Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1984 )

The Attorney, General of Texas
Dectrber 21, 1984
JIM MAfTOX
ttorney General
- ,preme Court Bullding Ronorable Jim Mapel Opinion NO. m-257
0. aox 12E48 Crlmiual District Axorney
ndstln. TX. 79711-2545 Brasoria County Cowthouse Re: Whether a hospital district
512l47529Ql Angleton, Texas 7’7Ii15 may acquire by lease or purchase
vex BlLvS7C1397
,IeCOpi~r512l4750299 real property outside its bound-
aries
‘*4 Jackson. Sulle 700 Dear Mr. Mapel:
illas, TX. 7!!202.45C6
_ r4i742gBU
You aak whether the Sweeny Hospital District may acquire, by
lease or purchase in fee simple. real property located outside its
124 Alberta Ave.. SUltO 160 boundaries when swb property is deemed necessary for the efficient
.; Paso. TX. 7900527s3 operation of the hospital district. We conclude that the Sweeny
9151533.S4S4 Hospital District :Lacks the authority to purchase real property
located outside itr boundaries to fulfill the district’s purpose of
ram. we 700 providing regular aedical and hospital care for its inhabitants.
Hc.~sto”. TX. 770023111
- mf2233a88 Grants of powr to hospital district8 and limitations on the
exercise of that ;?ower depend upon the constitution and upon each
hospital distrlct’li enabling statute. Attorney General Opinion M-171
595 Broadway. Suite 312
ubbock. TX. 79401.2479
(1967) ; see Moore YL Edna Rosultal District, 449 S.W.Zd 508 (Tax. Civ.
381747.5239 APP * - %iii:iSti 1969. writ ref’d n.r.e.). Special purpose
district8 have on3.y the authority which is clearly granted by the
legislature. Tri-Xty Fresh Water Supply District No. 2 of Harris
‘309 N. Tenth. Suite S
County V. Hannn? S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1940); Lower Nueces River
kAllen. TX. 78501-1085
,W882-4547 Water Supply District v. Cartwright. 274 S.W.Zd 199. 207 (Tex. Civ.
APP. - San Anton:;) 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.); -see Moore v. Edna
HOEPita District, >n.
00 win Pius. suite 490
ian Antonio. TX. 7S2952797
The Fifty-eighth Legislature authorized creation of the Sweeny
51212254191
Hospital District ..n accordance with article IX
Texas Constitution.’ Act8 1963, 58th Leg.. ch. &.‘??l yVP,‘C?
art. 4494q-13). The enabling statute provides. in part, as follow:
Sec. 2. The hospital district herein author-
ized to be created, shall provide for the esta-
blishment of a hospital system to furnish medical
and hosl~.tsl care to person8 residing in said
hospital-district by the purchase, construction,
acquisit Tona. repair, or renovation of buildings
and impxcvements; and the equipping of same and
the adml&tration thereof for hospital purposes.
Such district shall assume full responsibility for
p. 1143
Honorable Jim Mapel - Page 2 (m-257)
providing medical and hospital care for its needy
inhabitants.
. . . .
Sec. 9. A hospital district organized in
nursuance of this Act shall have the right and
power of eminent domain for the purpose of
acquiring by condem%ion any and all property of
any kind or charact&. resl, personal or mixed, or
any interest therei,-, including outright ownership
of such property in fee simple absolute, within
the boundaries of tE8 said district, necessary or
convenient to the clxercise of the rights, power,
privileges and funcc::lons conferred upon it by this
Act, in the manner provided by General Law with
respect to condemnal::.on . . . . (Emphssis added).
Acts 1963, 58th Leg., ch. 131i at 361. The only express reference to
acquiring real property limitli the district’s power of condemnation to
property “within the boundaries of the said district.” Nevertheless,
the purpose for the restriction also logically applies to non-condem-
nation acquisitions of properl:y.
Thus, neither the enabl:lng statute nor the constitutional pro-
vision upon which it is based expressly prohibit8 acquisitions of real
property located outside the district. However, because special
purpose district8 have only the authority clearly granted by the
legislature, the determinative? question is whether the legislature has
clearly granted the Sweeny Hospital District the authority to acquire
real property outside of ~I:II boundaries, not merely whether the
legislature has not prohibil:c!d such action. See Attorney General
Opinion WW-914 (1960). In c:he Sweeny Hospital-strict’s enabling
statute, the legislature gra~,ted authority to acquire real property
but did not clearly indicate l:he scope of the power.
Because the constitution does not require that the boundaries of
a special purpose political subdivision include all area8 in which the
subdivision has operations, c:he legislature may authorize operations
outside a district’8 boundaries. San Jacinto River Conservation and
Reclamation District V. Sellf:rs, 184 S.W.2d 920. 923-24 (Tex. 1945);
State ex rel Grimes County IzFpayers Association v. Texas Municipal
Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258-(Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [lst Dist.]
1978. no writ); Harris County Water Control and Improvement Dj~strict
No. 58 v. City of Houston. 357 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston
1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Lover NUaCe8 River Water Supply District v.
