Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1961 )


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  • Honorable Joe Resweber       Opinion No. WW-1074
    County Attorney
    Harris County                Re: Validity of lease contract
    Houston, Texas                   entered into by and between
    the County of Harris and Houston
    Dear Mr. ~Resweber:              Sports Association, Inc.
    Your request for ,an opinion on the above subject matter
    asks the following questions:
    "1. Does Harris County and Harris County
    Board of Park Commissioners have the authority
    to enter into thenattached Cbntract with the
    Houston Sports-Atisoclatlon,Inc. to operate the
    Harris County Sports Stadlti?.
    "2. Does the attached Contract violate Art. 3; "'
    Sec. 52, and Art. 11, Sec. 3, of the Texas Con-'
    stltution?'    ~
    Cm the 29th day of May, 1961, the contract in qvestlon
    _
    was executed by the County Judge of Harrls County, acting
    pursuant to an order of the Commlssloners' Court of Harris
    County, the Board of Park Commissioners; created pursuant to
    the provisions of Article 6C79e, Vernon's Civil Statutes,
    and the Houston Sports Association, Inc.
    The contract furnished with your request consists of 56
    pages with numerous prdvlslons concerning various obligations
    of the parties and therefore, for the purposes of this opinion,
    we will summarize the pertinent provisions which relate to your
    question.
    As stated In the lease agreement, this contract was enter-
    ed into for the reason that the "County, pursuant to the man-
    date of the voters of Harris County, Texas, at a special
    election held on January 31, 1961, 1s desirous of constructing,
    owning and having operated, a stadium of the nature hereln-
    after ldentlfled,upon the Leased Premises, for the use, welfare,
    enjoyment, entertainment and convenience of the citizens of
    the county."
    Hon. Joe Resweber, page 2 (WW 1074)
    Under the January lg6l election, the County was authorized
    and empowered to Issue and sell general obligation bonds as
    follows: (1) County Park Bonds In the amount of $3,000,000
    to be used primarily In the acquisition of the land described
    as the Leased Premises, and (2) County Park Bonds In the ambmt
    of $15,000,000 to be used In the construction and completion
    of the stadium, Including the building, dome and alr:cotid:ltlon-
    lng. The County, under this agreement, leases to the Houston
    Sports Association the property described therein for.conslder-
    atlon of sufficient rentper year as will equal the amount
    which will be required by the County of Harris to make pay-
    ments under the amortization schedule on the $15,000,000
    bonds aforesaid and the Houston Sports Association acquires
    "the exclusive right to possess, use, occupy and control the
    Leased Premises" during the term of the lease.
    The commissioners' court Is a court of limited jurlsdlct-
    ion and has only such powers as are conferred upon it by the
    Constitution or statutes offthis State, either by express terms
    or by necessary implication." Childress County,.viState, 127
    343, 
    92 S.W. 26
    1011 (1936); Hill     Sterrett 
    252 S.W.2d 766
    (Clv. App. 1952, error ref., n.r.eY'. on   Rosinberg
    j R.  er v     v. Lovett,
    
    173 S.W. 508
    (Clv.App.      error rei.)     p      . Hall, 2tm
    S.W. 289 (Clv. App.
    Sections 1 and 4 of Article 6081e, Vernon's Civil Statutes.
    provided as follows:
    "Sec. 1. That any county.or any Incorporated
    city of this State, either Independently or incoopera-
    tlon wlth.each other, or with the Texas estate Parks
    Board, may acquire byegift or purchase or by,&nde&ation
    proceedings, lands to be used for.pub1l.cparks and
    playgrounds, such lands to be situated In any locality
    In this State and In any slzed,ttiactsdeemed suitable
    by the governing body of the city or county acquiring
    same; provided, however, that la?ds to be acquired by any
    such city or county for said purposes may be, In the
    discretion of the governing body thereof, situated
    within the State, either within or without the boundary
    1Mts of said county and within the llmlts of said county
    wherein said city lies or Is situated."
    "Sec. 4. The management in charge of any park
    created by authority of this Act shall have the right
    to sell and lease concessions for the establishment
    and operation of such amusements, stores, filling
    stations and all such other concerrs are are consls-
    tent with the operation of a public park, the proceeds
    Hon. Joe Resweber, page 3 (WW 107&j
    of such sales and rentals to be used for,the lmprove-
    ment and operation of the park,."
    Relating to county park properties and facilities,
    Sections 9 and 10 of Article 6079e, V.C.S., authorize the
    Park .Board,with the approval of the Commissioners' Cotit,
    to enter.lnto any.contract, lease or other agreement connect-
    ed with or Incidental to or In any manner affecting the acqulsl-
    tlon financing, construction, equipment, maintenance or opera-,
    tlon of~any facility or facilities located on or to be located
    on or pertaining to any park or parks admlnlstered,by the Board
    and any such contract, lease or other agreement may be for
    such length or.perlod of time and upon such terms and conditions
    as may be prescribed therein. Section 12 of Article 607ge
    recognizes as a park purpose the construction of "stadla,
    coliseums, audltorlums, athletic fiel@,pavlllons and bulld-
    lngs and grounds for assembly, togetherwith p&king faclllt+es
    or other improvements Incidental thereto."
