Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1968 )


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  • A--       o-
    July 17, 1968
    Honorable John F. Pettlt     *OpinionNO. M- 260
    County Attorney
    Val Verde County              Re: Authority of the Commls-
    Del Rio, Texas  78440             sioners Court of Val Verde
    County to transfer certain
    real property to the Val
    Verde County Hospital
    Authority  created pursuant
    to the rovlsions of Arti-
    cle 449% 7, V@rXWh'S ClVll
    Dear Mr. Pettit:                  Statutes.
    Your request .for an opinion on the above subject mat-
    ter reads, in pert, as follower:
    "Recently the Commlssloner~sCourt of Val
    Verde County, by order of said Court, created
    the Val Verde County Hospital Authority ln ac-
    cordance with the provisions of Article b&k
    v.a.c.8.    Presently Val Verde County operates
    and maintains a hospital, Val Verde Memorial
    Hospital, which the Court anticipates trans-
    ferring to the newly created Authority. The
    existing hospital was built by the County with
    funds derived from a bond Issue; and title to
    the real estate upon which the hospital 1s
    situated 1s vested in the County.
    II....
    "Therefore, I respectfullyrequest your
    opinion as to whether a transfer by the Com-
    missioner's Court of Val Verde County of all
    the physical assets of the Val Verde Memorial
    Hospital, Including the real estate upon which
    said hospital Is situated, to the,Val Verde
    County Hospital Authority la authorized under
    the laws of the state of Texas."
    The pertinent provisions of Article 449&r, Vernon's
    Civil Statutes, reads aa follows:
    "Section 1. County Hospltal Authorities
    without taxing power may be created as hereln-
    after provided. This law shall be known as the
    lCounty Hospital Authority Act.'
    - 1258-
    Hon. John F. Pettit, page 2, ~-260
    "Sec. 2. As used In this law, 'County'
    means any county'ln the State of Texas; 'Qovern-
    lng Body' means the CommissionersCourt of a county;
    'Authority'means a County Hospital Authority
    created under this Act; 'Board' or 'Board of Dlr-
    ectors' means the board of directors of the Au-
    thority; 'Bond Resolution'means %he resolution
    authorizing the Issuance of revenue bonds; 'Trust
    Indenture'means the mortgage, deed of trust or
    other instrument pledging revenues of, or creat-
    ing a mortgage lien on properties, or both, to
    secure the revenue bonds Issued by the Authority;
    'Trustee'means the trust'eeunder the Trust
    Indenture.
    "Sec. 3. When the Governing Body of a
    county shall find that It Is to the best
    Interest of the County and Its inhabitantsto
    create a County Hospl,talAuthority, it shall
    pass an order creating the Authority and deslg-
    natlng the name by which It shall be known. The
    Authority shall comprise only the territory In-
    cluded within the boundarles of such County and
    shall be a body politic and corporate and a
    political subdivisionof the State. It shall
    have the power of perpetual succession,have.a
    seal, may sue and be sued and may make, amend
    and repeal its bylaws.
    II
    ....
    "Sec. 7. The Authority may Issue revenue
    bonds to provide funds for any of its purposes.
    Such bonds shall be payable from and secured
    by a pledge of the net revenues to be derived
    from the operation of the hospital or hospitals
    and any other revenues resulting from the owner-
    ship of the hospital properties. The bonds,may
    be additionally secured by a mortgage or deed of
    trust on real property of Authority or by a
    chattel mortgage on Its personal property, or
    by both.
    I,
    ....
    “Sec. 17. For the purpose of carrying out
    any power conferred by this Act, Authority shall
    have the right to acquire the fee simple title
    20 land and other property and easements by con-
    -1259-
    Hon. John F. Pettlt, page 3, M-260
    demnatlon In the manner provided by Title 52, Re-
    vised Civil Statutes as amended, relating to
    eminent domain. Authority Is hereby declared
    to be a municipal corporationwithin the mean-
    ing of Article 3268 of said Title 52. The amount
    of and character or interest In land, other prop-
    erty and easements thus to be acquired shall be
    determined by the Board of Directors." (Emphasis
    added.)
    In view of the foregoing provisions, a Hospital Au-
    thority created pursuant to the provisions of the above quoted
    statute constitutes a separate entity, a body politic and cor-
    porate, and a political subdivision of the State with the power
    to issue revenue bonds, but without the power of levying or col-
    lecting taxes; and that Authority also possesses the right or
    power of eminent domain. The statute does not expressly or lm-
    pliedly limit the right or power given.
    Since the Val Verde County Hospital Authority may
    exercise power of eminent domain pursuant tomthe provisions
    of Section 17 of Article 4494r, It has the power to acquire by
    condemnation the real estate
    of Tyler v. Smith County, 
    151 Tex. 80
    , 246
    Klngsville Independent School District v.
    q$l(T Cl A       1942
    v. Ci~;'ofvilP;;so,3j7e::::2d
