Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1962 )

ORNEY GENERAL
OFTEXAS
June 6, 1962
Plr.F. A. Taylor Opinion No. Wi-1346
County Auditor
Brazoria County Re: Payment of claims for
Angleton, Texas equipment, materials and
supplies used in construc-
tion of county roads, and
Dear Mr. Taylor: related questions.
Your request for an opinion asks the following ques-
tions:
"(1) Upon the refusal of the County Road
Administrator to certify that the equipment,
material, and supplies have been received, and
that the charges made for the same are correct,
can I, as County Auditor, pay the bills even If
ordered to do so by the Commissioners' Court?
"(2) What are my duties with reference to
investigation to determine whether or not these
bills are proper and that the County did in fact
receive the material, equipment, and supplies?
"(3) Can the Commissioners' Court of Brazorla
County under the Optional Road Law act as a fact-
finding body and certify the facts to me that the
equipment, material, and services were delivered
and performed and that the charges fop the same are
correct when the County Road Administrator refuses
to make such certification on the grounds that he
has no Information available upon which to base
such certification, and such equipment, materials
and supplies were not ordered, authorized, or
ratified by him?
"(4) After the recent 'Hurricane Carla' the
Federal Qovernment granted Brazorla County a
specific sum of money for the alleviation of hard-
ship, public health, and the restoration of bridges,
roada, and highways. When bills are lncurred'under
this Orant, whose duty Is It to certify to me the
facts necessary to qhow that the particular services
Mr. F. A. Taylor, page 2 (WW-1346)
and materials come under this Grant and Aid
when the County Road Administrator refuses to
do 80 on the ground that he has no knowledge of
the goods having been delivered or the materials
having been furnished OF the labor having been
performed?"
The statutes of this State confer the powers to build
and maintain the county roads upon the commissioners court and
the commissioners court in discharging Its duty must consider
the needs of the county as a whole: Canales v; Laughlin, 14~7
Tex: 169, 214 S.W.2d 451 1948); Stovall Shivers 129
256, 103 S.W.2d 363 (1937 ; Guerra 'v. Rod&uez; 234 S.W.%xb15
(Civ.App. 1951). In Querra v. Rodriguez, supra, it was held:
"Article 2351, ~Vernon's'Ann.Clv.Stats.,
places general control over all county roads
in the CommIaslonersl Court, but various stat-
utes have provided speolal methods by whloh
the court may perform or delegate these func-
tions. Tanales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214
S.W.2d 451, 457. (1) It may let the work on con-
tract to independent contractors.
Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats. (2) It mayA``~oZ3an
overseer for each PO&~ precinct and designate
all hands'liable to work on public roads. Arts.
6718-6736, 6739, 6755. (3) It may employ not more
than four road commissioners. Arts. 6737-6742.
(4) It may appoint a road superintendent for the
county or one for each precinct. Arts. 6743-6761.
(5) Provided the county has forty thousand in-
habitants, the members of the Commissioners'
Court shall be ex-officio road commissioners of
their respective precincts. Art. 6762. (6) It
may employ a County Road Engineer with broad
statutory powers In the event the county by an
election determines to adopt the Optional County
Road Law of 1947. Art. 6716-1,”
In IXlnbar,v.Brazoria County 224 S.W.2d 738 (Civ.App. 1949,
error ref.7. the court. In consider&z the auestion of whether
the county.road engineer of Brazorla i?ounty,-
employed pursuant
to the Optional Road Law adopted by Brazorla County, was a public
officer, stated:
m. F. A. Taylor, page 3 (if-1346)
“After the hearing of the charges against
appellant, the Commissioners Court entered an
order removing him from the office of County
Road Engineer.
“Article 6716-1, Vernon’s Annotated Civil
Statutes, Acts 50th Legislature, 1947, Chapter
178, page 288, authorizes the employment of a
County Road’Englneer to have general supervision
of the roads’of a county, if the provisions of
the statute are adopted by a majority vote of
its qualified voters,
“Sections ‘1 and 2 of the Artltileare not,
we’think, ‘materialto the consideration of the
instant case. Sedtlon 3 of said Article vests
the construction ‘andmaintenande’of county roads
In the co,unty’roaddepartmentand provides that
it shall be composed of the Commissioners Court
*as the policy-determining body* the County Road
Engineer ‘as,,thechief executive officers,’and
other administrative personnel and road employees.
“Section 4 of said Article provides that
the administration of the road department shall be
on the basis of the,county as a~.wholewithout re-
gard to Commissioners’ precincts.
“Section 5 provides that: ‘The County Roads
Engineer shall be appointed by the Commissioners
Court. He shall be a licensed professional engi-
neer, experienced in road construction and main-
tenance, who shall meet the qualifications re-
quired by the State Highway Department for its
county engineers.’
“Section 6 provides for salary of not to ex-
ceed $7200 per year, the exact amount to be deter-
mined by the Commissioners Court, out of the road
and bridge fund of the county.
“Section 7 provides that: ‘The County Road
Engineer shall hold his position for an indefinite
term and may be removed by a majority vote of the
Commissioners Court. Removal shall not become
effective until thirty (30) days after he shall
Mr. F. A. Taylor, page 4 (``-1346)
have been notified'in writing of the Inten-
tion of the'CommIasionera Court to remove him,
and until after a public 'hearing onthe question
of"his~removal shall have been held, if such a
hearing is requested by 017 the Commissioners
Court in writing by the &-ounty Road Engineer.'
