Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1975 )


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  • The Honorable Joe Resweber                           Opinion   No.   H-   547
    County Attorney
    Harris County Courthouse                             Re:   Whether a county may
    Houston,  Texas 77002                                regulate  the placement of
    portable signs on the right
    of way of state and county
    roads.
    Dear Mr.   Resweber:
    You have inquired about the authority of a county to regulate the
    placement of portable signs on the right of way of state and county roads
    in both incorporated and unincorporated  areas.
    Article   2351, V. T. C. S., confers upon the commissioners        court
    of a county general authority over that county’s roads.          But other statutes
    limit this power.      Article 1016, V. T. C. S., grants to “[a]ny city or town
    incorporated     under the general laws of this State . . . the exclusive
    control and power over the streets        . . . of the . . . town, and to abate
    and remove encroachments          or obstructions   thereon.  . . . ” (Emphasis
    added).    Section 16 of article 1175, V. T. C. S., declares     that home rule
    cities have “exclusive       dominion,  control and jurisdiction    in, over and
    under the public streets,      avenues.   . . .‘I (Emphasis added).      Section
    24 of that same statute grants to a home rule city the authority “[t]o
    license,   regulate,   control or prohibit the erection of signs or bill boards
    as may be provided by charter or ordinance.”
    We believe it is clear that the commissioners      court may regulate
    the placement of signs on the right of way of county roads in all un-
    incorporated   areas.   This conclusion is implicit in those decisions  and
    opinions cited, infra, which discuss the authority of a county over roads
    located in incorporated    areas.   It also follows from article 6703, V. T. C. S.,
    p.   2458
    The Honorable      Joe Resweber    page 2         (H- 547)
    which authorizes     the commissioners    court    to control    streets   and alleys
    in cities   and towns which have no “de facto”       municipal    governments.
    But such blanket authority to regulate must necessarily       be limited
    to unincorporated     areas,  In City of Breckenridge    v. Stephens County, 
    40 S. W. 2d 43
     (Tex. Sup. 1931), the Supreme Court held that the county com-
    missioners    court may improve city streets where such streets form integral
    parts of county roads or state highways and where such improvements             are
    made without conflicting with the jurisdiction     of the municipality,    or with
    its consent or approval,     The Court, quoting the early case of State v, Jones,
    
    18 Tex. 874
     (1857), explained that the phrase “without conflicting with the
    jurisdiction   of the municipality”   referred to a situation in which a city
    has totally failed to exercise    its power to lay out and regulate roads.
    Where the city has acted, the county must yield.
    A previous Attorney General Opinion,       M-561 (1970), reached the
    same basic result in slightly different terms.      “Where there are incorporated
    areas within a given county, the streets within the city are generally      subject
    to city control. ” If the street forms a connecting link in the county road
    or state highway system,     however,   the county commissioners    court may
    maintain it, provided    the city has expressly   or impliedly consented to such
    work.   We interpret this “implied consent” to be functionally     equivalent to
    the “no conflicting jurisdiction”   test approved in Breckenridge,    sz
    In incorporated    areas,  then, the county may regulate the placement
    of signs on county roads’ rights of way only with the consent of the particular
    incorporated    area.     Consent may be express       or implied,  and the test for
    implied consent is whether the incorporated          area has itself acted to regulate
    such signs.     Whether either type of consent exists in a particular        instance
    requires   a factual determination.      It is sufficient here to say that consent
    is a prerequisite     to county regulation.
    The State has authority to control the State highways.     V. T. C. S.,
    art. 6663,   et seq. ; Nairn v. Bean, 
    48 S. W. 2d 584
     (Tex. Sup. 1932);
    Britton v. Smith, 
    82 S. W. 2d 1065
     (Tex. Civ. App. --Waco       1935, no writ).
    The county may perform certain functions in regard to control of State
    highways including the placement of signs,     to the extent that their activities
    are not in conflict with the policy of the State Highway Department.      -See
    V. T. C. S., art. 6701d-11, 4 5 11 and 13.
    p.   2459
    I
    The Honorable   Joe Resweber       page 3          (H- 547)
    SUMMARY
    A county may regulate the placement of
    portable signs on the right of way of state and
    county roads in unincorporated      areas of the
    county; it may regulate the placement of such
    signs in the incorporated    areas of the county
    only with the consent,    express   or implied,  of
    the particular  incorporated    area.
    A county may place portable sigrs on the
    right of way of state roads if this is not in
    conflict with the policy of the State Highway
    Department.
    Very   truly yours,
    Attorney   General    of Texas
    APPROVED:
    DAVID   M.   KENDALL,    First   Assistant
    C. ROBERT HEATH,        Chairman
    Opinion Committee
    p.   2460
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H-547

Judges: John Hill

Filed Date: 7/2/1975

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017