Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1992 )


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  •                                Gffice of tty glttornep Qkneral
    &date     of ?F;exae
    DAN MORALES                                      March 13,1992
    ,Al-r,,RSEY
    CESERAL
    Honorable Chet Brooks                                 Opinion No. DM-97
    Chairman
    Committee on Health and                               Re: Whether Texas’procedure whereby
    Human Services                                       a man voluntarily can establish paternity
    Texas State Senate                                    of a child born out of wedlock “legiti-
    P. 0. Box 12068                                       mates” the child (RQ-178)
    Austin, Texas 78711
    Dear Senator Brooks:
    Prior to its amendment in 1986, section 309(a) of the United States
    Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provided that a child born outside of
    wedlock outside of the United States to a father who is a citizen of the United States
    and a noncitizen mother was deemed a citizen of the United States from birth if,
    before the child reached age twenty-one, the child’s paternity was established “by
    legitimation,” according to the law of the child’s or the father’s residence or
    domicile.’ We understand you to ask whether a child whose paternity is established
    tScction 209(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act appears at section 1409(a) of title 8 of
    the United States Code. In 1986, Congress amended section 309(a) so that a child bon outside of
    wedlock is deemed a citizeo of the United States from the time of bii if, before tbe child reaches the
    age of eighteel&
    a blood relationship benveen the child and the [child’s] father is established by
    clear and convincing tidence, provided the father bad the nationality of the
    United States at the time of the child’s bbtb, the father mdess deaascd has
    agreed in writing to provide tkaocial support for the child until such child
    reaches the age of eighteen years and if, while such child is under the age of
    eighteen years, (1) such child is le&imated under tbe law of the child’s
    residence or domicile, or (2) the father acknowledges paternity of the child in
    writing under oath, or (3) paternity of the child is c&abkhed by adjudication
    of a competent court.
    Immigration & Nationality Act Amends. of 1986, Pub. L 99653, 5 13(b), 
    100 Stat. 3657
     (1986). We
    arc informed that a child born before the effective date of the 19% amendments must become a citizen
    pursuant to the pre-1986 version of section 309(a) because that section deems tbe child a citizen from
    P.    490
    Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 2                    (DM-97)
    under Texas law pursuant to sections 13.21 through 13.24 of the Family Code, as
    amended in 1989, is deemed a United States citizen pursuant to the pre-1986
    version of section 309(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. While this office
    cannot determine the citizenship of an individual under federal law, we can explain
    the purpose as well as the effect, if any, of the 1989 amendments to sections 13.21
    through 13.24 of the Family Code on the status and rights of a child under Texas
    law.
    Until 1989, Texas law provided a procedure for “voluntary legitimation” in
    sections 13.21 through 13.24 of the Family Code. Using Texas’ statutory procedure
    for “voluntary legitimation,” a man who was a citizen of the United States and a
    resident of Texas, could, by voluntarily executing a proper statement of paternity
    and having a court designate him to be the father, legitimate his child born out of
    wedlock outside of the United States to an alien woman. After legitimation under
    the pre-1989 version of sections 13.21 through 13.24 of the Family Code, the child
    was entitled to the same rights under Texas law as a child born in wedlock. See
    Fam. Code 9s 11.01(3) (defining “[plarent” to include man who has been
    adjudicated to be child’s biological father), 11.01(4) (defining “[plarent-child rela-
    tionship”), 12.04 (listing rights, privileges, duties, and powers existing between
    parent and child). In 1989, however, Texas amended sections 13.21 through 13.24 of
    the Family Code to provide a procedure for “voluntary paternity,“’ instead of
    “voluntary legitimation.” By changing the name of the procedure, the Texas statute
    (footnote continued)
    birth if the terms of the statute are satisfied. Thus, the issue you rake will be pertinent until the year
    5007, when children born in 1986 will turn twenty-one years of age.
    ‘Section 13.21 establishes a procedure for voluntary adjudication of paternity in cases in which
    a man claiming to IX the biological farher of a child who has no presumed farher has executed a
    statement of paternity. A voluntary paternity suit is “voluntary”only in the sense that the alleged father
    voluntarily wires and signs a statement of paternity. Smith, Title 2: Comrnenruty, 8 TEX. TECH. L.
    REV. 19, 68 (1976) (Texas Family Code Symposium Supplement). The statement of paternity, which
    must be attached to the petition for adjudication of paternity, must comply with the requirements
    articulated in .section 13.22 of the Family Code. But see Fam. Code 0 13.24 (validating a statement
    acknowledging paternity or an obligation lo support a child if the alleged biological father signed the
    statement prior to January 1, 1974, although the statement does not comply with section 13.22 of the
    Family Code, and is not filed with the Texas Department of Human Services or with the court). A
    statement of paternity executed in compliance with section 13.22 constitutcspriwo facie evidence that
    the child is the child of the man execuGng the statement and that he has an obligation to support the
    child. 
    Id.
     5 13.23(a); see also Smith, suprcrat 73. SeegenrrcrllyDoyle, Commem, Volrtrtra~Legitinwtion
    Rig/m of Unwed Far/ws in Tews. 20 Hovs. L. REV. 1157 (1983).
    p.    491
    Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 3                 (DM-97)
    differs from the pre-1986 version of section 309(a) of the Immigration and
    Nationality Act, which requires “legitimation.”
    The Texas Legislature amended sections 13.21 through 13.24 of the Family
    Code, as well as other sections of the Family Code, Human Resources Code,
