Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1969 )


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  •                       July 9, 1969
    John Kinross-Wright, M. D.            Opinion No. M- 431
    Commissioner, Department of
    Mental Health and Mental              Re:   Whether a psychologist
    Retardation                                 employed by the Richmond
    Box S, Capitol Station                      State School who con-
    Austin, Texas    78711                      tracted tuberculosis
    from a patient is
    entitled to the benefits
    provided by Article
    6822a, V.C.S.
    Dear Dr. Kinross-Wright:
    Your recent request for an opinion is quoted as
    follows:
    "An employee at the Richmond State
    School, under control and management of
    this Department, has apparently con-
    tracted tuberculosis from a patient to
    which she administered a psychological
    examination, which examination was given
    in an enclosed area and lasted approxi-
    mately two hours. X-rays made later
    confirmed the person examined to be in-
    fected with tuberculosis.   The employee
    consulted a well-known chest specialist
    in Houston and medication to control
    the tuberculosis has been initiated and
    will have to be continued for at least
    one year.
    "Your opinion is respectfully
    requested as to whether or not those
    appropriations made to the Richmond
    State School described in Section 8 of
    Article V of H. B. No. 5. Acts 60th
    - 2145 -
    Dr. Kinross-Wright,   page 2 (M-431)
    Legislature, First Called Session,
    1968, may be used to pay the neces-
    sary drugs, medical and laboratory
    expenses incurred by this employee
    in combating the illness she has
    contracted."
    We assume for the purposes of this opinion that
    a request for payment of the expenses described has been
    or will be made to the Governor and his approval obtained
    as required by Section 8 of Article V of H. B. No. 5, Acts
    of the 60th Legislature, First Called Session, 1968 (Gen-
    eral Appropriations Bill). This section of the act pro-
    vides:
    ~"Sec. 8. PAYMENTS FOR INJURIES.
    Pursuant to Chapter 377, Acts, 1959,
    Fifty-sixth Legislature, Regular Session
    (Codified as Article 6822a), appropria-
    tions made in this Act for consumable
    supplies and materials, current and
    recurring operating expense, general
    operating expenses, other operating ex-
    penses, or general institutional expense,
    may also be expended for paying necessary
    drug, medical, hospital and laboratory
    expenses for the care and treatment of
    any State employee injured while perform-
    ing the duties of any hazardous position
    to which he is assigned by his State
    employment.   For the purposes of this
    Section, 'hazardous position' shall mean
    one for which the regular and normal
    duties inherently involve the risk or
    peril of bodily injury or harm.
    "The expenditure of any appropria-
    tion for the purposes authorized by this
    Section shall have the approval of the
    Governor, shall be made only to the ven-
    dors of necessary drugs, medical, hospital
    -2146-
    Dr. Kinross-Wright,   page 3 (M-431)
    or laboratory services, and shall not
    exceed the amounts appropriated for the
    purposes stipulated in the preceding
    paragraphs nor result in jeopardizing
    the financing of the regular functions
    or services of therespective State
    agency.
    "Where a State employee has re-
    ceived benefits through payments by
    the State pursuant to this Section,
    and also has received other liability
    benefits as a consequence of the same
    injury, such employee  shall pay to the
    State Treasury all sums received or
    paid in his behalf as damages, for medi-
    cal and hospital bills, up to but not
    in excess of the amounts of any such
    payments made by the State. No agency
    of this State who makes payments pur-
    suant to this Section shall present
    the name of any employee who has failed
    to comply with this paragraph to the
    State Comptroller for the issuance of
    any Treasury warrant payable to such
    an employee.
    "The provisions of this Section
    shall not apply to any agency of the
    State authorized to provide workmen's
    compensation insurance for its em-
    ployees."
    The pre-existing statute authorizing the legis-
    lature to make an appropriation of this nature is Article
    6822a, V.C.S., which provides as follows:
    "Section 1. The Legislature is
    hereby authorized to appropriate
    public funds for the purpose of paying
    for drugs and medical, hospital, labora-
    tory. and funeral expenses of state
    employees injured or killed while engaged
    -2147-
    Dr. Kinross-Wright,   Page   4   (M-431)
    in performance of a necessary govern-
    ment function assigned to the employee,
    or where the duties of such employee
    require the employee to expose himself
    to unavoidable dangers peculiar to the
    performance of a necessary governmental
    function.
    "Sec. 2.  Agencies of the state
    are hereby authorized to expend appro-
    priated funds for the purpose of paying
    for drugs and medical, hospital, labcra-
    tory, and funeral expenses to those
    state employees under their jurisdiction
    and control only when such employees
    are engaged in the activi>ies described
    in Section 1 of this Act, and only to
    the extent authorized by appropriations
    made by the Legislature.
    "Sec. 3.  The payment of the
    expenses provided for in Section 1 of
    this Act is authorized to be made in
    addition to other prerequisites of
    employment now authorized by law.
    Acts 1959, 56th Leg., p. 838, ch. 377."
    The Legislature has authorized the Richmond
    State School funds for, inter u,     "other operating
    expense." But before a State employee can be held to
    be qualified to receive the benefits of Section 8, Arti-
    cle V of House Bill No. 5, he must meet the tests esta-
    blished by the Legislature in Section 8, viz. be
    "injured while performing the duties of any hazardous
    position to which he is assigned by his State employ-
    ment."   (Emphasis supplied.) While a definition is
    furnished by the statute for the term "hazardous position,"
    none is furnished for the term "injured."
    The distinction between a "disease" and an
    "injury" has been the subject of much litigation under
    the Workmen's Compensation Act of this State. Since
    the Legislature has excluded from the operation of said
    -2148-
    Dr. Kinross-Wright,   page 5   (M-431)
    section those state agencies authorized to provide
    Workmen's Compensation insurance for their employees,
    we believe the legislature intended that the term
    "injured" be used and defined in the same sense that
    it is used in the Workmen's Compensation Act.
    Article 8306, Section 20, Vernon's Civil
    Statutes, provides as follows:
    "Wherever the terms 'injury' or
    'personal injury' are used in the
    Workmen's Compensation Law of this
    state, such terms shall be con-
    strued to mean damage or harm to
    the physical structure of the body
    and such diseases or infection as
    naturally result therefrom. . .'
    The courts give liberal construction to the
    Workmen's Compensation Act, and if a reasonable doubt
    exists as to the right of an employee to compensation,
    it should be resolved in favbr of such right. Bailey
    v. American General Insurance Company, 
    154 Tex. 430
    ,
    