"Section 8 provides that In the absence or
inability of the County Road Engineer to per-
form his duties, the Commissioners Court may
designate a qualified administrative officer to
perform these duties during such absence or in-
ability.
11
. . .
'Worn an analysis of said Article 6716-1,
It Is, we think, apparent that the legislature
intended In enacting the Statute to make the
County Road Engineer a member of the.administra-
tlve'personnel of the County Road Department-and
not an officer as contemplated in Article'l6,
Section 30 of the Constitution of this State.
"The~Artlcle provides that the County Road
Engineer shall hold his 'position for an indefl-
nlte term and that he may be removed by a majority
vote of the Commissioners Court."
It Is apparent from Bunbar v. Braxorla County, su ra that
the construction and maintenance of county roads under-P
t e Option-
al Road Law is vested In the commissioners court.
In Attorney General's Opinion O-6506 (1945), It was held:
"Where supplies have been purchased under
contract by the commissioners' court or under
emergency requisitions authorized by the com-
missioners* court, the functions of the county
auditor with respect to such purchased are de-
fined in Articles 1660 and 1661, Vernon's Anno-
tated Civil Statutes. Under the provisions of
said ArtFclea the County Auditor's fun&Ion is
to examine 'all claims, bills and accounts
against the county' (Art. 1660) and 'he shall not
or. F. A. Taylor, page 5 (WW-1346)
audit or approve any such claim unlek&It
has been contra&ad as provided by law, nor
any acdount for the purohase of supplies or
materials for the use of said county or any
of”lts officers, unless, In addition to other
requirements of l&w, there Is attached there-
to a tiequitiltlonsigned by the officer ordering
same and approved by the aounty judge. Said
?iqulsltlon must be made out and signed an&
approved In trlplicati3by“the said officers,
the triplicat6 to remain with the officer
desiring the purchas6;‘the dupliciiteto be’
filed with the county a``ltor,~and~the,or’lglnal
to be”delIVered to tiheparty from whom said’
purohase Is to be made before any purchase shall
be made. t (Art. 1661).
‘With reference to’.
the matte?,of”requisI-
Mona, ‘Article 1661 clearly states that .requisi-
tions are.‘tobb’slgned by the officer making the
purchase’and approved by the county judge. We
find no’authbrity‘for the county auditor to re-
quire,,as a prlreaulsite to approvdl 0r a cl&GM
based on suoh’purchaee,that the requisition shall
be signed br approved b$ him when the purohaee is
made.
II
. . .
‘“Alfhough the county auditor has general
oversight over the flnancea’of the oounty, the
exercise of.&uch bversight with reference to
purchases made and expenses incurred for the use
of the county or by certain offibei-s In the con-
duct of’their offiaes, is defined and oontrolled
by the specific provisiona of the statute8 pertaln-
Ing to such purchases and expenses. In view 0r
the foregoing and In view of the fdcts given, it
Is the opinion of this department that’the county
auditor la not authorized’to require, as a pre-
requisite to his approval of a alaim or Items of
expenee, that 811 requi~itlona for suoh purchaaea
or expenae Items shall be signed or approved by
him at the tine the purchase is made or the expense
incurred.I’
In Attorney General’s Opinion WW-1328 (1962), It was
held:
Mr. F. A. Taylor,page 6 (W-1346)
“Attorney General Opinion V-1111 (October
3, 1950) construed the duties of the county
auditor to examine and approve claIm& in con-
nection with expenses of visiting district
judges. We believe that the facts of the opln-
Idn are sufficiently in point for it to be rele-
vant .
“Article 1660, Vernon’s Civil Statutes, re-
puir&s that’iio-claim,bill or account shall be
allowed or paid by the cowlllssioherscourt until
it has been examined and,approved,by the county
audltdr . Section 10 0r Arti~Ole: 200a provides
that when dlatrfct judgea are assigned to dls-
tricts other than their own, they shall retielve
actual expense for travel and subsistence which
shall be p&Id out of the General Fund’of the
county In which their dutlea are performed, tipon
accounts certified and approved by the presiding
judge of the admlnlatratlve district.
“The opinion held that expense aacounts of
the visiting district judge are subject to audit by
the county audltor~from a ‘bookkeeping etkndpolnt,’
but suah audit la not to Be construed a0 as to
authorize a county auditor to review the legality
i5fitems of expendfture’contained in the expetibe
&count when the same has been certified and ap-
proved by the #reeldIng judge of the admlnietra-
tlve district.
In view of the foregoing authorities, it is our opinion
that the Commissioners Court of Brazoria County la the fact-
finding body to determine whether equipment, material ‘and
services were delivered to the county, and the reasonable
value of such equipment and aervlaee.
It la OUP further opinion that the county auditor is
required to pay bills if Artld.lea1660 and 1661, Vernon’s
Civil Statutes, are complied with.
This opinion is not to be construed as pas(singOIIany
raat question. Such questione must be determined by the Com-
missioners Court of Brazorla County.
Mr. F. A. Taylor, page 7 (WW-1346)
SUMMARY
The Commissioners Court of Brazoria
County is the fact-finding body to
determine whether equipment, material
and services were delivered to the
countyI and the reasonable value of
such equipment and services.
The county auditor is required to pay
bills If Articles 1660,and 1661, Vernon's
Civil Statutes, are complied with.
Yours very truly,
WILL WILSON
Attorney Oeneral of Texas
Assistant
JR:ms
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
W. V. Geppert, Chairman
Henry Braswell
Jerry Roberts
Grundy Williams
J. C. Davis
REVIEWEDFORTRE ATPORWEY(IENERAL
By: Leonard Passmore