Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1970 )

April 2, 1970
Honor.able Joe Resweber Opinion No. M- 605
County Attorney
Harris County Courthouse
Houston, Texas Re: Authority of Commissioners
Court to enter into contract
with the United States for a
Concentrated Employment
Project under the MDTA and
Dear Mr. Resweber: the EOA.
In your recent request for an opinion you state:
“This office has on this date been requested
by the Commissioners Court to render an opinion as
to whether or not the Commissioners Court has the
authority to enter into a contract with the United States
Department of Labor for implementation of a ‘Con-
centrated Employment Project’ under the Manpower
Development and Training Act (MDTA) and the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act (EOA). Enclosed are a copy
of the proposed contract, a document entitled, ‘United
States Department of Labor, Manpower Administra-
tion, General Provisions for Cost-Reimbursement Type
Contracts’ and a document entitled ‘Special Provisions. ’
“In the light of your recent opinion, No. M-264,
dated August 2, 1969, relating to the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act, in which you declared that no constitutional
or statutory authority could be found for commissioners’
courts in Texas to engage in ‘such community projects
as day care and pre-school, literacy courses and other
adult basic education, legal advice and representation,
consumer education, employment and manpower training,
assistance to small neighborhood businesses and many
others, ’ a serious question arises as to whether or not
the Commissioners Court of Harris County can enter into
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Honorable Joe Resweber, page 2 Opinion No. M- 605
such a contract as is now proposed under both the
Economic Opportunity Act and the Manpower De-
velopment and Training Act, whereby the Court would
participate as the local operating agency for the federal-
ly underwritten activity therein contemplated. In your
said Opinion No. M-264, you further stated that ‘Com-
missioners’ Courts are limited strictly to County busi-
ness’ and that ‘substantial constitutional and statutory
amendments would be required in Texas before OEO
would be assured that commissioners’ courts could
undertake either directly or by contract with other or-
ganizations the wide range of activities and projects
listed and required by such federal agency. ”
The special provision of the contract in question provides in part
as follows:
“CLAUSE NO. 1 STATEMENT OF WORK
(Work schedule)
“I. The Contractor, Harris County Com-
missioner’s Court, Houston, Texas, will be respon-
sible for accomplishing the tasks set forth in this
statement of work to be performed under this contract.
It is understood that parts of the program will be car-
ried out through subcontracts with Texas Employment
Commission, Vocational Guidance Service, Houston
Jobs for Progress and other agencies and organizations
as necessary to perform the work set forth in this state-
ment.
“II. The major objective of this project is to
provide employment and substantial expansion of em-
ployment and work-training opportunities for residents
of a selected high-unemployment area in Houston,
Harris County, Texas. More specifically, the Con-
tractor will link together and administer various man-
power development and employment services, encour-
aging and utilizing t.he cooperative efforts of industry,
community and labor organizations, private non-profit
and public agencies to provide pre-employment work
orientation, training and employment placement assis-
tance to approximately 1,900 un-employed and under-
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Honorable Joe Resweber, page 3 Opinion No. M- 605
employed residents of the target area(s), and in the
period of this Contract, complete such preparations
and place in meaningful employment at least 1, 250
such residents. ”
The Contract reflects that a substantial part of the $2, 270, 113 which
is to be spent on the program will be paid (at an hourly rate) to the job trainees
during their training period. The remainder is spent on the salaries of super-
visory personnel and other operational costs of the program.
Since receiving your original request for an opinion we have been
advised that the contract in question has been amended to expressly limit
the program to
11. . the paupers, the indigent, the needy, and the poor
who are unemployed or underemployed, and who are
residents of a highly selected unemployment area in
Houston, Harris County, Texas. Such residents, for
whose support the county has been traditionally re-
sponsible, fall within the economic qualifications set
up for this project by the federal government. ‘I
-We have concluded that the Commissioners Court of Harris County
does have the authority to enter the contract in question in the discharge of its
statutory duty toward the above mentioned citizens. Our conclusion is based
upon Article 2351, V. C. S. , which provides, in part, as follows:
“Each Commissioner’s Court shall . . .
,I
.