    279 S.W.2d 315
    (1955). In the Bailey 
    case, supra
    , the
    Supreme Court defined the terms "physical structure of
    the body" and "harm" as used in Article 8306, Section
    20, as follows:
    "The phrase 'physical structure of
    the body' as it is used in the sta-
    tute, must refer to the entire body,
    not simply to the skeletal structure
    or to the circulatory system or to
    the digestive system.  It refers to
    the whole, to the complex of per-
    fectly integrated and interdependent
    bones, tissues and organs which
    function together. . .the structure
    should be considered that of a
    living person not as a static, inani-
    mate thing.
    "The ordinary as well as legal
    connotation of 'harm' is that it is
    of broader import than 'damage.'
    -2149-
    .
    Dr. Kinross-Wright,   page 6   (M-431)
    Damage embraces direct physical
    injury to a cell, tissue or organ
    system: 'harm' to the physical
    structure of the body embraces also
    imoairment of use or control of
    physical structures, directly caused
    by the accident."   (Emphasis supplied.)
    The distinction between an accidental injury
    and occupational disease is that an accidental injury can
    be traced to a reasonably definite time, place and cause,
    whereas an occupational disease is of slow and gradual
    development, and the time, place and cause of it are not
    susceptible of definite ascertainment.   Barron vs. Texas
    Employers' Ins. Ass'n., 36 S.W.Zd 464 (Tex.Comm.App. 1931).
    See also Texas Emplovers' Ins. Ass'n. v. McKay, 
    146 Tex. 569
    , 
    210 S.W.2d 147
    (1948): Texas Employers' Insurance
    Association v. Bradford, 
    381 S.W.2d 234
    (Tex.Civ.App. 1964,
    error ref. n.r.e.): Solomon v. Massachusetts Bondinq and
    Insurance Co., 
    347 S.W.2d 17
    (Tex.Civ.App. 1961, error
    ref.).
    In the case of Barron v. Texas Employers' Ins.
    
    Ass'n., supra
    , the employee contracted tuberculosis as
    the result of inhaling gas from an oil well. He was able
    to point with reasonable certainty to the time, place and
    cause of the tuberculosis.   The court held that the em-
    ployee had suffered an "injury" within the meaning of the
    word as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, in the
    following language:
    "A disease contracted as the
    direct result of unusual condi-
    tions connected with the work,
    and not as an ordinary or reason-
    ably to be anticipated result of
    pursuing the same should be con-
    sidered as an accidental injury."
    From the cases cited we conclude that the State
    employee in question was "injured" as that term is used
    in the statute in question.
    - 2150-
    .   .   .
    Dr. Kinross-Wright,   page 7 (M-431)
    Whether the State employee was injured while
    performing the duties of a "hazardous position" is con-
    trolled by the definition supplied in Section 8, Article
    V, House Bill No. 5, quoted as follows:
    "For the purposes of this Section,
    'hazardous position' shall mean one
    for which the regular and normal
    duties inherently involve the risk
    or peril of bodily harm."
    The patients of Richmond State School are
    impaired mentally, and often physically, or they would
    not qualify for admission to the school.   In our opin-
    ion this State employee, required in the performance
    of her normal duty to expose herself at close quarters
    to the infirmities, mental and physical, of these
    patients, was in a position where her duties inherently
    involved the risk or peril of bodily injury or harm, and
    was occupying a "hazardous position" as defined by the
    statute.  That the injury suffered, tuberculosis, was
    not one of the particular perils expected does not in
    our opinion bar this employee's qualification under the
    definition contained in Section 8.
    If in fact the employee's tuberculosis was,
    in reasonable medical probability, caused by her exposure
    to the tubercular patient on the occasion  in question,
    we conclude that the State employee in question does
    qualify for the benefits authorized by Section 8 of Arti-
    cle V, House Bill No. 5, 60th Legislature, First Called
    Session, 1968.
    SUMMARY
    An employee of Richmond State School
    contracting tuberculosis as the result of
    conducting a psychological examination of
    a tubercular patient may have necessary drug,
    medical, hospital or laboratory expenses
    paid from the appropriations made to Richmond
    - 2151-
    .
    Dr. Kinross-Wright,   page 8 (M-431)
    State School for "other operating expense"
    pursuant to Article 6822a, Vernon's Civil
    Statutes, and Section 8, of Article V,
    House Bill No. 5, Acts of the 60th Legisla-
    ture, First Called Session, 1968.
    Prepared by Tom Neely
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Kerns Taylor, Chairman
    George Kelton, Co-Chairman
    Terry Goodman
    Robert C. Crouch
    Ralph Rash
    Malcolm Quick
    Hawthorne Phillips
    Executive Assistant
    -2152-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M-431

Judges: Crawford Martin

Filed Date: 7/2/1969

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017