Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1950 )

Hon. C. H. Caress Odnion
-s-
.No. V-999
State Auditor
Capitol, Station .Ra: Constitutionality pf the grant
Austin, Texas of public funds made b-y H.B.
No. 97, Acts 51st Leg., R.S.
1949, ch. 540, p. 1000, to soil
conservation districts created
under Article 1658-4. V.C.S.,
and the procedure prescribed
to withdraw same from the
State. Treasury.
Dear Sir:
Your request
for an opinion presents eleven questions per-
taining to Heusc Bill No. 97;Acts 51st Leg., R.S. 1949, ch. 540, p. 1000,
the, first thr.ee of which are as follows:
.“l. ,Does the Legislature have constitutional authority
to make a grant of this type to districts such as the State
Soil Conservation Distri@s?
“2. Can the Comptroller issue a warrant payable, to
a Soil Conservation District on funds drawn from the Gen-
eral’Revenue Eund, based only on the certification of the
State Soil Conservation Board, which funds can be deposited
in the local depository of the Soil Conservation District
and become a checking account of such district?
‘3. If your answer to the above question is No, can
the Soil Conservation Districts present their vouchers to
the Comptroller’s Office for payment of such axpanditures
as are authoriaed by the provisions of H.B. 97, after an al-
lotment has been approved ‘by the State Soil Conservation
Board for the particular district? l
We will first discuss the three questions above in the order
stated,
Section 1 of H.B. 97, supra, reads as follows:
“Section. 1. There is hereby appropriated out of the
General Fund of the State Treasury not otherwise appro-
riated the sum of Two and One-Half h$llion Dollars
P$2,500,000) for the fiscal year ending August 31. 1950.
, . .
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 2 (V-999)
and the sum of Two and One-Half Million Dollars
($Z,SOO,OOO) for the,fiscal year ending August 31, 1951,
to the several soil conservation districts in Texas. A
soil conservation district shall be eligible to receive
grants for each period of the biennium after it has been
duly organized and a Certificate of Organization for the
district has been approved and signed by the Secretary
of State, All grants to soil conservation districts shall
be made by the State Soil Conservation Board based on
the Board’s determination of equity and need of the dis-
trict applying for grant.”
Before we can answer the first question,. it is necessary
to’first consider and determine the nature or status of soil conserva-
tion districts and the purposes for which they were created.
The first two paragraphs of Section 59, Article XVI of the
Constitution of Texas read as follows:
“Sec. 59 a. The conservation and development of all
of the natural resources of this State, including the cou-
,trol, storing, preservation and distribution of its storm
and fiood waters, the waters of its rivers dnd’streams,
for irrigation. power and all other useful purposes, the
ie&mation and irrigation of its arid, semi-arid and
other lands needing iriigation, the reclamation and
drainage of its over-flowed lands; and other lands need-
ing drainage, the conservation and development of its
forests, water and hydra-electric power, the navigation
of its inland and coastal waters, and the preservation
and conservation of all such natural resources of the
State are each and all hereby declared public ,riShts and
duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws ,as
may be appropriate thereto.
“(b) There may be created within the State of Texas,
or the State may be divided into, such number of conser-
vation and reclamation districts as may be determined to
be essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of this
amendment to the. constitution. which districts shall be
governmental agencies and bodies politic and corporate
with such powers of government and with the authority to
exercise such rights, privileges and functions concerning
the subject matter of this amendment as may be conferred
by law.*
This section of the Constitution authorizes the creation of
various kinds of conservation and reclamation districts. Many of such
districts have been created by the Legislature (See the respective Acts
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 3 (V-999)
following Art. 8197f, V.C.S.). Many others have been.created under
authority of statutes enacted zby the Legislature pursuant to its
mandatory provisions. (Title 128, chs. 2-8, and Art. ,165a-4, KC.
S.); Hedge v. Lower Colorado River Authority, 163 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942, error dism. by hgr.).
Soil conservation districts are created under the provi-
sions of Article 1658-4, V.C&, a verylong and comprehensive stat-
ute which was first enacted by Acts 46th Leg.. 1939i ch. 3, p. ~7,
amended by Acts 47thLeg.; 1941; chi 308, p. 491, and is ,known as
the “State Soil Conservation Law.” Section 2 thereof reads as fol-
lows:
_.
‘Sec. .2. Legislative Determinations, and Declara- ~.
tion, of Rolicy.: .,
*It is hereby declared* as a matter of Legislative
Determination:
-(aj ,‘T.he.&ndition: That
” the farm and ,grasing
lands of thenState: of ,Texas .are among the basic assets
of the State and that the preservation of these lands; is
necessary to protect and promote the health, safety, and
general welfare of .its people: that improper land-use
pr~actices haue- caused’and have-:contributed to,, and are
now causing and contributing’ to, ~a progressivelymore.
serious ,erosion~ of .the farm and grazing, lands of, this
State by wind and water,; that the breaking of natural
graisi plant, .d forest cover has’ interfered with ,the
natural factors,of soil stabilization, causing loosening
of soil and exhaustion of humus, and developing a soil
condition that favors erosion; that the: topsoil is being
blown and washed out of fields ,and pastures; that there
has been an accelerated washing of sloping fields; that~
these processes of erosion by wind and water speed up
with removal of absorptive topsoil, causing exposure of
less absorptive and. less .protective but .more erosive
subsoil; that failure by any occupier :of land to ‘conserve
the soil and cqntrol erosion upon such land causes a
washing and blowing of still and water from such lands
onto other lands and makes -the .conservation of soil and
control of erosion on such other lands difficult or im-
possible.
“(b). The Consequences. That :the.consequences of
such soil erosion.in the form of soil-blowing and soil-
washing are the silting ,and %sedimentation of stream chan-
nels, reservoirs, dams, ditches,. and harbors; the loss of
.fertile soil material in dust storms: the piling up of soil
Hon. C. H. Cavness. page 4 (V-999)
on lower slopes, and its deposit over alluvial plains;
the reduction in productivity or outright ruin of rich
bottom lands by overwesh of poor subsoil materiel,
sand, and gravel swept out of the hills; deterioration of
soil and its fertility, deterioration of crtips grown
thereon, and declining acre yields despite development
bf scientific processes for increasing such yields; loss
of soil and water which causes destruction of food end
cover for wildlife; ‘a.blowing and washing of soil into
streams which silts over spawning beds, and d&troy6
water plants, dimfnishing the food supply of .fish; a
dfminishing of the underground water reserve, which.
ceuses water shortages, intensifies periods of drought,
andcauses crop failures; an increase in the speed and
volume of rainfall run-off, causing severe and increea-
tng floods, which bring suffering, disease, end death;
impoverishment of families attempting to farm eroding
and eroded lands; damage to roads, highways, railways,
farm buildings, and othdr property from floods and from
dust storms;’ and losses in navigation, hydro-electric
power, municipal water ,supply, irrigation developments,
farming, and grbzing.