    The park.under ooniideratlon, ,includlng,thest&d+um, Is
    specifically to,be used for,'sportlng events, rodeos,        '.,.
    festivals, fairs, reor,eationalactivities of all klnds,.coh-
    certs, conventions and civic events of all kinds" 'in tiddl-  ..
    tlon to the playing and conducting of professional baseball.
    and football games.
    In City of Fort Worth v. Barlow,.313 S.W. 2d 966 (Clv.
    App. 1958, error ref., n.r.e.) the,court stated:
    'In the light of the law, as followed
    In the above cited cases, the city bad the
    legal right to enter Into the lease contract
    with Reach Company. The lease obligated the
    Beach Company to do, in the public Interest,
    what the city could have done through its own
    servants. The lease was not Illegal. . . .ll
    In City of Fort Worth v. 
    Barlow, supra
    , the lease agreement
    referred t b the above quote conaerned leasing by the city
    of a sw&'beach,      whereby the Beach Company was obligated
    to make the area an outstanding swlrmnlngcenter.
    Under the authority of City of Fort Worth v. Barlow,
    assuming that the County of fEarrlshas the authority to con-
    struct the stadium In question, It Is our opinion that the
    lease agreement executed May 29th, 1961, obligates the Houston
    Hon. Joe Resweber, page 4 (WW 1074)
    Sports Association to do in the public interest what the County
    could have done through Its own servant8 and, In the event
    that the County Is authorized to construct the stadium In ques-
    tion for the purposes stated above, the lease Is legal. There-
    fore the question resented Is whether, pursuant to the provls-
    Ions of Articles t&e,,.and 6079e, V.C.S., the County has the
    authority to-construct a stadium on a park owned by the County
    to be used In the conduct of professional baseball and football
    games, sporting events, rodeos, festivals, fairs, recreational
    activities of all kinds, concerts, conventions and civic
    events of all kinds.
    In discussing public parks, the court stated In King v.
    Sheppard, 
    157 S.W. 26
    682 (Clv.App. 1941, error ref., w.o.m.);
    "In almost every jurisdiction, both state
    and federal, the courts of this country have held'
    that the Legislature or the Cdngrkss may make ap-
    propriations to purchase land and maintain publlc~
    parks without any specific designation of such
    power In theltirespective constitutions. These
    decisions, although recognlzlngthat in the ,memory
    of m8n now living the proposition of taking land,
    for a compensation for public parks may have been
    regarded as a novel exercise of legislative power
    and although many things which In the Immediate
    past uere regarded as luxuries, or altogether unknown;
    l!=Y have become necessities, hold that the
    establishment   of public parks affect the health,
    comfort, pleasure, taste, education, and the mental
    and physical health of the people, and are.thus
    cond=lve to the public welfare of the people. . . .
    .. . .
    I w . . as used In modern and presenttimes
    ln APerica the term 'park' usually signifies an
    open or lnclosed tract of land set apart for the
    recreutlon, and enjoyment of the public; or, 'In
    the -era1 acceptance of the term, a public park
    Is s8ld to be a tract of land, great or small,
    dediuted and maintained for the purposes of
    pleamre, exercise, amusement, or ornament; a
    place to which the public at large-may resort
    to fearrecreation, air, and light.'. . ."
    and held that the Legislature was authorized to make an appro-
    priation M the purchase of the land now constituting the
    Big Bend I&tlonal Park and to transfer It to the United
    States government.
    Hon. Joe Resweber, page 5 (WW-1074)
    Wketilse, In Conley v. Daughters of the Republic, 
    106 Tex. 80
    , 
    156 S.W. 197
    (1913), the court held that the State had the
    authority tomacquire title to the Alamo property and to place
    that property In the'custody of the Daughters of the Republic,
    a private corporation.
    In Clty~of Dallas v. George,      Tex.         169, S.W.
    2d 473, ny               whe    thxldlty     of a &tract    be-
    tween the City of Dallas, State Fair of Texas and R.B. George,
    whereby George agreed to advance a sum of money for the use
    of the State Fair of Texas In building a racetrack on property
    belonging to the City of Dallas which the State Fair of Texas
    was entitled to us@ exclusively.
    For additional Texas cases on this question see City of
    Port Arthur v. Young, 
    337 S.W.2d 385
    (Clv: App. 1931, error
    Is v. City of Fort Worth, Tex.-,      
    89 S.W. 2d
    ~
    .
