Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1986 )


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    Honorable Pablo Avila            Opinion No.   JM-553
    Zavala County Attorney
    Zavala County Courthouse         Re: Whether a mayor automatically
    Crystal City, Texas   78839      resigns his position upon announcing
    his candidacy for the position of
    county judge
    Dear Mr. Avila:
    You ask whether the mayor of Crystal City may continue to occupy
    his office as mayor while he holds another office or is a candidate
    for another office. He :Lnitially served Crystal City as a city
    council member and was ap:?ointed to the position of mayor, a non-
    paying position. He had a, little over a year left on his term as
    mayor when he filed for thf:office of county judge for Zavala County.
    Based on these facts, you first ask whether the mayor of Crystal City
    may continue to hold that office after becoming a candidate for the
    office of county judge. You also ask whether there is a conflict of
    interest in the interim before the election.
    The mayor is also a justice of the peace in Zavala County. You
    state that he had over one: year left on his term as justice of the
    peace when he filed for reelaction to the city council of Crystal City
    in March of 1985. You ar;k whether the mayor automatically relin-
    quished his position as just:lceof the peace, pursuant to article XVI,
    section 65, of the Texas Constitution, by becoming a candidate for
    city council when more than a year remained on his unexpired term as
    justice of the peace.
    We will answer your second question first. The person you inquire
    about was serving as city :ouncilman and justice of the peace at the
    time he filed for reelectian to the city council. You do not ask and
    we do not decide whether this dual service was permissible. See Turner
    V. Trinity Independent Schoo,lDistrict Board of Trustees, 70m.W.Zd   1
    (Tex. App. - Houston [14tl;Dist.] 1983, no writ); Attorney General
    opinion JM-395 (1985).     Pou ask simply whether this individual
    automatically resigned his position as justice of the peace when he
    announced his candidacy for #citycouncil member.
    Attorney General 0pin:Lon JM-395 (1985) considered whether a
    justice of the peace automatically resigned his office pursuant to
    article XVI, section 65, oE the Texas Constitution when he announced
    r   his candidacy for city council member of a general law city at a time
    when he had more than one year remaining on his unexpired term as
    p. 2454
    ,
    Honorable Pablo Avila - Pa&e 2    (JM-553)
    justice. Article XVI, sect:lon65, of the Texas Constitution provides
    as follows:
    Sec. 65. St,%ggering Terms of Office -- The
    following officers elected at the General Election
    in November, 195i1,and thereafter, shall serve for
    the full terms provided in this Constitution:
    (a) District Clerks; (b) County Clerks; (c)
    County Judges; ((1)Judges of County Courts at Law,
    County Criminal Courts, County Probate Courts and
    County Domestic Relations Courts; (e) County
    Treasurers; (f) C:riminal District Attorneys; (g)
    County Surveyors;; (h) Inspectors of Hides and
    Animals; (I) Comty Commissioners for Precincts
    Two and Four; (j:~Justices of the Peace.
    .   .   .   .
    Provided, howlrver,if any of the officers named
    herein shall an&&e    their candidacy, or shall in
    fact become a c&didate, in any General, Special
    or Primary Election, for any office of profit or
    trust under the laws of this State or the United
    States other th& the office then held, at any
    time when the u&pired    term of the office then
    held shall exceed one (1) year, such announcement
    or such candida:)r shall constitute an automatic
    resignation of 1:he office then held, and the
    vacancy thereby created shall be filled pursuant
    to law in the satnemanner as other vacancies for
    such office are E:illed. (Emphasis added).
    This provision applj.es to a justice of the peace. Attorney
    General Opinion JM-395 c~lcluded that a councilman of a general law
    city occupied an office of trust within article XVI, section 65, of
    the Texas Constitution. This conclusion also applies to a city
    councilman of a home rule city. He engages in governmental activities
    and exercises a portion of the sovereign powers of the state and thus
    also occupies an office of trust within article XVI, section 65. Tex.
    Const. art. XI, 95; --
    Willis v. Potts, 
    377 S.W.2d 622
    (Tex. 1964). The
    person in question had OVI:I'one year remaining on his term as justice
    of the peace when he fi:.ed for reelection to the city council of
    Crystal City in March of 1.985. He therefore resigned his office as
    justice of the peace at t,hat time, pursuant to article XVI, section
    65, of the Texas Constitution.
    We turn to your firirt question: whether the mayor of Crystal
    City may continue to hold that office after becoming a candidate for