“(c) The Appropriate Correctiue Methods. That to
conserve soil resources end control and prevent soil
erosion, it is necessary that la&-use practices contri-
buting to soil wastage and soil erosion may be discouraged
and discontinued, and appropriate soil-conserving land-
use practices be adopted aad~cerried out; that among the
procedures necessary for widespread adoption, are the
carrying on of engineering operations such es the con-
struction of terraces,. terrace outlets, check dams, dikes,
ponds, ditches, and the like; the utilization of strip crop-
ping, lister furrowing, contour cultivating, and contour
furrowing; land irrigation, seeding and planting of waste,
sloping, abandoned, or eroded lands to water-conserving
and ~erosion-preventing plants, trees, and grasses; for-
estation and reforestation; rotation of crops, soil stabilima-
tion with trees, grasses, legumes. and other thick-growing,
soil-holding crops, retardation of runoff by increasing ab-
sorption of rafnfall; end retirement from cultivation of
steep. highly erosive ereas end areas now badly @lied or,
otherwise eroded.
‘(d) Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the Legislature to provide for the conservation
of soil and soil resources of this State, and for,the control
and prevention of soil erosion, and thereby to preserve nat-
ural resources, control floods, prevent impairment of dams
-
,
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 5 (V-999)
and reservoirs,. assist in maintaining the navigability
of rivers and harbors, preserve wildlife, protect the
``tax ,bese. brotact public Iands,~ and pro~tect and promote
the health,. safety, and general welfare of the people of
this State:and thus to carry out the mandate expressed
in Article XVI , Section 59a; of the Constitution of ,Texas.-
It is .further declared as a matter of Legislative intent
’ and, determination of ~policy that the agencies ‘created, ‘.
~‘.,$owf?rs conferred and.the activities contemplated in this v
Act for the tionservation of soil and water resources and
for the reduction of public damage resulting from failure
to conserve such natural resources, shall be supplementary
and complementary to the work, of various river and other
authorities now established in the State and to other State
officers, agencies, and districts engaged in closely re-
lated projects, and shall not be duplicative thereof nor
conflicting therewith.”
Section 3 provides in part that:
“Sec. 3. Definitions.
“Wherever used or referred to in this Act,~ unle.ss a
differ~ent meaning. clearly appears from the context:
“(1) ‘District’ or ‘Soil Conservation District’ meens
a governmental. iubd,ivision.of this State, and a public
body corporate end,politic, organized in ~accordance with
the provisions of this Act, for the purposes, with the
powers,, and subject to the restrictions hereinafter set
forth. ‘,
“(8) ‘Agency of this State’ includes the government of
this State and any ,subdivision, agency. or instrumentality,
corporate or otherwise. of the government of this State.
“(9):‘United States* or ‘Agencies of the United States’
includes the United States of America, the Soil Conserva-
,tion Service of the United States Department of Agriculture,
and any ,other agency or .instrumentality, corporate or other-
wise, of the United States of America.
‘(10) ‘Government’ or ‘Governmental’ includes the Gov-
ernment of this State, the Government of the United States,
and any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, Corporate
or otherwise of either of them.”
Hon. C. H. Cevness, page 6 (V-999)
Section 4 creates the State Soil Conservation Board, con-
sisting of five members, *to serve as en agency of the State and to
perform the functions conferred ,on it. in this Act*; divides the State
into five (5) districts for the purpose c$ ~selectfng one member of the
Board from each district; prescribes the procedure to be followed in d
selecting such members and filling vacancies on the Board; fixes their
tenure of office and compensation; requires each member of the Board
to -take the State Constitutional Oath of Office”; empowers the Board
c
to employ an administrative officer and such other employees, deter-
mine their qualifications, duties and compensation, “according to the
terms and amounts as specified in the general appropriation bills.”
Subsection G of this section reads:
‘0. fry addition to the duties and powers hereinafter
conferred upon the State Soil Conservation Board, it shall
have the following duties and powers:
“(1) To offer such’essistance as may be appropriate
to the supervisors of Soil Conservation Districts, organ-
ized as provided hereinafter, in the carrying out of any
of the powers and programs.
“(2) To coordinate the programs of the several Soil
Conservation Districts organized hereunder so far 8s~
thJs may be done by adviae and consultation.
“(3) To secure the cooperation and assistance of the
United States and auy of its agencies, and of agencies of
~this State, in the work of such districts.
“(4) To disseminate information throughout the State
concerning the acthities and programs of the Soil Con-
servation Districts organized hereunder, and to encourage
the formation of such districts in arees where their organ-
ization is desirable.”
Other sections of the statute prescribe in detail, and at great
length, the procedure to be followed by landowners and the State Soil
Conservation Board in organizing a soil conservation district; the se-
lecting of its governing body consisting of five members or supervisors:
fixing their tenure of office and compensation; and defining. their powers
and duties, and the powers of the districts so created. Included in the
powers granted and withheld from such districts in Section 7 are the fol-
lowing:
*. . . .
“(8) To sue and be sued in the name of the district:
to have a seal, which seal shall be judicially noticed; to
.’
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 7 (V-999)
_I
have perpetual succession unless terminated es here-
inafterprovided; to make and execute contracts and
other. instruments.~ neoessary~or ,convenient to the ex-’
ercise of its powers, to make, Andyfrom .time to time ..
amend and repeal, rules end reguletions~ not inconsistent
with this Act, to carry ,into effect its purpdses ,and pow-.
errs; ;’ I
.’ .,“(9)As a condition~tothe extending of any~ benefits
under this Act to,~ or the,performance of work upon,, any
lands not owned or controlled by this State or any of its
agencies, the ‘~supervisors may require contributions in
th+.form of servides, materials, or otherwise: to .any, op-
eration conferring such benefits, and,~may require land
occupiers to ente~r into and perform such agreements or
covenants es-to the permanent use of such lends as will
tend to prevent or’cont,rol erosion’thereon. .’
