Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1977 )


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  • Honorable William P. Hobby            Opinion No. H-1022
    Lieutenant Governor of Texas
    State Capitol
    Austin, Texas
    Honorable Bill Clayton
    Speaker of the House                  Re: Valuation of property
    State Capitol                         for ad valorem taxation
    Austin, Texas                         purposes.
    Dear Governor   Hobby and Speaker Clayton:
    You have asked our opinion on four questions relating to
    ad valorem taxation and the distribution of funds for public
    school purposes.
    Your first question   is:
    Ray the' Legislature, in exercising its
    duty under Articl.e 8, Section 1, of the
    Texas Constitution, to provide by law how
    value is to be ascertained for ad valorem
    tax purposes, constitutionally provide that
    land used to produce agricultural products
    be valued for ad valorem tax purposes ac-
    cording to some standard of value other
    than market value, such as valuation on
    the basis of use or capability to produce
    agricultural products?
    We initially note that the first question is directed
    solely to article a, section 1 and does not involve article
    9, section l-d which is discussed in your second question
    and which involves valuation of certain agricultural land.
    Article a, section 1 of the Texas Constitution provides in
    part:
    Taxation   shall be equal and uniform.  All
    property   in this State, whether owned by
    I’. 4220
    .      .
    Honorable William P. Hobby
    Honorable Bill Clayton              - Page 2   (H-1022)
    natural persons or corporations, other
    than municipal, shall be taxed in propor-
    tion to its value, which shall be ascer-
    tained as may be provided by law.
    On several occasions Texas courts have specifically in-
    dicated that the term "value," as used in article 8, section
    1, means market value.     Lively v. Missouri,   K. & T. Ry. of
    Texas, 
    120 S.W. 852
    , 856 (Tex. 1909); Rowland v. City of Tyler,
    5.2d      756, 760 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adoptea)       Har-
    lingen Independent School Dist. v. DunlaE, 
    146 S.W.2d 235
    , m
    (Tex. Civ. App. -- San Antonio 1940,      writ ref'd); Atlantic
    Richfield Co. v. Warren Independent School Dist., 453 S.W..2d
    190  19/ (Tex. Civ. App. -- Beaumont 1970 writ ref'd n.r.e.);
    Diekrich v. Phipps, 
    438 S.W.2d 900
    , 902 (&ex. Civ. App. --
    Houston [lst Dist) 1969, no writ).      See Whelan v. State, 282
    -
    S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. 1955); State v. Whittenburq, 26 5 S.W.Zd
    569, 572 (Tex. 1954). While it can be argued that the portion
    of article a, section l,.which refers to a~scertainment of value
    "as provided by law" permits the Legislature to establish a
    standard of value for taxation purposes other      than market value,
    the courts have clearly ruled otherwise.       See also Tex. Const.
    art. 8, § 20. Accordingly, it is our opinion that article 8,
    section 1 of the Constitution does not permit the Legislature
    to provide for the taxation of property other than in propor-
    tion to its market  value.
    Your second question   is:
    If the answer to question #l is negative,
    could the Legislature constitutionally .pro-
    vide for use of a standard of value other
    than market value for taxation of agricul-
    tural land if Article 8, section l(d), of the
    Texas Constitution were repealed?
    Article a, section l-d permits assessment of certain land
    at its agricultural use value.   While this technique is based
    on market value principles, see King v. Real, ~466 S.W.Zd 1
    (Tcx. Civ. App. -- San Antonliol971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); At-
    torney General Opinion H-863 (1976). it will generally result
    in a lower value than assessment at full market value.
    If article 8, section l-d were repealed the standard of
    value would be determined by the requirements of article 8,
    section 1. In light of the judicial authority reviewed in
    P. 4221
    Honorable William P. Robby
    Honorable Bill Clayton           - Page 3   (H-1022)
    discussion of your first question, it is apparent that the
    repeal of article a, section l-d, would leave the Legislature
    without authority to value agricultural land other than in
    proportion to its market value.
    Your third question   is:
    May the Legislature, by statute, consti-
    tutionally provide that single-family res-
    idences be valued for tax purposes on the
    basis of a percentage of market value?
    We understand this question to involve the power of the
    Legislature to provide for the assessment of residential prop-
    erty at a different percentage of market value than other prop-
    erty. As noted above, article 8, section 1 of the Texas Con-
    stitution requires that taxation be equal and uniform.    The
    courts have found schemes to tax one class of property at a
    percentage of its value and another class at a differentper-
    centage to be unconstitutional.    Among the plans the courts