    Probate Code, and civil statutes in Senate Bill 401. Acts 1989, 71st leg., ch. 375,
    3 17, at 1481, to remove all references to legitimacy and illegitimacy. Tapes of a
    public hearing conducted regarding Senate Bill 401 reveal that, by removing
    references to legitimacy and illegitimacy throughout Texas law, the legislature
    merely intended to eradicate what it considered an “odious term” that wrongly
    stigmatized the child of an “illicit union.” Hearings on S.B. 401 Before the Senate
    Jurisprudence Comm., 71st Leg. (Mar. 14, 1989) (testimony of Harry Tindell, drafter
    of S.B. 401); see aLr0 
    id.
     (testimony of Steven McNally, expert witness, stating that
    word change was nonsubstantive).
    The present voluntary paternity procedure is one method by which a parent-
    child relationship may be established. Fam. Code 9 12.01(a). According to the
    Family Code, once parenthood has been established by the volu.ntary paternity
    procedure or by any other method listed in section 12.01(a), the parent-child
    relationship “extends equally to every child and parent regardless of the marital
    status of the parents.” 
    Id.
     9 12.01(b). Thus, once a court adjudicates the man to be a
    parent of the child, see 
    id.
     5 13.21, the man and child have a legal parent-child
    relationship “incident to which the rights, privileges, duties, and powers as provided
    by Section 12.04 of this code are conferred or imposed.“) 
    Id.
     § 11.01(4).
    3Section 12.04 of the Family Code states:
    Except as otherwise provided by judicial order or by an affidavit of
    relinquishment of parental rights executed under Section 15.03 of thii code, the
    parent of a child hasthe following rights, privileges, duties, and powers:
    (1)    the right to have physical possession, to direct the moral and
    religious training, and to establish the legal domicile of the child:
    (2)    the duty of care, control,     protection, and reasonable
    diicipliie of the child;
    (3)    the duty to support the child, including providing the child
    with clothing, food, shelter, medical care, and education;
    (4)  the duty, except when a guardian of the child’s estate has
    been appointed, to manage the estate of the child, including a power
    P.      492
    Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 4                   (DM-97)
    Although Senate Bill 401 changed the name of the procedure from “voluntary
    legitimation” to “voluntary paternity,” the bill did not change the procedure involved,
    with the exception of amending section 13.21 to permit governmental entities other
    than the Texas Department of Human Services to file a petition for adjudication of
    paternity. Moreov& both the previous “voluntary legitimation” procedure and the
    current “voluntary paternity” procedure produce the same result: the establishment
    of a parent-child relationship. The legislature did not alter the substance of rights,
    privileges, duties, and powers incident to the parent-child relationship listed in
    sectlon 12.04 in 1989 when it changed the name of the procedure from “voluntary
    legitimation” to “voluntary paternity.” Clearly, then, a child born out of wedlock
    whose paternity has been established pursuant to the voluntary paternity procedure
    set forth in sections 13.21 through 13.24 of the Family Code is entitled to the same
    parent-child relationship, and therefore the same rights under Texas law, as a child
    born in wedlock.” In our opinion, the 1989 amendments to sections 13.21 through
    13.24 made no substantive change, and the change in terminology thus should not
    (footnote continued)
    as an agent of the child to act in relation to the child’s estate if the
    child’s action is required by a state, the United States, or a foreign
    government;
    (5)   the right to the services and earnings of the child;
    (6)    the power to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the
    armed forces of the United States, and to medical, psychiatric, and
    surgical treatment;
    (7)   the power to represent the child in legal action and to make
    other decisions of substantial legal significance concerning the child;
    (8)    the power to receive and give receipt for payments for the
    support of the child and to hold or disburse any funds for the benefit
    of the child;
    (9)    the right to inherit from and through the child; and
    (10)   any other right, privilege, duty, or power existing between a
    parent and child by virtue of law.
    4For interesting cases regarding chapter 13 of the Family Code, see Bore v. Lmw~, 802 S.W.Zd
    73, 75 a.1 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990), wrirgrmfed, 34 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 687 (Nov. 19, 1991); TercrsDep’f of
    Hunum Resorrrres I’.Hmnrmrder,595 S.W.Zd 189 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, writ ret’d n.r.e.)
    (overruled on other grounds in In Inferest o/J&M., 631 S.W.Zd 730 (Tex. 1982)).
    p*   493
    Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 5          (DM-97)
    affect the way in which the federal government applies the provisions in determining
    citizenship of children born out of wedlock under the Immigration and Nationality
    Act.
    SUMMARY
    The procedure for establishing “voluntary paternity” under
    sections 13.21 through 13.24 of the Family Code is essentially
    the same as the procedure for “voluntary legitimation” under the
    pre-1989 version of sections 13.21 through 13.24, and both
    procedures produce the same result. A child born out of
    wedlock whose paternity has been established pursuant to
    sections 13.21 through 13.24 of the Family Code is entitled to
    the same parent-child relationship and the same rights under
    Texas law as a child born in wedlock.
    Very truly yours,
    DAN      MORALES
    Attorney General of Texas
    WILL PRYOR
    First Assistant Attorney General
    MARY KELLER
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY (Ret.)
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    RENEA HICKS
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    MADELEINE B. JOHNSON
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Kym Oltrogge
    Assistant Attorney General
    P-   494
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DM-97

Judges: Dan Morales

Filed Date: 7/2/1992

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017