Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1952 )


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  •                     December 19, 1952'
    Hon. A. K. Stewart      Ctpi+on No..V-1556
    County Attorney
    Montgomery County      Re: Validity of a construction
    Conroe, Texas              contract let by the Commls-
    sloners' Court In an amount
    in excess of the unobligated
    balance In the permanent
    lmprovement.,fund~pluf~the
    amount of a bond issue voted
    for this .constructlonpro-
    Dear Sir:                  ject.
    Your request reads a8 follows:
    'On October 13, 1952, the Commlsslon-
    era' Cotit of 74ontgomeryCounty, Texas,
    entered into a construction contract for
    an addition td.the county hospltal,ln the
    amount of $581,491.00. eon this date the
    county had.on hand Unencumbered funds
    avalla@le In the amount of $570,820.65.
    However, based on experience for many pre-
    vious years, the Cbmml~slonersl Court
    reasonably anticipated that it would col-
    lect $10,670.35 ln delinquent taxes and
    other.unencumbred and unappropriated
    revenuea, exclusive of the 1952 tax levy.
    "Questloti,:
    Ii the contract valid?"
    you are more specifically concerned with whether
    the contract constitutes a debt in violation of Section
    7 of Article XI of the Constitution of Texas since all
    statutory provieions concerning the awarding of the con-
    tract and the expenditure of money have been complied
    with.
    In answering your question we shall assume that
    the anticipated delinquent tax collections and other un-
    encumbered and unappropriated revenues~referred to In
    your request Include only revenue8 which are properly
    payable to the county's Permanent Improvement Fund.
    Hon. A. K. Stewart, page 2 (V-1556)
    Article KI, Section 7 of the Constitution of
    Texas provides In part:
    "But no debt for any purpose shall
    ever be Incurred in any manner by any city
    or county unless~provlslon Is made, at the
    time of creating the same, for levying and
    collecting a sufficient tax to pay the
    Interest thereon and provide .at least two
    per cent (29) as a sinkingfund; and the
    condemnatlon~of the right of way for the
    erection of such works shall be fully pro-
    vided for."
    The term "debt" as used in the above quoted
    constitutional provlslon:has been uniformly held by the
    courts of this State to mean "any pecuniary obligation
    Imposed by contract, ,exceptsuch as were, at the date of
    the contraot, within the lawful and reasonable contem-
    plation of the parties, to-be satisfied o,utof the cur-
    rent revenues forthe. year; or out of some fund then
    within the immediate control of the corporation."
    Tex. 420, 151 S.W.   523,'m).   y,
    An excellent discussion of Section 7 of Article
    XI IS found in MoNeill v.~City of Waco, ,
    89 Tex. 83
    , 33
    s.W. 322 (1895),:wherein the 'SupremeCourt atated:
    'Since the inhibition against the
    'creation' or 'incurring' of a 'debt,'
    without the fprovlslon,' la universal, it
    is of vital imnortance'to determine the
    meaning of the w&d 'debt' as used In the
    constltutlon: The word has no fixed, legal
    algnlflcatlon, as has the word 'contract,'
    but Is used in different statutes and con-
    stltutlons in senses varying fr.oma very
    restricted to a very general one. Its
    meaning, therefore;ln any particular stat-
    ute or constitution, Is to be determined by
    construction, and decisions upon one stat-,
    ute or ~constltutlon often tend to~confuse
    rather than ald~In ascertaining its slgnlfi-
    cation in another relating to,an entirely
    Hon. A. K. Stewart, page 3 (V-1556)    ``'.
    different subject., These constlt,utlonal
    provlslons were~lntended as.restraints upon
    the power of municipal corp&atlona,to'conr
    tract that class of pcicunlary~Llabllltles
    not to be satisfied out of the current
    revenues or other funds within their control
    lawfully applicable thereto, and which would
    therefore, titthe date of the contract, be
    an unprovided-for llablllty, and properly
    included within the general meaning of the
    word 'debt.' They have no application, how-
    ever, to that class of pecuniary obligations
    In good faith Intended to be, and lawfully,
    payable out of either the current revenues
    for the year of the contract or any other
    fund within the Immediate control of the
    corporation. Such obligations being pro-
    vided for at the time of their creation, so
    that in the.due course of the transactions
    they.are to be satisfied by the provisions
    made, it would be an m-easonable construc-
    tion of the ctinstltutionto:hold them debts,
    within Its meaiiing,,soas to require the
    levy of a wholly unnecessary tax upon the
    citizen. Thu``,'awarrant drawn against the
    current revenues of the year for one of the
    ordinary expenses~of the ~corporatlon for such
    year, when all .the claims for ordinary .ex-
    penses foti~thatyear do not exceed such rev-
    enues, or a contract entered Into for the
    making of any public improvement authorized
    by law, e:g. the building of a courthouse or
    jail, and obligating the corporation to pay
    therefor, there being funds within its lm-
    mediate control lawfully applicable thereto
    sufficient; and in good faith contemplated
    by the contracting parties to be used in pay-
    ment thereof when due, are not debts, within
    the meaning of such constitutional provl-
    slons requiring the making of provision for
    the Interest and sinking fund. The payment
    of such claims being lawfully provided for,
    In such way-that their satisfaction In the
    due course of business is reasonably certain,
    they are, In legal contemplation, so far
    satisfied as to be considered as not contem-
    plated by the constitutional provisions,
    though It may result, from some cause not
    .   ,   .
    2
    Hon. A. K. Stewart, page 4 (V-1556)
    provided against by the law, such as failure
    to collect the taxes, robbery, embezzlement,
    or wrongful diversion of the funds, that
    they are not'pald from the contemplated
    sources.*
    Under the facts presented, the obllgatdon
    created by the contzact 1s to be satisfied out of the
    reasonably anticipated ourrent revenues available for
    the year 1952 and no art of the 1952 tax levy (available
    for 3953 expendituresP Is to be used to satisfy the
    obligation. It Is therefore our opinion that the con-
    tract does not create a debt In violation of Section 7
    of Article XI of the Constitution of Texas.
    S.l.mMARY
    An obligation created by a contract
    to be satisfied out of r,easonablyanticipated
    dtireiitrevenue& does not constitute a debt
    -the       meanlng of Section 7 of Article
    of Texas. Stevenson
    XI of the C6ns~tltiatlon
    Yours very truly,
    APPROVED:                           PRICE DANIEL
    Attorney Qeneral
    J. C. Davis. Jr.
    County Affairs Division
    Mary K. wall                      BY
    Reviewing Asaiatnat                    Bruce Allen
    Assistant
    Charles D. Mathews
    First Assistant
    BA:am
    

Document Info

Docket Number: V-1556

Judges: Price Daniel

Filed Date: 7/2/1952

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017