    county judge at a time wh:n he had more than a year remaining of his
    term as mayor. Article XI, section 11, of the Texas Constitution
    pertains to the term of ofEice of city officers. It also includes a
    p. 2455
    Honorable Pablo Avila - Page 3   (JM-553)
    provision for automatic m~signation of city officers who become
    candidates for another of:iice under certain circumstances. Article
    XI. section 11. of the constitution provides in part:
    Sec. 11. A g,me Rule City may provide by
    charter or chartfiramendment, and a city, town or
    village 0peratir.g under the general laws may
    provide by majority vote of the qualified voters
    voting at an election called for that purpose, for
    a longer term of office than two (2) years for its
    officers, either elective or appointive, or both,
    but not to exceed four (4) years; provided,
    however, that terure under Civil Service shall not
    be affected hereby.
    Provided, however, if any of such officers,
    elective or ap:?ointive, shall announce their
    candidacy, or shz.11in fact become a candidate, in
    any general, spectal or primary election, for any
    office of profit or trust under the laws of this
    State or the United States other than the office
    then held, at a?7 time when the unexpired term of
    the office then held shall exceed one (1) year,
    such announcemen,:or such candidacy shall consti-
    tute an automatic resignation of the office then
    held, and the vacancy thereby created shall be
    filled pursuant l:cs
    law in the same manner as other
    vacancies for such.office are filled.
    The constitutional provision was construed by Attorney General
    Opinion M-586  (1970). which considered whether the mayor of Amarillo
    resigned his office upon hecoming a candidate for county judge at a
    time when the unexpired te'm of his office exceeded one year. The
    opinion determined that the provision for automatic resignation
    applied only to city officers whose term of office was longer than two
    years, having been extend<:dbeyond two years under the authority of
    paragraph one of article XI, section 11. Attorney General Opinion
    M-586, at 3-4. The mayor of Amarillo served only a two year term,
    accordingly, he was not subject to the provision for automatic
    resignation in article XI, section 11.
    The answer to your question depends upon whether the mayor of
    Crystal City serves a two year term, or whether his term of office has
    been lengthened beyond two :years. If he serves only a two year term,
    he is not subject to the provision in article XI, section 11 for
    automatic resignation. If his term as mayor is longer than two years,
    then he will automatically resign that office by becoming a candidate
    for any other "office of profit or trust" at any time when his un-
    expired term as mayor exceeds one year. A county judge occupies an
    office of profit. See Tex. Const. art. V. 515. Thus, if the mayor's
    term of office exceeds two years, his becoming a candidate for the
    office of county judge at a time when he had more than one year left
    p. 2456
    Honorable Pablo Avila - Page 4     (JM-553)
    to serve as mayor   would constitute his automatic resignation from his
    office as mayor.
    In the event that the mayor of Crystal City may continue to hold
    his office while running fcr the office of county judge, you wish to
    know whether he would be jmvolved in a conflict of interest in the
    interim before the election.. The mere fact that this individual is
    serving as a mayor while nmning for the office of county judge does
    not involve him in a conflict of interest. Whether he has engaged in
    conduct that would violate 'any law depends upon all the surrounding
    facts and circumstances and is beyond the scope of this opinion. -See
    Penal Code art. 39.01.
    SUMMARY
    Under article XVI, section 65, of the Texas
    Constitution a justice of the peace who announces
    his candidacy for city councilman of a home rule
    city at a time whmznmore than one year remained on
    his unexpired tern of office as justice thereby
    automatically resigned that office.
    Under article XI. section 11, of the Texas
    Constitution the mayor of a city whose term of
    office is two yems does not automatically resign
    that office by becoming a candidate for county
    judge at a time ohen his unexpired term of office
    as mayor exceeds 'me year. If the mayor's term of
    office exceeds two years, then his announcing his
    candidacy for comty judge at a time when more
    than one year resmlns on his term as mayor consti-
    tutes an automatic resignation of the office of
    mayor.
    Attorney General of Texas
    JACK HIGHTOWER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    MARY KELLER
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman, Opinion Comittee
    Prepared by Susan L. Garrison
    Assistant Attorney General
    p. 2457
    

Document Info

Docket Number: JM-553

Judges: Jim Mattox

Filed Date: 7/2/1986

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017