Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1952 )


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  •                      December      11, 1952
    Hon. Jack Ross               Opinion No. V-1552
    Secretary of State
    State of Texas               Re:    The proper section of Arti-
    Austin, Texas        ’              cle 7084, V.C.S., under which
    motor bus and motor freight
    truck corporations should file
    Dear Mr. Ross:                      their franchise tax returns.
    You request the opinion of this office upon the question
    presented in your letter which reads as follows:
    “We have a number ‘of motor bus and motor
    freight truck corporations, ordinarily designated
    as ‘common carriers.’ which are operating under
    certificates of public convenience and necessity
    issued by the Railroad Commission of Texas. These
    corporations are required to file a franchise tax re-
    turn as provided in Article 7089, R.C.S., and pay a
    franchise tax in accordance with one of the provisions
    of Article 7084. R.C.S. ~The question arises as to
    which classification is proper, 7084 (1) or 7084 (3),
    in computing the franchise tax due by these corpora-
    tions.
    “In accordance with Article 7084 (1) and (3).
    R.C..S., as interpreted by your office in Opinion No.
    O-1331, we have allowed ‘common carriers’ which
    are maintaining ‘fixed lines and schedules’ to file
    their franchise tax returns as a public utility under
    Article 7084 (3), R.C.S., thereby avoiding the payment
    of any tax upon their long term indebtedness as de-
    fined in that article. Other ‘common carriers’ which
    do not maintafn ‘fixed lines and schedules’ have been
    required to file their franchise tax return under the
    provisions of Article 7084 (1). R.C.S., thereby paying
    franchise taxes upon their long term indebtedness.
    UArticle 7084 (d) which at the time of the above
    opinion of your office ‘reads in part as follows: * . . .
    All public utility corporations, which shall include
    every such corporation engaged solely in the business
    of a public utility whose rates or service is regulated,
    or subject to regulation m whole or in part, by law
    .   .
    Hon. Jack Ross, page 2 (V-1552)
    shall pay a franchise tax as provided in this Act,
    . . : was changed in 1949 to Article 7084 (3). It
    noiv reads as follows:      ‘All public utility corpora-
    tions; which shall include every such corporation
    engaged solely in the business of a public utility as
    defined by the laws of Texas whose rates or services
    are regulated, or subject to regulation in whole or in
    part, by law. shall pay a franchise tax as provided in
    this Article. . . .I Opinion O-133 1 ulaced authoritv
    on the words “whose rates or service is resulated. or
    subject to regiBrt                              allowing com-
    mon carriers      to file their franchise
    -   ;tax returns as a
    uublic utilitv. The 1949 Amendment changed these words
    Eo ‘a public: utility as defined by the laws of Texas whose
    rates or services are regulated. . . .
    ‘This office respectfully requests that you give
    your opinion in view of the above and in the light of
    -Chapter 10, V..C.S., titled ‘Public Utilities’, Articles
    1416 to 1446, inclusive, defining public utilities and the
    opinion of Judge Blair in Gulf States Utility Company vs.
    State, 
    46 S.W.2d 1018
    , cited i         0 ini    o-133 1  d
    JiElJEg that the Legislature rX?YefiZe       v%t corporz
    tions are public utilities, as to whether these ‘common
    carriers’ should file their franchise tax returns under
    Article 7084 (1) or as a public utility under Article
    7084 (3), regardless of maintaining a ‘fixed line and
    schedule’.‘
    The basic franchise tax-levying provisions are contained
    in Article 7084, V.C.S. It is observed that this statute levies the
    tax generally against every domestic and foreign corporation with
    exceptions in this language: “( 1) Except as herein provided, every
    domestic and foreign corporation heretofore or hereafter chartered
    or authorized to do business in Texas, or doing business in Texas,
    shall, on or before May first of each year, pay in advance to the
    Secretary of State a franchise tax for the year following, based up-
    on . . .* : Then follows the formula for the measurement of the tax.
    Following this general statement of the measurement of
    the tax there are provided certain exceptions and modifications of
    the tax rate for certain types of corporations.   For example, Clause
    (2) provides for a tax equal to one-fifth of the general levy on cor-
    porations required by law to pay an intangible assets tax except
    cor~porations enjoying the use of the public highways by virtue of a
    certificate of public convenience and necessity granted by the Rail-
    road Commission of Texas and Clause (3) provides a special meas.-
    urement for the computation of the tax upon public utility corpora-
    tions which is in this language: “Rxcept as provided in preceding
    I:,
    I
    Hon. Jack Ross, page 3 (V-1552)
    Clause (2), all public utility corporations, which shall incIude
    I     every such corporation engaged solely in the business of a pub-
    lic utility as defined by the laws of Texas whose rates or serv-
    !     ices are regulated,, orsup~etf    to a regulation in whole or in part,