“11. Provide for the support of paupers
residents of their county, who are unable to support
themselves. I’
In our opinion the contract in question constitutes a lawful exercise
of the duty of the Commissioners Court to “provide for the support of paupers, ”
within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of Article 2351.
In connection with this statute we consider the constitutional con-
cepts found in Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution of Texas, which
authorizes the Legislature to provide for the establishment of poor houses
and farms, and Section 8 of Article XVI of the Constitution, which authorizes
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Honorable Joe Resweber, page 4 Opinion No. M- 605
each county to “provide, in such manner as may be prescribed by law,
a Manual Labor Poor House and Farm, for taking care of, managing, em-
ploying and supplying the wants of its indigents and poor inhabitants. I’
Additional statutory authority for some of the activities of the
Commissioners Court which may become necessary under the contract in
question may be found in Articles 2372e-2, V. C. S. and Article 5221a-3,
V.~C. s. Article 2372e-2 authorizes the Commissioners Court to contract
for or lease or rent office space for the purpose of aiding and cooperating
with the agencies of the federal and state government engaged in the ad-
ministration of relief to the unemployed and needy people of the state and
to pay the utility bills and rent out of the county general funds. Article
5221a-3 authorizes the Commissioners Court to enter contracts with the State
employment service for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a free
public employment service within the county upon such terms and conditions
as the parties may agree upon. The statute further provides that the Com-
missioners Court may obligate the county to pay for rent and salaries, and
for the purchase of the equipment, “or such other purposes as may be deemed
advisable by said Commissioners Court . ”
The above quoted constitutional and statutory provisions, involving
the advancement of public welfare and being regarded as humanitarian and
beneficial, are subject to a liberal or comprehensive construction to promote
the public interest or welfare. 82 C. J.S. 916, Statutes, Sec. 387, note 49;
70 C. J.S. 12, Paupers, Sets. 3 and 4; 50 Am. Jur. 420-421, Statutes,
Sets. 395 and 396. See Board of Ins. Com’rs. v. Great Southern Life Ins.
2.) 150 Tex. 258, 239 S. W. Zd 803, 809 (1951).
The answer to your question depends upon the construction of the
language, “provide for the support of paupers, ‘I found in Article 2351, and
more specifically, whether the job training program embraced in the con-
tract in question constitutes “support” and whether the citizens forwhose
benefit the program is established constitute “paupers, ” within the meaning
of the statute.
The word “support ” is a word of “general welfare” and is defined
in 83 C. J. S. 906, “Support, ” as follows:
“As applied to persons, the word ‘support’ is
a general term, of broad signification, and like most
words, it has a variety of meanings. It is not a word
of art, but, rather, a word which has a relative mean-
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Honorable Joe Resweber, page 5 Opinion No. M- 685
ing, and its meaning is necessarily flexible . . . As
a noun, the word ‘support, ’ as used with respect to
persons, means maintenance; subsistence: sustenance;
the supply of necessaries; a livelihood; a living, a
source or means of living; that which furnishes liveli-
hood to a person or family . . . ”
The direct cash income received by the job trainees clearly would
constitute “support. ” In our opinion, the benefits of job training and job
placement also would constitute “support. ” The basic purpose of the project
is to provide a type of support which will render the indigent independent of
support. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “pauper” as “a person so poor that
he must be supported at public expense. ” We believe that the recipients of
the support above defined may be properly considered as paupers.
In determining the meaning of the words “support” and “paupers” we
are required to take the current concepts of those terms, and not necessarily
those concepts which existed at the time the statute was first written.
In Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Oil Well Drilling Co. , 258 S. W. Zd
523, 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953, affirmed Tex. Sup,, 264 S.W.2d 697), the
Court said:
“Moreover, we believe that our law, even our
statutory law, is a living thing capable of adjustment
within certain limits to meet varying circumstances.
Our law is not forever and immutably fixed like the
rules of syntax of the ancient dead Latin and Greek
languages. An example of what we mean is our ex-
emption statute, Art. 3832, Subdivision 10, V. A. C. S.
When passed in 1870 . . . the legislature did not have auto-
mobiles in mind when it used the word ‘carriage. ’ Yet
our courts had no difficulty in holding that the word
‘carriage’ must be interpreted to include automobiles.
