Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1974 )


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    The Honorable   CL8yton T. Garrison            Opinion   No. H-   303
    Executive Director
    Texrs Parks & Wildlife Department              Re: Are sale8 of gravel, etc.,
    John H. Reagan Building                        by Parka and Wildlife Dept.
    Auatin,  Tcx8r 78701                           subject to s8lee taxes under
    Article 20.01, T8x8tion-Gener81,
    Dcrr   Mr.   Glrrieon:                         8nd Article 1066~. V. T. C.S. ?
    Article 4053d, V. T. C. S., give0 to the P8rks rnd Wildlife Department
    ruthority to rell 8t8te owned marl, grrvel,    nand rnd ehell. And 8ee 8100
    Article 4053, V. T. C. S.
    Your question is whether sales made under Article 4053d 8re subject
    to taxation under the Limited Saleo, Exci8e and Uae T8x Act provided by
    Chrpter 20 of Tax8tiOn-General,    V. T. C. S. The brsic provision impoaing
    the tax is found in Ar title 20.02 which provides:
    “There is hereby imposed a limited sales t8x
    at the rate of four per cent (4%) on the receipts from
    the sale at ret8il of all taxable itema within this State.”
    The terms employed in this Article are defined in Article 20.01.     From
    those definitions  there c8n be little doubt but that the S8le of state ownedmarl,
    gr8ve1, sand and ahell by the Texan Parka rnd Wildlife Dep8rtment pursusnt
    to ‘Article 4053d is a sale at retail and the question then is whether the marl,
    gravel, sand rnd shell ccnstitute tax8ble items.
    Article   20.01(W) defines tax8ble item8 to mean “tangible perron        prop-
    erty. If Tangible person81 property,      on the other hand, is defined in Article
    20.01(P) 8a “perronrl     property which m8y be seen, weighed,       me8eured.   felt
    or touched.    or which ia in any other runner     perceptible to the rrenaea. ” The
    Act does not define “perron       property. ” In Sutton v. Wright & S8ndere. 280
    p. 1407
    ..
    .
    The Honor8ble     Clayton   T. Glrrison,        p8ge 2   (H-303)
    S. W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. , S8.n Antonio,  1926, no writ), 8 suit for bre8ch
    of m or81 contr8ct to purchrse,and    sell gr8vel in pl8Ce, the court held
    that the a8le of gravel to be removed from the soil w8a 8 sale of 8 chrttel
    and not 8 sale of real property.
    In Cooper v. Cocke. 
    145 S.W.2d 275
    (Tex. Civ.App.,       Anurillo,
    1940,    no writ), the court held th8t on rgreement    for the a8le of crliche
    from    8 homeste8d     to the St8te Highway Dep8rtment at 8 price per cubic
    yrrd    did not constitute 8 sale of homestead   or of any portion thereof in
    such    manner as to be exempt from garnishment       under this st8tute.
    These two cases lead ua to conclude thrt marl, grrvel,    rrnd 8nd
    shell, when the subject of a contr8ct of eale separate from the real prop-
    erty, are person81 property within the meaning of Article 20.01(P) and
    constitute tangible property,  the equivrlent of t8x8ble itema, so 8s to make
    their s8le subject to the t8X imposed by the Limited Slles,    Excise 8nd Use
    Tw Act.
    Your second question.        asked in the event of an affirmative    8nlWer
    to the first,is    whether such aales sre subject to the LOC81 S8Le8 md Uoe
    Tax Act, Article       1066~. V. T. C.S.    Section 2B of Article 1066~ provides
    th8t the a8lea t8x portion of my 10~81 a8ler 8nd use t8x adopted under th8t
    Article is imposed within rny city 8dopting such tu upon items which 8re
    subject to t8x8tion by the St8te under the provisions        of the Limited S8les,
    Excise and Use Tax Act.          For  that reason  we conclude   th8t the s8leof
    marl. gravel.       s8nd and shell by the Texas Parka and Wildlife Deportment
    conaummrted        “within any city adopting such t8x” in subject to tbe 10~81
    ssles 8nd use t8x if one hrs been adopted by th8.t city.         Your  second question,
    therefore,     is rnswered    in the affirmrtive.
    The third question asks where            such s8leS 8re consummrted   for the
    purpose of the lOC81 s8Ies t8x.
    Sutton v. Wright & Sanders,  suprr, rnd Cooper v. Cocke,      supr8,
    would seem to compel the conclusion    th8t the aale of tangible person81
    property,   including mrrl. gravel, sand Andyshell, is consumm8ted      8t the
    pI8ce where the personal property is severed from the real est8te.
    p.   1408
    The Honorable   Cl8ytOn’ T. G8rrison,      page 3     (H-303)
    SUMMARY
    s8ies of marl, gravel,    rrnd and shell by the
    Texas Parks 8nd Wildlife Department,        pursuant to
    Article 4053d, V. T. C.S.,    8re subject to t8x8tion
    by the Shte under the Limited Sales, Excise 8nd
    Use Tu Act rnd by 8ppropri8te       cities under the
    Locrl S8le6 rnd Uoe Tax Act.       For the purpose Of
    10~81  s8leS t8xes, the arle is conaumm8ted 8nd the
    tmx ir p8yable to 8ny city in which the msrl, grrvel,
    s8nd 8nd shell 8re nevered frcanre81 est8te.
    Very   truly youra,
    ~c/           Attorney    Generrl     of Texas
    f&w
    DAVID M. KENDALL,        Chrirmsn
    Opinion Committee
    p.     1409
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H-303

Judges: John Hill

Filed Date: 7/2/1974

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017