    Aqaamsl Land Co. v. City of Cape Glrardeau, 
    142 S.W.2d 332
    (Sup.Ct. of Missouri No. 2, 1940) involved an attack on
    the expenditure-of bond proceeds for a "public park", the erec-
    tion of "community building and stadium with Indoor court fcr
    games and community activities and for landscaping and grading
    the grounds, building a race track, athletic field, drives,
    entrances, etc." The court In that case held that such con-
    struction was a~proper park usage, stating:
    "There Is no doubt In our minds about the
    fact that the contemplated athletic facilities come
    within proper park usage. It was ruled In Miller'
    v. City of Columbia, 
    138 S.C. 343
    , 351, 
    126 S.E. 484
    , that an athletic stadium could not be built
    In a certain public park In that city, but that
    was because such use would violate restrictive
    covenants contained In the private grant by which
    the park was dedicated. In the Instant case the
    large arena building, with a floor area of 86 feet
    by 126 feet, and a stage 20 feet by 60 feet, Is
    adapted %o public speaking of an educational rellg-
    lous or political nature, theatrical and musical
    entertainments, dances and Indoor athletics. Another
    hall ln the building will accomodate smaller gatherings,
    banquets and exhibits of various kinds. We see no
    objection to that. . . ."
    For additional authorities see annotations 
    144 A.L.R. 487-513
    .
    Honorable Joe Re$weber, page 6 (WW-1074)
    In view of the foregoing authorities, it Is our opinion
    that the consttictlon of the stadium In question Is a proper
    park usage and Is within the authority of the Commissioners'
    Court of Harris County, pursuant to the provisions .of Artlcl~es
    6081e and 607ge, Vernon's Civil Statutes.
    Section 52 of Article III of the Constitution of Texas
    provides:
    "The Legislature shall have no powerto
    authorize any county, city, town or other
    poll$lcal corporation or subdivision of the
    State to lend Its credit or to grant public
    money or thing of value in aid of, or to any
    Individual, association or corporation what:
    soevfsr,or to become a stockholder In such   ._
    corporation, as~oclatlon or company; . .~.I!.
    Section 2 of A&lcle XI of the Constitution ~of Texas
    pro&des:
    'INo county, city or other..plutilclpal
    corporation shall hereafter become a subscriber
    to the capital of any private corporation or
    aeeoclatlon,.or make any appropriation or
    donation $0 the same, eon In anywise loan Its
    ~,cmdlt; but thls~shall pot be construed to in
    any way affect any obligation heretofore under-
    taken pursuant to law."
    As noted above, the lease contract uad&conslderatlon
    calls for a consideration of approximately $15,000,000 and
    the'Houston Sports Assoclaton is obligated to do $n the
    public lntereat,what the County could have done through Its
    own servants. Therefore, the lease contract Is not In.
    violation of.,Sectlon52.0f Article III .of the Constitution
    of Texas. City of Fort Worth v. Barlo&   sunra.
    In mv.                         T8X.      338 s.w.za
    133 (1960), the City of Beaumont aTthe   Stx'of   Texas agreed
    to finance the removal of a span of railroad from Its location
    In the city to another. The City was to pay all expenses of
    the project In excess of $550,000 and the State was to have
    the work done and was to contribute $550,000 toward the.expense.
    Certain taxpayers sought to lnvalldate~the contract. The
    court held, In construing the provlslosn of Section 3 of
    ,,!
    Honorable Joe Resweber, page 7 (WW-1074).
    Article XI or the Constitution of Texas:
    "
    . . .'Under the Contititutionof 1869
    and a statute enacted by the Legislature
    In 1871, the counties and munlclpalltles
    of Texas were'-authorizedto aid such construc-
    tion by taking stock In and making loans
    or donations to railroad companies. The
    primary purpose of Article XI, Section 3, Is
    to deprive these political subdivisions of
    that power. It does not prohibit all business
    dealings with private corporations and asso-
    ciations, but mlnlclpal funds or credit may
    not be used simply to obtain for the community
    and Its citizens the general benefits resulting
    from the operation of such an enterprise. On
    the other hand an expenditure for the credit
    accomplishment of a legitimate public and
    municipal purpose Is not rendered unlawful by
    the fact that a prlvaiely owned business may
    be benefited thereby.
    The contract In question does not seek to have'th.e'.
    County become a subscriber  to the capital stock of any.prl-
    vate corporation 43or'to make any appropriation br donat+
    to any private corporation nor otherwise loan Its credit.
    On the contrary, the:County of Harris Is receiving a valuable
    consideration from the Houston.Sp6rts Association and.the
    Houston Sports Association Is obligated to carry out the
    public purpose:.here&oforestated. It Is, therefore, our
    opinion that the contract In question does not violate the
    provisions of Section 3 of Articl8 XI of the Constitution
    Of 'FeXaS.
    The lease contract executed by the County of
    Harris and the Houston Sports Association, Inc.,
    Wh8r8bJrthe County Of HarPi leases t0 Houston
    SpOtiS A88OCiatiOn a StadiUUl located On COUnty
    owned property for the purpose of conducting
    therein sporting events, rodeos, festivals,
    fairs, recreational activities of all kinds,
    Honorable Joe Resweber, page 8 (WW-1074).
    concerts, conventionsand civic events of
    all kinds, in addition to the playing and
    conducting of professional .baseballand
    football games, Is valid.
    Yours very truly,
    WILL WILSON
    Attorney General of Texas
    Assistant
    JR:ms:mfh
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    BY W. V. Geppert, Chairman
    Milton Richardson
    Houghton Brownlee, Jr.
    Sam Wilson
    Llnward Shivers
    REVIEWDFORTHEiATTORNEYGENERAL
    BY: Morgan Neesbltt.