Cartwright, supra. However- the cases allowing acquisitions of real
property outside the houndarles of ‘a special district usually deal
with a specific legislative Srant of authority to acquire property
vithin or without the district. See, e.g., San Jacinto River
?* 1144
Honorable Jim Mapel - Page 11 (311-257)
Conservation and Reclamntio~ District v. Sellers, rupra; Lower Nueces
River Water Supply District~r. Cartwright, B.
The court in State ex Eel Grimes County Taxpayers Association v.
Texas Municipal Power Agency. supra , upheld inclusion of a portion of
Grimes County within the TlUta8 Municipal Power Agsncy’s [hereinafter
TMPA1 operating area that was not within its boundaries although the
enabling statute did not expressly authorize acquisitions of property
outside of the TMPA’s boundaries. See V.T.C.S. srt. 1435a. 14(2).
However, the court emphasized that rwss undisputed that from the
inception of planning to establish the TMPA, it was contemplated that
certain areas outside its boundaries were to be acquired as sources of
lignite coal to carry out the purpose of the TMPA of producing
electricity. Further, even when a statute does authorize acquisitions
outside district boundaries, the acquisitions must further the purpose
for creation of the district. Harris County Water Control and
Improvement DiStriCt No. 28 V. City of Houston. supra; Attorney
General oninion WW-914 (1960). Therefore, determination of the
legislative intent for c&&n of the Sweeny Hospital District is
necessary.
The legislature is not required to set forth in detail all the
provisions governing the e.uthority of a political subdivision in
carrying out its legislative purpose, State ex rel Grimes County
Taxpayers Association v. T~?:tas Municipal Power Agency, supra at 273,
and the courts vi11 occa&nally add words or phrase8 to a statute
when necessary to give effect to-legislative intent when the intent is
clearly disclosed by the ::t!mainder of the statute. Sweeny Hospital
District v. Carr, 378 S.W.ld 40, 47 (Tex. 1964). Eowever, we conclude
that the lack of an express grant to the Sweeny Hospital District of
authority to acquire property outside its boundaries, and the express
limit on the exercise of its eminent domain power to vithin its
boundaries indicate that the legislature did not intend the district
to have the implied power to acquire property located outside of its
boundaries.
Further, the fundsmcztal purpose for the hospital di8triCt
militates against implied authoritation for the acquisition of
facilities outside the boundaries of the district. The sole purpose
of the Sweeny Hospital District is to provide medical ar.d hospital
care to persons residing ,111the hospital district. Acts 1963. 58th
Len.. ch. 135. 52. Conce Stably, a medical facility locat.ed outside
th; district’s boundaries ‘&ny dc~near enough to the district to serve
its inhabitants efficientl:r.~ Although purchasing an existing facility
outside the district could be less expensive than purchasing one
inside the district and less expensive than constructing a new
facility, the inhabitants of a hospital district will usually best be
served through medical fa~::Llities located within their district. A
hospital district’s difficulty in serving its inhabitants within its
boundaries may indicate a need for a change in district boundaries
rather than a need for acquisitions of facilities outside its
p. 1145
Honorable Jim Mapel - Page 4 UM-257)
boundarier. The legislature uay provide a solution to this problem by
authorizing expansion of the boundaries of a hospital district even
when it is alreadv in creat!.oo and subiect to bonded indebtedness.
See Stamford Hospital District. v. Vinsoi. 517 S.W.Zd 358 (Tex. Civ.
App. - Rastland 1974, wit r;f’d n.r.e.1; see also Carter V. Aamlin
Hospital District. 538 S.W.211 671 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1976.
writ ref’d n.r.e. .
Rowever, we note that ill fulfilling its constitutional duty to
assume full responsibility for providing medical and hospital care for
its needy inhabitants. the hospital district has the authority to pay
for the medical expense of cwndlng a needy inhabitant to a medical
facility outside the district because of a temporary or emergency lack
of sufficient medical or hospital facilities. Attorney General
Opinion M-171 (1967); see also Attorney General Opinion h-870 (1971).
We conclude only that the S&eny Hospital District may not acquire
real property located outside the district to fulfill its purpose of
providing regular medical and hospital care for inhabitants of the
district.
The Sweeny Hos+tal District has only the
authority which :La clearly granted by the
legislature. The lack of an express grant to the
district of authority to acquire property outside
its boundaries, the express limit on the exercise
of its eminent domain power to within its
boundaries. and th,e fundamental purpose for the
hospital district of providing medical and
hospital care to its inhabitants indicate that the
legislature did not intend the district to have
the authority to ac,quire property located outside
of its boundaries.
J k
Very truly yo ,
iv
JIH MATTOX
Attorney General of TLxas
TOM GREEN
First Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. RICHARDS
Executive Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman. Opinion Committee
p. 1146
Ronorable Jim &lapel - Page 5 (JM-257)
Prepared by Jennifer Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
Rick Cllpin, Chairman
Co1111Carl
Susan Garrison
Jim Moellinger
Jennifer Riggs
Nancy Sutton
pi 1147