Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1959 )


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  • Honorable Joe Resweber     Opinion No. w-.691
    County Attorney
    Harris County Courthouse   Re:   Severabilityof improve-
    Houston 2, Texas                 ments from land and classifi-
    cation thereof as realty
    or personalty for tax pur-
    Dear Mr. Resweber:               poses.
    We quote from your opinion request as follows:
    "'OnMarch lst, 1957 this office, at the :
    request of Mr. Carl S. Smith, Tax Assessor
    and Collector of Harris County, rendered an
    opinion regarding the severabilityof improve-
    ments erected by a lessee on land owned by
    another party, but under lease to said lessee,
    and the classificationof such improvementsas
    realty or personalty.
    "It is the feeling of this writer that the
    provisions of Article 7146, V.C.S., are very clear   c
    and definite as to what Is real property for the
    purpose of taxation. It is our further feeling
    that the effects of this Statute cannot be varied
    by contracts or.agreementsto the contrary be-
    tween private parties.
    "On March 34d, 1943 your Office rendered Its
    Opinion No. O-5059 regarding a similar situation
    where improvementshad been erected by the vendee
    under a contract for deed. In this opinion views
    similar to ours were expressed. However, with the
    great number of leases currently in existence in
    Harris County providing that the improvements
    shall remain the property of the Lessee and that
    the Lessee shall have the right to remove such at
    the terminationof the lease, (with taxes becoming
    delinquent on many of such improvements),Mr. Smith
    feels that anopinion should be requested from your
    Office."
    Article 7146, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes,
    provides that:
    Honorable Joe Resweber,page 2          Opinion NO. WW-691
    "Real property for the purpose of taxation,
    shall be construed to include the land Itself,
    whether laid out in town lots or otherwise, and
    all buildings, structures and improvements,or
    other fixtures of whatsoever kind thereon, and
    all the rights and privileges belonging or in
    anywise appertainingthereto, and all mines,
    minerals, quarries and fossils in and under the
    same. Id."
    The early case of W. J. Hutchins v. Masterson and
    Street, 
    46 Tex. 551
    , 26 Am. Rep. 28b (l&%77),established t ee
    criteria for determiningwhether improvements should be classed
    as real orpersonal property: (1) there must be a real or
    constructiveannexationof the article in question to the
    realty; (2) the article mustbe adapted to the uses or pur-
    poses of the realty to which it is connected; (3) the party
    'makingthe annexationmust intend that the improvementbe-
    come a permanent accession to the freehold. Of the three
    tests, pre-eminence is given the question of intention.
    See Maro Company v. State, 
    168 S.W.2d 510
    (Tex.Civ.App.,1943,
    error refused). However, the rules of common law which govern
    'the right of private persons to fixtures are not necessarily
    controllingIn the field of taxation. This question turns
    primarily upon the intention;of the Legislature as expressed '-.
    in the tax statutes and construed by the courts. 1% A.L.R.
    1309, 1311.
    The A.L.R. Annotation cited above discusses the
    varying treatment of this problem,by different jurisdictions.
    Certain jurisdictionshold that the improvements are part of
    the realty and as such are taxable to the lessor. Other jur-
    isdictionshold that the improvementsmay be severed for the
    purpose of taxation but are taxable to the lessee as realty.
    A third school of though taxes the improvements to the
    lessee as personalty. Texas falls,within the third group.
    The case of Maro Company v. 
    State, supra
    , held tha
    casings, rods, tubing, pumps and tanks which the lessee was
    entitled to remove from-the leasehold were personal property
    for the purpose of taxation. In reaching its conclusion,
    the court stated:,
    "Appellee tries to make a distinction between
    -the rule making accessories orappliances such
    as these a part of the realty for taxable pur-
    poses and any other rules governing the question
    of.whether such appliances or accessories are
    personal property or a part of the realty. After
    ,
    :m5
    Honorable Joe Resweber, page 3         Opinion No. W-691
    making an exhaustive research we have failed to
    find any distinction or any difference in the
    rules applicable in such cases."
    To the same effect is Shugart v. Nocona Independent
    School District, 
    288 S.W.2d 243
    (Tex.Clv.App.,1956).
    The case of Armstrong v. Mission Independent School
    District, 
    195 S.W. 895
    (Tex.Civ.App.1917) specifically
    stated that certain buildings constituting a cotton mill
    located on the property of a lessor were
    and not real estate because "it
    improvements placed upon the lan of a railroad company
    by a lessee with an agreement that it was for the use of
    the lessee and with the further agreement that it could be
    removed." This case was reversed in Mission v. Armstrong
    
    222 S.W. 201
    (Tex.Com.App.1920, opinion approved), but o;ly
    upon the point of whether or not the school district had a
    lien for taxes upon the personal property in question.~
    For further support of the proposition that Texas
    regards the general principles of the law of fixtures as
    controlling the determinationof whether property is real
    or personal for the purposes of taxation, see the case of
    900 Main, Inc. v. City of Houston, 
    150 S.W.2d 468
    (Tex.Civ.
    App. 1941, Dism.Judg.Cor.),in Which it was held that an
    air conditioning system was realty for the purpose of taxa-
    tion; the court rested its decision on the general law of
    fixtures and in particular upon the intention of the parties
    as evidenced by the contract between the lessor and lessee.
    In view of the foregoing authorities, you are
    respectfully advised that improvementsplaced upon demised
    premises by the lessee which remain the property of the
    lessee and which may be removed at the termination of the
    lease are personal property for the purpose of taxation.
    SUMMARY
    Improvementsplaced upon leased land
    by a lessee which remain the property of the
    lessee and which may be removed at the termina-
    tion of the lease are severable for the purpose
    ,‘?f?.3c-
    ,J:P.-LFP
    Honorable Joe Resweber, page 4             Opinion No. w-691
    of taxation and are classified as personalty.
    Yours very truly,
    WILL WILSON
    Attorney General
    JNP:cm
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE:
    Geo. P. Blackburn, Chairman
    C. K. Richards
    J. Arthur Sandlin
    Howard Mays
    ... .._
    REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    By: W. V. GEPPERT
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WW-691

Judges: Will Wilson

Filed Date: 7/2/1959

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017