Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1972 )


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  •                            March 13. 1972
    Hon. James E. Peavy, M.D.          Opinion NO.   M-1094
    Commissioner of Health
    Texas State Department of Health   Re:   Whether the phrase "shall
    Austin, Texas 78756                      receive no remuneration
    or compensation for blood
    so donated", as used in
    Article 44473, Vernon's
    Civil Statutes, includes
    non-monetary gratuities
    extended by a blood bank
    to a donor 18-21 years of
    Dear Dr. Peavy:                          age.
    Your recent request for an opinion concerning the above
    referenced matter states, in part, as follows:
    "As you know, this department is charged
    with licensing hospitals under the 'Texas Hospital
    Licensing Law' referred to in Article 44473 and
    in such capacity respectfully requests your opinion
    as to the following questions:
    "1 . Does the language 'shall receive no
    remuneration or compensation for blood so donated',
    as contained in Article 44473, include non-mone-
    tary gratuities extended by the blood bank to a
    donor, such as blood replacement credits (a promise
    to replace the blood donated by that donor when the
    need arises) or other plans or programs which serve
    to insure that the future blood needs of the donor
    will be wholly or partially satisfied as a result
    of his donation of blood?
    "2 . Does the inclusion of the language 'shall
    receive no remuneration or compensation for blood
    so donated' as contained in Article 4447j prohibit
    the providing of any gratuity extended by the blood
    bank to the donor in anything other than money for
    the donation of the blood?"
    Article 44473, Vernon's Civil Statutes? reads as follows:
    1
    Acts 62nd Leg., R.S. 1971, H.B. 663, ch. 417, p. 1556.
    -5336-
    Dr. James E. Peavy, page 2     (M-1094)
    "Any person 18 years or older has the
    capacity to donate his blood to the American
    Red Cross, a blood bank operating under the
    supervision of a licensed physician or a hospital
    licensed under the provisions of the Texas
    Hospital Licensing Law provided, however, that
    such donee between the age of 18 and 21 shall
    receive no remuneration or compensation for
    blood so donated."   (Emphasis added.)
    Your inquiry concerns only the underscored portion of this
    Article.
    Our answer to your first question is that any donee
    named in this Article may contract with a donor between the ages
    of 18 and 21 for blood replacement to the donor, or for other
    plans or programs which serve to insure that the future blood
    needs of the donor will be wholly or partially satisfied as a
    result of his donation of blood.
    We do not discern any intent by the Legislature to make
    any impediment to any arrangements between a donor of blood
    within this age bracket and any authorized donee concerning any
    subsequent replacement of blood into the body of the donor or
    for his own personal necessary medical usage.
    In view of our answer to your first question we refrain
    from answering your second question.
    "Remuneration" has been defined as follows:  "something
    that remunerates: recompense, pay." Webster's Third New Inter-
    national Dictionary (Rev.Ed. 1966) 1921. "Compensation" has been
    defined thusly:   "payment for value received or service rendered:
    remuneration."   
    Id. at 463.
    In accord, Black's Law Dictionary,
    Fourth Ed., p. 354. This is the ordinary signification required
    to be given to the words. Article 10, Vernon's Civil Statutes.
    The word "gratuity" as used in your request would
    seem antagonistic to the ordinary meaning of that word, if the
    "gratuities" are to be considered an exchange for blood. A
    "gratuity," by definition, is not "remuneration" or "compensa-
    tion." A "gratuity" is "Something acquired without bargain or
    inducement . . . Something given freely or without recompense;
    a gift . . .II Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed., p. 830. Let
    us suppose that an eighteen year old donates a pint of blood
    for the use and benefitof  an ailing parent, and after the blood
    is drawn, the hospital gives him a glass of orange juice and the
    other parent, or an older sibling, treats him to a steak dinner.
    -5337-
    Dr. James E. Peavy, page ,3    ,(M-1094)
    We cannot perceive any legislative intent to deny to this eighteen
    year old either the orange juice or the steak. Nor do we see any
    intent to deny to our eighteen year old his right to build up a
    reserve of blood credit for his own use. This is analogous to
    depositing his money in a bank. In either instance, he makes
    his own available for his future use.
    The obvious intent of the statute is to prevent young
    people abusing their bodies by excessive sale of their blood.
    The prohibition of sale is necessary because of lack of an ob-
    jective means to determine the frequency and quantity of blood
    drawings. Any means by which blood is sold or exchanged is pro-
    hibited by the statute. Conversely, donation of blood, for what-
    ever reason, is not prohibited by the statute. There is no pro-
    hibition against gratuities unless a nominal gratuity is in
    reality a subterfuge to effect a sale or exchange.
    We do not consider credits in a blood bank either
    compensation, remuneration, or gratuity. We consider them credits;
    just as money deposited in a money bank, is a credit. A credit
    does not constitute an exchange or sale. Each individual may
    choose whether to donate or deposit for credit. In either event,
    the choice of terminology does not create compensation, remunera-
    tion, or gratuity.
    The statute prohibits neither blood bank credits, nor
    actual gratuities.
    SUMMARY
    Article 44473, Vernon's Civil Statutes, in
    relation to donation of blood by those between the
    ages of 18 and 21, prohibits neither blood bank credit
    nor actual gratuities.
    Jjfi$&
    General of Texas
    Prepared by Austin C. Bray, Jr.        "
    Assistant Attorney General
    -5338-
    Dr. James E. Peavy, page 4     (M-1094)
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Kerns Taylor, Chairman
    W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman
    Mike Stork
    Mel Corley
    James Maxwell
    Ben Harrison
    SAMUEL D. MCDANIEL
    Staff Legal Assistant
    ALFRED WALKER
    Executive Assistant
    NOLA WHITE
    First Assistant
    -5339-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M-1094

Judges: Crawford Martin

Filed Date: 7/2/1972

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017