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Honorable R. Canon CoiintgAuditor Gragson County Sherman, Texas Dear Sir: Opinion No.~O-7519 Re: Applicability of Article 373, Penal Code, to consulting engineer employed by Commissioners' Court under authority of Section 15, Chapter 52, Special Laws of Texas, 36th Legislature. Your letter of November 20, 1946, to this department states in part as follows: "At present Grayson County is employing a County Engineer at a salary of $2,970.00 per annum. This same employee operates a~roaclconstruction organization, which organization has been doing road construct,ionfor the County. As Engineer of the County, this employee recommends types of sur- facing, aiPects and approves the purchase of sup- plies and materials for such projects, and gives final approval of the completed ConstructIon; and as an owner of the construction concern contract- ing the job, directs the activities of the con- struction. "The undersigned questions the legality of such joint ectivities and requests your opinion on the following questions: "Question #l. "IS the County Engineer considered '8 county officer' as referred to in Article 373 of the Penal Code of the State of Texas. "Question #2. "Can the County Auditor approve payment of monies for road construction to an unincorporated fir1II,when one of the owners of the firm is receiving a salary Honorable R. Canon - page 2 o-7519 as County Engineer of the obligated County, and is concurrently directing the activities of the firm." In reply to our request for additional facts, your letter of December 9, 1946, states: "1 . From the Minutes of the Commissioners' Court of this County it appears that the County Engineer is employed under the authority of H.B. 387. "2. He is not holding the Office of 'Superln- tendent of Roads and BrIdgesI. “3 . He is not required to take an oath of of- fice nor to post a bona. "The County Judge states that he, the County En- gineer, Is in reality holding the position of Consult- ing Engineer." House Bill 387 Is found on page 160 of the Special Laws of Texas, 36th Legislature, 1919, and 1s entitled "Creating a More Efficient Road System for Grayson County." Section 15 of this Act, referring to the Commissioners1 Court, provldes: "Said Court may employ a consultlng engineer when in its judgment it may be necessary at such salary and for such length of time as it may deem it proper." Article 373, Penal Code of Texas provldes: "If any officer of any county, of any city or town, shall become in any manner pecuniarily inter- ested In any contracts made by such county, city or town, through Its agents, or otherwise, for the construction or repair of any bridge, road, street, alley or house, or any other work undertaken by such county, city or town, or shall become interested in any bid or proposal for such work or in the pur- chase or sale of anything made for or on account of such county, city or town, or who shall contract for or receive any money or property, or the repre- sentative of either, or any emolument or advantage whatsoever in consideration of such bid, proposal, contract, purchase or sale, he shall be flned not less than Fifty ($50.00) nor more than Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars." There is a material difference between a public office TlnnorableR. Canon - page 3 o-7519 and a pl;F,lie employment. The relationship of the office hold- er and the government under which he functions is not that of an employer and employee. Further, their rights are not deter- mined by the ordinary rules of contracts. In the case of Robertson vs. Ellis County,
84 S.W. 1097, the Court used the following quotation attributed to Chief Justice Marshall: "Although an office is an employment, it does not follow that every employment is an office." The distinctions applied are that in the creation and conferring of an office, there is a delegation of some of the sovereign functions of the government be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; an office is created by law, while an employment may be created by contract; officers are usually required to take an oath; serve for a definite term; and the duties are generally continuing and permanent rather than temporary and transitory. Garrett vs. Commissioners' Court of Limestone,
230 S.W. 1010, reversed onother grounds 236 ,S.W. 970, rehearing denied
238 S.W. 894; Lightfoot vs. Lane,
140 S.W. 89. PublLc office is generally considered to be one which is elected by the popular vote of the citizens, or appointed as provided by statute, and incident to such appointment is the right to retain su~choffice for a specified term except as provi~dedfor in the statutes for removing public officials generally. IIere the statute uses the term "employ a consulting engineer", therefore, inferring that said consulting engineer is an employee or agent of the county and not a public officer as such. Further, under the provision that a public office should be permanent and continuing, the sta+ute provides "when in its judgment it may be necessary", thereby indicating that an office 1s not created, but merely an employment by the Com- missioners' Court whenever it deems It necessary and for what- ever length of time said Commissioners' Court may deem proper. It is noted that nowhere In the said Act Is such offlcer men- t ioned, and in particular no specific duties are prescribed 1~:connection with such employment. Therefore, it is our opinion that the said engineer is not a county officer within the meaning of Az2ticle373, Penal Code of Texas. We are not passing on the validltg of such activities nor legality of such contracts. However, as an agent of the _-. . Honorable R. Canon - page 4 o-7519 county, your engineer would .be governed by the general rules of agency. For a discussion of these rules see 2 Texas Jur- isprudence 592, Sections 181 et seq. and 2'American Jurispru- dence 203, Sections 251 et seq. As to the application of these rules to your partlcu- lar fact situation, we suggest that you consult your County Attorney. Yours very truly ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEEAS By s/$Ii.lllam B. Henley, Jr. . William B. Henley, Jr. Assistant wmi :a jm:wc APPROVFD DEC 17, 1946 s/Grover Sellers ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Approved Opinion Committee By s/%iB Chairman
Document Info
Docket Number: O-7519
Judges: Grover Sellers
Filed Date: 7/2/1946
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2017