
    DAN     MORALES
    Attorney General of Texas
    JORGE VEGA
    First Assistant Attorney General
    SARAH J. SHIRLEY
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Barbara Griffin
    Assistant Attorney General
    p.   2826
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DM-495

Judges: Dan Morales

Filed Date: 7/2/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017