“(10)~ The supervisors shall~ have.no powe.r to levy
taxes; and no debts incurred in the name of the district
shall, create a alien eon.lands of landowners or ,land~oc-
cupiers in the-district.?. ..~
.,.
The Courts of this,:State; ‘so far es we have been able to
.
ascertain; have had no o&asion to consider Artiale .165a-4 for any
purpose. However, hour appellate courts have.had before them the
question of the status or. nature of conservation ,and reclamation dis-
tricts of different’ kinds created by. the Legislature under authority of
Section 59;. Artidle’XVl of the ,Constitution,, end of those districts.
created under statutes enacted pursuant to the same authority.
In the case of State v. Smith; 47 S.W.2d,642.(Tex.-Civ. App.
1932), .the Court had before it the, questions of the constitutionality of
Articles 165a-165m, Vernon’s,Civil Statutes (Adts 42nd Leg., 2nd C.
S. 1931, ch. 2, p. 2), which purported to regulate the planting, growing
and harvesting of cotton and other soil exhausting plants for’the pur-
pose of preserving and conserving the soil. The Act declared that:
“The preservation and restoration of the soil and the fertility of the
soil is essential to the welfare of the people of the State.”
The Court held some regulatory provisions of the statute
contravened certein provisions of both the Federal and State Constitu-
tions. With these provisions we are not here concerned. In the course
of the opinion, the Court said:,
.
“In 1917 our State Constitution was amended by
adding section ~59 (a)to articles 16, which authorizes, the
Legislature to~pass all laws.thet are appropriate for-
the conservation and development of all of the natural
. .
H&L C. H. Cavness, page 8 (V-999)
resources of~the state. Unquestionably, we think the
soil is one of the natural resources of the state, and,
if it becomes necessary, we think the Legislature could
enact such reasonable and appropriate laws as may
be required for the preservation of the soil. The quea-
tion as to whether said laws were reasonable and ap-
propriate would be for judicial determination.* ..
.~.
In the case of Willacv County Water Control and Imarove-
ment Dist. No. 1 v. Abendroth,.l42 Tex. 320, 177 S.W.2d 936 (1944). it
became necessary for the court to determine the status or nature of
a district created under the provisions of Section 59, ArticleXVI of
the Constitution, and Title 128, Chapter 3A, Articles 7880-I to 7880-
1472. V&S. The Court said:
e
. . . . Irrigation districts, navigation districts,
levee and improvement districts, and like political
subdivisions created,under Section 59a of Article
XVI of the Constitution, and statutes enacted tbere-
under carrying out the purposes of such constitutional
provision, are not classed with municipal corporations,
but are held to be political subdivisions of the State,
performing governmental functions, and standing upon
the same footing as counties and other political sub-
-divisions established by law. Harris County Flood Con-
trol District v. Mann, 135 Tex. 239, 140 S.W.2d 1098;
Wharton County Drainage District No. 1 et al. v. Higbee
et al., Tex. Civ. App., 149 S.W. 381, writ refused; Bexar-
Medina-Atascosa Counties Water Improvement District
No. 1 v. State, Tex. Ch. App., 21 S.W.2d 747, writ re,-
fused; Engleman Land Co. et al. v. Donna Irrigation
District No. 1 et al., Tex. Civ. App., 209 SW. 428, writ
refused; Arneson v. Shary et al., Tex, Civ. App., 32
. .
S;W.Zd 907. appeal dismissed, Arneson v. United Irr.
Co., 284 U.S. 592, 52 S. Ct. 202, 76 L. Ed. 510; Harris
County Drainage District No. 12 v. City of Houston, Tex.
Corn. App;, 35 S.W.2d 118, 120; 44 Tex. Jur., p. 262, b
176.*
Counties are appropriate agencies through which the State
may perform duties resting on the State. Weaver v. Scurry County,
28 S.W. 836 (Tax. Civ. App. 1894); Bexar County v. Linden, 110 Tex.
344, 220 S.W. 761 (1920); City of Aransas Pass v. Keelin& 112Tax.
339, 247 S.W. 818 (1923); Jefferson Countv v. Board of Countv and Dis-
trict Road Indebtedness, 143 Tex. 99, 182 S.W.2d 908 (1944).
Conservation districts created by the Legislature under the
provisions of Section 59 are governmental agencies, bodies politic and
corporate, and have been held to be competent agencies of the State
Hon. C, H. Cavness, page 9 (V-999)
through which the State,may perform certain governmental functions
and duties. Bravos River Conservation and Reclamation District v.
McGraw, 126 Tex. 506, 91 S.W.2d 665 (1936); Harris County Flood
Control~District v. Mann, 135 Tex. 239; 140 S.W.Zd 1098 ~(1940).
In view of the provisions. of Section 59 of Article XVI :of~the
Constitution of ~Texhs and Article 165a-4, and then status of other con-
servation.districts created under similar statutes enacted under.au-..
thority of Section, 59. and the status ~of such districts created by the
Legislature under the same authority, we think a soil conservation’ ::.:
district created under the provisions of Article 165a-4 is a political
subdivision of the State, a body politic and corporate, and a State
governmental agency with authority to exercise such. rights; privileges
and functions pertaining to the conservation and reclamation of soil,
a natural resource of the State, and the other purposes named in Sec-
tion 2~thereof, as we have been conferred upon it by Section 59 and this
Article. The Legislature has declared all these purposes are to “pro-
tect Andypromote the. health, safety, and general w.elfare .of the people
of this State, and thus carry out the mandate expressed in Article XVI,
Section 59, of the Constitution of Texas.* (Art. 165a-4, sec. 2, subset.
(4 1. .,. -4
Therefore, it is our opinion that-soil.conservation districts
created under the provisions of Art. ~lbSa*4. are proper agencies through
.
which the State may perform duties resting upon the State.
Our Courts. in passing on the question of the constitutionality
of an Act of the Legislature, have often said: .
..~
68
. . . every’rehsonable intendment and presumption
will be,made .+nfavor .of the constitutionality ax&validity
of a statute, until the contrary is clearly shown. ~The
Legislature is presumed, to have regarded constitutional.
limitations or requirements in enacting laws, as assidu-
ously as the courts do in construing and applying them.
And before a legislative act will be set aside, it must
clearly appear that its validity cannot be supported by
any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption.”