    /
    /     by law, shall pay a franchise tax as provided in this Article, ex-
    I     cept the same shall be based on that proportion of the issued and
    !     outstanding capital stock, sur.plus. and undivided profits, which
    the gross receipts of the business of said corporation done in
    !     this State bear to its total gross receipts instead of the groJs
    I     assets; and in lieu of the rate hereinbefore prescribed s&d tax
    shall be computed on the basis of One Dollar and Twenty-five
    Cents ($1.25) per One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) or fractional
    /     part thereof.”
    j                You present the question of whether or not motor bus
    and motor freight truck corporations which are required by law
    to secure from the Railroad Commission a certificate of con-
    venience and necessity and are designated as “co-on       carriers”
    are required to pay a franchise tax as provided for the general
    ,     levy in Clause (1) of Article 7084, V.C.S., or Clause (3) of said
    article applicable to public utility corporations.
    I
    !                  To answer this question we must first determine
    whether ‘motor carriers commonly designated as common car-
    !
    riers are public utility corporations as provided in the .t+xing
    statute. It is significant to note that prior to 1949,,Clause (a)
    !     of Article 7084, V.C;S., which is now Clause (3) of said article,
    provided as follows:    y . . . all public utility corporations, which
    shall include every such corporation engaged solely in the busi-
    hess of a public utility whose rates or services are regulated,
    or subject to regulation in whole or in part, by law, shall pay a
    /
    franchise tax as provided in this Article . . .” The comparable
    provision in the present act is Clause (3). changed in 1949 by
    j     an amendment to Article 7084, V.C.S., which now reads as fol-
    i
    lows: ” . . . all public utility corporationg, which shall include
    1     every such corporation engaged solely in the business of a pub-
    ,     lic utility as defined,by the laws of Texas whose rates or seF-
    t     Ices are regulated, or subJect to a regulation in whole or in
    part, by law. shall pay a franchise tax as provided in this Arti-
    cle . . .*
    There is a marked distinction between the language of
    the act prior to the 1949 amendment and that inserted by the Leg-
    islature in the 1949 amendment and we must assume that.the Leg-
    islature had a very definite purpose in making this change. We
    think this purpose is obvious. The .Legislature sought to make
    certain that only those corporations which were by law defined.by
    the Legislature to be public utility corporations ne      entitled
    to have their franchise tax measured under the terms of Clause
    .
    Hon. Jack Ross, page 4 (V-1552)
    (3) of the act instead of Clause (1). The term “by the laws of
    Texas” means .by statutory definition or classification.     .This
    is the holding of the court in the case of Gulf States Utilities   -
    Companyv. State, 
    46 S.W.2d 1018
    (Tex.div.App.         1Y32, error
    ref.). In this case, ,the question was whether or not the manu-
    facture of ice’ constituted a public utility entitled to pay fran-
    chise taxes as such. The court, after discussing the general
    aspects of a public utility under general law. held in effect that
    it was a matter for legislative determination and in the absence
    of a statute designating or classifying a corporation as a public
    utility, it could reap no benefit under the section of the statute
    applicable to public utilities. This is manifest by the following
    quotation from the case:
    ‘Passing to a consideration of subdivision (d),! 
    -,, supra
    , of the Franchise Tax Act of 1930, we find
    that it neither expressly nor impliedly includes or
    ,classifies for taxfng purposes private corporations
    engaged in the manufacture and sale of ic,e to the
    public in Texas a&public utility corporations.’
    Under the language of subdivision (d) only ‘public
    .utility corporations, which sbaI1. include ‘every such
    corporation engag,ed solely in the business of a pub-
    lic utility whose rates or service is regulated, or
    .subjec.t to regulation, in whole or in part, by law,’
    are included. It is manifest from this language that
    the Legislature did not intend to include within the.
    statute any corporation which it had not theretofore,
    or might thereafter, declare to be ‘by law’ a public
    utility corporatiorior business.     The phrase ‘every
    such corporation’ is necessarily limited to ‘all pub-
    lic utility corporations’ declared to be such ‘by law,’
    which means, as applied here! by a legislative en-
    actment. If the language may be regarded as of
    doubtful meaning in this regard, then we think that
    such const~ruction is manifestly the intention of the
    Legislature from its long-continued policy of en-
    acting from time to time declaratory statutes, de-
    claring businesses or enterprises to be public
    utilities, or to be affected with the public interest,
    and in subjecting them to some sort of public regu-
    lation or control. And especially has this been the
    practice of the Legislature with respect to busi-
    nesses or enterprises which were deemed to have
    by growth and by public need and use become pub:
