Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1962 )


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  • Honorable Jerry Sadler        Opinion No. W-1467
    Commissioner
    General Land Office           Re:   Whether the Commissioner
    Austin, Texas                       of the General Land Office
    should collect certain
    annual rentals on oil and
    gas leases as provided in
    such leases, which provi-
    sions are in conflict with
    Dear Mr. Sadler:                    Article 5344, V.C.S.
    The 1917 predecessor of Article 5344, Vernon's Civil
    Statutes, provided for the paymenitof $2.00 per acre annual
    rental on certain State mineral leases. In 1925, the act was
    amended so as to provide, as interpreted by the Texas Supreme
    Court In State v. J. M. Huber Corporation, 
    145 Tex. 517
    , 
    199 S.W.2d 501
    (1947) that only the down payment of $2.CO an
    acre and one rent:1 payment of $2.00 an acre at the beginning
    of the second year of the lease would be due. Under the said
    decision, no further rental was due for the remaining years
    of the lease.
    You state that a number of leases Issued under Ar-
    ticle 5344, as amended In 1925, are still in effect. The
    leases, however, call for annual rentals as authorized under
    the 1917 law. Thus, the provision In the leases appears to
    be In conflict with the statute, as such statute was inter-
    preted by the Supreme Court In the Huber case.
    You request an answer to the following question:
    "Should I, as Commissioner of the
    General Land Office, require the holder
    of such a lease to pay an annual rental
    of $2.00 per acre in conformance with
    the .termsof the lease on the theory
    that the contract controls in spite of
    the 1925 statute?"
    .   \
    Honorable Jerry Sadler, page 2 (ww-1467)
    The Huber case was a suit by the State to collect
    the claimed an-rentals.      The Court of Civil Appeals In
    its opinion In the case, 193 s.w.2d 882, 883, stated:
    11
    It is conceded by all parties,
    however,'that the language of the statute
    in force at the time, authorizing execu-
    tion of such lease and prescribing Its
    terms, is to be read into and deemed to
    be a part of the lease."
    The State contended that the amended statute provided for
    annual rentals. Roth high courts accepted the admission of
    the parties as stated above and, after interpreting the stat-
    ute as not authorizing annual rentals, ruled against the
    State. Raising the question for the first time in ,the Supreme
    Court, the State sought recovery on the lease contract provi-
    sion for annual rentals, even though same was in conflict with
    the statute. The Supreme Court held that as a reviewing court,
    it "would not be authorized to consider the question," since
    the lower courts had not had an opportunity to consider it.
    In Empire Gas and Fuel Company v. State, 
    121 Tex. 138
    , 
    47 S.W.2d 2bb
    , 266 (1932), the Court said:
    "It is a rule in this State that,
    where contract is made, like the one under
    consideration, with reference to the
    performance of certain acts prescribed by
    statute, the contract and statute will be
    considered together. . . ."
    The rule Is thus stated In Langever v. Miller, 
    124 Tex. 80
    , 
    76 S.W.2d 1025
    , 1026 (1934):
    "The laws, at least as to substantial
    rights and remedies, existing at the time
    a contract is made, become a part of the
    contract."
    To the same effect see Stanolind Oil and Gas Company
    v. Terrell, 
    183 S.W.2d 743
    , 744 (Civ.App. 1944, error ref.);
    Farmer's State Rank v. Brasoria County, 
    275 S.W. 1103
    (Clv.App.
    1925, error ref. in 
    278 S.W. 177
    ).
    .   -
    Honorable Jerry Sadler,~pa&3   (WW-1467)
    Since the statute is deemed a part of the contract
    Itself, the result is that we have conflicting provisions
    within the contract. At least, there is a conflict to the
    extent that, the statute having fixed the rental at a set
    amount, there Is, in our opinion, an implied prohibition
    against charging a greater (or smaller) amount. Otherwise,
    the fixing of the amount by statute would be meaningless.
    We regard as very ersuasive the case of Gulf    C.
    & S.F. Railway Co. v. Hume, 
    87 Tex. 211
    , 27 S.W. Ilo*),
    wherein the court says that It is
    "settled by the authorities that
    an officer cannot contract to receive
    compensation ,for services in addition
    to those prescribed by law. . . . This
    is placed upon the ground that, the
    compensation being prescribed by law,
    It is against public policy that it
    should be the subject of ctntract between
    the officer and litigants.
    In Gorman v. Gause, 
    56 S.W.2d 855
    (Comm.App. 1933),
    It is said to be "uniformly held by the decisions~of our
    courts that a contract cannot impair the validity of any law."
    Citing numerous authorities.
    And see Laird v. Brown, 
    210 S.W.2d 276
    , 279 (Civ.
    App. 1948); King v. Matney, 259 S.W.~2d606, 609 (Clv.App.
    1953, error ref., n.r.e.).               .,,
    We are of the opinion that the annual rentals pro-
    vided for in the leases under consideration over and above
    those authorized by Article 5344 may not be collected. We
    accordingly answer your question In the negative.
    SUMMARY
    Where State oil and gas leases
    issued under Article 5344, V.C.S., pro-
    vide for additional rentals over and
    -   .
    Honorable Jerry Sadler, page 4 (W-1467)
    above those authorized by the statute,
    the Commissioner of the General Land
    Office 1s not authorized to collect
    such additional rentals.
    Yours very truly,
    WILL WILSON
    Attorney General of Texas
    JAS:afg
    APPROVED:
    OPINION 'COMMITTEE
    W. V. Geppert, Chairman
    Ben Harrison
    Morgan Nesbitt
    Pat Bailey
    Cecil Rotsch
    REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: Leonard Passmore
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WW-1467

Judges: Will Wilson

Filed Date: 7/2/1962

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017