    have overturned include an omission of certain types of pro-
    perty from the tax rolls, City of Arlington v. C%Inon, 
    251 S.W.2d 414
    , 416 (Tex. 1954); the assessment of railroad intan-
    gible property at full market value while all other property
    was assessed at 67 percent of value, 176 S.W. 820
    , 623 (Tex. Civ. App. -- Galveston 1915,
    writ ref'd).   See Yudof, The Property Tax in Texas under State
    -
    and Federal Law, 
    51 Tex. L. Rev. 885
    ,' 899-900 (1973).   Accord-
    ingly, it is well established that-any plan to value or assess
    one class of property at a smaller   percentage of market value
    than other property is prohibited by the Constitution.
    Your final question   is:
    In calculating the local share of finan-
    cing the Minimum Foundation Program in
    public education, may the Legislature, by
    statute, set local fund assignments based
    on property values estimated at less than
    market value?
    P. 4222
    Honorable William P. Hobby
    Honorable Bill Clayton         - Page 4   (H-1022)
    While your first three questions relate to assessment
    and taxation of property, the final question involves distri-
    bution of State funds to local school districts.     We note
    that the current formulas for distributing state funds for
    education are under attack in the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas in Wilson v. Brockette
    (Civil Action No. A-76-CA-2231 and Bennett v. Brockette (Civil
    Action No. A-77-CA-21).   Plaintiffs ins thes e cases allege that
    the current formula for distribution of state funds is invalid
    since it is alleged to entirely omit the value of substantial
    amounts of property which are required by law to be taxed.
    See also Sheffield v. Driscoc (No. B-6829) now pending in the
    ---
    Tcxasiipi%iiieCourt.   'l'hczadings  in these suits do not pre-
    cisely raise the issues involved in your more general inquiry,
    but the issues are similar and we call your attention to the
    litigation.
    In determining how to allocate state funds for public
    education, the Legislature has broad authority.    Efunnnev.
    Marrs, 
    40 S.W.2d 31
    (Tex. 1931).    In fact, the Texas Consti-
    tution even provides a method other than property valuation
    for the distribution of certain school funds. Tex. Const.
    art. 7, § 5. It also requires the Legislature to 'make suit-
    able provision for the'support and maintenance of an effi-
    cient system of public free schools."    Tex. Const., art. 7,
    §I. The federal constitutional requirement that will have
    to be satisfied by any school finance plan is that it must
    bear some rational relationshio to a leaitimate state DurDose.
    San Antonio Independent School*Dist. v.-Rodriguez, 411-U.S. 1
    (1973). For example, WC have already indicated that assess-
    ments determined pursuant to article 8, section l-d of the
    Texas Constitution, which permits certain land to be assessed
    on the basis of agricultural use factors, could constitutionally
    be utilized in the formula by which school aid was apportioned
    among districts.    Letter Advisory No. 109 (1975).
    Whether a particular proposal will meet the constitutional
    test will depend on the details of the proposal and its rela-
    tionship to the overall statutory scheme of which it is a part.
    your question is broadly phrased, and no specific legislative
    proposal is before us. Unless and until a specific proposal
    is presented, we have no basis on which to say that any and all
    proposals which might fall within the scope of your inquiry
    would meet the constitutional test we have outlined.   We be-
    lieve that any proposal the Legislature adopts should specifi-
    c;I``L~indicate the legitimate state purpose which is being
    served by the formula and should clearly reflect the rational
    relationship between the legitimate state purpose and the formula.
    P. 4223
    ,.._       .    .
    *   (.       ”
    Honorable William P. Hobby
    Honorable Bill Clayton            - Page S   (H-1022)
    SUMMARY
    The Texas Constitution requires that prop-
    erty be assessed for taxation purposes in
    proportion to its market value.  The Legis-
    lature may not provide that one type of
    property be assessed at a smaller percen-
    tage of its market value than other types
    of property.
    The Legislature has a constitutional ob-
    ligation to provide for the support and
    maintenance of an efficient system of public
    free schools.   It has broad authority to
    devise a plan to distribute state funds
    for public education.   Any proposal the Leg-
    islature adopts should specifically indicate
    the legitimate state purpose which is being
    served by the formula and should clearly re-
    flect t,he rational relationship between the
    legitimate state purpose and the formula.
    Very truly yours,
    JOHN L. HILL
    Attorney General of Texas
    APPROVED:
    DAVID M. KENDALL,     First Assistant
    Opinion   Committee
    klw
    p- 4224
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H-1022

Judges: John Hill

Filed Date: 7/2/1977

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017