Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1949 )


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  •                                    AURTIN 11.I'Exas
    PRICE   DANIEL
    ATTORNEY GENERAL
    September   20,    1949
    xou. UB. r. PO01                           OpllIloax80.v-909.
    COuleJ Attoraey
    Ylnkler CQuntiJ                            Re: The constitutionality
    Kermit,  Texas                                 of 5.B. 463, 5lst Leg-
    islature, relative to
    purchaaseof an airport
    la counti*s harlu$ a
    6141 to 6150 poptia-
    Dear     Sir:                                 tion.
    Referanise   i*   tie   to your     recent   request   which
    r8ads In part au follew~:
    "The undersignedrerpnctfullyre uests
    ain oplnloafrom  our office es to whe her
    Senate Bill Ro. 7163(Art. 1581d, R.C ! ) as
    parsod by the 51st Leglslaturet, Is v&i and
    unconstltutloarlas a local or special law
    regulating the affabs of oomtlem, con-
    trary to the provisionsOS Article 3, Sea-
    tlon 56 of our state oonatltution.H
    Section 1 of Senate Bill Ro. 463, Acts of the
    fart     Legislature,Regular Rasslon, 1949, is as .rdmfs:
    "5ection 1. All counties la this state
    having a populat1enof not less thaq slx
    thousand one hundred fortyous (6,141) and
    not wro than sk~thousand one hundred iii-
    ty (6,150) lohabltgts aacordlug to the lalrt
    precedlngFederal Census, and having an as-
    sessed valuatioa of clotloss than Twenty-
    one Willloa ($21,000,000.00)Dollars accord-
    lug to the last approved tax rolls, are here-
    b7 authorlsed to acquire by purchase or
    otherwise an airport not to exceed six hun-
    dred forty (640) acrea in area to be locat-
    ed not wre then five (5) riles from the
    heaviest populated are&In the county.”
    The populationof Uimklor County is 6,141 accdkdiig to
    the last precedl Federal Census and Winkler Couaty's
    tax valuation Is "041,284,474according to the 1948 tax
    Bon. Wm. B. Pool, page 2   (V-909)
    rolls. According to the la,atpreceding Federal Ceusus
    Winkler County 1s the only county in this State falling
    within the above classification.
    Section 56 of Article III of the Comtitutioa
    of Texas provides In part as follows:
    "The Legislatureshall not, except as
    otherwise provided In this Constitution,
    pass any local or special laws, . D . re-
    gulating the affairs of counties, cities,
    towns, wards or school districts; 0 . S
    creating offices or prescribingthe powers
    and duties of officers, in counties, cities,
    towns, election or school districts; . o .'
    We quote the followlug from our Opinion Ho,
    O-2221, which ,oplalonwas upheld by 8 Texas Court of
    Civil A peals in the case of Oakley v. Kent, 181 S.W.26
    919   (19&4)   :
    "A law which applies ouly to a part of
    a uatural class of persons or things must
    predicate Its Inclusion of the part and ex-
    clusion of the balance upon characteristics
    peculiar to the part, which, consideringthe
    objects and purposes of the law, afford rea-
    sonable ground for restrictingthe appllca-
    tlon of the law'to the part S Classlflcatfon
    muat be reasoueble and uatural, not arbitrary
    and capricious. Arbitrary desiguationis not
    classlflcatlou. The vice of local or special
    laws Is that they rest on arbitrary des~lgna-
    tlon; that they do not embrace and affect all
    of the class to which they are uaturallg re-
    lated."
    Ih County of Bexar v. Tyuan,l28 Tex. 223, 97
    S.W.26 467 (l-6) the Suprenm Courtof Texas announced
    the following pr&lple which controls the armtterhere-
    in:
    'NotwithstaudlngIt Is true that the
    Legislaturemy classify counties upon 8
    basis of population for the purpose of flx-
    lng compensationof couutg aud precinct of-
    ficers, yet lu doing so the classlflcatloa
    must be based upou a real dlstluction,aud
    muat not be arbitrary or a device to give
    HQP. wk. r. Pool, page 3       (v-909)
    what    In substaoce a local or special law
    is
    the form of a general law."
    We quote the followlug from 0akl.e~v. 
    Kent. supra
      :
    "Point 2 challenges said ruling of the
    trial oourt on the eploundthat the bill Is
    wholLy unconstltutloualIn that Sec. 3 there-
    of, &aVlag reference to the employmentand
    paymsnt of a deputy arsessor-collectorof
    t-es, applies only to counties havlug a,
    populationof 140,000 to 220,000 Inhabitants,
    accordlag to the 1940 Federal census, ao that
    811 ether counties are exxeluded  and Jeffer-
    son County only ooms within such provision,
    amd so the provision exaludss counties of
    leaser or greater population from employment
    and paying a deputy assessor-collectorof
    taxes, and for such reasons Sec. 3 1s arbi-
    trary and dlscrlmlnatoryand Is but a local
    or sp@clal law paesed under the guise of a
    general statute   aad violates Art. 3, Sec.
    56 of tlao fjt*te Constitutha,  vtirnon’aAnn.
    St., forbidding the Legislatureto pass any
