Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1977 )


Menu:
  •            TIXEATIWRNEYGENERAL
    OFTEXAS
    ~IXSTIN.   ~-II      76711
    April 1, 1977
    The Bonorabie W. E. Snelson             Opinion XC. H- 969
    Chairman
    Senate Committee on Intergovern-      Re: Whether a city or
    mental Relations                    county can require dis-
    State Capitol                        ~closure of public officials
    Austin, Texas                         assets and income.
    Dear Chairman Snelson:
    You have requested our opinion regarding whether
    municipalities and counties may require their public'officials
    to file financial disclosure statements as a conditron of
    holding office. Although you have not provided us ,#ith the
    details of the content of any such proposed financial
    statements, we assume for purposes of discussion that they
    would contain information similar to that required of certain
    state officials by article 6252-9b. V.T.C.S. .~
    It is well established that a home .rule city may exer-
    cise any power not inconsistent with the Texas Constitution
    or with general law.    Tex. Const. art. 11, §5; V.T.C.S. art.
    1165: City of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.Zd 550, 552 (Tex.
    1964); Wagstaff v. City OFGroves,  
    419 S.W.2d 441
    , 443 (Tex.
    Civ. App. -- Beaumont 19-,-wxref'd      n.r.e.1. As'we noted
    fin Attorney General Opinion H-15 (19731, the public has "a
    legitimate interest in the current financial condition and
    recent financial history~of those of its servants who are in
    positions of authority." 
    Id. at 2.
    On that basis, we have
    upheld the constitutional validity of article.6252-9b.    Attor-
    ney General Opinion H-190 (1973).
    There appears to be no constitutional or statutory pro-
    vision which would per se prohibit a home rule city from re-
    quiring that its officials file financial disclosure statements
    as a condition of holding office. The Texas Election Code im-
    poses certain eligibility requirements upon persons who hold
    elective office, and specifically permits a home rule city to
    prescribe "different age and residence requirements from those
    prescribed" by statute. Election Code, art. 1.05 (Subdiv. 3.).
    In addition, a number of other statutes prescribe further eli-
    gibility requirements for certain offices.  See e.g.
    -    --   V.T.C.S.
    P- 4035
    The Honorable W. E. Snelson - page 2   (R-969)
    arts. 987, 1003, 1004. Even assuming that requiring the filing
    of these financial statements would constitute a "qualification"
    for office, the statutory qualifications have not been deemed
    exclusive and since neither the Constitution nor any statute
    per se prohibits the imposition of additional requirements,
    we believe that a home rule city is authorized to prescribe
    them.
    We are supported in this conclusion by a number of decisions
    from other jurisdictions. The general rule is that a city
    may establish conditions for holding a municipal office
    in addition to those imposed by state law, so long as such
    conditions are not inconsistent therewith. See *
    Do le v. City of Dearborn, 121 N.W.Zd 473, 4576     (Mich.
    &;Ttate       errel. Isham v. w     of Spokane, 
    98 P.2d 306
    , 3Oms.K      m0);   Lindzy v. D?%iin uez 
    20 P.2d 327
    ,
    328 (Cal. 1933). Of course, no-+ condzt on of holding office
    may be prescribed in contravention of the due process and
    equal protection guarantees of the State and Federal Constltu-
    tion. Thompson v. Gallagher, 
    489 F.2d 443
    , 449 (5th Cir. 1973).
    Furthermore, if se requirement of financial disclosure is
    imposed by ordinance, the municipality must first determine
    that such ordinance is not in violation of any provision of
    its charter. city --of Fort Worth 5 Lillard, 
    272 S.W. 577
    , 580
    (Tex. Civ. APP. -- Ft. Worth 1925). aff'd 
    294 S.W. 831
    (Tex.
    1927). In general, however, it is-our opinion that a home
    rule city is authorized to require its public officials to file
    financial disclosure statements as a condition of holding office.
    As to general law cities, their powers are'derived from
    article 11, section 4 of the Texas Constitution. While home
    rule cities are authorized to amend their charters and adopt
    ordinances, subject only to the limitation that neither
    charter nor ordinance may be inconsistent with the Constitution
    or with general law, no such power is granted to general law
    cities. It is generally held that non-home rule municipalities
    have only those powers which are specifically granted them
    by the Legislature.   Ex parte Farley, 
    144 S.W. 530
    (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1912); StaG ex rel. Rea v. Etheridge, 
    32 S.W.2d 828
    , 830 (Tex. Comm'n. Ai%.T30).i%iint    adopted, 36 S.W.2d
    983'(Tex..l937); Lindslek-v. Dallas-C&solid&ed    Street
    Railway z,    200 S.W. 207,ilm.       Civ. App. -- Dallas
    1917, no writ).
    Counties, too, have only those powers which are clearly
    set forth in the Constitution and statutes. Harrison County
    v- City -
    of Marshall, 
    253 S.W.2d 67
    , 69 (Tex. Civ. App. --
    P. 4036
    The Honorable W. E. Snelson - page 3     (~-969)
    Ft. Worth 1952, writ ref'd); Wichita County v. Vance, 
    217 S.W.2d 702
    . 703 (Tex. Civ. App. -- Ft. Worth 19nrit      ref'd
    n.r.e.1.  It is thus our view that neither a non-home rule
    city nor county may require its officials to file financial
    disclosure statements without express authorization from
    the Legislature.
    SUMMARY
    Home rule cities may require their
    public officials to file financial
    disclosure statements as a condition of
    holding office, but general law cities
    and counties may not do so without express
    authorization from the Legislature.
    Very truly yours,
    APPROVED:
    Opinion Committee
    km1
    p. 4037