Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1965 )

NEY GENE
QFTEXAS
Honorable Don Hall Opinion No. C-387
Criminal District Attorney
McLennan County Courthouse Re: Whether a person whose
Waco, Texas driver’s license has been
suspended under the Safety
Responsibility Act (Article
67Olh, V.C.S.) must sur-
render such license to the
Department of Public
Safety on demand pursuant
to Section 32 (4), Article
Dear Mr. Hall: 6687b, V.C.S.
You recently requested an opinion of this office concerning the following
question:
“Should a person whose driver’s
license has been suspended under the
provisions of the Safety Responsibility
Act, (Article 6701h) be required to
surrender said driver’s license on demand
in view of Section 32 (4), Article 668713,
V.C.S., of the Drivers License Law?”
In order to arrive at the correct answer to your question, it is felt
necessary to first review the legislative history of the particular acts
involved and their relationship to each other.
The Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, codified as
Article 6701h, V.C.S., was first enacted in 1951 by the 52nd Legislature and
became effective January 1, 1952. Section 31 of that Act provides as
follows :
“Any person whose license or registration
shall have been suspended as herein provided,
or whose policy of insurance or bond, when
required under this Act, shall have been can-
celed or terminated, or who shall neglect to
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Hon. Don Hall, page 2 (C-387)
furnish other proof upon request of
the Department shall immediately return
his license and registration to the Depart-
ment. If any person shall fail to return
to the Department the license or registra-
tion as provided herein, the Department
shall forthwith direct any peace officer to
secure possession thereof and to return
the same to the Department.”
Section 32 (d) of the same Act states as follows:
“(d) Any person willfully failing to
return license or registration as required
in Section 31 shall be fined not more than
Five Hundred Dollars ($500) or imprisoned
not to exceed thirty (30) days, or both.”
The two above quoted sections of Article 6701h, if valid, would provide
a practical means for enforcement of a suspension of a driver’s license
which has been suspended under the Safety Responsibility Act. However,
in Attorney General’s Opinion No. C-341 (1964), this office expressed its
opinion that Section 32 (d), quoted above, construed in connkction with
Section 31, quoted above, is unconstitutional and void, as the term
“immediately ” is so indefinite and uncertain that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess as to the meaning of the term and differ as
to its application. Thus, as you have observed, if the various law enforce-
ment agencies concerned with enforcement of Article 6701h follow the
above mentioned Attorney General’s Opinion, the practical result is that
the State, under the Safety Responsibility Act, is not afforded an effective
course of action against the person who, after having his license sus-
pended in accordance with the provisions of Article 6701h, shall refuse
to return his license to the Department of Public Safety.
However, Article 6687b, Section 32 (4), V.C.S., a portion of the
Drivers License Law, provides that it shall be unlawful for any person:
II . . . .
“4. To fail or refuse to surrender to the
Department on demand any operator’s,
commercial operator’s, or chauffeur’s
license which has been suspended, cancelled,
or revoked as provided by law;
!I , , . . II
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Hon. Don Hall, page 3 (C-387)
Section 44 of that Act provides for penalties for violations of the pro-
visions of Article 6687b. The question thus arises as to whether or not
the penalty provisions of Article 6687b may be invoked and used as a
means of enforcement against a person who refuses to return his license
which has been suspended under the provisions of Article 6701h. Clearly,
Section 32 (4), Article 6687b, declares it unlawful for any person to fail
or refuse to surrender to the Department a license which has been sus-
pended as provided by law. It does not limit the suspension covered to
one obtained under Article 6687b. It would seem to logically follow that
prosecution could be maintained under this Article for failure to surrender
a license suspended under any other valid statute.