39 Tex. Jur. 251. Statutes, Set; 1,33.
In the recent case of State v. Rector, 224 S.W.2d 706, (Tex.
Sup. 1949) it was said:’ .,, .:
“This. Court‘has repeatedly ~held that no .Act of the
Legislature will be -declared unconstitutional unless some
provision of the ‘Constitution CM be cited which clearly
shows that the Act is invalid. Texas National Guard Ar-
mory Board v. h&Craw. 132 Tex.~ 613, 126 S.W.2d 627;
Harris County v. Stewart, 91 Tex. 133, 41 .S.W. 650; Brown
sm
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 10 (V-999)
‘XI
v. City of Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S.W. 488; 9 Tex.
Jur., pp. 477, 478, g 59.”
Therefore, it cannot be said that the Legislature lacked the
power to make the appropriations found in House Bill 97 to the sev-
eral soil conservation~ districts of this State; unless there is some
provision in the constitution which can be cited clearly withholding
such power, from that body. The only provisions of the Constitution
which may be considered as possibly inhibiting the Legislature from
making these grants of public money to such districts are the follow-
ing:
Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:
“Taxes shall be levied and collected by gen-
eral laws and for public purposes only.”
The pertinent provision of Section 48, Article III of the Con-
stitution reads:
Y9ec. 48. The Legislature shall not have the right
to levy taxes or impose burdens upon the people, ex-
cept to raise revonue sufficient for the economical ad-
ministration of the government, . . . ,*
Section 51, Article IIIof the Constitution reads in part as fol-
lows:
3 Sec.
51. The Legislature shall have no power to
make any grant or authorixe the making of any grant
of public money to any individual, association of indi-
viduals. municipal or other corporations whatsoever,
provided, however, . . . . the provisions of this section
shall not be construed so as to prevent the grant of aid
in cases of public calamity.”
In numerous instances the courts of this and other jurisdictions,
and text writers, have said that the question of what is a public purpose
cannot be answered by any precise definition. 6 McQuillen on Municipal
Corporations (2d Ed.) 338, Sec. 2532.
“What may or may not be termed a ‘public purpose’
is not easily defined, and no definition has as yet been
framed that will fit all conditions or provisions, . . .
The determination of whether a particular purpose is
public or private is ultimately a judicial question, but
the public policy of the state, as it has found expression
in legislative enactments is entitled to weighty considera-
tion, and all reasonable doubts on the question should be
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 11 (V-999)
.
resolved in favor of a legislative declaration, thereon.”
50C.J.860,Sec.67. ” in ,,
1nGieen.v. Frazier, 44.N.D. 395, 176 N.‘W; 11 (1920),, affirmed,
253 U.S. 233, 40 S.Ct.’ 499, ‘64, L.Ed. ~878 (1919). ~the term “public pur-
pose” was defined as follow,s: ,.’
~ .”
i
. . :. a public .purpose . . . . ha’s for its obj~ective :’
the promotion of the general welfare of all the inhabitants
or.residentswitliinagiven..political division, as;,,for ex-
tlmp~e;~,a state, the .sovereignty and -sovereign power.s of
which are exercised to’promote the’public health, safety,
morals, general welfare, security. prosperity, content&
merit,, and equality before the law of all.the citizens of the‘,’ ‘.
state.” : .’
In affirming this case, the Supreme Court of the United States
said:
.a
. . . What is a public purpose has, given rise to:no~
littIe judicial consideration. Courts, as a .rule, have at-
‘tempted no judicial consideration. Courts) as’s rule., have
attempted no.judic,ial definition of a ‘public’ as distinguished
from a ‘private’ purpose, but have left each case to be .de-
tei%nined by its .own peculiar circumstances.~ Gray, Limita-.
tions of Taxing Power. % 176. ‘Necessity alone is not the
test by’which the’ limits of State authorityin this direction ~.
are to be defined, but’s wise .statesmanship must look.be-
ydnd: the expenditures. which are absolutely needful to the
continued existence of, organized government, and embrace
others which may tends to make that government subserve..
,. the general well-being -of society, and advance the present
and prospective happiness’and prosperity of the people.’ ”
In Weaver v. Scurry Countv, 28 S.W. 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894),
it was held that the determination of what is a public purpose is largely
left to the legislature.
In Davis v. Citv of Taylor, 123 Tex. 39, 67 S.W.2d ,I033 (1934),
it was held that Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution inhibited mu-
nicipalities, including home rule cities, from imposing taxes for other
than public purposes. The Court also held this section of the Constitu-
tion did not inhibit the City of Taylor, a home rule city, from adopting
an amendment’to its charter authorizing the city to assess and collect
an ad valorem tax on property within the city to be devoted.to “the
growth, advertisement, development, imp.rovement and increase of the
tax values in.the city,” and for the establishment and maintenance of a
Board of CityDevelopment with authority to expend funds so derived for
such purposes~: The Court said:
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 12 (V-999)
“It would not be of value now ‘to attempt to
thoroughly define or discuss what are public pur-
poses. No exact definition can be made. Suffice it
to say that, unless a court can say that,the purposes
for which public funds are expended are clearly not
public purposes, it would not be justified in holding
invalid,a legislative act or provision in a city charter
providing funds for such purposes.” (Emphasis added)
In Friedman v. American Suretv Co. of’New York, 139 Tex.
570. 151 S.W.2d 570 (1941). the Court said. in substance, that the uur-
pose of Section 48, Article III of the Constitution is *to prohibit the
Legislature from levying taxes or impos,mg burdens for purposes
other than to administer the Government . . . . The administering of
the Government, however, covers and embraces a very large field
of action. ”
The Thirty-Sixth Legislature, at its third called session
passed an Act (Acts 36th Leg., 3rd C.S. 1920, ch. 22, p. 32). by which
the State donated and granted to the City of Aransas Pass, for a period
of 20 years. eight-ninths of the State ad valorem taxes to be collected
upon the property and from persons in San.Patricio County; author-
ized the issuance of bonds by the city to procure money to be used ex-
clusively to construct and maintain sea walls, breakwaters, and shore
protection in order to avert from the city calamitous overflows; and
_declared that the taxes donated mthe city should be held in trust and
applied to create a sinking fund for the redemption of the bonds and
pay the interest thereon. Thereafter, bonds were duly authorized by
the resident tax paying voters of the city. When the bond record was
presented to the then Attorney General of Texas for approval, he raised
several constitutional objections to the Act and refused to approve the
record. Whereupon. the city instituted proceedings in the Supreme
Court to compel him to approve the bond record.
