Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1969 )


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    Honorable J. W. Edgar                 Opinion No. M- 395
    Commissioner of Education
    Texas Education Agency                Re:   Clarification of
    201 East 11th Street                        Attorney General
    Austin, Texas 78711                         Opinion No. M-332,
    concerning whether
    a school dlatrict
    may suspend a
    student for certain,
    conduct in the ab-
    sence of any policy
    or rule promulgated
    covering such con-
    Dear Dr. Edgar:                             duct.
    This will acknowledge receipt of your request for
    clarification of the followin statement made In Attorney
    General Opinion No. M-332 (19f9):
    II     It ia noted that prior to
    Novembir.12, 1968, there was no pol-
    icy concerning dangerous drugs and
    narcotics; It la our opinion that
    the board of trustee8 would have no
    authority to expel a student for
    narcotic-connected offenses occur-
    ring prior to that date."
    r research indicates that a student may be aus-.
    9
    pended from school only If he ha8 performed an act which
    i8 forbidden by rule, regulation , or statute. An ex-
    cellent discussion on this subject is contained in a
    general order, covering judicial standards of procedure
    IIn our previous opinion, M-332, the word "expel"
    was used Interchangeably with "suspend." We will
    use the word "suspend" throughout this opinion in
    deference to its usage in Article 2904, Vernon's
    Civil Statutes.
    - 1958-
    1      .
    Honorable J. W. Edgar, Page 2 (M- 395   )
    and substance applicable to student discipline in tax
    supported schools of higher education. The decision
    was handed down by the United States District Court for.
    the Western District of Missouri, four federal judges
    and reported in 45 Federal Rules Decisions
    ::yt"s:;t. 18, 1968). Following certain definitions
    and the outlining of lawful missions of tax supported
    schools, this court decision undertakes a discussion
    of student discipline. Among other substantive stan-
    dards the following appear3:
    .   .   .
    "An institution may establish
    appropriate standards of conduct
    (scholastic and behavioral) in
    any form and manner reasonably
    calculated to give adequate notice
    of the scholastic attainments and
    behavior expected of the student.
    "The notice of the scholastic
    and behavioral standards to the
    students may be written or oral,
    or partly written and partly oral,
    but preferably written. The stan-
    dards may be positive or negative
    in form,
    "In severe cases of student
    discipline for alleged miscon-
    duct, such as final expulsion,
    indefinite OP long-term suspen-
    sion, dismissal with deferred
    leave to reapply, the instltu-
    tion Is obligated to give to
    the student minimal procedural
    requirements of due process of
    law. The requirements of due process
    do not demand an inflexible
    procedure for all such cases.
    'But "due process" unlike some
    legal rules, Is not a technl-
    cal conception with a fixed
    content unrelated to time,
    place and circumstances.'
    -1959-
    Honorable J. W. Edgar, Page 3 (M- 395 )
    Three minimal requirements apply
    In cases of severe discipline,
    growing out of fundamental con-
    ceptions of fairness implicit In
    procedural due process. First,
    the student should be given ade-
    quate notice in writing of the
    specific ground or grounds and
    the nature of the evidence on
    which the disciplinary proce-
    edings are based. Second, the
    student should be given an op-
    portunity for a hearing in which
    the disciplinary authority pro-
    vides a fair opportunity for
    hearing of the student's posi-
    tion, explanations and evidence.
    The third requirement is that
    no disciplinary action be taken
    on grounds which are not sup-
    ported by any substantial evi-
    dence. Within limits of due
    process, institutions must be
    free to devise various types
    of disciplinary procedures rel-
    evant to their lawful missions,
    ,, consistent with their varying
    processes and functions, and
    which do not impose unreason-
    able strain on their resources
    and personnel."
    While the above legal standards.are held to apply
    to educational institutions of higher education, we
    believe they~are equally applicable in the Texas public
    school system, wherein the right to attend school Is
    assured to all students within certain age limits and
    attendance is compulsory until the age of seventeen.
    In Corpus Juris Secundum, a discussion of the
    "CONTROL OF PUPILS AND DISCIPLINE" appears under Schools
    and School Districts, Sections 493 through 503. In
    this discussion, it la made clear that a teacher has many
    rights in dealing directly with a pupil and exercising
    "parental" discipline at the time of Improper conduct,
    but that superintendents and principals control teachers;
    and school boards must exercise their power by establish-
    ing rules, regulations, and policies for the discipline
    -1960-
    Honorable J. W. Edgar, Page 4 (M-   395)
    and control of pupils,
    The general rule is that '. . the school board
    which by statute has the general charge and superin-
    tendence of the public schools has power to adopt
    appropriate and reasonable rules and regulations for
    the discipline and management of such schools, such
    as a rule requiring that there shall be prompt at-
    tendance, diligence in study and proper deportment."