Willis v. Schoelman, Tex. Civ. App. , 206 S.W.2d
283. Our views on this subject are all the more ap-
plicable to a statute like the one now under considera-
tion, which admittedly grants discretionary powers to
the Board. ”
In Accord, 50 Am. Jur. 224, Statutes, Sec. 237, and cited cases.
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Honorable Joe Resweber,, page 6 Opinion No. M- 605
Following the reasoning above quoted, it seems clear that the in-
digent citizens involved in the project in question may be properly classified
by the Commissioners Court as “paupers” and that the project constitutes
“support” within the meaning of Article 2351.
It will be noted that the facts involved in Opinion M-264, supra, were
quite different from those in the question now before us. In that opinion we
emphasized that we could find no statutory or constitutional authority for the
participation of the Commissioners Court in the wide range of activities in-
volved in the proposed contract with the office of Economic Opportunities
program; namely, day care and pre-school, literacy courses and other adult
basic education, legal advice and representation, consumer education,
assistance to small neighborhood businesses, as well as the employment and
man power training program. Clearly, those activities would extend the Com-
missioners Court far beyond the function of “providing for the support of
paupers. ” Indeed, Paragraph 11 of Article 2351 was never suggested as a
source of authority for such a wide range of activities.
Attorney General’s Opinion No. O-2474 (1940) and the authorities
which were cited in that opinion, together with recent cases to which we
will refer hereinbelow, are closely in point with the matter here considered
and are applicable thereto. The question involved in Opinion No. O-2474 was
whether the Commissioners Court may legally cause to be paid out of county
funds the sum of $3. 50 per month per person employed in the WPA sewing
room. This contribution was to be used for the purchase of textiles from
which garments would be zrlade in the sewing room for distribution to poor
and destitute families. After discussing the above mentioned sections of
the Constitution we said:
“In our opinion the facts above stated and assumed
to be true would support a finding of the Commissioners
Court that the employees in the sewing room, as well as
those receiving the articles of clothing, are so needy and
dependent as to come within the authority provided in Sec-
tion 11 of Article 2351, Revised Civil Statutes.
“Considering the humanitarian purpose of this
statute, we do not believe it should be given a severe and
literal construction. Rather, it should be given at least
a fairly liberal construction to the end that,its wholly de-
sirable purpose shall at least be possible of achievement . .
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Honorable Joe Resweber, page 7 Opinion No. M- 605
“We do not believe that the statute was meant to
require a man to be reduced to pauperism in the starkest
meaning of the word before assistance may be extended t.o
him.
“These projects known as WPA sewing rooms
actually dispense aid in two forms: (1) direct aid to
those who receive the garments, and (2) indirect aid in
the way of employment for the women operating the ma-
chines. Article 2351 does not require the assistance to
be
it will be much more wholesome and desirable for it to
be given in the nature of employment.
“Furthermore, we do not believe that a county’s
obligation to extend aid is necessarily destroyed the
moment the Federal Government gives its assistance.
There is nothing to prevent the county from providing
for a part of such support, the Federal Government also
contributing. If the Commissioners’ Court finds that those
to whom the clothes are given are dependent upon public
relief, either direct or indirect, for living necessities,
or that the sewing room employees would probably become
subjects of direct relief if the projects should be termi-
nated, in our opinion the contributions requested of the
county may be made. Our opinion, of course, would be
to the contrary if the Commissioners’ Court finds that
such facts are not true. ” (Emphasis added. )
We are well aware of the authorities ‘holding t.hat the Commissioners
Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are without powers except those
conferred upon them by the Constitiltion or statutes or necessarily implied
therefrom. The case of Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S.W.2d 451
(1948), which was quoted and relied upon by this office in Opinion No. M-264,
supra, while holding that the Commissioners Court exceeded its authority
in the matter there involved, recognized the existence of implied powers.