The Attorney General urged that the Act was unconstitutional
in that it violated several prohibitory provisions of the Constitution, one
of which was Section 51, Article III, denying power to the Legislature to
make any grant of public money to a municipal corporation. The Court
in City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling, 112 Tex. 339, 247 S.W. 818 (1923), an-
swered this contention, saying:
“The act makes no grant of public money as for-
bidden by section 51 of article 3 of the Constitution. The
state here bestows no gratuity. The people of the state
at large have a direct and vital interest in protecting the
coast cities from the perils of violent storms. The de-
struction of ports, through which moves the commerce
of the state, is a state-wide calamity. Hence sea walls
and breakwaters on the Gulf coast, though of special
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 13 (V-999)
benefit to particular co-unities, must be reg,a,rded
as promoting~the general welfare and prosperity of
the state; It is because of the special benefits to par-
titular cities and counties that special burdens on
property within their boundaries, through .t+xation; are
justified. But the state, in promotins the welfare, ad-
vancement. .and pr.osperity. of all her citizens, or ‘in
aidins to. avert .iniury to her entire. citizenship. cannot
be regarded otherwise than as performinn a proper
function of state government. Cities or c,ounties fur-~
nish convenient and, appropriate agencies through which
the state Mayo perform duties resting on ,me state, in.
the performance of which the ‘cities or counties have .a. .’
special interest. The.use of .the cities or counties as.’
agents .of the state in the discharge of the. state’s duty ::
is in no wise inhibited by the Constitution in section 51
I of article 3. Bexar .County v. .Linden, 110 Tex. 344 to 348.
220 S.W. 76l;‘City of Galveston v. Posnainsky,.62 Tex.
c
127, 50 Am. Rep; 517; Weaver v. Scurry .County(Tex. Civ.
App.) 28 S.W..~836.” .(Emphasis added) _’
The Court concluded that the grant of the State’s’ taxes to
the ~City of Aransas Pass. to be used .for the. purposes: stated in the Act
was expressly authorixed: by Section 8, Article ,X1 of the Constitution.
..
In Bexar..Countvv.:Linden, 110 Tex..,344,.220~S,W.. 761 (1920),
the Court had under ,ctinsideration the constitutionality of a statute which
required a~district attorney to pay over to the county fees collected by
him in excess of the amount which the statute permitted.him to retain.
It appears that ~of the amount claimed by the county to be’due it:from
.
Mr. Linden the greater part thereof had, been paid to him by the State
of Texas out of public funds,% the State Treasury for his services
rendered as District Attorney.
It was the defendant’s contention that the statute was uncon-
stitutional as amounting to a ,grant of public money to counties of the
State as municipal corporations, within the meaning of Section 51, Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution. The trial court and the Court ,of Civil Ap-
peals sustained the contention. The Supreme Court reversed. and re-
manded, saying:
“The giving``away of public money, its application to
other than strictly governmental purposes, is what the
provision is intended’to guard against.’ The prohibition
is a positive and absolute one except as to a distinctive
class to whom the State is under a sacred obligation. Not
only are individuals, associations of individuals and pri-
vate corporations within its spirit, but all kinds of public
or political corporations, as well; whether strictly municipal
s74
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 14 (v-999
or not. It therefore applies to counties, whether con-
sidered as public corporations or only quasi corpora-
tions. . . ..
“If, therefore, the effect of the statute is to bestow
funds of the State upon countits of the State as a gratuity,
or fo’r uses not related to the State’s governmental duties,
it would be invalid. Oathe other hand, if its effect is to
but apply such funds to the uses of the State, as a gov-
ernment, there can be no reason for holding it void.
“It is accordingly important to consider the nature
, of counties under our form of government, their relatlon-
ship to the State, their functions and their uses, in order
to ascertain whether the powers they exercise in a gov-
ernmental capacity are other than State powers, and
whether their use of such State funds as are constituted
by these excess fees for the purposes to which they may
legally apply them, is any other than a use for the State
as a gover.nment, for which purpose the counties are only
availed of as a means.eu
After discussing and defining the nature of counties, their
relationship to the States, and their functions, .the Court continued:
“Since the duties which the counties perform are .,
State duties and the powers they exercise are State pow-
ers, an apportionment to them of State fund’s, as the pay-
ment into their treasuries of the excess fees of District
Attorneys under this statute, for the carrying out of those
duties, is manifestly not a grant of public money. There
is nothing of the bestowal of a bounty or gratuity about
it. It is but a method adopted by the State for the discharge
of an obligation of the State--the obligation to provide the
people with the facilities of civil government through the
counties as effective agencies for the purpose. The counties
receiving such excess fees can appropriate them to none
other than strictly governmental purposes, from which,
presumably, the State as a sovereignty, derives the bene-
fit.”
The validity of certain Road Bond Assumption Acts of the
Legislature was upheld in Jefferson County v. Board of County and Road
District Indebtedness. supra. The Court, after quoting the prohibitory
provisions of Section 51, Article XXI, of the Constitution said at 182 S.
W.2d 912:
“This section of the Constitution-forbids the granting
of public moneys to any ‘municipal or other corporations
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 15 (V-999)
whatsoever.’ Under the decis~ions of this State this
provision prohibits the granting of public moneys to
counties. Bexar County v. Linden, ll0 Tex. 339, 220
S.W. 761. However, it does not prohibit every appro-
priation of State funds for use by counties. It merely
prohibits the bestowing of gratuities on counties.
Counties are agencies of the State through~which the
States performs a part of its governmental functions.
Consequently an annortionment of State funds to
counties to be used bv them in carrvinn out a part of
the duties or governmental functions which properly
* the mean’
of the above constitutional inhibition. ,Bexar Count+.~v.
Linde,n, ~supra; City of Arkansas Pass v. Keeling, .Il2
Tex. 339, 247 S.W. 818. The construction of public
roads-is a governmental function properly belonging
to the State. Robbins v. Limestone County, 114.Tex.