    law regulating the affairs of any such COUP-
    ty, craatlng offices oilpr*sc*$@,@gtk+ pew-
    er or duties of oiflcem In eWtitlb8.
    "Point 3 challenges the court's action
    in giving the peremptory Instructionand re-
    fusing to enjoin the county treasurer and
    county auditor of Jefferson County from is-
    suing, registeringand paying the salary of
    the purchaslugagent for said couaty accord-
    1116to the ~ovlslons of 3s~. 4 (a) of said
    blll, because the bill Is unconstitutional
    In that &K.. 4 (a), having reference to the
    creation and payment of a county purchasing
    a&sat, &p&lea to the 1940 Federal census so
    tbst  s&1 &her oouatles  are exxalnded and
    Jsffarsoa:~Gounty only aoma withha such pro-
    via@ns and so counties   of lesser or greater
    populatiousare not permitted to exercise
    the power of appointinga purchasinga eat.
    That by mason of such situation 3ec. t (a)
    Is arbitrary and discrlalnatoryand but a
    looal or s#ecial law pasred under the guise
    ef the general statute  and violative of AI%.
    Bon. urn.E. Pool, page 4   (V-909)
    III, Sec. 56, forbiddingthe Legislature
    passing any such law regulatingthe affairs
    of,any such county, creating offices or pre-
    scrlblng the powers or duties of the offl-
    cers la counties . . .
    "f&cause populationas a basis for
    classlfleatlonhas been sustalued by the
    courts In respect to legislationon certain
    subjects, It has been assumed, erroneously,
    that populationbrackets will serve la all
    Instances to avoid the condemnationof the
    Constitution. This mistaken assumption pro-
    ceeds from a failure to note that population
    has been sustainedas a basis for classlfl-
    cation only in those Instanceswhere It bore
    a reasonable relation to the objects and pur-
    poses of the law and was founded upon raMon-
    al difference In the necessitiesor conditions
    of the groups subjected to different laws.~
    Where it has been determined that, conslder-
    lag the objects and purposes of the law, dlf-
    ferences in populationafford no retlonal ba-
    sis for dlscrlmlnatingbetween groups of the
    same natural class, classlflcatlonon the ba-
    sis of populationhas been termed arbitrary
    selection,and the law has been held to be
    special and local."
    We quote the following from Miller v. El Pas0
    County, 
    136 Tex. 370
    , 150 S,W,2d 1000 m41) :
    “The peculiar llmltatlonsemployed by
    the Legislature In this instance to segre-
    gate the class to be affected by the legis-
    lation not only bears no substantialrela-
    tion to the objects sought to be accompllsh-
    ed by the Act, but the purported clgas at-
    temped to be so segregated Is, In fact, not
    a class distinct in any substantialmanner
    from others In this State. There Is noth-
    ing peculiar about a county having a popu-
    lation of less than 125,000 nor more than
    175,000 Inhabitantsand containinga city
    with a populationof not less thaa 90,000
    InQabltaatsthat llarksIt a suitable aad
    peculiar field for the expendlng of publie
    funds for advertisingand prowtlng the
    growth and development of the county aud
    Ban. Wm. E. Pool, page 5   (V-909)
    its county seat, as dlstlngulshedfror
    other counties havfag substantiallythe'
    same populationor cltlos of similar size.
    The.slight variatloa between the popula-
    tion of El Paaso County and Its principal
    city and other counties and cities in the
    State does not distinguish It In any man-
    ner that Is germane to the purpose of this
    particular legislation. In other words,
    whatever difference there Is In population
    does not appear to be material to the ob-
    jects sou&t   to be accomplished. After
    havlngcarefully considered the smtter,
    we are convinced that the attempted clas-
    slflcatioP``ls uareasenableand bears no
    rolatiea to the eb j.ectssought to be ac-
    complished by the Act, and that as a con-
    sequencethe Act Is void."
    Since Senate Bill 463 of the 51ti &eglslature
    19$9 applies only to Wlnkler County, It Is our opinion,
    la view of the foregoingauthorities that the classlfl-
    eation contained In said bill Is not based on a real
    Qlstlnctlon,but is an arbitrary classifl~atlonand Is
    ¶imsubstance a local or special law. Therefore, It is
    &&'oplnion that Senate I3111463 Is unconstltutloaal~.
    Senate Bill 463, Acts of the 51st &eg-
    lslature, 1949, applicable only to coun-
    ties with a populationbetween 6141 and
    6150 according to the last census, and af-
    feet1 08ly Winkler County, violates Ssc-
    tion.5
    2   Article III of the Texas Constl-
    tutlon &d Is unconstitutionalas a local
    and special law.
    Yovs    vary truly,
    ATTORRBY    OBRBRAL OF TEXAS
    BY
    BA:bhzmw                                 Aeiistait
    

Document Info

Docket Number: V-909

Judges: Price Daniel

Filed Date: 7/2/1949

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017