    We do not find any specific statutory provision au-
    thorizing transfer of real estate from the county to the Authority
    and ordinarily in the absence of such specific authorization
    the county could not dispose of Its real estate In this manner.
    However, in view of the decisions in City of Tyler v. Smith
    m;;;";l,;;r;. ,a;lngsvI;ri;IM;Penzent Schzol Dis;Pg;;:s;ir;C;n-
    Zii?xcep on to the general rule exists In view of th
    that the Authority has power of eminent domain. The cas?oS
    El Paso County v. City of El Paso, su ra   Involved a suit
    fmlne                              +f' e validity of a trans-
    St: of real prope:t$Eom Ehe county to the city. The court in
    upholding the transfer made the following observations,begln-
    nlng at 
    357 S.W.2d 785
    :
    "Ordinarilythere could be no doubt that
    the Couhty, like any other political subdivision
    of the State, could dispose of Its real estate
    only in strict adherence to the pertinent stat-
    utes.   Here, however, the City has cited two
    -1260-
    Hon. John F. Pettlt, page 4, M-260
    cases that appear to be an exception to this
    rule. These cases are City of Tyler v. Smith
    County, 
    151 Tex. 80
    , 
    246 S.W.2d 601
    (S.Ct.),
    and Klngsville Ind. School Dlst. v. Crenshaw,
    Tex.CIv.App.,
    164 S.W.2d 49
    (dls'm. car. judg.).
    ...The Supreme Court held that the county
    owned the property In See simple, with the
    city having no rights In the square except its
    street easements along the sides, and while the
    county had the right to remove the courthouse,
    the entire square was Impressed with a public
    use and therefore could,not be diverted to
    private use or sold to private agencies or
    persons. On motion for rehearing, parties
    asked the court IS Its opinion meant that
    the city could never connect its hlghw;ieby
    running a street through the square.
    court answered pointing out that such was not
    the meaning of Its original opinion, but that
    the City of Tyler (like El Paso), being a home-
    rule city, had the right of condemnation,and
    in that right was contained the right to con-
    demn public as well as private property....
    The Supreme Court then went on to say:
    "'If counsel will refer to Klngsvllle In-
    dependent School District v. Crenshaw, Tex.
    Clv.App., 
    164 S.W.2d 49
    , (error dismissed,
    cor.judgt.) they will find how the desired re-
    sult may be accomplished even without resort
    to condemnationproceedings.'
    "Article 1577 requires the appointment of
    a commissioner to sell county land at public
    auction, but it is obvious,that this statute
    could not be complied with In either the Tyler
    case or this case, because the land was lm-
    pressed with a trust and public use, and could
    not otherwise b,eemployed;.and this Is likely
    one of the reasons why the Supreme Court did
    not mention this article or suggest that It
    had to be complied with......
    II....
    "'We think the statutes hereinabove re-
    -1261-
    . .
    Hon. John F. P&tit, page 5, M-260
    Serred to do apply wherever a political sub-
    division, subject to such statutes, desires to
    dispose of any of Its public land to an ln-
    divldual or private agency, but not where such
    political subdivisionwith the power of eminent
    domain and condemnation chooses to deal with
    its opposite number and reach an agreement as
    to the change of public use, rather than to
    resort to the expensive and tedious medium of
    litigating the entire matter through the
    courts, thereby holding up the public benefit
    and depleting to some extent the tax funds of.
    the subdivisions Involved."
    In view of the Soregolng, since Val Verde County Au-
    thority Is vested with the power of eminent domain, it may choose
    to deal with the county and reach an agreement as to the change
    of title to all the physical assets of the Val Verde Memorial
    Hospital, Including the real estate upon which said hospital
    Is located, rather than to resort to condemnationproceedings.
    El Paso County v. City of El Paso, 
    357 S.W.2d 783
    at 787.
    You are therefore advised that If the Commissioners
    Court of Val Verde County and the Hoard of Directors of the
    Val Verde County Hospital Authority determine that it Is to the
    best Interest of both the county and the Authority to consummate
    such transfer, the CommissionersCourt of Val Verde County has
    the authority to make such transfer.
    SUMMARY
    A counts has the authority to transfer a
    County Hospital to a Hospital Authority created
    pursuant to the provisions of Article %@4r,
    Vernon's Civil Statutes.
    Verfiruly yours,
    C. MARTIN
    General of Texas
    -1262-
    Hon. John F. Pettlt, page 6, M-260
    Prepared by John Reeves
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Hawthorne Phillips, Chairman
    Kerns Taylor, Co-Chairman
    James McCoy
    Roger Tyler
    Houghton Brownlee
    James Broadhurst
    A. J. CAFWBBI, JR.
    Executive Assistant
    -1263-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M-260

Judges: Crawford Martin

Filed Date: 7/2/1968

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017