345, 268, S.W. 915. Consequently public funds may be
apportioned by the Legislature, to counties for the pur-
pose of constructing.publicroads or for other govern-
mental purposes. In doing so the State is ,merely using
the county as its agent to ‘use its funds for the; purpose’
of performing its functions. Bexar County v; Linde,
supra; City of Ar_kansas~Pass v. Keeling, ,supra; Road,
District MO. 4, Shelby County v. Allred, 123 Tex. 77,
68 S.W.2d 164..” (Emphasis added)‘.
In Brazes River Conservation AndyReclamation District v.
McGraw, supra, the Court said at 91 S. N.2d.673:
“The Conservation Amendment to the Constitution
of the state (article 16, 8 59 (a) expressly declares that
the performance of the duties prescribed for this dis-
trict are ‘public rights and duties,’ and the Legislature
is commanded to ‘pass all such laws as may be appropriate
thereto.’ . . . .
The purposes for which this District was created are enum-
erated in the Court’s opinion, one of which is:
“For the purpose of conservation of all soils against
destructive erosion and thereby preventing the increased
flood menace incident thereto.”
Soil conservation districts are to accomplish not only the
same purposes, but many others, including the restoration of the fer-
tility of soil. An examination of numerous Acts of the Legislature cre-
ating conservation districts discloses that one of the purposes for which
such districts were created is to prevent soil erosion. In many instances
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 16 (V-999)
the Legislature has donated all or part of the State’s ad valorem taxes
collected therein for general purposes during a given period. In many
instances this period has been for more than two years on the basis of
a finding of public calamity, but that question is not presented here
because the appropriation in H.B. 97 is limited to the current biennium.
See Opinion V-794, dated March 25, 1949.
We think the purposes for which soil conservation districts
were created are for ,public purposes and are in the interest of and for
the general welfare of all the people of the State. The functions of such
districts are undoubtedly governmental functions. The Legislature has
evidently considered such functions as duties resting upon the State,
under both the provisions of Section 59, Article XVI of the Constitution
and Article 165a-4, and that there is no provision of the Constitution
inhibiting it from making grants of public money to such districts to
enable them to perform such duties. Its acts over a long period of
years lead to n0 other conclusion.
The original State Soil Conservation Law was enacted in
1939 and from that time down to and including the appropriations for
the current biennium, the Legislature has consistently made appropria-
tions to pay per diem and mileage of delegates selected to attend State
District Conservation Conventions held for the purpose of ,selecting a
member of the State Soil Conservation Board. and to pay the per diem
of supervisors of soil conservation districts and five cents per mile
traveled, as provided in Article 165a-4. Furthermore, the Cegislature
has in numerous instances granted, loaned, or both granted and loaned
public money out of the State Treasury to Conservation districts. 1
1 A loan of $5,000 was made to the Lower Colorado River Author-
ity by the Act creating the District (Acts 43rd Leg., 4th C.S. 1934,
ch. 7, p. 19); A grant of $10,000 to the same District (Acts 44th
Leg., 1st C.S. 1935, ch. 405, p. 1604); A grant of $5.000 to the Sa-
bine-Neches Conservation and Reclamation District by the Act
creating the District (Acts 44th Leg., R.S. 1935, ch. 97, p. 237);
Another grant to same District in the sum of $500 for “Expenses
of District work” (Acts 45th Leg., R.S. 1937, ch. 384, p. 786); A
further grant to this District in the sum of $6,000 was made in
1939 (Acts 46th Leg., R.S. 1929, ch. 30, p. 519); Lower Neches
Valley Authority granted a loan of $10,000 (Acts 46th Leg., R.S.
1939, ch. 25, p. 503); Another loan of $10,000 was subsequently
made to this District in 1941 (Acts 47th Leg.. R.S. 1941. ch. 144.
p. 199); See Lower Neches Valley Authority v. Mann. 140 Tex. 294.
167 S.W.2d 1011, 1017; A grant of $5,000 to Guadalupe-Blanco River
Conservation and Reclamation District (Acts 44th Leg., 1st C.S.
1935. ch. 410, p. 1615); A loan of $15.000 ,was made to this District
in 1939 (Acts 46th Leg., R.S. 1939. cht 28. p. 501); A loan of $5,000
was made to the Pease River Flood Control District by the Act (cont’d)
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 17 (V-999)
Our Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the
Rural Aid Appropriation Act of 1929, appropriating $5,000,000 to be
apportioned to all children
~.. of scholastic age living in small and finan-
cially weak school distr%cts; said:
“As has been sho&,‘the Legislatures since 1915 has
consistently construed ‘the Constitution as permitting
the enactment of rural .aid measures, land the executive
department has approved and executed these.laws. The
~universa! rule of construction is that,~Jegislative and
executive interpretations’of ‘the ‘organic law; acquiesced
inand loini continued. a6 in the case before us. are-of’
great wei& m determining the validity of any-act, &J
in case of ambigui or doubt will be followed bv the
;````i.3i~: .” +&e v. Marrs, 12: Tex. 383, 40 S,;?.
The ‘rule of construction announced in M umme v. Marrs, supra,
is applicable here. The Legislature has over a long period 6f years
construed the Constitution as permitting it to make grants of public mon-
ey to conservation districts,, without the necessity of declaring the exis-
tence of a~bublic calamitytherein. So far as we are aware,~these grants
have been withdrawn from the State Treasury in the same manner that
: other public funds of the State are withdrawn.
In view of, all the. foregoing, it is our opinion,‘that the grant of
public money made by H.B. 97 (Acts: 51st Leg., R.S. ,1949, ch. ,540, up. 1000)
to Soil Conservation Districts created under ,the provisions of Article
165a-4, is constitutional.
For convenience, we restate your question No. 2:
“Can the Comptroller issue a warrant payable to
a Soil Conservation District on funds drawn’from the Gen-
eral Revenue Fund, based only on the certification of the
State Soil Conservation Board, w.hich funds can be de-
posited in the local depository of the Soil Conservation
District and become a checking account of such district? *
1 cont’d. creating the District (Acts 44th Leg., 1st C.S. 1935, ch. 420, p.
1646); A further loan of $6,000 was made to this District in 1939
(Acts 46th Leg., R.S. 1939, ch. 28; p. 506); A loan of $2,000 was
made to the Upper Red River Flood Control and Irrigation District
by the Act creating the District (Acts 45th Leg., R.S. 1937, ch. 454,
1128); Another loan of $5,000 was made to this District in 1939
&cts 46th Leg ., R.S. 1939, ch. 33. p. 513).