    79 C.J.S. 443, Schools & School District, Sec. 494c;
    Wilson v. Abilene Indep. School Dist., 190 S.W.2d
    mb (T     Ci A       45, error ref w.m.)* Bozeman v.
    MorrowTx34 g:W!P2d1&+ (Tex.Civ.App. 193; no writ)
    m       Indep. School Dist. v. Andrews, 335 S.W. 2d f
    8ob [T    Ci A     1960, no writ); and14 A.L.R. 3d
    1201 cf``otXZj       The authority of school trustees
    to enforce reasonable rules and regulations by reason-
    able and proper punishment includes the right to
    susnend a pupil for persistent violation of rules and
    regulations.- 51 Tex.Jur.2d 620, Schools, Sec. 241;
    Bishop v. Houston Independent School Dist., 119 Tex.
    tiO3, 
    29 S.W.2d 312
    (1930).
    Article 2780, Vernon's Civil Statutes, concern-
    ing the authority of Independent School District
    Trustees, directs, in part:
    "Said trustees shall adopt
    such rules, regula=,     and
    by-laws as they may deem prop-
    . and the public free schools
    EF'such independent district
    shall be under their control;
    and they shall have the exclu-
    sive power to manage and govern
    said schools, 0 s . *I'
    (Emphasis added.)
    It Is thus apparent that the right of a student to
    attend a public school is qualified by the school trustees'
    power to make reasonable and necessary rules and regu-
    lations, while at the same time such power of the trustees
    is also qualified by the necessity to make such rules and'
    regulations as It may deem proper.
    It is settled law that a student may be refused
    enrollment for failure to comply with a school regulation
    banning long hair. Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist.,
    -1961-
    Honorable J. W. Edgar, Page 5 (M- 395 )
    261 F.  supp. 545        affirmed 
    392 F.2d 697
    (5th Clr.),
    cert. den. 89                    In the recent case of
    Leonard v. School Committee,'349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d
    qbtl (19651, upholding the suspension of a student "until
    such time as he returns to school with an acceptable
    haircut," the student attacked the action of the School
    Committee In suspending him because no school regu-
    lation had been previously formally adopted and pub-
    licized .by the Committee. The Court here recognized
    the need of the Committee to thus meet the fundamental
    and basic requirement8 of constitutional due process,
    yet upheld the Committee's action on the following
    ground:
    "We hold that the prlncipal~s
    verbal directive, followed immed-
    lately by a letter and later by
    the ratification of the school
    committee, q atisfles any proce-
    dural requirements exacted by
    statute or b considerations of
    due process.if
    After careful research, we have been unable to find
    any authority which would permit a school board to create
    and enforce a prohibitory rule, regulation, or policy
    Involving suspension from school after the occurrence
    of the prohibited conduct. Such anfort     In our opinion
    would violate basic and fundamental standards and concept3
    of due process and would be illegal and not sustainable
    In court. It Is our opinion from the authorities that
    In the absence of an existing statute which authorizes
    suspension or expulsion by a school board for the pro-
    hibited conduct, a school board must first place Into
    effect some rule, regulation, or policy prohibiting
    such conduct before It may exercise the power of suspen-
    sion or expulsion. As pointed out, however, the rule
    may be general, informal, or even verbal.
    In Texas, Article 2904, Vernon's Civil Statutes,
    makes general provision for the powers of school trustees
    over pupils: "They ftrustees amay suspend from the
    privileges of schools any pupiifound guilty of lncor-~
    rigible conduct, but such suspension shall not extend
    beyond the current term of the school."
    -   1962-
    Honorable J. W. Edgar, Page 6 (M- 395 )
    Article 2898, Vernon's Civil Statutes, further
    provides, in part{ for the disciplL:&cgand parole of
    certain pupils: 'Any child within the compulsory
    school attendance ages who shall be insubordinate, dis-
    orderly, vicious or immoral in conduct, or who per-
    sistently violates the reasonable rule8 and regula-
    tions of the school which he attends, or who otherwise
    persistently misbehaves therein 80 as to render him-
    self incorrigible, shall be reported to the attendance
    officer who shall proceed against such child in the ju-
    venile court," That statute further provide3 for a
    hearing in court by the judge of the court and for a
    parole of the pupil when found guilty by the court,
    which is empowered to remove the student from Bchool
    and commit him to some agreeable and suitable training
    school.