However, it must be noted that Section 32 (4) was first enacted by the
Legislature in 1935 [Acts 1935, 44th Legislature, 2d C.S. Page 1785,
Ch. 466, Sec. 19 (4)]. This Article was retained in the law as it was amended
by Acts 1937, 45th Legislature, Page 752, Ch. 369. When the old Drivers
License Law, above quoted, was repealed in 1941, and our present law,
Article 6687b, enacted, Section 32 (4) was included. It is thus seen that
the provisions of Section 32 (4) have been a part of our Drivers License
Law since 1935, some 16 years prior to the effective date of Article 6701h.
From the above reviewed legislative history, it is therefore obvious
that the suspensions as provided for in Article 67Olh were not in existence
until some 16 years subsequent to the passage of Article 6687b. Since
Section 32 (4), Article 668713, refers to all suspensions as provided by law,
the fundamental issue to be decided in answering your question may be
stated thusly: Is the “as provided by law ” Section 32 (4), Article 6687b, to
be construed as applying to a suspension under a law which did not exist
until some 16 years after Section 32 (4). It is believed evident that the
Legislature at the time Section 32 (4) was enacted had no specific intent
that Section 32 (4) would apply to a suspension had under Article 67Olh,
passed some 16 years later. The answer to your question must depend
upon the construction to be given the various statutes concerned. There
has been found no Texas authority directly in point.
In 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 237, is found the following language:
II
. . . .
“The language of a statute may be so broad,
and its object so general, as to reach conditions
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Hon. Don Hall, page 4 (C-387)
not coming into existence until a long time
after its enactment. Indeed, it is a general
rule of statutory construction that, in the absence
of a contrary indication, legislative enactments,
which are prospective in operation and which are
couched in general and comprehensive terms
broad enough to include unknown things that might
spring into existence in the future, even though
they are words of the present tense, apply alike in
new situations, cases, conditions, things, subjects,
methods, inventions, or persons or entities coming
into existence subsequent to their passage, where
such situations, cases, conditions, things, subjects,
methods, inventions, persons, or entities are of
the same class as those specified, and can reason-
ably be said to come within the general purview,
scope, purpose, and policy of the statute, the mis-
chief sought to be prevented, and the evident
meaning of the terms used.
“The latter rule prevails whether the new
subject comes into existence by statute or
otherwise . . . .I’
In 82 C.J.S. Statutes, Section 319, appears the following statement:
“Statutes framed in general terms ordinarily
apply to cases and subjects within their terms sub-
sequently arising, and, unless plainly indicating the
contrary, are to be construed prospectively, espe-
cially where substantive rights are involved. Accord-
ingly, it is a usual rule of statutory construction that
legislative enactments in general and comprehensive
terms, prospective in operation, apply alike to all
persons, subjects, and business within their purview
and scope coming into existence subsequent to their
passage. So, also, where a statute is expressed in
general terms and in words of the present tense it
will be construed to apply not only to things and
conditions existing at its passage, but will also be
given a prospective interpretation, by which it
will apply to such as come into existence there-
after.”
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Hon. Don Hall, page 5 (C-387)
In Sutherland-Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, 3rd Edition, Section 5102,
appears the following:
“Standards established by the medium of
legislation are usually intended to have con-
siderable breadth with the result that a statute
may cover many situations that do not immediately
occur to the mind. And so it is a general rule of
statutory construction that a statute, expressed in
general terms and words of present or future tense,
will be applied, not only to situations existing and
known at the time of the enactment, but also pros-
pectively to things and conditions that come into
existence thereafter. Legislation must be given
elastic operation if it is to cope with the changing
economic and social conditions . . . .
“The rule that a statute will operate pros-
pectively so as to include circumstances unknown
at the time of enactment has been employed in
the construction of penal as well as remedial
statutes. . . .‘I
In Browder vs. United States of America, 312 U.S. 335, 85 L. Ed. 862,
61 S. Ct. 599 (1941), Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the Court, made the
following statement:
“The fact that at the time of the passage of
the act, passports were not customarily used by
citizens to assure easy reentry is brought forward
by petitioner to support the argument that Congress
did not intend to punish uses such as the one charged
here. There is nothing in the legislative history to
indicate that Congress considered the question of
use by returning citizens. Old crimes, however,
may be committed under new conditions. Old laws
apply to changed situations. The reach of the act
is not sustained or opposed by the fact that it is
sought to bring new situations under its terms.