    lit necessities or utilfties. This intention is further
    manifest from the practical standpoint of collecting
    the tax. The statute is a tax statute enacted for the
    purpose 0f mposm
    ministrative officers or departments of the govern-
    .            .
    7        Hon. Jack Ross,   page 5 (V-1552)
    ment from what character of corporations they
    should demand the tax., We hardly think the legis-
    lature intended to leave to these officers and depart-
    ments of government the intricate legal matters of
    determining what businesses are public utility busi-
    nesses, or what corporations are public utilfty corpo-
    rations, or of determining the matter of what public
    utility corporations’ rates or service are subject to
    regulation. It is well settled that the forum for declar-
    ing a business to be affected with the,public interest,
    and for subjecting its rates or service to regulation,
    is in the first instance the Legislature, and, until the
    Legislature has acted; we do not think administrative
    officials or de artments of government can determine
    the questions. B
    ‘This case was decided prior to 1949 and henc~e prior to
    , the 1949 amendment. We think the 1949 amendment by the .Legis-
    lature does nothing more than to definitely confirm the decision
    c,            ~‘in the Gulf States Utilfties Company chase to the effect that the desig-
    nation or classification as a public utility must be by statute, thus
    relieving the Secretary~of State Of the intricate legal matters of
    d~etermining what corporations are public utilities within the purview
    of this statute.
    There are certain statutory provisions which define pub-
    lic utilities generally.  These are embodied in Articles 1416 to 1446,
    inc,lusive, V.C.S. Also, Article 6050, V;C.S., classifies gas pipeline
    corporations as public. utilities. A careful search, however, of all
    the pertinent statutory provisions,. pertaining to motor bus and truck-
    ing corporations, although snbj,ected to~regulation by the Railroad
    .Commission. nowhere defines or classifies these corporations as
    public utilities. In the~absence of a statute designating these corpo-
    rations as public utilities.or classifying them as such, we think
    they should be classified as corporations subject to and required
    to pay the tax imposed by Clause (1) of Article 7084. V..CS.. and
    not by Clause (3) of said article applicable to corporations that are
    public utilities.
    Attorney General’s Opinion O-133 1 (1939) was based
    primarily upon that portion of the statute which then read ‘ivhose
    rates or service is regulated or subject to regulation in whole or
    in part,” as justifyfng the classification as public utilities of mo-
    tor busses and motor trucks whose operations were regulated by
    the Railroad Commission.      We think the 1949 amendment which
    added the further condition that they be classified or defined as
    such by the laws of Texas llmits the application of the special
    consideration accorded public utility corporations to only those
    which the Legislature has chosen by statute’to designate or clas-
    sify as public utilities. Since the Legislature has not by statute
    Hon. Jack Ross, page 6 (V-1552)
    classified motor busses and motor carriers as public utilities,
    we have no authority to do so by implication. Mere regulation
    by the Railroad Commission as,authorized by law is not suf-
    ficient. ~To hold that regulation alone was sufficient would, in
    our view, nulIify and render meaningless the 1949 amendment
    which provided that such a public utility in order to reap the
    benefits of the lower tax that would result in the application
    of the measurement of tax as provided in Clause (3) of Article
    7084, V.C.S., must be designated or classified as such by
    statute or legislative action. You are, therefore, respectfully
    advised that it is our opinion that motor bus and motor freight
    truck corporations ordinarily designated as common carriers
    are s.ubject to and required to pay a franchise tax under Clause
    (1) of Article 7084. V.C.S., and not under Clause (3) applicable
    to public utility corporations.
    SUMMARY
    Motor bus and motor freight truck corporations
    ordinarily designated as common carriers under a
    certificate of public convenience and necessity issued
    by the Railroad Commission of Texas are required to
    pay a franchise tax as provided in Clause (1) of Article
    7084. V.C.S.. and are not entitled to pay this tax as a
    public utility as provided in Clause (3) of said article.
    It is within the province of the Legislature to declare
    what corporations constitute public utilities within the
    purview ~of Clause (3) of Article 7084. V.C.S., and un~-
    less designated and classified by the Legislature as
    public utilities, corporations may not avail themselves
    of the lesser tax liability imposed upon public utilities
    by this statute.
    APPROVED:                          Yours very truly,
    .W. V. Geppert                      PRICE DANIEL
    Taxation Division                  Attorney General
    C. K. Richards
    Revlew,ing Assistant
    Charles D. Mathews
    First Assistant
    LPL:mw
    

Document Info

Docket Number: V-1552

Judges: Price Daniel

Filed Date: 7/2/1952

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017