Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1974 )


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  •                               July 19, 1974
    The Honorable James D. Cole                   Opinion No.   H-   351
    House Administrator
    House of Representatives                      Re: Validity of rider to
    Austin, Texas                                 Appropriations  Act (H. B.
    139, 63rd Leg.) regarding
    equal employment    opportunity.
    Dear Representative   CoTe:
    Your letter on behalf of the House of Representatives  Committee
    on House Administration    raises one of the most frequent questions of
    statutory interpretation to come before the Attorney General and one
    of the most troublesome.
    You have asked our opinion of the constitutionality   of a provision
    of the Appropriations Act for fiscal 1974 and 1975 (Laws 1973, 63rd Leg.,
    ch. 659, p. 1986) found as a rider to the appropriation    to the office of      .
    the Governor at pages 1967-68:
    As a limitation on the expenditure of funds
    appropriated    in this Act and to insure that funds
    appropriated    for salaries  of classified   positions
    are spent in accordance      with Legislative    intent
    and the laws of the State, each agency and depart-
    ment of the State of Texas shall prepare and main-
    tain a written plan to assure implementation          of
    a program of equal employment         opportunity whereby
    all personnel transactions     are made without regard
    to race, religion,    national origin,    or sex .(except
    where sex constitutes a bona fide occupational
    qualification).    The plans shall contain a compre-
    hensive analysis of all employees        by race,   sex,
    p. 1633
    ’
    The Honorable     James   D.   Cole   page 2    (H-351)
    and class of position and shall include plans for
    recruitment,     Eelection,  appointment,   training,
    promotion,    and other personnel practices.       The
    plans shall also include objectives     and goals,
    timetables   for the accomplishment      and assignments
    of responsibility    for their completion.
    The plans shall be filed with the Office of the
    Governor within ninety days after the enactment
    of this Bill covering the period September 1, 1973,
    through August 31, 1974, and shall be updated
    on an annual basis.     Progress   reports shall
    be submitted within thirty days of September 1
    and March 1 of each year..     The Office of the
    Governor    shall cooperate with agencies to pro-
    vide technical assistance    to agencies and
    departments    in the preparation of these plans.
    Article   3, Section   35 of the Texas   Constitution   provides:
    . . . No bill, (except general appropriation
    bills, whtch may embrace the various subjects
    and accounta,    for and on account of which
    moneys are appropriated)      shall contain more
    than one subject,    which shall be expressed   in
    its title.  But if any subject shall be embraced
    in an act, which shall not be expressed     in the
    title, such act shall be void only as to so much                 .
    thereof,   as shall not be so expressed.
    The courts in a few instances and Attorneys  General in many have
    construed this section as it applies to riders to Appropriation Acts.
    Perhaps the most definitive analysis is that contained in Attorney General
    Opinion V-1254 (1951) by then Attorney General Price Daniel, as follows:
    p. 1634
    ‘_
    i        :
    The Honorable     James   D.   Cole   page 3   (H-351)
    With special regard to what incidental
    provisions   may be included within a general
    appropriation   bill, our Texas courts have not
    stated a general rule.     However,   from state-
    ments as to what may not be included and from
    numerous opinions of the Attorney General,        we
    believe the rule may be stated generally as
    follows:   In addition to appropriating   money
    and stipulating the amount, manner,       and purpose
    of the various item,* of expenditure.     a general
    appropriation   bill may contain any provisions
    or riders which detail, limit,     or restrict the
    use of the funds or otherwise insure that the
    money is spent for the required activity
    for which it is therein appropriated,     if the
    provisions   or riders are necessarily     con-
    nected with an incidental to the appropria-
    tion and use of the funds, and provided they
    do not conflict with general legislation.
    (Opinion V-1254.    rupra, p. 8).
    As long as a general appropriation     bill
    includes only subjects of appropriating     money
    and limiting the use thereof in harmony with
    general legislation,   it may relate to any number
    of different ‘subjects   and accounts. ’ In such
    instances all of the subjects are under the one
    general object and purpose of appropriating        funds
    from the treasury.      The obvious purpose of             .
    this limited exception was to make certain that
    appropriations    torrmre than one department in
    the same bill would not be prohibited.      In all
    other respects    general appropriation   bills are
    subject to the same prohibition as all other bills
    against containing more than one subject.        The