    We hasten to point out that Article 2898 ha3 been
    held merely to be an "additional remedy" to that pos-
    sessed by the board of trustee8 "in enforcing compliance
    with reasonable rule8 designed to bring about proper
    discipline in the public schools of this State." Blshoe
    v. Houston Independent School Dist., 
    119 Tex. 403
    ,.29
    . .    312 (19301.
    Unless the remedy provided in Article 2898 Is fol-
    lowed, apparently the only statute in thia State author-;
    izing student suspension which may be utilized, in the
    absence of rules or regulations on the subject ro-
    mulgated by the school trustees, is Article 290fi, author-
    izing suspension for "incorrigible conduct." Therefore,
    absent a school policy, rule or regulation, the only
    basis for suspension of a student would be on the stat-
    utory ground of incorrigible conduct, which is defined
    in law as "Incapable of being corrected, amended, or
    improved; with respect to juvenile offenders, unmanage-
    able bv narents or guardians." Black's Law Dlctionarv.
    -1963-
    Honorable J. W. Edgar, Page 7 (M- 395 )
    In narcotic-connected cases, often the sole act of
    mere possession or the mere use in a single Instance
    la made a criminal offense. See Article 725b, Section
    2(a), Vernon's Penal Code. Yet being guilty of such
    an offense, even by final judgment of conviction, does
    not render a student, as a matter of law, guilty of
    "Incorrigible conduct," within the legal definition as
    above set out, so as to authorize suspension of the student
    from school. This, therefore, was the basis of our state-
    ment in Attorney General Opinion No. M-332 (1969) that
    since there was no school policy, rule, or regulation
    concerning drugs or narcotics prior to the date mentioned,
    the board of trustees was without authority to expel
    a student for the mere violation'of the narcotics law,
    whether found guilty by a court or by school authorities.
    Of course, if the particular violation was based on a
    finding of habitual possession, sale, OP use, etc., such
    as to render the person guilty of lncorrlgible conduct,
    then there would be a basis to suspend the student.
    In view of the foregoing considerations and in order
    to clarify this matter, we conclude that the Board of
    Trustees is without authority to suspend a student for
    any act or conduct unless prior thereto the Board has
    placed In effect a rule, regulation, or policy generally
    covering such act or conduct or unless the act or conduct
    constitutes "incorrlgible conduct" in violation of Article
    2904. The dlscipllnary policy, rule, or regulation may
    be a general one, or informal, or even verbal, so long
    as it fairly apprises the student of the type of pro-
    hibited conduct for which he may be suspended from school.
    As stated next above, the disciplinary policy, rule or
    regulation may be a "general one." To illustrate: A
    school policy, rule or regulation that provides for the
    suspension of a student who violates the Penal laws of
    Texas, of the grade of a felony, would authorize the
    suspension of a student who is guilty of violating our
    penal laws relative to narcotic drugs. Article 725 b,
    V.P.C.
    -1964-
    Honorable J. W. Edgar, Page 8 (M- 395)
    SUMMARY
    The School Board of Trustees
    is without authority to suspend
    a student for any act or conduct
    unless, prior thereto, the Board
    has promulgated a rule, regula-
    tion, or policy generally cover-
    ing such act or conduct for which
    the student is subject to being
    suspended or unless the act or
    conduct constituted "incorrigible
    conduct" in violation of Article
    2904, Vernon's Civil Statutes.
    Such rule, regulation or policy
    may be informal, preferably writ-
    ten but may be verbal, so long
    as It fairly apprises the stu-
    dent of the type of prohibited
    conduct for which he may be sus-
    pended from school.
    Very   ruly yours,
    k
    Prepared by Howard M. Fender
    ,Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Kerns Taylor, Chairman
    George Kelton, Vice-Chairman
    Bill Allen
    John Banks
    Robert Darden
    Tom Bullington
    W, V. Geppert
    Staff Legal Assistant
    Hawthorne Phillips
    Executive Assistant
    -1965-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M-395

Judges: Crawford Martin

Filed Date: 7/2/1969

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017