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 18 (V-999)
Sections 2 and 6 of House Bill 97 read respectively as fol-
lows:
‘Sec. 2. Approval of all grants to soil conserva-
tion districts as provided for in this Act, shall be cer-
tified to the State Comptroller of Public Accounts by the
State Soil Conservation Board. Such c~ertification of ap-
proval by the State Soil Conservation Board presented to
~the said Comptroller shall be sufficient authority for the
Comptroller tomissue his warrants against any appropriations
made for grants to soil conservation districts, and shall
also be sufficient authority for the’state, Treasurer to hon-
or payment of such warrants.? ‘I
“Sec. 6. Grants to soil conservation districts as pro-
vided in this Act, when received by the district, shall be
deposited in the name of the district; such deposit shall
be with a State or National bank or banks. Any withdrawal
of such funds so deposited to the credit of the district may
be withdrawn only on approval of the board of supervisors
of the district. All checks or orders for such withdrawal
shall be signed by the, chairman and secretary of the board
of supervisors of the district.*.
We have been unable to find any constitutional objection to
the provisions of Sections 2 or 6. of H.B. 97.. Therefore, we answer
your second question in the affirmative.
Our affirmative answer to your ,second question makes un-
necessary an answer to your third question.
Your eight remaining questions read as follows:
“4. Section.5 of H.B. 97 provides that ‘any funds
granted hereunder to any soil conservation district which
shall remain unexpended at the end of the biennium shall
revert to the General Fund . . .’ If a district used the ap-
propriation to buy grass seed, and within the biennium
sold the grass seed for cash, so that at the end of the
biennium cash received for the sale of the seed remained
in the bank account of the district, would Such cash re-
vert to the General Fund? Stated differently, does dis-
bursement of the appropriated money for merchandise
to be resold constitute expenditure for the purpose of the
bill? Would it make any difference whether the money
received from such sales was placed in a separate bank
account or co-tngled in the bank account with the apt-
propriation received from the State Comptroller? *
Hon. C. H. Gavness, page 19 (v-999)
“5. What is,the ,relation between Section 3 of H.B.
97 and Section 6 of HiB. 444,of the’47th Legislature, ,~
which says’that ’ .~ . . the Supervisors’. . . shall,provide
for an annual audit of’the accounts of receipts and’dis-
bursements’? *
“6. Would the audit required by H.B. ~97 cover ‘.
only the original receipt and first’disbursement;by
‘h district, of the State appropriation. ‘or would it iri-
dude all receipts and disbursements? ‘For example,
would it cover receipts fror&the sale of seeds or fer-
tiliser purchased out of State .appropriations, or the
funds of a district.acquired by donation or from loans? *
-7. Would the fee for the audits,~ to be paid out of
local funds of.the districts, be paid into the State Treas-
ury and made available to the State Auditor to pay the ,’
costs or expenses of making the audits?”
“0. Section, 3 says inpart: * .‘; .’The expense of
the audit shall be paid by each SaUCohservation,Dis-
trict involved,out of local funds.’ Will the funds’ ii;.
ceived from the General Revenue Fund, on being ~”
deposited to local banks to the account of respective
districts, become local funds~to the’extent that the dis-
tricts”can’pay for, the statutorily required audits frem-
these ,funds which are, in fact; ,a part of their initial ap-
L.’
propriation? T
“9. Does the provision that ‘the .charge in any par-
ticular ~project, shall never be less than the actual cost
to the particular district for labor, maintenance,-de-
preciation, and replacement of equipment’ at the end
of paragraph 4D of, H.B. 97,’ apply only to projects au-
thorized in paragraph 4D, in both 4C and 4D. or to all
the provisions of H.B. 97 and also to H.B. 444 of the
47th Legislature? *
“10. Does the provision at the end of paragraph 4B
of H.B. 97 prevent the districts from buying seeds ,or
plants to be resold at not less than costto the district?”
“11. Will the districts be included in the political
subdivisions of the State which are required to secure
from depository banks a pledge of securities against the
money deposited? *
We will answer these remaining questions in the order
stated.
Hon. C. H. Cavness. page 20 (v-9~99)
4. It is our opinion that the Legislature intended, as to the
granted funds, that all of such funds on hand at the end of the biennium
revert to the General Fund. The use of the granted funds to purchase
seed to be resold would not constitute an expenditure of the funds so as
to prevent the moneys received upon the resale from being a part of
the granted funds. The placing of the moneys received from the re-
sale of the seed into a “separate bank account’ would not have the ef-
fect of making the funds “expended.“. If at the end of the biennium a
soil conservation district has purchased seed on hand that is later re-
sold, the amount receive,d from the resale should tbep be paid into the
General Fund of the State Treasury.
5. Section 3 of H.B. No. 97, 51st Legislature, and Section
6 of H.B. No. 444, 47th Legislature, each provide for a separate audit,
and such provisions have no relation to each other, In other words,
H.B. No. 97 does not. either directly or by implication, repeal or mod-
ify the provisions of H.B. No. 444 in reference to the audit therein pro-
vided for.
6. The audit provided for in H.B. No. 97 iS not by the terms
thereof limited in its scopein any manner. It therefore contemplates a
full and complete. audit covering all receipts and disbursements of the
audited district.
7. The fees collected from the local funds of the soil con-
servation districts for the making of audits should be placed into the
State Treasury. Such funds will not be available to pay the costs or
expenses of the State Auditor unless appropriated by the Legislature
for that purpose. H.B. No. 97 contains no such appropriation.
a. H.B. No. 97 provides: “The expense of the audit shall
be paid by each Soil Conservation District involved out of local funds.”
(Emphasis added) The expense of the audit required by H.B. No, 97
can only be paid out of the district’s “local funds” as ,distinguished
from the moneys granted by the State in H.B. No. 97. We are led to
this conclusion by virtue of the clause “out of local funds.” Had the
Legislature intended that these audit expenses be paid out of any funds
available to the district, it would not have added the clause “out of local
funds” to the sentence in question. We can conceive of no other reason
why the Legislature added said clause. It is an elementary rule of stat-
utory construction that each word, clause and sentence should be given
a meaning, if possible.