While a statute speaks from its enactment, even a
criminal statute embraces everything which sub-
sequently falls within its scope . . . .‘I (Emphasis
added)
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Hon. Don Hall, page 6 (C-387)
It is thus seen from the authorities above quoted that the general rule
of statutory construction is that legislation will be given a prospective
application, and will apply to conditions and circumstances coming into
existence subsequent to the passage of the legislation, even though the
enacting body did not specifically intend that the new circumstance or
condition would be covered by the legislation. The Browder case, supra,
although not directly in point to the question here under consideration,
indicates that the Supreme Court of the United States will follow the
general rule as it is applied to criminal statutes, and will apply a penal
statute to a condition arising subsequent to the enactment of the penal
statute, even though the act complained of would not have been con-
sidered a crime at the time of the passage of the act.
It has been previously stated that there has been found no Texas
authority directly in point. Even so, it is felt that the Texas Courts have
expressed a tendency to follow the general rule of statutory construction
outlined above. In Oil Well Drilling Co. vs. Associated Indemnity Corp.,
258 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Civ.App. 1953) affirmed 153 Tex. 153, 264 S.W.2d
697 (1954), on page 529 of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is
found the following:
“Moreover, we believe that our law, even
our statutory law, is a living thing capable of
adjustment within certain limits to meet varying
circumstances. Our law is not forever and im-
mutably fixed like the rules of syntax of the ancient
dead Latin and Greek languages. An example of
what we mean is our exemption statute, Article 3832,
subd. 10, V.A.C.S. When passed in 1870, the statute
named a ‘carriage’ as exempt property. The statu-
tory language has remained unchanged to this day.
Certainly in 1870 the Legislature did not have auto-
mobiles in mind when it used the word ‘carriage’.
Yet our courts had no difficulty in holding that the
word ‘carriage’ must be interpreted to include
automobiles. Willis v. Schoelman, Tex.Civ.App.,
206 S.W.2d 283. Our views on this subject are
all the more applicable to a statute like the one
now under consideration, which admittedly grants
discretionary powers to the Board.”
It should also be noted that in Section 39, Article 6701h, the Legis-
lature indicated that the Safety Responsibility Act should in no respect
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Hon. Don Hall, page 7 (C-387)
be considered as a repeal of the then existing motor vehicle laws of the
State, but should be construed as supplemental thereto. Also, there is
nothing in either of the acts above discussed, either expressed or im-
plied, which would militate against the result reached by this opinion.
Therefore, in view of the general rule of statutory construction above set
out, and because of the fact that there has been found no authority which
would indicate that the Texas Courts would reach a result other than that
of the general rule, it is the opinion of this office that your question posed
should be answered in the affirmative, and a person whose driver’s
license has been suspended under the provisions of the Safety Responsi-
bility Act, Article 6701h, V.C.S., and who fails or refuses to surrender
such suspended license upon demand to the Department of Public Safety
may be prosecuted for said refusal in accordance with the provisions of
Article 6687b, V.C.S.
SUMMARY
A person whose driver’s license has been sus-
pended under the provisions of the Safety Respon-
sibility Act, Article 6701h, V.C.S. and who fails
or refuses to surrender such suspended license
upon demand to the Department of Public Safety,
may be prosecuted for said refusal in accordance
with the provisions of Article 6687b, V.C.S.
Yours very truly,
WAGGONER CARR
Attorney General
Assistant
SLK:sss
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
W. V. Geppert, Chairman
Roger Tyler
Brady Coleman
Vince Taylor
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Hon. Don Hall, page 8(C -387) ’
APPROVEDFOR THEATTORNEYGENERAL
BY: Stanton Stone
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