Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1982 )


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  •                                          The Attorney            General of Texas
    December 31, 1982
    MARK WHITE
    Attorney General
    Honorable Warren G. Harding              Opinion No.   MW-556
    Supreme      Court Building             Texas State Treasurer
    P. 0. Box 12546
    Treasury Department                                 Applicability of section
    Austin. TX. 76711. 2546
    5121475-2501                            P. 0. Box 12608, Capitol Station         ::tO6(d) , Texas Business and
    Telex    9101674.1367                   Austin, Texas   78711                    COlNllerCe      Code,   to warrants
    Telecopier     51214750266                                                       issued by the comptroller and
    paid by the state treasurer
    1607 Main St., Suite 1400
    Dallas. TX. 75201-4709                  Dear Mr. Harding:
    2141742-6944
    You have requested our opinion as to whether section 4.406(d) of
    the Texas Business and Commerce Code (hereinafter TUCC) applies to
    4624 Alberta       Ave., Suite    160
    state warrants issued by the comptroller of public accounts and drawn
    El Paso, TX.       799052793
    9151533.3464                            on and paid by the state treasury.  In addition, you ask if there is a
    statute of limitations which applies to the return of state warrants
    to presenting banks or other parties due to late discovery of faulty
    1220 Dallas Ave., Suite          202
    or improper presentation.
    “ouston.     TX. 77002.6966
    7131650.0666
    Before reaching your specific questions, we must address the
    threshold issue of whether chapter four of the TUCC can be said to
    606 Broadway.        Suite 312          apply to the treasury of the state of Texas.     Chapter four covers,
    Lubbock.     TX.    79401-3479
    generally, bank deposits and collections, and constitutes a uniform
    6061747-5236
    statement of the principal rules of the bank collection process.  Tex.
    BUS. & Comm. Code 84.101, comment.    In the context of your inquiry,
    4309 N. Tenth. Suite S                  the provisions of chapter four apply to the treasury of the state of
    McAllen,     TX. 76501-1665             Texas only if the treasury is a "bank" within the meaning of the code.
    5121662-4547
    Although the term "bank" may have a commonly understood meaning
    200 Main Plaza. Suite 400               which connotes a state or federally regulated corporate entity and
    San Antonio,  TX. 76205.2797            which would necessarily preclude the inclusion of a governmental body
    5121225.4191                            as one of its kind, we are not dealing with the dictionary definition
    of a "bank."   The TUCC definitions are terms of art, limited to the
    An Equal      Opportunity/
    specific statutory enactment and not intended to apply generally.
    Affirmative     Action     Emplpyer    Reed V. Washington Trailer Sales, Inc., 
    393 F. Supp. 886
    (M.D. Term.
    1974).   We are bound to apply the code's statutory definition in
    deciding the issue of the &p&ability        of chapter four.   Nelson v.
    Union Equity Co-Operative Exchange, 
    548 S.W.2d 352
    (Tex. 1977).         A
    "bank" is defined as any person engaged in the business of banking.
    Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code §1.201(4).     A "person" is an individual or an
    organization,   and   an   "organization"   includes   a government    or
    governmental   subdivision    or  agency.    Tex.   Bus. &   COUUtl. Code
    §1.201(28), (30). Thus, the state treasury is a "bank" for purposes
    p. 2035
    Honorable Warren G. Harding - Page 2    (MW-556)
    of chapter 4 of the code if it is engaged in the "business of
    banking."  Neither the Uniform Commercial Code nor the Texas Uniform
    Commercial Code defines the "business of banking."
    This has a two-fold aspect. First, it permits the
    Code to apply to whatever business is known as the
    'banking business'     at the particular      time in
    question rather than narrowing the application to
    persons engaged in what was known as the banking
    business as of the time when the Code was adopted.
    This flexible coverage of the Code is in harmony
    with its underlying purposes of 'modernizing' the
    law   governing   business    transactions,    and   of
    permitting    continued   expansion    of   commercial
    practices through usage.    Secondly, it permits the
    Code to apply to persons and to organizations
    which engage in only a restricted area or segment
    of the total possible banking business.        To hold
    that to be a bank there must be an engaging in the
    totality of banking business would lead to the
    absurd result that many organizations which are
    admittedly    and    obviously    engaged    in    bank
    collections would not be considered banks within
    the meaning of the Code.
    1 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §l-201:8, at 74 (2d ed. 1970).
    The courts have held that the keenina  .  I of denosits constitutes the
    business of banking.     Moran v. Cobb, 120 F.26 16 (D.C. Cir. 1941),
    cert. dismissed,     
    314 U.S. 703
    (1941); Brenham Production      Credit
    Association v. Zeiss, 
    264 S.W.2d 95
    (1954); Kaliski v. Gossett, 
    109 S.W.2d 340
    (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1937, writ ref'd).          "IA1
    person carrying on the business of receiving deposits may be. said to
    be carrying on the banking business."      Rosenblum v. Anglim, 
    135 F.2d 512
    , 513 (9th Cir. 1943). The treasurer of the state of Texas keeps
    and pays out deposits.      V.T.C.S. arts. 4370, 4371.   To that limited
    extent, the treasurer is engaged in what is commonly recognized as the
    business of banking.     Thus, the state treasury is a "bank" to which
    chapter four of the TUCC applies.      It must be reiterated that we are
    finding here that the treasury is a bank only as defined by the TUCC,
    with the only result being that the uniform commercial rules set out
    in chapter four are applicable to the treasury.          This result is
    compelled by the terms of the statute and fosters the underlying
    purposes and policies of the TUCC. The code "was written in terms of
    current commercial practices, to meet the contemporary needs of a fast
    moving   cormnercial society and to advance       fair dealing."    1 R.
    Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §l-102:7, at 12 (2d ed. 1970). The
    treasury is involved, on an enormous scale, with daily financial
    transactions.    The provisions of chapter four promote the smooth and
    orderly disposition of financial transactions and are to the benefit
    of the state of Texas.
    p. 2036
    Honorable Warren C. Harding - Page 3    (MW-556)
    Having found that chapter four of the TUCC does apply to the
    state treasury, we turn to your inquiry regarding the applicability of
    section 4.406(d) of the TUCC to state warrants.       Section 4.406(d)
    provides:
    Without regard to care or lack of care of either
    the customer or the bank a customer who does not
    within one year from the time the statement and
    items   are   made   available     to    the   customer
    (Subsection    (a))    discover    and     report   his
    unauthorized signature or any alteration on the
    face or back of the item or does not within three
    years from the time discover and report any
    unauthorized    indorsement     is    precluded    from
    asserting   against   the bank     such unauthorized
    signature or indorsement or such alteration.
    This section has been cited to you as a basis for a bank's refusal to
    charge back an amount paid on a state warrant which had a forged
    indorsement.
    Special Fund Warrant No. R499313 was issued on June 1, 1977. The
    warrant was deposited in a collecting bank on June 6, 1977, and passed
    through an intermediary bank to the state treasurer on June 8, 1977.
    The treasurer paid the warrant on June 9, 1977. On June 18, 1980, the
    payee notified the state, by affidavit, that she had neither received
    nor indorsed the Family Care Provider Warrant issued to her for
    services rendered in May 1977, indicating that the indorsement on the
    warrant was forged by an unknown third party.    On June 30, 1980, the
    warrant was returned to the collecting bank for a charge back.     The
    collecting bank has refused to return the amount of the warrant to the
    state, claiming that the treasurer is barred by section 4.406(d) from
    seeking recovery based upon the forged indorsement.
    By its terms, section 4.406(d) governs the relationship between a
    bank and its customer.     The treasury is not a customer of the
    collecting bank in this instance.     If the treasury is barred from
    recovering the money paid on a forged indorsement under the facts you
    have described, it is by virtue of section 4.406(e) of the TUCC which
    provides:
    If under this section a payor bank has a valid
    defense against a claim of a customer upon or
    resulting from payment of an item and waives or
    fails upon request to assert the defense the bank
    may not assert against any collecting bank or
    other prior party presenting or transferring the
    item a claim based upon the unauthorized signature
    or alteration giving rise to the customer's claim.
    p. 2037
    Honorable Warren G. Harding - Page 4   (Mw-55h)
    "Under the Commercial Code, defenses available to a drawee bank
    against claims of its depositor, by clear implication are also
    available   to a collecting   or depository bank."     Allied  Concord
    Financial Corporation V. Bank of America National Trust and Savings
    Association, 
    275 Cal. App. 2d 1
    , 
    80 Cal. Rptr. 622
    , 625 (1969). Those
    defenses include the time limits imposed by section 4.406(d).   Sun 'N
    Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 
    148 Cal. Rptr. 329
    , 
    582 P.2d 920
    (1978). Therefore, if the treasury has a valid defense to a demand by
    its customer to charge back the amount paid on the warrant bearing a
    forged indorsement, such defense is, in turn, available to the
    collecting bank.
    Under section 4.104(a)(5) of the TUCC, a "customer" is "any
    person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to
    collect items and includes a bank carrying an account with another
    bank."   The person whose funds were on deposit with the treasury and
    whose funds were used to pay the warrant in question was the state of
    Texas.   The state's failure to notify the treasury of the forgery of
    Special Fund Warrant No. R499313 within three years triggers the bar
    of section 4.406(d).   Consequently, the treasury may not look to the
    collecting bank for reimbursement based upon the forged indorsement of
    that warrant.
    In response to your second inquiry, it is our opinion that
    statutes of limitations, generally, are not applicable to the state
    when it is operating in its governmental capacity. Hemphill County v.
    Adams, 
    408 S.W.2d 926
    (Tex. 1966); Lewis Cox and Son, Inc. v. High
    Plains Underground Water Conservation District No. 1, 
    538 S.W.2d 659
    (Tex. Civ. App. 155
    S.W.2d 1012 
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1941, writ rei?d). This principle
    does not eliminate the bar of section 4.406(d) and (e). Statutes of
    limitations may apply to the state if such provision is made by
    statute.   State v. Stone, 
    271 S.W.2d 741
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont
    1954, no writ).    Through its definitions of "bank," "person," and
    "organization," the TUCC makes clear that its provisions do apply to
    the government or to governmental subdivisions or agencies.
    SUMMARY
    Sections 4.406(d) and (a) of the Texas Business
    and Commerce Code apply to state warrants issued
    by the comptroller of public accounts and drawn on
    the state treasury.  The time limits set by these
    sections constitute a bar to recovery applicable
    to the state.
    MARK      WHITE
    Attorney General of Texas
    p. 2038
    .
    Honorable Warren G. Harding - Page 5   (MW-556)
    JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    RICHARD E. GRAY III
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    Prepared by Catherine Fryer
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Susan L. Garrison, Chairman
    Jon Bible
    Catherine Fryer
    Rick Gilpin
    Patricia Hinojosa
    p. 2039