    result is that general legislation    cannot be
    p. 1635
    The Honorable   James   D.   Cole   page 4   (H-3511
    embodied within a general appropriation bill.
    Moore v. 
    Sheppard, supra
    . [
    192 S.W.2d 559
                    (Tex. 194611.
    A general appropriation    bill may be defined
    as a single bill which appropriates    funds for two
    or more departments,     subjects,   accounts,  or
    purposes.   It has the one general purpose or
    subject matter of appropriating     money.
    General legislation does more than ap-
    propriate money and limit its expenditure.  As
    said by a former Attorney General in Opinion
    No. 2965 (19351,
    1, . . if the Bill does more than
    set aside a sum of money, provide
    the means of its distribution,   and
    to whom it shall be distributed,
    then it is a general law . . . ’
    Thus, the distinction between general
    appropriation    bills and general legislation
    has been recognized      in this State in the simple
    fact that the former merely sets apart sums
    of money for specific objects and uses while
    the latter does more than merely appropriate
    and limit the use of funds.      General legislation
    constitutes   a separate subject and cannot be
    included within a general appropriation       bill.
    Moore v. 
    Sheppard, supra
    ; Attorney General
    Opinion No. 2965, supra.(Opinion        
    V-1254, supra
    ,
    pp. 6-7).
    The difficulty lies in applying these rules to a particular   enactment
    or rider.   Opimon    
    V-1254. supra
    ,  was  a general discussion  of riders.  It
    did not involve a particular   rider.  Attorney General Opinion V-1253 (1951),
    p. 1636
    The Honorable    James   D.   Cole   page 5 (H-351)
    issued the day before Opinion V-1254,      involved riders (1) prohibiting the
    purchase of any passenger     motor vehicle with appropriated    funds and (2)
    ordering that all statehowned passenger      motor vehicles be sold not later
    than October 1, 1951.     The first provision was held to be valid as a “mere”
    limitation and restriction   on the use of the money.    The second was held
    invalid as general legislation.    For other examples,    we would call to your
    attention Attorney General Opinion M-1199 (1972), a detailed study of riders
    in the 1971 Appropriations   Act as well as those cited in Opinion 
    V-1254, supra
    .
    With these rules in mind, it is apparent to us that the rider in
    question while, of course,     laudable in its purpose does more than merely
    limit or restrict the expenditure of appropriated        funds.  In our opinion,
    it is general legislation  affirmatively   decreeing    that all agencies and
    departments    of the state are to take certain action.      And, as laudable
    as the required action may be, we are legally bound to hold that forced
    compliance   will require further legislative    action.
    As in Opinion 
    V-1253, supra
    , our reasoning,    perhaps, may be
    made clearer by contrasting    the rider with another.   The same Appropria-
    tion Act, in its General Provisions,    Article V, at page 2217, contains
    Sec. 55 as follows:
    Sec. 55. DISCRIMINATORY         PRACTICES.     None
    of the funds appropriated   in this Act shall be expended
    by agencies which practice discrimination      based on
    race, creed,   sex or national origin.    The State Attorney
    General shall be specifically   responsible  for the enforce-
    ment thereof upon the request of the Governor.
    Sec. 55 -is   “merely”   a limitation or restriction   on the expenditure
    of appropriated   funds and is a valid rider.     The rider requiring an affirmative
    plan containing an analysis   of employees     by race, sex and class of position
    and containing a plan for recruitment       and other matters,  is general legisla-
    tion, and therefore invalid.
    p. 1637
    The Honorable       James    D.   Cole   page 6   (H-351)
    This     opinion in no way affects or lessens   the effect of 
    Subsection 55 supra
    .    Nor     does it lessen the requirement   that states and their political
    subdivisions       abide by the federal laws prohibiting discrimination    in employ-
    ment, e.g.       
    42 U.S. C
    . §2000e-2,    29 C.F.R.   Sec. 160 et seq.,   or that
    they ta!-eaffi    rmative action required under the federal law.      
    42 U.S. C
    .
    § 20OOe-5(g).
    SUMMARY
    While Sec. 55 of Article V of the Appropria-
    tion Act for 1974 and 1975 mandates that no appropiated
    funds be expended by agencies    that practice discrimina-
    tion based on race, creed,    sex or national origin, the
    rider to the Act requiring affirmative    action plans to
    provide equal employment     opportunity is invalid as
    general legislation.   Requirements     of the Federal
    laws prohibiting discrimination    in employment    or
    requiring affirmative  action are unaffected by this
    opinion.
    +,.&RRk    F.     /YORK,   F/irst kBai-&ant                                              ,
    &J&H
    DAVID M. KENDALL,            Chairman
    Opinion Committee
    llz
    p. 1638
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H-351

Judges: John Hill

Filed Date: 7/2/1974

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017