9. It is dur.opinion that the provision “. . . provided, how-
ever, that the charge in any particular project shall never be less than
the actual cost to the particular district for labor, maintenance. de-
preciation and replacement of equipment‘” which appears in paragraph
D of Section 4 of H.B. No, 97 applies only to those projects authorized
in said paragraph. The items mentioned, “labor, maintenance, depre-
ciation, and replacement of equipment” are not applicable to the other
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 21 (V-999)
provisions of ~H.B. No. 97 or to the provisions of H.B.‘No. 444. How-
ever, as to the provisions of H.B. No. 97, and the ex$enditures’au-
thorised.by H.B. Non. 444, we call your attention to. the.provision of
Section 52 of Article III of ~the Texas Constitution, which,reads:
“The Legislature shall have no power to author-
ize any county, city, town or other politicalcorporation
or subdivision of the.State to lend its credit or to grant
public money or. thing ,of vatue (value) in aid of, ok to any
individual, association or corporation whatsoever, . . .’.?
The Supreme Court in Harris Countv Flood Control Dis-
trict v, Mann, 135 Tex. 239, 140,S.W.2d 1098 (1940). held that this con-
stitutional provision prohibits the use of county funds to pay the bonds
of a flood control district. The Supreme Court said:
, “The Act of 1937 here, involved contains the following ’
provision: ‘Should the necessity arise, the Commissioners’
Court may supplement from its general funds any State
taxes hereafter donated and granted; but no tax shall ever
‘:be levied or any debt be created ,against the County for’ :
such~ purpose without a vote of the people.‘, .’; . .”
,,The Act of 1939 contains the following provision:
‘Should the necessity arise, the Commissione.rs’* Court
may .supplement the State taxes herein donated and granted
from its general funds.‘~. , . .-
The State taxes donated and referred’to in boththe- and the 1939
Acts were to the~Harris County Flood Control District,’
The Supreme Court, after quoting from the 1937 and 1939
Acts, then stated!
‘By his fifth proposition the Attorney General con-
tends that both of the above-quoted provisions are void,
because in contravention of Section 52 of Article III and
Section 59 of Article XVI of our State Constitution.
‘So far as pertinent here, Section 52 of Article III of
our State Constitution prohibits the Legislature from au:
thorieing any county to lend its credit, or to grant public
money or thing of value, in aid of any corporation whatso-
ever. We have already held that this District is a govern-
mental agency and a body politic and corporate, separate
and independent from Harris County. It follows that, under
the plain terms of Section 52 of Article III, supra,.no part
of the funds of Harris County can be pledged or used to pay
the bonds of this District.,,
Hon. C. H. Cavness, page 22 (V-999)
A soil conservation district being a “political corporation:.
or subdivision of the State” within the meaning of these terms as used
in Section 52, Article III of the Constitution of Texas, it is prohibited
from either lending its credit or granting any of its funds in aid of, or
to any individual, association or corporation whatsoever.
It follows, therefore, that in all instances where either H.B.
No. 97 or H.B. No. 444 provides for the districts to furnish aid or as-
sistance to other political subdivisions or to individuals, that such
other political subdivisions or individuals must be charged and made
to pay not less than the actual cost of the material or labor furnished.
Soil conservation districts may cooperate with agencies of
either the State or the United States in carrying out conservation pro-
rams, but such districts cannot give or loan such other agencies
rState and Federal) money received under H.B. No. 97. See Harris
County Flood Control District v. Mann, supra.
10. The provision at the end of Section 4B of H.B. No. 97,
which reads: u . . , provided, however, that the owner or occupier of
such land shall be required to furnish all plants, seeds, grasses, le-
gumes, trees and crops which may be planted upon such area or areas
at no expense to the District” does not, iniour opinion, prevent soil
conservation districts from purchasing seed and reselling them to oth-
ers for cash, at a price not less than the seed cost the district, when
such seed are to be used for the purposes of soil conservation under
the direction and authority of the district.
11. We have carefully considered all the provisions of Title
47, V.C.S., which provide for State,. county, city and special depositories.
None of these provisions are deemed applicable to or apply to soil con-
servation districts. Neither does H.B. No. 97, or H.B. No. 444 make
any provision for the districts to secure pledges of securities from de-
pository banks. We are therefore of the opinion that soil conservation
districts are not included in the political subdivisions of the State which
are required to secure from depository banks a pledge of securities
against the money deposited. However, there is nothing in our statutes
#at would prohibit the districts in question from requiring their depos-
itory banks to make the pledges in question.
SUMMARY
Soil Conservation Districts created under Article
165a-4, V.C.S., a statute enacted pursuant to the man-
datory provisions of Section 59a, Article XVI of the Con-
stitution of Texas to carry out the purposes of such
constitutional provision, are political subdivisions of
the State, bodies politic and corporate, performing gov-
ernmental functions. Willacv Countv Water Control and
Improvement District No. 1 v. Abendroth, 142 Tex. 320,
Hon. C. H. Cavness. page 23 (V-999)
177 S.W.Zd 936 (1944). Such districts are competent
agencies of the State through which the State may
perform a part of its governmental functions. Bravos
River Conservation and Reclamation District v. Mc-
Craw. 126 Tex. 506, 91 S.W.2d 665 (1936); Harris
County Flood Control District v. MS 135 Tex. 239,
140 S.W.Zd 1098 (1940).
The Legislature is not prohibited by Section 51,
Article XVI of the Constitution of Texas, or any other
provision of the Constitution, fro-n making grants of
public money to such districts for a period of two years,
when such grants are to be used by them in performing
a part of the duties or governmental functions of the
State of Texas. Bexhr Countv v. Linden, 110 .Tex. 339,
220 S.W.2d 761(1920); Citv of Aransas Pass v. Keeling,
112 Tex. 339, 247 S.W. 818 (1923); Jefferson County v.
Board of County and District Road Indebtedness, 143
Tex. 99, 182 S.W.2d 908 (1944).
There is no constitutional objection to the provisions
of Sections 2 and 6 of H.B. 97, supra, providing far the
issuance of warrants by the Comptroller to Soil Con-
servation Districts; the payment of such warrants by
the State Treasurer; and the depositing of the proceeds
derived therefrom by each Soil Conservation District
.in a State or National Bank, subject to withdrawal by
the particular district in the manner provided in Section
6.
The answers to eight additional questions are sum-
marined in the body of the opinion.
Yours very truly,
PRICE DANIEL
Attorney General
APPROVED:
C. K. Richards &.Z&Cdd/h;yclog
Appellate Division
Bruce W. Bryant
Charles D. Mathews
Executive Assistant
Price Daniel W. V. Geppert
Attorney General Assistants
BWB:WVG:v