Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1972 )


Menu:
  • .    .
    THE      LI~RNEY                GEINEEAL
    OIF-XAS
    Honorable Larry Teaver                    Opinion No. M-i 132
    Chairman, State Board of Insurance
    1110 San Jacinto                          Re: Whether the proposed regula-
    Austin, Texas    78701                        tions of the State Board of
    Insurance for the safe move-
    ment and operation of mobile
    service units and dispensing
    of flammable liquids are
    invalid because in conflict
    with the federal rules and
    regulations which implement
    the federal Occupational
    Safety and Health Act and
    Dear Mr. Teaver:                              related questions?
    You have requested an opinion of this office on the above captioned
    matter and we quote from your letter, (in part):
    “The proposed regulations as suggested by the
    advisory committee [to the State Board of Insurance],
    which we attach hereto as Exhibit ‘A’, contain pro-
    visions that apparently would permit dispensing of
    flammable liquids from a tank vehicle to a motor
    vehicle on premises open to the public. (See
    Exhibit ‘A’, Chapter V, Article 5013, Parking,
    pages 3-4)
    “The State Board of Insurance has heretofore
    promulgated Rules and Regulations for the Safe
    Storage, Handling and Use of Flammable Liquids
    at Retail Service Stations, which Rules and Regula-
    tions are attached as Exhibit ‘B’.
    “It has come to the attention of the Board that
    the Federal Congress has passed an Occupational
    Safety and Health Act of 1970, pertinent parts of
    -5506-
    Honorable Larry Teaver,   page 2      (M-1132)
    which became effective February 15, 1972. Section
    1910.106, Part II of Title 29, Chapter XVII, Volume
    36, Federal Register, of the said OSHA is attached
    hereto as Exhibit ‘C’.   It contains provisions to
    which the Board directs your attention, and we ,pose
    the following questions to your office:
    “1. Would the proposed regulations in
    Exhibit ‘A’ be in conflict with the cited
    provisions of Exhibit ‘C’?
    “2. Are the existing regulations of Exhibit
    ‘B’ in conflict with the cited provisions of
    Exhibit ‘C’?
    “3. If a conflict is inherent in the state
    regulations (either exisiting or proposed)
    and the standards promulgated by the
    Secretary of Labor in part 1910 (OSHA),
    will the federal regulations pre-empt the
    state regulations?”
    Question No. 3 asks whether the federal regulations found in
    Exhibit C will pre-empt either the proposed or existing regulations in
    the field of occupational safety and health. Article llllc-1,    Vernon’s
    Texas Penal Code, as amended by Acts 62nd Legislature,        R. S. 1971,
    Chapter 226, p0 1074, directed the State Board of Insurance to
    “formulate, adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the safe
    storage, handling and use of flammable liquids at retail service stations”
    and to “formulate, adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the
    safe movement and operation of mobi,le service units. ”
    The federal statute, the William-Steiger Occupational Safety and
    Health Act of 1970, 29 USC g 651 et seq (The Act), became effective
    on April 28, 1971. The primary purpose of The Act is to reduce on-
    the-,job injuries and to provide employees with safe working conditions.
    The first section declares that the Congressional policy is:
    1,. D ~to provide for the general welfare, to
    assure so far as possible every working man and
    -5507-
    /       .
    Honorable Larry Teaver,    page 3      (M-1132)
    woman in this nation safe and healthful working
    conditions and to preserve our human recourse.
    “(3) D ~ . by authorizing the Secretary of Labor
    to set mandatory occupational safety and health
    standards applicable to business affecting inter-
    state commerce and . . .
    “(11) . . . by encouraging the States to assume
    the fullest responsibility for the administration
    and enforcement of their occupational safety and
    he alth laws by providing grants to the States to
    assist-identifying     their needs and responsibilities
    in the area of occupational safety, to develop plans
    in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter,
    to improve the administration and enforcement of
    State occupational safety and health laws. ” 29
    USC g 651 (Emphasis added.)
    The Act provides a method whereby the states may continue to
    enforce their own safety standards and draft others.    29 USC 8 667.
    Section 667 (b) entitled “Submission of State Plan for Development and
    Enforcement of State Standards to Preempt Applicable Federal Standards”
    provides:
    “any state which, at any time, desires to assume
    full responsibility for development and enforcement
    of their occupational safety and health standards
    relating to any occupational safety or health issue
    with respect to which a federal standard has been
    promulgated under 8 655 of this Title shall submit
    a state plan for the development of such standards
    and their enforcement. ” (Emphasis added. )
    In connection with state jurisdiction and enforcement of standards,
    The Act also provides that the Secretary of Labor may make federal
    grants to states to assist them in identifying and studying safety needs
    and to assist them in developing their state plans under § 667 (b).
    -5508-
    Honorable Larry Teaver,    page 4      (M-1132)
    Initially, it is to be presumed that a duly enacted statute of the
    State of Texas is valid against objection on constitutional grounds.
    12 Tex. Jur. 2d, Const. Law, Sec. 42, pp. 385-386.
    The basic requirements of the doctrine of preemption are clear.
    Mr. Justice Douglas, in discussing whether a Federal Act preempted
    a previously unregulated area (as here) observed:
    “Congress legislated here in a field which the
    states have traditionally occupied.   See Munn v.
    Illinois, 
    94 U.S. 113
    , 
    24 L. Ed. 77
    ; Davis Ware-
    house Company v. Bowles, 
    321 U.S. 144
    , 148-
    149, 
    64 S. Ct. 474
    , 477, 478, 
    88 L. Ed. 635
    . So
    we start with the assumption that the historic
    police powers of the states were not to be super-
    seded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
    and manifest purpose of Congress.     Napier v.
    Atlantic Coast Line Railway Company, 
    272 U.S. 605
    , 611, 
    47 S. Ct. 207
    , 209, 
    71 L. Ed. 432
    , Allen-
    Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
    Board, 
    315 U.S. 740
    , 749, 
    62 S. Ct. 820
    , 825,
    
