Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1961 )


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  •                            EA                     Y   GENERAL
    AUSTIN    1% -I?EXAS
    IWILL      WIILSON
    AlTGRNEYGENERAt
    October 26, 1961
    Honorable Oscar M. Laurel               Opinion NO. ``-1176
    District Attorney
    Dimmit, Webb, Jim Hogg and
    Zapata Counties                       Re:   Whether Section 1 of
    Laredo, Texas                                 Article @4a, C.C.P. is
    mandatory or discretionary
    in its application in view
    of Section la having been
    repealed by Acts of the
    56th Legislature and re-
    Dear Mr. Laurel:                              lated questions.
    You have requested an opinion on the following
    questions:
    "1. Whether Section 1 of Article &g&a,
    C.C.P. is mandatory or discretionary in
    its application in view of Section la
    having been repealed by Acts of the 1959,
    56th Legislature.
    "2 . If the language of Section 1 of the
    Article is mandatory in its application
    so that the Commissioners Court is obli-
    gated to pay the amounts provided therein
    to defense counsel, then from what County
    funds should such payments be made."
    Article &&a   is as follows:
    "Section 1. Whenever the court shall
    appoint one or more counsel(s) to defend
    any person or persons pursuant to law in
    any felony case in this State, each counsel
    may, at the discretion of the trial judge,
    be paid a fee in the sum of Twenty-five
    Dollars ($25) per day for each day such
    appointed attorney is actually in trial
    court representing the person he has been
    appointed to represent. Provided, further,
    that in all cases wherein a bona fide
    appeal is actually prosecuted to a final
    conclusion, each appointed counsel may be
    Hon. Oscar M. Laurel        Page 2      Opinion No. ``-1176
    paid One Hundred Dollars ($100) for said
    appeal. Provided, however, on pleas of
    quilty before the court, said appointed
    counsel may be paid Ten Dollars ($10) per
    case. The fee allowed counsel shall be
    paid by the county wherein such trial is
    held and such sum to be paid from,county
    funds, where such funds are available.
    "Sec. 1A. Repealed. Acts 1959, 56th
    Leg., 2nd C.S., p. 147, ch, 31 52.
    "Sec. 2. No such allowance shall be
    made unless an affidavit is filed with
    the clerk of the court by the defendant
    showing that he is wholly destitute of
    means to provide counsel, and that he has
    not been released on bail bond. As amended
    Acts 1959, 56th Leg. 2nd C.S., p. 147
    ch. 31 81."                                       r
    The original 494s Vernon's Annotated Criminal Code
    was passed in 1951 by the 52nd Legislature. Section la
    therein provided:
    "The Commissioners Court of any county
    in the State may determine within its
    discretion whether or not such county
    shall pay the fees provided herein."
    Acts 52nd Leg., 1951, ch. 19, P. 25.
    In 1959 the Legislature rewrote what was the entire
    Chapter 19 of the 52nd Legislature (Article 494a). The
    changes written into the Act were:
    1.   Raising the fee from $10.00 to $25.00
    per day in Section 1 and raising the fee
    on appeal from $25.00 to $100.00.
    2.    Adding the following sentence in Section 1:
    "Provided, however, on pleas of guilty
    before the court, said ap ointed counsel
    may be paid Ten Dollars (P 10) per case."
    3.   In Section 1 added the phrase:
    "where such funds are available"
    to the last sentence of Section 1 so
    that the sentence reads:
    Hon. Oscar M. Laurel           Page 3     Opinion No. ``-1176
    "The fee allowed counsel shall be paid
    by the County wherein such trial is held
    and such sum to be paid from county funds,
    where such funds are available."
    4.   Section la was expressly repealed by
    Section 2 of the amended chapter as
    differentiated from the amended Section 2
    of Article 494a, thus depriving the Com-
    missioners' Court of their former discretion.
    We conclude that the payment of the fees depends
    upon two factors:
    1.   The discretion of the trial judge as
    set out in Section 1 of @&a and
    2.   The availability of such funds as set
    out in the last sentence of Section 1 as
    amended.
    It would, therefore, appear that where the trial judge
    has ordered such payment and where the county has avail-
    able the money to pay the fee, such payment should be
    made. No other conclusion can be reached because the
    Legislature, by expressly repealing Section la, as set
    out above, has removed the matter from the discretion of
    the Commissioners' Court.
    SUMMARY
    Section 1 of Article &&a makes it manda-
    tory for the county to pay the fees therein
    provided when such fees are ordered by the
    trial judge and such funds are available to
    the county.
    Yours very truly,
    !jiEzLi;~
    NVS:sh
    Assistant Attorn y General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    W. V. Geppert, Chairman
    Vernon Teofan
    Gordan Cass
    W. Ray Scruggs                REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Ben Harrison                  BY: Houghton Brownlee, Jr.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WW-1176

Judges: Will Wilson

Filed Date: 7/2/1961

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017