At page 453, the Courts said:
“We must therefore examine the statutes to as-
certain whether expressly or by necessary implication
the Commissioners Court was authorized t.o do what it
did in this case. ”
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Honorable Joe Resweber, page 8 Opinion No. M-605
The language used by the Supreme Court in Pritchard and Abbott
v. McKenna, 350 S.W.2d 333, 334 (1961) is particularly applicable to the
facts disclosed by your opinion request. There the Court said:
“Admittedly the Commissioners Court is
not expressly clothed with constitutional or statutory
authority to contract for the services detailed in this
agreement, but we think that the authority is implied
from the powers that have been expressly granted to
and the duties imposed upon this body by law. ”
Paragraph 11 of Article 2351, in broad and unequivocal language,
grants the authority and duty to “provide for the support of paupers, ” and,
as we view the decisions, the courts will not interfere with the discretion
of the Commissioners Court in carrying out that duty. Rogers v. County
of Taylor, 368 S.W.2d 794 (Civ. App. 1963, error ref. n. r. e.),; Anderson
v. Parsley, 37 S.W.2d 358, 365 (Civ. App. 1931, error ref. ). In Com-
missioners Court of Madison County v. Wallace, 118 Tex. 279, 15e.2d
535, 537 (1929) the Court said:
“The commissioners’ court must have authority
of law for its contracts, and when the authority is given,
a reasonable construction of it will be given to effect this
purpose. ‘I
In Attorney General’s Opinion No. O-2217 (1940) this office held
that Paragraph 11 of Article 2351 authorized the Commissioners Court to
lease a building to be used as a warehouse to store surplus commodities,
such as foods and clothing furnished by the Federal Government, to be issued
to the indigents of the county, and to pay $100 per month for the lease of
such building. We stated:
“When the Commissioners’ Courts are ex-
pressly given the power and duty to ‘provide for the
support of paupers, ’ by necessary implication they
were clothed with the authority to do all the incidental
things necessary to provide for their support. ”
We further pointed out that the Commissioners Courts “were given the
sound discretion of determining those whom they were required to provide
for under the terms of the statute. I’ We further held that the Commissioners
Court had authority (necessarily implied by said statute) to employ necessary
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Honorable Joe Resweber, page 9 Opinion No. M- 605
personnel “to properly sift out those entitled to such relief and to investigate
and ascertain the extent and amount of need. ” The same opinion construed
Article 2372e-2 (supra) to authorize the Commissioners Court to pay utility
bills for the warehouse involved. It is the policy of this office and the courts
to follow earlier Attorney General Opinions on the subject unless clearly
wrong. Attorney General Opinion No. O-1659 (1939); Thomas v. Groebl,
147 Tex. 70, 212 S. W. Zd 625 (1948).
We have examined the contract in question, and, while it involves a
complicated approach to the problem, all of the provisions, in our opinion,
are reasonably related to the statutory purpose of “providing for the support
of paupers . . . residents of their county who are unable to support them-
selves. ” The Contract provides in Section III (3) that the Contractor, Harris
County Commissioners Court, “will, through a subcontract with the Texas
Employment Commission, recruit the residents of the target area for parti-
cipation in the project . I’ Thus, the discretion of determining those whom
they were required to provide for under Article 2351, paragraph 11, is left
to the Harris County Commissioners Court, which we must presume will act
lawfully and within the authority granted to it.
In view of the vast complexities of modern life, especially in the
realm of public welfare and especially in large cities, this office would not
be inclined to declare to be unlawful or unauthorized the particular method
here employed by the Commissioners Court of Harris County to carry out
its statutory duty under the provisions above quoted. Therefore, we hold
that the Commissioners Court of Harris County may lawfully enter the con-
tract to administer the job training program described in your letter and in
the attachments.
SUMMARY
Under the provisions of Paragraph 11 of
Article 2351, V. C. S. , the Commissioners Court
may enter into a contract with the United States
government to administer the Concentrated Em-
ployment Project under the Manpower Development
and Training Act (MDTA) and the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act (EOA).
Yoddvery truly,
General of Texas
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Honorable Joe Resweber, page 10 Opinion No. M- 605
Prepared by Ralph R. Rash
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
Kerns Taylor, Chairman
W. E. Allen, Acting Co-Chairman
John Grace
Earl Hines
Sam Jones
Robert C. Flowers
MEADE F. GRIFFIN
Staff Legal Assistant
ALFRED WALKER
Executive Assistant
NOLA WHITE
First Assistant
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