    86 L. Ed. 1154
    .” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
    Company, 
    331 U.S. 218
    , 230, 
    67 S. Ct. 1146
    , 1152,
    
    91 L. Ed. 1447
    (1947).
    The Supreme Court of the United States has emphasized that
    VI                              . oenjoin(s) seeking out conflicts
    . . . this Court’s decisions.
    between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists. ”
    Huron Portland Cement Co. ;, City of Detroit, 
    362 U.S. 440
    , 446
    (1960). A clear showing of conflict is required.     Schwartz v. State of
    Texas. 
    344 U.S. 199
    . 203 (1952).
    In Florida Lime and Avocado Growers,        Inc. v. Paul, 
    373 U.S. 132
    , 142 (1963) the court held:
    “The test of whether both federal and state
    regulations may operate, or the state regulation
    must give wav. is whether both regulations can
    be enforced without impairing the Federal super-
    intendence of the field, not whether they are aimed
    at similar or different objectives.
    -5509-
    Honorable Larry Teaver,      page 5      (M-1 132)
    “The principle to be derived from our decisions
    is that federal regulation of a field of commerce should
    not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power
    in the absence of persuasive reasons -- either that
    the nature of the regulated subject matter permits
    no other conclusion, or that the Congress has un-
    mistakably so ordained.    See, e. g., Huron Portland
    Cement Co. v. 
    Detroit, supra
    . ” (Emphasis added.)
    Further in Colorado Anti-Discrim.    Comm. v. Continental Air
    Lines, 
    372 U.S. 714
    , 721 (1963), the Supreme Court, in ruling on the
    validity of a state statute under the Supremacy Doctrine, held:
    11
    .that the mere ‘fact of identity does not
    .   .
    mean the automatic invalidity of State measures.’     ”
    (Emphasis added. )
    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recently
    issued a Policy Statement, pertinent provisions of which reveal the intent
    of both Congress and the OSHA:
    “The mandate of most State and local fire
    marshals is quite broad - to promote fire pre-
    vention in order to protect all persons in virtually
    all types of establishments and facilities,   including
    places of employment.     All States and territories
    have some fire regulation activity; forty-five States
    have State fire marshals with statewide jurisdiction
    usually operating as an independent department, or
    as part of the State insurance department, or as a
    part of the State public safety agency. Counterparts
    of the State fire marshals carry out this responsibility
    in municipalities or at the county level.   It is estimated
    that approximately 15,000 persons are involved in fire
    marshal activities at all levels throughout the country.
    “It is the belief of the Occupational Safety and
    Health Administration that it was not Congress’ intent
    in passing the Act to preempt these extensive activities
    with respect to places of employment covered by the
    -5510-
    Honorable Larry Teaver,    page 6   (M-1132)
    Act. While there is an overlap of jurisdiction in
    workplaces,   the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
    ministration feels that the much broader goals of
    fire marshals’ activities preclude their being preempted,
    despite the promulgation of Section 6 standards sub-
    stantially the same as those enforced by fire marshals,
    Thus, State fire marshal activities will not be preempted
    regardless of whether or not a State 18(b) plan is in
    effect. ” (Emphasis supplied. )
    This office is of the opinion that the intent of The Act is to
    encourage, the state “to assume the fullest responsibility for the
    administration and enforcement of their occupational safety and health
    laws, ‘I and that since the, Congress did not intend to preempt the field
    of occupational health and safety, the rules and regulations (either
    adopted or proposed) regarding the safe movement and operation of
    mobile service units and dispensing of flammable liquids and the “Rules
    and Regulations for the Safe Storage, Handling and Use of Flammable
    Liquids at Retail Service Stations” are not preempted by the regulations
    promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Occupational
    Safety and Health Act of 1970.
    Since our answer to Question No. 3 is in the negative,   Questions
    No. 1 and 2 are not answered.
    SUMMARY
    The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
    Labor pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health
    Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1593, 1600; 29 U.S.C. 655, 657,
    do not preempt the proposed regulations concerning
    “Mobile Service Units” or the existing regulations
    regarding the storage, handling and use of flammable
    liquids at retail service stations.
    4       .
    Honorable Larry Teaver,    page 7   (~-1132)
    Prepared by James Hackney
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Kerns Taylor, Chairman
    W. E. Allen. Co-Chairman
    James Quick
    Lynn Taylor
    Van Thompson,     Jr.
    Sally Phillips
    SAMUEL D. MCDANIEL
    Staff Legal Assistant
    ALFRED WALKER
    Executive Assistant
    NOLA WHITE
    First Assistant
    -5512-