Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1974 )


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  •                               February   15. 1974
    The Honorable Wilson E. Speir, Director             Opinion No. H-    232
    Texan Department of Public Safety
    5805 N. Lamar, Box 4087                             Re: Whether the recent
    Austin. Thiar 78773                                 decision of the Court of
    Criminal Appeals in Ex
    parte Johnny Ray h&f&m
    renders Article 6701 l-4,
    Vernoda Texas Civilikatutes
    unconstitutional?
    Dear Colonel Speir:
    You have requested our opinion concerning the constitutionality and
    interpretation of Article 67011-4, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes (formerly
    Article 802e, Vernon’s Texas Penal Code), in view of the decision of the
    Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Mattbewr,   
    488 S.W.2d 434
    (Tex. Crim.
    1913).
    Articlk 6701’-   4, V. T. C. S., provides penalties for driving a motor
    vehicle’while   under the influence of intoxicating liquor or otherwise in violation
    of the ‘Cnffir laws of the State of Texas.   By its terms. it is applicable to:
    YSection 1. Any male minor who has passed hie
    14th birthday but ha6 not reached his 17th birthday. and
    atiy’female minoi who has parsed her 14th birthday but
    has not reached her 18th birthday. . . ”
    In Ex parte Matthews, rupra. Matthews claimed that Article 2338-1.      0 3,
    Vernon’s Texai Civil Statuter. and Article 30, 5 2. of the old Penal Code (now
    $8:07,   Vernon’s Texas Penal Code), the statuteiunder which he had been
    tried as an adult (he was 17 at the time of trial), were unconstitutional in that
    the males and females   were treated unequally, and that he was therefore denied
    p. 1080
    The Honorable    Wilson   E. Spcir,   page 2 (H-232)
    equal protection of the law. Article 2338-1, $ 3, defined “child” to be any
    female over the age of ten and under the age of eighteen yearcr or any male
    over the-age of tep,ad under the age of seventeen years.       Article 30, g 2, as
    it was applied to Matthew% provided that no male under s‘eventeen yza>S of
    age and no female under eighteen years of age might be convicted of an offense
    (except perjury) without waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court.     Following
    a growing line of casea. the Court of Criminal Appeals, on January 3, 1973.
    rendered its decision in Matthew. stating that it was unable to find any rational
    objective or logical constitutional justification for the disparity in the age/nex
    classification.  In concluded that those portions of the two statutes which treated
    males.and females differently were unconstitutional.
    Your first question is:
    “Does the rationale of the Matthews case render
    Article   802e, Vernon’cl Penal Code, unconstitutional 7
    If it is unconstitutional, are there any parts of the
    rtatute not affscted by the unconstitutionality? I’
    There may be valid bares.for distinguishing between the sexes in defining
    crimea. an, for example, ia Buchanan v. State, 
    480 S.W.2d 207
    (Tu.          Grim.
    1972).  However,   we ace no justification or rational basis in the distinction
    made by Article 6701 1 - 4, V. T. C. S. , concerning peraonn in the neventeen-
    eighteen year old category and in our opinion the courts will hold the statute
    unconstitutional to the extent of its application to that category of persons.
    Ex part* Matthews, rupra.
    In Ex parte 
    Matthews,, supra
    . the Court of Criminal Appeals said “WC
    conclude that the portion. . . which provides for the inclusion of females of
    age aevsnteen within the definition of the word ‘child’, ia violative of the equal
    protection clause. ” It also aatd. “[alfter    excising the seventeen-eighteen year
    old classification from Article 30, V. A. P. C. and Article 2338-1, V. A. C. S.,
    appellant was amenable to prosecution.      . . . I’ The Court seems to have consid-
    ered those statutes unconstitutional only in their application to persona in the
    seventeen-eighteen   year old classification.
    The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of
    the Legislature and to give it effect where possible.  Texas-Louisiana   Power Co.
    p. 1061
    The Honorable    Wilnon E. Speir.    page 3     (H-232)
    v. City of Farmerrville,      
    67 S.W. 2d
    235 (Tex.   1933).
    In Vol.   2. Sutherland,   Statutory Coastruction,         6 2412, p. 189 it is said:
    ---“m... _ .
    “When exceptions,  exemptions or proviros in
    a statute are found to be invalid, the entire act may
    be void on the theory that by ntrihing out the invalid
    exception the act ham been widened in its scope aad
    .tberefore cannot properly represent the legislative
    intent. .. , . I!.
    See alao Texas-Louislana.Power  Co. v. City of Farmersvtlle,    supra;
    Anderron v. Wood, 
    152 S.W.2d 1084
    (Tax. 1941), both citing and quoting from
    an earlier. adition .af Sutherland.
    Strik$g  ;from Article .6701 L.- 4 that portion which would make it applicable
    to femalea .Qy+.r seventeen but sot to male8 past their seventeenth birthday, the
    invalid :exoeption in the Act, would .aot broaden its .acope.  To the contrary, the
    scope would 4e limited to the .extent that it would no longer apply to female0 pant
    the age of seventeen.    Female0 seventeen and under as well aB malee seventeen
    and under are now subject to it# provision6 and would remain so.
    It .is our opinion,  therefore, that ~the rationale of the Matthew8 came
    does render,.Article     67011 - 4, V. T.C. S. , , unconstitutional to the extent that
    it distinguishes between males and femalea over seventeen and under .eighteen
    years of ages. It is our opinion further that the ‘statute. insofar as it applies to
    male8 and females seventeen and under. ia not unconstitutional.
    ‘f;our...nextquestion   as&
    1% [ 6701 1 .- 4 in constitutional, do its provisiona
    .allow.the arrest and prosecution of minor6 who have
    passed their fourteenth birthdays for an action committed
    before such person is fifteen years of age?”
    Section 8:07    of the new Penal Code provides.        in part:
    “(a) Except am provided by Subsection (c) of this
    section. a person may not be prosecuted or convicted
    for ay offense that he committed when younger than
    15 yearcl.
    p. 1082
    The Honorable    Wilson    E. Speir,   page 4    (H-232)
    ‘1.   . . .
    ‘j(c) Subsection (E) and (b)-of thirclection       shall
    not apply to pro6ecutton6 for:
    ..
    .*. . .
    ‘(2) a violation of a penal statute
    cognimable under Chapter 302, Act6
    of the 55th Legislature,  Regular
    Session, 1957, a6 amended; [Article
    67OlL- 4. V. T. C. S. 1. . . . ”
    Article   6701k     4. V. T. C. S.,   in it6 0 4, provide6   in part:
    “The offenses created under thin Act rhall be
    under the jurisdiction of the courts regularly empowered
    to try misdemeanors    carrying the penalty herein affixed,
    ad shall not be under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile
    Courtr; . . . ‘I
    It is our opinion, therefore, that, under our present rtatutes, minors
    over fourteen yearsof     age may be arrented and prosecuted for violation of
    Article 6701 L- 4. committed prior to their fifteenth birthdays.
    SUMMARY
    Article 6701 L- 4 Vernon’6 Tens     Civil Statute6. cannot
    be con6titutionally enforced against persons in the seventeen to
    eighteen year old category but i6 enforceable against those
    seventeen and under.    Persons over fourteen but under fifteen
    years of age may be prosecuted for violation of, Article 67011 - 4.
    Attorney General   of Texas
    The Honorable   Wilson E. Speir.   page 5    (H-232)
    Opinion Committee
    p. 1084
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H-232

Judges: John Hill

Filed Date: 7/2/1974

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017